

The Central Problems of
Bhartrhari's
Philosophy

Devendra Nath Tiwari



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NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION OF SANSKRIT ALPHABETS

Vowels

अ A (a)	आ Ā (ā)	इ I (i)	ई Ī (ī)	उ U (u)	ऊ Ū (ū)
ए E (e)	ऐ AI (ai)	ओ O (o)	औ AU (au)	अं Ṃ (ṁ)	अः Ḥ (ḥ)
ऋ R (r)	ॠ Ṛ (ṛ)				

Consonants

क K (k)	ख KH (kh)	ग G (g)	घ GH (gh)	ङ Ṇ (ṇ)	च C (c)
छ CH (ch)	ज J (j)	झ JH (jh)	ञ Ñ (ñ)	ट Ṭ (ṭ)	ठ ṬH (ṭh)
ड D (d)	ढ DH (dh)	ण Ṇ (ṇ)	त T (t)	थ TH (th)	द D (d)
ध DH (dh)	न N (n)	प P (p)	फ PH (ph)	ब B (b)	भ BH (bh)
म M (m)	य Y (y)	र R (r)	ल L (l)	व V (v)	श Ś (ś)
ष Ṣ (ṣ)	स S (s)	ह H (h)	क्ष KṢ (kṣ)	त्र TR (tr)	ज्ञ JÑ (jñ)

ABBREVIATIONS

Brh. Up.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
HR.	Helārāja's Prakāśa Commentary on Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari
M.B.	Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali
M.B. Dīpikā	Mahābhāṣya dīpikā of Bhartṛhari
N.M.	Nyāya Mañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa
Paddhati	Vṛṣbha Commentary of first part of Vākyapadīya
Pāṇini	Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini
Pradīpa	Mahābhāṣyapradīpatīkā of Kaiyaṭa
Puṇyarāja	Puṇyarāja's Commentary on the second part (Vākyakāṇḍa) of Vākyapadīya,
Sūtra	Sūtras of Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini
Vārtika	Vārtika of Kātyāyana on Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini
VP.	Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari
VP.I	First part (Brahman Kāṇḍa) of Vākyapadīya, edited with Harivṛtti and Amākartrī tīkā from Sampurnananda Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, Varanasi
VP.II	Second part (Vākya Kāṇḍa) of Vākyapadīya, edited with Puṇyarāja's and Ambākartrītikā from Sampurnananda Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, Varanasi

VP.III

Third part (Prakīrṇa Kāṇḍa) of
Vākyapadīya, edited with Helārajā's
Prakāśa Commentary and
Ambākartrīṭikā of Raghunath Sharma
from Sampurnananda Sanskrit
Visvavidyalaya, Varanasi.

Vṛtti on VP.

Harivṛtti of Bhartṛhari on first part of
Vākyapadīya

Vṛṣabha

Commentary of Śrī Vṛṣabha on first part
of Vākyapadīya

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Devendra Nath Tiwari

PREFACE

Vākyapadīya, the magnum opus of Bhartṛhari, written more than fifteen hundred years ago, contains reflections on the contents of language and grammar in a way that raises the *Pāṇinian* system of grammar to the ranks of a philosophy of language. It is difficult to understand the verses (*kārikas*) of the *Vākyapadīya*, which have deep grammatical and philosophical concerns. The various commentaries on it are of help for those well-versed in the tradition of Sanskrit grammar and philosophy. This is the reason why very few scholars have dared to work on the philosophy of *Vākyapadīya*.

Wilhelm Rau (1977-88) in the first part of 'The editions of *Vākyapadīya*' has given a comprehensive list of the various editions of the text. In the second part is given a list of editions of *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, and in the third part a list of different studies, translations and book reviews on *Vākyapadīya*. Yves Ramseier of Lausanne (Switzerland) followed the list given by Rau and integrated more into it in 1994. His 'Bibliography on Bhartṛhari', comprising editions of *Vākyapadīya*, editions of *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, studies, translations and reviews of the books on *Vākyapadīya*, is published in the book *Bhartṛhari: Philosopher and Grammarian*, which is a collection of scholarly papers presented at the first international seminar on Bhartṛhari held at Pune in 1992, and is edited by Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst, 1994. As my primary concern in this book is the philosophical exposition of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, I spent time neither in discussing the differences in these editions nor updating them further. The present study is based on Bhāgīratha Prasād Tripāṭhī's edition, published from *Varanaseya Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya*, with ancient commentaries followed by a recent commentary *Ambākarī* of Raghunāth Sharma. I have consulted K.A.S. Iyer's and K.R. Pillai's 1971 comments and translations. I have quoted the text only from Bhāgīratha Prasād Tripāṭhī's edition. The excellencies of the commentaries by Bhartṛhari on the first part, Puṇyarāja on the second part, Helārāja on the third and Bhartṛhari's *dīpikā* on *Mahābhāṣya* have been well utilized for providing a clear exposition of the issues at hand.

Most of the scholarly writing, research and reference books on Bhartṛhari have underestimated the philosophical excellence of

Bhartṛhari as observed in the *Vṛtti* and that in the expositions of Helārāja. They have considered his work primarily as metaphysics of language and grammar, and have occupied themselves with all their novelty and differences involved in presenting his metaphysics in a consistent and coherent non-dualistic system and, thus, they are important in helping further philosophical investigation. However, Bhartṛhari's philosophical aim is not to build or to support a system of metaphysics, though it cannot be denied that he has referred to metaphysical assumptions at some places, specially in the first part of *Vākyapadīya*, as the basis of *sādhana* for those having a religious goal. The primacy of metaphysics, whether realistic or idealistic, is all-important for religious purposes. Philosophically, metaphysical things - empirical or transcendental - are not the objects revealed or expressed by language in the mind, and hence, they are beyond the objects known to us. The objects known to us are the beings or ideas expressed in the mind by language, to which our cognition is confined. However, the existence of such transcendental things have been accepted by him as the ontic substrata of the beings revealed by language in the mind. Bhartṛhari has not accepted them as the object proper of philosophical reflections. The present work is an attempt to show that *Vākyapadīya* is, intrinsically a philosophical work, the excellence of which stands challenge before the thinking world of today.

In this presentation, the term language/real/inner language has been used for *spṛṣṭa*, the meaning-revealing, ubiquitously given unit, which is awareness in nature, and the term language-token/garb has been used as the English equivalent for *dhvaniyān/lipiyān*, through which language is manifested.

Manifested by language-tokens/garbs, language reveals itself first and then the meaning is revealed non-differently by it in the mind. At the ordinary plane, language wrapped in tokens, which we read and write, is revealed when one intends to speak. It manifests through articulated utterances. Manifested so, it reveals its own form in the mind of the audience, by which meaning is revealed non-differently. The being of language and that of meaning, non-differently revealed by it, are the only objects of philosophy or intelligible beings. Bhartṛhari and his commentator Helārāja repeatedly remind that philosophical thinking is confined only to the beings that are of awareness in character, and that the being of language and of its meaning are only such beings

as are intelligible to the mind. Knowledge ceases to be so if isolated from language.

The present work is a cognitive approach that views Bhartṛhari's philosophy in accordance with his goal of analyzing and interpreting cognition as revealed by language in usual communication. It views even the metaphysical concepts, as they are revealed in the mind by language. Philosophy cannot excel, or there is no possibility of any philosophy, if it is taken to engage with transcendental, non-cognitive and incommunicable things beyond the reach of language. Philosophy is a cognitive activity par excellence in the sense that it is concerned with and is confined to the beings that are awareness in character, and the world of awareness, for a Bhartṛharian, comprises the being of language and that of the meaning revealed non-differently by it in the mind. The language expresses/reveals those beings independently of things in-themselves – empirical or transcendental – and of our allegiances to them. Such beings, as are revealed by language, are alone intelligible and, hence, philosophical beings.

Language (*śabda*) for Bhartṛhari is not confined to what we speak, read or write. It is the light, the unit of awareness, a conscious force, different in character and in function from other lights, viz. sun, lamp, etc. which serve as tools in perception. Unlike other lights, it is awareness and, hence, foundational in character. It functions as the expresser of both itself and its meaning. Lights, other than language, illuminate external things caught in their compass, while language reveals all light, non-light, consciousness, unconsciousness and self-awareness as well. As a lamp illuminates many things falling within its compass, but the thing desired or expected, specifically, is taken primarily as illuminated by it, language (*śabda*) is expressive of all meanings (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*), but the meaning popularly expected is primarily taken to be known by it and other meanings are known on its basis either by implication or by closeness to the primary meaning. The present work observes that any oversight of the importance of expressive or primary meaning may cause confusion in understanding philosophical excellence of *Vākyapadīya*, because it is the primary meaning on the basis of which secondary and tertiary meanings of the word/language are known by imposition and nearness to it.

There is a difference between the objects revealed by language and things illuminated by lamps, etc. A lamp illuminates external things/Beings to be known by the knower as the object of perception, while the objects/beings revealed by language (*śabda*) are self-restrained beings. I have used the term 'self-restrained being' in the sense of intelligible being that is controlled by its own law that is the law of awareness. Throughout the presentation, I have used the term 'being' (with small 'b') for intelligible beings, the beings figured/revealed in the mind by language and the term Being (with capital 'B') for the thing-in-itself, which is transcendental to or beyond the grasp of language. Only that which is revealed in the mind by language is intelligible, and hence, is a philosophical being. What figures in the mind by language is a being, i.e. *upacāra-sattā*, which includes the inner being (*idea*) of language as the expresser (*vācaka*) and the inner being of meaning as the expressed (*vācya*). The two – language and meaning – are non-different; the latter is revealed non-differently by the former. Such a revelation by language is possible on account of its natural-fitness. This natural-fitness of language (*yogyatā-sambandha*), for revealing meaning non-differently, is taken by grammarians, as the given relation between language and meaning. This relation is given with all meanings (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*), but is confined by convention to a fixed meaning. Here, I emphasize a very significant concept of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, according to which meaning is always the meaning of language and that meaning known by factors, context, etc., are also explained as the meaning of language itself for the reason that context in our philosophy is neither a meaning of a word nor expressive of a meaning. It is *ultra vires*.

The inner-language, as per the expectancy for communicating, is manifested through tokens, i.e. verbal utterances/noises or written marks, gestures, signs, etc. which are perceived entities and are garbs of the real language, i.e. of ideas or thought-objects revealed in the mind after the manifestation by those tokens. Changes in the tokens (taken conventionally as standing for the real-language) or dissatisfaction regarding their proper use, or emulation of them, does not cause any difference in the real-language that is inner being. The changes in token caused by dissatisfaction regarding the exact expression of the inner-language through them, result in inappropriateness of the tokens in expressing the exact expression, and, as such, cannot be taken as the inadequacy of the real-language, which

is lying as the foundational idea behind these changes caused by dissatisfaction, emulation, etc. of the use of tokens. If they fail to express the exactness of the expression, which is inner, indivisible, and ubiquitously given as the meaning revealing unit for the manifestation of which they are used, the question of confusing the meaning, dissatisfaction, emulation arises.

Taking the view of language as an inner being, the theory of non-difference of language and thought, infusion of language and cognition of the objects in consideration, Bhartṛhari propounds his philosophy of *Śabdādvaita*. Unlike *Śabdādvaita*, as a metaphysical theory, based on *Śabda-Brahman* as the ultimate ontic Reality, his sentence/cognitive-holism (*Śabdādvaita*) is purely a philosophical theory, for which philosophical reflections and investigations are not only based, but confined to intelligible beings. The beings figured in the mind by language, that is, ideas, are intelligible/philosophical beings. Any idea, when it becomes the object of cognition or of which we are reflective or conscious, is an intelligible/philosophical being (*upacārasattā*).

Vākyapadīya is observed and evaluated by some Indian and western scholars as a work on the principles of language (*Bhāṣātattva Śāstra*) based on the language-principle (*Śabda-Brahman*) as the non-dual ultimate Reality. So far volumes and volumes have been written by scholarly minds on Bhartṛhari's *Śabdādvaita* as a theory of metaphysics, or as a theory of language based on non-dualistic metaphysics, but it, as a work on proper philosophy that is confined to the reflections on the problems as they are cognized by mind, is ignored by most of its scholars. The present monograph is, perhaps, the first attempt that presents Bhartṛhari's reflections on the problems of *Śabdādvaita* on the basis of analysis of cognition, as it is expressed by language in the mind. It considers that the basic problem of *Vākyapadīya* is neither metaphysical nor epistemological in popular use of the term, but is cognitive as it explains the concepts that is the units of awareness on the basis of cognition as presented by language. The present monograph views the fact that his *Śabdādvaita* can be presented interestingly as a philosophy of language and analysis and as a philosophy close to life and thought, only if it is understood as a reflection on cognition as it is figured in the mind by language. The idea that 'Bhartṛhari has a cognitive understanding on the problems of

language, being and cognition' is evident from the fact that he, while reflecting on the issues, is always seen well aware of the limits of philosophical reflections to the beings revealed by language.

Here, in this work, we observe Bhartṛhari's philosophy of 'Śabdādvaita' as cognitive/sentence-holism based on the logic of non-difference of language (*sphoṭa*) and meaning (*pratibhā*). The present exposition takes *sphoṭa* and *pratibhā* as the beings of awareness by nature or cognitive-beings. Since they are beings revealed in character, they cannot be confused with Being. His Śabdādvaita is a philosophy based on the non-difference of *sphoṭa* and *pratibhā* and of language and cognition as 'cognition infused with language'. If, otherwise, or if we assume the two as metaphysical entities, the problem of cognition and the relation between language (linguistic unit) and *sphoṭa* (if a metaphysical unit) or language (the linguistic unit) and *pratibhā* (if an ontic Being), will be difficult to explain. If a link between the two is supposed for that purpose, the problem of the nature of the link (whether it is linguistic or a non-linguistic unit) may arise. Moreover, no cognitive or epistemological justification for accepting that link as either of the characters can be given properly. It will also be difficult to find the cognitive base of it. His Śabdādvaita is a cognitive-holism, as it elucidates *sphoṭa* as a self-revealed being and *pratibhā* as a being non-differently revealed by language in the mind. It is sentence-holism as it takes that language infuses cognition and assumes sentence as an indivisible expresser and expressing principle or as a unit which is awareness in character. Language is awareness and there is no possibility of any real division of awareness. Not only that, cognition is indivisible by nature and the analytic division of it into different parts or components is an artificial remedy, making the indivisible understandable to those who can understand it only through piecemeal devices. Through the device, cognition itself is not actually divided but is understood in the whole-part scheme.

I have approached sentence-holism with a consideration of it as cognitive holism for which language infuses cognition. Knowledge ceases to be so, if it is isolated from language. The language and the meaning are cognitive beings; they are units of awareness in nature. It is the beings to which our philosophical reflections and investigation are confined. By the term beings, we mean the ideas that figure in the mind by language and, thus, they are intelligible beings which, by contrast to Being that is external object as primary Being, are called

Preface

secondary beings. As there is no possibility of extension and division in an unit awareness by nature, it considers that the divisions of the indivisible sentence into different units words/roots/stems/suffixes, etc. are artificial remedies useful for practical or grammatical purposes. The scheme of analysis (*apoddhāra*) is useful for the explanation of the indivisible sentence, because no explanation of it is possible without its artificial divisions. No logic of part and whole is applicable to the sentence as awareness, an indivisible unit which is revealed by itself as a flash of awareness, i.e. *sphoṭa*. All grammatical and analytical methods and the units derived by those methods are significant and are considered real only for the clear understanding of the awareness as accomplished in communication. The indivisible sentence is a being that serves as the cognitive base of not only all the divisions of it but of the cognition revealed by them, and only in this sense it is called the cognitive unit.

The present observation of his holism clearly holds that the indivisible sentence is ubiquitously given as the foundational being (*sphoṭa*), which is the expresser that expresses meaning non-differently (*grāhaka-grāhya*). Meaning is not cognized independently of it and, hence, the relation between the two does not arise as an insolvable problem. As meaning is the thought-object revealed non-differently by language in the mind, there is no room for taking them as of separate entities of linguistic and of non-linguistic character and thus, in his holism, the meaning revealing language and the meaning revealed non-differently by it, are non-different beings. The relation, for Bhartṛhari, is the eternal-fitness of the expresser for expressing the expressed.

As cognition for Bhartṛhari is cognition revealed by and is shot through and through with language, and, as no meaning is possible if it is not revealed non-differently by language, knowledge is determinate-knowledge. This determination is not possible if knowledge is not taken as infused with language. Even indeterminate knowledge requires language in order to be known so. Knowledge ceases to be so if isolated from language. Isolated from language, the analysis of language will not be the analysis of knowledge and vice versa and, hence, is impossibility of analysis.

This does not mean that my observation of *Vākyapadīya* denies or overlooks Bhartṛhari's stand on things-in-themselves. It considers

that Bhartṛhari, as a philosopher of language, emphasizes to explain even very popular ontological concepts like *Brahman*, world, soul, sky, space, time, etc. as they are presented by languages in the mind. For his philosophy, cognition is revealed by the language in the mind, but mind-itself (as an ontic entity) is beyond the grasp of language. The mind does not grasp the mind-itself, but it as presented by the language 'mind'. The mind-itself is known by implication or by inference as the substratum of the cognition figured in the mind by the language 'mind'. Physical and psychological entities are known as the ontological substrata of the inner-beings (meaning revealed-non-differently in the mind by language), but in all the cases, he emphasizes reflection on the concept as they are revealed when presented in the mind by language. It is the cognition of the object revealed by language in the mind that serves as the cognitive base for other meanings by a word and for the implication or inference of the entities (metaphysical, physical or psychological) as the ontic (*tāttvika*) substrata of the cognition as well.

The cognition revealed by language is veridical cognition, as communication is accomplished by it. If veridical cognition revealed by language in the mind is denied as the cognitive base, any implication, inference will be unfounded. Metaphysical entities may be accepted as known by implication as ontic base of the cognition revealed by language, but cognitively their ontic existence without the cognition cannot even be inferred or implicated. On the contrary, if the cognition revealed by language is taken as the cognitive-base of inference, etc. of those entities, the problem of the link between the two (i.e.. between the cognition revealed and the cognition consequently inferred), the demand of any further epistemic justification for convincing the philosophical need for accepting or denying it will not stand significant. Even if further justification is demanded for convincing and believing the veridical cognition, the cognition revealed by language stands as the cognitive base of all those known consequentially by inference, etc. and, perhaps, this is the reason that Bhartṛhari and his commentators have not felt any need to discuss epistemological problems separately.

In order to impart to the book a pattern of organic unity, it is symmetrically arranged into nine chapters. The presentation contains investigations into the problem of different theories of language, meaning and the relation between the two from the point of view of

analysis of cognition as revealed by language in communication. It deals with almost all the major arguments of the *Naiyāyikas*, *Bauddhas* and the *Mīmāṃsakas* on the various issues of philosophical semantics and syntactics and answers them persuasively from the point of view of Bhartṛhari's philosophy. Attempt has been made to present a philosophical exposition of the concepts without leaving any important verse of *Vākyapadīya* untouched. That is why, it has become a useful monograph not only for scholars, but also for general readers interested in the central philosophy of *Vākyapadīya*. The author is well aware of his limitations. It is up to wise readers to correct him for an improved next edition.

Ambāmbeti yathā bālaḥ śikṣamāṇaḥ prabhāsate Avyaktam tadvidām tena vyakte bhavati niścayaḥ. (VP, 1/151)

Devendra Nath Tiwari

CHAPTER-I

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF VĀKYAPADĪYA

In the Indian culture, *śravaṇa* (the proper learning of the knowledge of the sacred text, i.e. the *śruti*) or authority, *manana* (reflecting on the knowledge acquired by *śravaṇa* for wisdom, i.e. *mati-jñāna*) and *nididhyāsana* (contemplation on the knowledge, revealed by wisdom), are observed by authority (*śruti*) as constituting the royal road to the realization of truth, which has been variously interpreted as truth (*satyam*), knowledge (*jñānam*) and bliss (*ānandam*). Acquisition of wisdom through clear and distinct knowledge, by reflecting on the objects acquired by *śravaṇa*, is accepted as the chief objective of philosophy on account of which it is characterized, distinctly, as a system of reflection for clear and systematic cognition of the various aspects of Beings and beings.¹ Such an accomplishment of cognition provides bliss. It is, perhaps, the bliss providing character of philosophical reflections that philosophy, in India and abroad, has been a very popular discipline of learning and investigation since the dawn of culture and civilization.

Bharṭṛhari's aim in his philosophy of *Vākyapadīya* is distinctly marked as the interpretation of cognition, as revealed in the mind by language, in usual communication (*vyavahāra*) for clarity and conception that provide bliss.² The central problem of Bharṭṛhari's philosophy is to analyze and clarify the problems on the basis of cognition as accomplished in usual communication by taking cognition as shot through and through by language, which is the foundational being of philosophical reflections. The other problems are related with the central problem. As cognition, revealed in the mind by language, is inner and indivisible (*akhaṇḍa*), and as the verbal utterance/noise through which the indivisible cognition is accomplished are discrete instants, how can the indivisible, inner cognition by discrete instants be explained? How the two - the synthetic and the analytic - be reconciled in the indivisibility of cognition? How is the cognition accomplished? What is the nature, validity and boundary of the cognition? These problems are related with the chief problem of interpreting the indivisible cognition accomplished by language and

to acquire clarity and a conception of the same. The problem of *Vākyapadīya* is specifically not logical, epistemological, metaphysical or grammatical, as Bhartṛhari is devoted to the explanation of cognition on the basis of how it figures in the mind by language in usual communication. Those that figure in the mind in communication, as Bhartṛhari and his commentators Helārāja and Puṇyarāja clarify, are the language itself and the meaning revealed non-differently by it and, thus, are the objects proper for philosophical reflection.³

Even as a metaphysician, Bhartṛhari's problem, is different from that of other metaphysicians who, by putting Reality in the centre of their speculation, take the relation between cognition and Reality to be the central problem. Bhartṛhari, even while discussing metaphysical issues like *śabda-brahman*, substance, causality, etc., is interested not in the ontic nature of things, i.e. things-in-themselves, but in explaining those words as they are used in communication, or as they reveal cognition in the mind. He accepts things-in-themselves or transcendental Beings as the ontological substratum (*tāttvika samānādhikaraṇa*) of the beings expressed by language in mind that is cognitive beings that is the units of awareness in nature. His concern with Beings is not primary, but only to the extent that they seem unavoidable in the analysis and interpretation of the beings, that is the beings of language and of meanings they reveal. Such an endeavour, as that made in the *Vākyapadīya* is rare in the history of philosophy.

As a grammarian Bhartṛhari confronts to the problem of interpreting the syntactical and semantic rules of communication by analyzing beings on the basis of cognition revealed by language and, thus, removing the confusion corrupting or obscuring communication. *Vākyapadīya* is exceptionally original and different from those systems that take epistemology as a system of justification of their metaphysical assumptions. Language in *Vākyapadīya* is not an indicator or a pointer to reality (in the ontological sense) but that which reveals cognition. It is expressive by nature. The reality in-itself is not revealed by language and what is revealed by language is not something external but meaning that is an idea or a cognised or cognizable being. The meaning is not different from the language that reveals it non-differently.⁴ Thus, the problem of interpreting communication on the basis of non-difference of thought and language is the basic problem of *Vākyapadīya*. One can find that the traditional epistemological problems have been

transferred in *Vākyapadīya* as an investigation into the problem concerning analysis and interpretation of cognition, as it is revealed in the mind by language.

As the name *Vākyapadīya* suggests, its field is confined to the elucidation on the problems of sentence (*vākya*) and word (*pada*) and the meaning revealed non-differently by them. It accepts *śabda* (language) as discriminating awareness, or as a unit of distinct and self-determinate cognition and discusses the concepts of *vākya* and *pada*, and their meaning, in a way that provides a clear exposition of communication on the basis of how it is revealed in the mind by language. It seems true to say that *Vākyapadīya* is chiefly a cognitive analytic inquiry into the nature of cognition and communication, for which what is real is *upacāra-sattā*, i.e. beings or ideas revealed non-differently in the mind by language. Philosophical reflections are confined to these intelligible beings (*upacāra-sattās*) on which our world of communication (*vyavahāra*) is based. The *upacāra-sattā* or being is what forms the subject matter of philosophy as a cognitive activity.⁵ Bhartṛhari does not reject the existence of Beings that is things-in-themselves, rather, he accepts them as ontological substratum (*samānādhikaraṇa*) of the cognition and of the objects of cognition revealed in the mind by language. Thus, different from other philosopher of East and West who speculate into the problem of Reality (ontological reality) on the basis of mystical experience, Bhartṛhari accepts the cognition as foundational and interprets the problems from the point of view of cognition as revealed in the mind by language. Cognition for him is foundational as incentive to do or not to do or otherwise is caused, and communication is accomplished without recourse to any ontological reality inferred as its substratum.⁶ The inferred reality is secondary, and what is directly revealed by words serves as the base of the inference of that also, and, therefore, the latter, for Bhartṛhari, is primary. As the reality outside is inferred on the basis of the cognition revealed by language, cognitively, it is dependent on cognition of the objects revealed by language, and hence, is secondary. On the basis of these observations, we can say that Bhartṛhari's philosophical concern is cognitive, i.e. he investigates beings from the point of view of cognition and not from the point of view of finding a Reality as its substratum. What is real is, philosophically, the expressed (*vācya*), and what is expressed is not an ontological reality, but ideas or beings revealed by language

independently of Beings which are presumed as *samānādhikaraṇa* (substratum) of the cognition and of the objects of cognition revealed in the mind by words. The concept, nature and functions of the *śabda*-principle as Being known by inference/presumption as an ontological substratum of cognition revealed by language, will be discussed in the second half of the chapter.

In spirit, Bhartṛhari's philosophy is that of sentence-holism. It accepts that cognition, in usual communication, is accomplished not through the process of the association of words and word-meanings, but directly by the indivisible unit, i.e. sentence (*vākya-sphoṭa*). The meaning revealed non-differently in the mind by sentence (*sphoṭa*) is also the indivisible flash of understanding (*pratibhā*). The concepts of *vākya-sphoṭa* and *pratibhā* will be discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 4. Presently, we want to show that *Vākyapadīya*, chiefly a treatise on the philosophy of language and grammar, believes that the indivisible is made understandable to beginners through the process of grammatical analysis of the indivisible into smaller units i.e. through the association of analysed words, word meanings and so on. Though the indivisible sentence and sentential-meaning are understood through the parts as association of them, it cannot be taken as the sum total of parts. Actually, there is no part in an indivisible unit and the process of understanding and explaining it through parts is significant only for grammatical purposes. This holistic approach towards the units of communication can be understood properly only when indivisibility of cognition is taken into account. As cognition is intertwined with language, as *sphoṭa* is the inner indivisible unit having a character of awareness, as the meaning revealed non-differently by language is also awareness, and as there is no possibility of parts in awareness, the indivisibility of cognition cannot be denied. Meaning, as an inner unit or flash, is conveyed not in the manner of either association of words or word meanings, but by the indivisible unit (*sphoṭa*). The analysis of this partless unit into parts or the understanding of the whole through parts is an artificial instrument for making it understandable to the ignorant and children.

There is no separate awareness of words (*pada*) in cognition of a sentence (*vākya*) and of letters (*varṇa*) in a word, because the unit as a whole accomplishes communication.⁷ According to Bhartṛhari's philosophy, if a complete meaning is revealed by a word or even by a

single letter, they are then sentences and not discrete words or letters. So far as the concept of the word (*pada*) is concerned, it is also an indivisible unit. The part of an indivisible is also indivisible and indivisibly conveys the indivisible word-meaning. In grammar and practice, words are also taken to be real units of language. A word, as a unit whole, is taken as a meaning-conveying unit, and not as an association of discrete letters. On the grammatical reality of words, Bhartṛhari reflects that something may once be imagined or fashioned for some purpose to be fulfilled and from the point of view of the purpose it fulfils it may be taken as real and not imaginary. Similarly, words are derived by a grammatical analysis of an indivisible, but the consequences reached on its basis, its formation, its separate meaning and the explanation of connected concepts on its basis, all become real. Communication, cognition and semantic and syntactic laws of language are explained in *Vākyapadīya* by taking the word and its meaning as real cognitive units.

Now, it may be observed that Bhartṛhari as a language philosopher confines reflection to beings (*upacāra-sattā*), by accepting meaning as the expressed (*vācya*) and language as the expresser (*vākya*). Bhartṛhari, as a philosopher, is not interested in establishing any system of philosophy or even in supporting one or the other of the established systems, but in interpreting cognition as revealed in communication. It is interesting to note that he explains cognition with the help of grammar and metaphysics, also with a view to showing that grammar, philosophy and metaphysics are but different approaches to interpreting the cognition revealed in the mind by language. They differ in viewing the nature of language and the nature and formation of concepts. However, as a philosopher of language, Bhartṛhari does not feel any need to accept things-in-themselves in order to explain concepts. He holds that the expresser (*sphoṭa*) is a given as inner-language, which when manifested by utterances reveals itself and its meaning non-differently. By taking language as a revealing force of awareness, he has befittingly explained the expressive nature of language on the one hand, and, on the other, by accepting the diversity of language-tokens used differently by different users of cultured societies, he has left open the possibility of new or different tokens. However, he recommends popularity of tokens as an inevitable necessity for the accomplishment of communication in day-to-day practice.

BHARTṚHARI ON PHILOSOPHY

According to the interpretation '*dṛṣṭiḥ darśanam*', philosophy is a cognitive activity par excellence. It is a self-conscious reflection on the objects of cognition and on cognition itself. As cognition is confined only to language and meaning non-differently revealed by it,⁸ and as cognition is always infused by language,⁹ philosophy is concerned with language primarily as a cognitive activity.

Ideas are the only objects revealed in the mind by language, and, thus, philosophical reflections are confined to these cognitive units only. As these objects of cognition are infused by language, philosophy may well be defined as the critique of cognition for clarity and wisdom. Helārāja has emphasized two significant facts about philosophy – one on the function of philosophy and the other on the subject matter of philosophical reflections. On the subject matter of philosophy (*vyākaraṇa darśana*) he has repeatedly quoted the following statement: '*sarva pārṣadam hīdam śāstram śabdārtho arthaḥ padārtha iti vā vyavastheyam*'.¹⁰ It is the *expresser* (*pārṣadam*) of all sorts of objects concerning different disciplines because of the reasons that the objects are revealed, cognized and communicated as are revealed by the language in the mind. As a system of expression of objects of awareness in nature, philosophy functions as their *pārṣad*. As all reflections are reflections in and through language, different approaches to objects imply it as their *pārṣadam*. Philosophical reflections present the objects to the extent of cognitive/conceptual clarity. The system of thought, which is identified as *sarvapārṣadam*, considers the objects as they figure in the mind by language. It is not the things but beings the language reveals on the basis of which knowledge becomes possible. Bhartṛhari accepts infusion of language and of thought which are the foundational beings of philosophical enterprises.¹¹ It is the language, which reveals thoughts and it is the thought of language and that of meaning revealed non-differently by it, to which our reflections are confined. Reflecting on this way only that the concepts, as they are revealed in usual communications, can be clarified analytically.

According to Bhartṛhari, philosophy is concerned not only with a specific discipline of cognition, but with all sorts of disciplines of cognition, and that is why it is called *sarvapārṣadam*. It does not present only a particular system of thought, but interprets objects of cognition

concerning different systems. As language is the expresser, and philosophy takes thought, language, their structure, meaning, relation and other concepts as the objects of reflection, it is called their *pārṣad*. All units of thoughts are expressed in language and, hence, the primacy of language in cognitive activities is the life force of all expressions, cognitions, reflections and communications. As it is basic to different interpretations of the objects revealed by language, and as this revelation is the cause of incentives to do or not to do, this is another sense in which philosophy is called *sarvapārṣadam*. Conclusively, all knowledge is revealed by language, and no knowledge claim isolated from language can be made. In such a system, philosophy is concerned with the objects of cognition revealed by language, and that is the reason it is called the *pārṣad* of all intelligible objects.

On the function of philosophy of language and grammar, Bhartṛhari's verses 1/14 and 1/146, as per Sarswati Prakasana 1976, Sampurnanand Sanskrita Vishwavidyalaya, and 1/147, as per Motilal Banarsidass 1971, with English translation by K. Raghvana Pillai, are uniquely significant as they emphasize the therapeutic function of it.

Impurities or diseases of the body are cured with the help of physical treatment (medical sciences), those of language/speech is effected through the philosophy of language and grammar and those of the mind through the science of spirituality (1/147). Verse 1/14 signifies philosophy of language and grammar as a gateway to freedom, a cure against the corruptions in the use of language/speech, a purifier of all disciplines, through which all disciplines shine.

Truth is revealed by language, so if language is diseased it cannot reveal the truth and may cause confusion and chaos. Language may be diseased in many ways. First, by using corrupted forms of words/language (*apabhraṇśas*). Second, by using a deviated mode. For example, word/language is expressive of the expressed (thought-objects), and it functions properly only as expresser. If it is used either as identified with the things internal or external, or as the indicator of things, serious confusions in understanding may arise, which may lead not only to darkness and suffering, but also a state from which we cannot understand the proper nature and function of language.

Against these impurities of language and of the use of language, philosophy of grammar and language is the only cure. As knowledge

is infused with language, impurity of language is ignorance, and the removal of the impurities is the revelation of pure or true knowledge, by attaining which one realizes bliss.

On the aim of philosophical thinking, Bhartṛhari has written a very distinctive *kārikā*: *Prajñā vivekam labhate bhinnairāgamadarśanaiḥ. Kiyadvā śakyamunnetum svatarkamanudhāvātā*.¹² The *kārikā* may be presented as follows. Reflections cannot achieve any excellence if one follows one's own superstitions (*svatarkam*). Reflections can achieve excellence only if they are free from passionate assumptions, allegiances, etc. It is such reflection that provides discriminative knowledge (*vivekam*) in which the mind (*prajñā*) plays its full freedom from passions and allegiances to one or the other school of thought (*bhinnaiḥ āgamadarśanaiḥ*). In such reflections, the mind acts on cognition as it is revealed in communication, without any objective or subjective determinations. It reflects differently for confirmation, verification, and falsification of the cognition revealed by language in usual communication. It also reflects on different reasonings and argumentations on the basis of cognition as accomplished by language, in order to gain clarity of conception of beings as they figure in the mind through language.¹³ Accomplishment of clarity and wisdom provides bliss (*ānanda*).

This discipline that assumes the verity of cognition revealed by language is distinct from the disciplines that believe in the external existence or corresponding factors as the verity of cognition, in so far as the former accepts language as the authority even in the confirmation and awareness of the existence of external things.¹⁴ The cognition of the 'existence of pot' is accomplished by the sentence 'It is pot'. If the cognition expressed by language is not veridical, veridical cognition by the sentence 'It is pot' will not be possible. Validity based on the existence of things is of no use in the revelation of cognition and accomplishment of communication that is accomplished by language itself (*kiṃasmākam vastugatena vicāreṇa*)¹⁵, because meaning or objects, for Bhartṛhari, is what figures in the mind by language (*arthastu asmākam yaḥ śabdenābhidhīyate*).¹⁶ Cognition is always veridical, because incentives to do or not to do are caused by it independently of any external existence – empirical or transcendental – and not posteriorly by tools like verification, confirmation, etc. For a language philosopher (*śābdika*), accepting meaning over and above the beings

revealed by language causes logical and epistemological difficulties in the explanation of cognition. Epistemological difficulties in the sense that external things are not revealed by *śabda* and meaning is always the meaning of a *śabda* revealed non-differently by it in the mind and thus it is not an external thing. The logical difficulty is that if meaning independent of *śabda* is accepted, it will not be an expressed (*vācya*) of a *śabda*, and cannot be the object of knowledge. Its expression will be impossible, because if language is the only expresser, then the meaning is not a unit independent of language, and it is contradictory with the nature of meaning itself to accept that it is independent from language. On the basis of these arguments, the *vaiyākaraṇa*'s assumption of meaning 'as what figures in the mind by language', seems cognitively justified and communicatively natural. The assumption of meaning as external is contradictory to the very nature of thinking or reflecting, for which the world of cognition, of ideas infused with language, is the being of reflections. The objects of philosophical reflections are thus differentiated from other non-objects, and *Vākyapadīya* determines the field of philosophical reflection as the world of thought objects or beings revealed by language in the mind. Language reveals meaning independently of the things outside (*kim na etena idam nityam idam anityam*)¹⁷. Philosophy is not the reflection on the eternity or non-eternity of the things, but on the meaning expressed by the language 'eternity' and 'non-eternity'. According to Bhartṛhari, knowledge acquired by perception, inference, etc. is also knowledge revealed by language (*tasmāt pratyakṣamapyartham vidvāñicehetayuktitaḥ, nadarśanasya prāmāṇyāt dṛṣyamartham*)¹⁸. Thus, he is of the opinion that in philosophical reflections all knowledge is revealed by language, and knowledge revealed by language is veridical. The accomplishment of communication by language, independently of things-in-themselves, is a sufficient cognitive ground for the verity of knowledge.

The standard of philosophical reflections, according to Bhartṛhari, is the freedom of thought from our allegiances to ontological and psychological entities.¹⁹ Thought may be influenced by the views of other schools, traditions and beliefs. Philosophical reflections are concerned with the clarification of problems for cognition and conception of the beings as they figure by language in communication.²⁰

This does not mean that we deny cultural or inter-cultural elements in cognition; rather, we hold that cognition expressed by language ubiquitously given by culturally arena of mind is a cultural consciousness and that is why the cognition or communication by language, independently of things-in-themselves, is possible in a linguistically cultured community. Cognition itself is not possible, if language does not reveal it. Language, and the meaning it reveals, are not private but cultural beings on account of which communication is possible by language itself.

Being primarily a cognitive philosophy of language, Bhartṛhari's philosophy is equally important and useful to understand and to explain communication accomplished by different language-tokens because it considers the differences of language only on an apparent level, i.e. on the level of language-token/garb (*vaikhari*). By 'apparent level difference' we mean the differences in articulating utterances, gestures, noises, symbols, signs, etc., which, for Bhartṛhari, are instruments only in the manifestation of the inner language. The inner-language (*sphoṭa*) is real language (*śabda*), because it is an expresser by nature, and its meaning is revealed non-differently by it. He, by assuming the language and thought as non-different, has reflected on the concepts as revealed in ordinary communication. Therefore, *Vākyapadīya* is the philosophy of the beings of communication, i.e. language and meaning which are beings of awareness in nature. They are the beings to which our cognition, communication and philosophical reflections are confined and on which those cognitive activities are based.

BHARTṚHARI ON LANGUAGE

The primacy of language as the object of philosophical reflections has been accepted by *Vākyapadīya* because, for Bhartṛhari, cognition is revealed by and is shot through and through by language. It can rightly be said that the *Vākyapadīya* is a monumental work in philosophy that discusses almost all the popular issues of language based on communication. According to Bhartṛhari, all thought, passions, determinations, incentives to actions are revealed non-differently by language. 'Thought, isolated from language, is not possible and thought is infused with language'; is what *Vākyapadīya*²¹ expounds with great conviction. Bhartṛhari defines it as *the grāhya* and *grāhaka* (the

expresser and expressed) principle.²² *Harivṛtti* quotes a verse regarding the primacy of language (*śabda*) in cognition, which is as follows: *iha trīṇī jyotīṇṣi trayāḥ prakāśāḥ svarūpapararūpayoravadyotakāḥ. Tadyathā-yoyam jātavedā yaśca puruṣeśvāntaraḥ prakāśaḥ yaśca prakāśāprakāśayoḥ prakāśayitā śabdākhyāḥ prakāśastatraitat sarvamupanibaddham yāvat sthasnu cariṣṇu ca*.²³ The *śruti* says that there are three categories of illuminating forces (*jyotiṣāṇ*) or lights in the world that illuminate objects. The first is the fire (like sun) that lights up the things in the world, the second is the light of the mind, and the third is *śabda* (language), which expresses not only the lights (*prakāśa*) but also non-lights (*aprakāśa*). *Śabda* distinguishes intelligible beings, and it distinctly reveals discriminating knowledge of beings and, hence, its primacy in the philosophy cannot be denied. Not only that, philosophical reflections, *Bhartṛhari*, like his predecessors, assumes is confined to language and to what it reveals distinctly in the mind.

Bhartṛhari is aware of the fact that overlooking the proper field of language may provide no excellence to philosophical reflections except causing confusion.²⁴ Language is not merely a tool; it is not confined to the articulated sounds or written marks which stand by proxy for the things/Beings, but is expressive of itself and of meaning. As we have discussed earlier, language (*śabda*) for *Bhartṛhari* is not confined to what we speak, read or write, that is symbols, letters, words and sentence-tokens uttered or written. Perceptual data and other experiences are only instrumental in the manifestation of the indivisible language, which is ubiquitously given and is manifested in the mind by these tokens. It, when manifested by verbal noises or by language-tokens, reveals itself first, and then the meaning is revealed non-differently by it in the mind.²⁵

Language (*sphoṭa*) is communicative by its own nature. It is ubiquitously given in the mind of all individuals and is articulated variously through different language-tokens or garbs used by the society of which an individual is a member. The observation of the gestures, modes and references of the utterances, as used by the elders of the society, are instrumental only in the manifestation of it. The individual only uses language through the garbs that are, to an extent, fixed by convention, as, otherwise, communication, which inevitably demands the participation of speakers and hearers, will not be

accomplished. Thus, the idea of private language does not stand in a philosophy that believes in the ubiquity of language, and whose aim is to explain communication. Participation in a linguistic community is the essential feature of language, and it is possible only because of ubiquity of language that reveals cognition. If, it is otherwise, the revelation of cognition and accomplishment of communication, in a linguistic (cultured) society, will not be possible. In the explanation of the language-token, the inter-social nature of language is inevitably accepted, primarily because of its communicable feature. A child learns to communicate in a linguistic society. He is introduced to the garbs used by the society in which he is born and grown, and he learns to communicate by observation of the uses of the tokens learnt. His thoughts are expressed through the tokens, which is usually called communication. The socio-historical facts in communicating are inevitably contained in the language we speak, read or write, as communicating is based on the observation of the uses by the society to which we belong. Though Bhartṛhari accepts language as the foundational being of the world of communication, he also gives importance to tokens as means to the manifestation of the former.²⁶ The garbs and the expresser, the inner meaning-revealing language, are inseparably involved in the accomplishment of communication. The garbs are tools through which the latter is manifested. Being manifested it expresses reveals itself and the meaning.

Bhartṛhari's *technique* of analysis of language aims at clarification of the concepts on the basis of cognition, as accomplished in usual communication. He has put forward almost all popular views on the clarification of concepts, analyzed them and shown to what extent these different views are helpful. In the process, he has created an unparalleled body of syntactics and semantics. Here, I wish to emphasize that Bhartṛhari's syntactics and semantics are so comprehensive that a thorough and popular study of it may mould philosophical reflection on language and meaning to a novel and philosophically, very useful consequences. One step more, we can say that Bhartṛhari reflections on language and meaning are of much importance not only for a cognitive model of the philosophical analysis today but for understanding concepts in its clarity (*lokasiddhārtha*). No other treatise on language and meaning except *Vākyapadīya* discusses the issues of syntactics and semantics so exhaustively and clearly. It discusses different theories of language, including sentence,

words, root, stem, suffix, prefix, particles, prepositions, postpositions, at least six theories of sentential-meaning, at least fourteen theories on word-meaning and many other issues associated with them. A large section in the third Part of it includes fourteen chapters (*samuddeśaḥ*), discusses the nature and function of word-meaning (*padārtha*) in an analytic way which is of much help in understanding the concept in its philosophical import.

As cognition, for Bhartṛhari, is cognition shot through and through with language, and as the cognition revealed by it is always veridical, its foundational character may not be denied. It is only for the sake of the explanation of the verity of cognition revealed by language that different theories of verification, confirmations, falsification, etc. stand significantly as factors of the validity of that cognition. In brief, language, for Bhartṛhari, is foundational as it is of awareness in nature and as meaning is revealed non-differently by it. It functions for the incentives to or not do something.²⁷ It is not designation, but an expression, and it is only this way that his reflections on language may properly be estimated as philosophical and interesting as well.

Bhartṛhari on Logic

Bhartṛhari is not an epistemologist as the term is taken popularly. The sources of knowledge like perception, inference implication, presumption, etc. are only tools that help manifestation of the real language (*sphoṭa*) because the knowledge is always the knowledge expressed/revealed by language in the mind and is veridical. In this regard, it is interesting to present his criticism of reasoning (*tarka*) and inference (*anumāna*).

For Bhartṛhari, knowledge is not merely reasoning, it is virtue. He clearly says 'If knowledge were reasoning (*svabhāvika jñāna*) then scripture is of no use but if virtue is the cause of knowledge then the scripture (*veda*) is the foundational. I have taken the term '*svabhāvika jñāna*' for reasoning. K. Pillai has translated the term as instinctive knowledge. Bhartṛhari in his *vṛtti* has defined the term in the sense of knowledge acquired independently of scripture and with a purpose of demonstrating or proving one's own interests (*Ahitpratiśedhārthān āmhitprātīpādanārthānām copadeśa śāstrāṇām vaiyarthyaṃ prasajyate*).

The *Vṛtti* supports my stand on the meaning of the term as reasoning derived through the senses naturally fixed in the objects of their own. In the light of knowledge as virtue, Bhartṛhari has criticized *tarka* (reasoning including hypothetical reasoning) specifically in verses VP 1/31, 1/136-138, 2/78, perception in VP. 2/296 and inference in VP 1/30-42, 136, 138, 2/46, 2/140, 2/299, 2/352, 2/368, as the sources leading to erroneous cognition on the basis of which communication can not be established. The world of communication is the world of knowledge intertwined with language (*śabdāloka nibandhāḥ*) VP 2/297.

The basic reasoning lying behind refutation of *tarka* and *anumāna* by him is that they are subjective and are dependent upon means by the defects of which the knowledge acquired by them is corrupted. Not only that but they need a cognitive ground that is to be proved by them also and, thus, they cannot work independently of the knowledge revealed in the mind by language that serves as the cognitive ground of reasoning. Taking the aforesaid line into consideration, we can easily conclude that *svārthānumāna* is not different from implication and *parārthānumāna* is the knowledge revealed by the sentence put in the form of subordinate clauses i.e. syllogistic form.

Conclusively, we can say that Bhartṛhari has refuted inference (*anumāna*) and reasoning (*tarka*) in so far as they are accepted by the theorist as a means of knowledge independently of language (*āgama*) and have accepted their importance in so far as they are based on the scripture (*veda*). Scripture is the sentence (*vākya*) and is the expresser of knowledge which is revealed by and is shot through and through by language. Knowledge ceases to be so if isolated from the language.

BHARTṚHARI ON ANALYSIS

Bhartṛhari has adopted two kinds of analysis: philosophical and grammatical-analysis (*apoddhāra*). Through the method of grammatical analysis, an indivisible unit of communication is explained by dividing it into different parts. The process of grammatical analysis, for Bhartṛhari, is instrumental for beginners for their understanding of an indivisible in a piecemeal manner.²⁸

Philosophical analysis is a more comprehensive act. It is a method applied for the clarification of concepts as expressed or figured in the

mind by language in usual communication. There may be a number of views regarding a concept. Sometimes one gets confused because of different opposite views on the same concept. A philosophical analysis of those views clarifies the causes of confusion and provides a clear understanding of the concept by vindicating the view of the concept as it is expressed in usual communication. The analysis also includes reflection, through which fresh light is shed on the concept. However, Bhartṛhari's aim of analysis is to clarify the concepts as revealed in usual communication, and on which our day-to-day transactions are grounded. A given sentence, according to Bhartṛhari, is explained in the analytic scheme in two ways: firstly, by dividing the sentence into words, and words into roots and stems, and deciding their meanings separately to construe the sentential-meaning as a synthesis. Secondly, the sentence is divided into parts in the purview of the sentence itself and the meaning of the sentence through the analyzed scheme is decided in the sentential feature. The issue will be discussed separately in chapter VII.

Conclusively, it can be said that analysis, for Bhartṛhari, is a wide term and grammatical-analysis (*apoddhara*) is simply a kind of it.

COGNITIVE BACKGROUND OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF BHARTṚHARI

Unlike metaphysical, epistemological and psychological approaches to 'being and cognition by expression', I have adopted a purely philosophical outlook for the present discussion on the problem. By the term 'purely philosophical outlook', I mean the reflection on the problem from the point of view elucidated in the previous section on analysis.

According to Bhartṛhari's philosophy, language itself and the meaning revealed non-differently by it, are the objects of cognition. The objects of cognition are beings expressed/revealed by language in the mind, and our reflections are confined to them.²⁹ Immanuel Kant said we know only phenomena, that is, how things appear in the mind. In other words, sense qualities that are constituents of perceptual things are the objects of our cognition. Bhartṛhari, contrary to Kant, elucidates that perceptual things or their constituents can be revealed neither as being nor as non-being. Being and non-being are known as

they are revealed in the mind by language.³⁰ His philosophy is quite different from those interpreting the physical world of entities through the linguistic units. He conceives physical entities as those beyond the grasp of language and of mind.³¹ For him, the aim of philosophy is to interpret the cognition revealed by language (*śabda*) in usual communication. Physical entities whether eternal or transient, existent or non-existent, are of no use as far as the cognition or the accomplishment of communication is concerned. The sense data acquired through senses like gestures, tokens, and utterances serve only as instrumental in the manifestation of language and the meaning is revealed non-differently by the language (*śabda*) itself.

Our cognition, philosophical reflection and investigation are not only based on but are confined to the objects figured in the mind by language. Grammarians call these objects, in general, as the expressed (*vācya*). Language (*vācaka*), in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, is not confined to the garbs/tokens we speak, read or write. It is the inner, indivisible meaning revealing unit (*sphoṭa*).³² Articulated utterances, perceptual sense-data, gestures and other tokens are only tools in the manifestation of inner *śabda* which, when manifested by them, reveals itself (it own real nature) and the meaning afterwards, and, hence, as expresser (*vācaka*), the language (*sphoṭa*), in his philosophy, is accepted as the object of cognition in a cognition by language as well.

Being and non-being, either of accomplished or of non-accomplished character, is cognized as revealed by language in the mind. The language revealed in the mind, for Bhartṛhari, is a being, that is, an intelligible being or ideas expressed as *vācaka*, the meaning revealed non-differently by it in the mind is also a being, that is thought-object/expressed (*vācya*) of the expresser. They are self-restraint beings not only in the sense that their own law of awareness sustains them but that they regulate or act on for cognition by their own rule also. They are not abstractions from external, things but are revealed/expressed beings. They, unlike the Wittgensteinian facts are not independent, discrete-beings, but are non-different. The language reveals itself and is eternally fit to reveal the meaning non-differently, hence, the identical or unitary and indivisible cognition is accomplished by language. Meaning without language is not possible and cognition isolated/independently of language ceases to be cognition, because all cognition, as Bhartṛhari propounds it, is cognition shot through and

through with language (*śabdānuviddha*).³³ If the thesis 'cognition as shot through and through by language' is not accepted, the philosophy that takes analysis of language for clarification of thoughts as its basic function will face the pains of contradiction. Analysis of language vis-à-vis analysis of thought is possible only if cognition is taken as shot through and through by language and only in this way philosophy may be taken to perform its function for the clarification of thought by the analysis of language and for the analysis of language by the clarification of thought as well.

Philosophers have often doubted the objectivity of the study of language by language itself. They have opined that it is due to human limitations that he has only language to study even language itself. H.G. Coward remarks, 'all thinking about language must, by virtue of human limitation, be done in language itself. One cannot get outside of language so as to objectively examine it'.³⁴ It is rather misleading and non-philosophical to study a set of language-tokens by another set of them or to present them in a set of logical symbols and then to study them. A philosophical study of language takes it as concept and investigates or reflects on it as it figures in the mind in usual communication. Language reveals itself as the object of cognition in cognition by language. Thanks to Bhartṛhari who emphasizes for the first time in the history of philosophy that language in every cognition inevitably reveals itself first as the expresser (*vācaka*) and, then its meaning is revealed by it non-differently. If it would not reveal itself first, meaning could not be revealed and, as meaning is the being revealed by language, no meaning is acceptable to him independent of and isolated from language. A significant question to ask is: How can the expresser be its own expressed? As, an expresser cannot, at the same time, be the expressed, language cannot be studied objectively by language itself. But if we take into consideration the point made by Bhartṛhari, that 'language also figures as an object of cognition through language', we will be in a better position to estimate that language is naturally fit to be studied by language itself. Not only that, Bhartṛhar has analyzed the functional language (*upādāna-śabda*) as a unity of two – one that serves as the cause of the cognition of language (that is, *svarūpa śabda*), different from utterances/noises; another that serves as the cause of the cognition of the meaning (*vācya*). In other words, he analyzes language as the illuminating as

(*grāhya*) and the illuminating principle (*grāhaka*) and elucidates an expresser-expressed (*vācaka-vācya*) relation between the two. As language is expressed by language in cognition, it is also an expressed being and is studied as an object by the language itself.³⁵ Vyāḍi, as Vṛṣabha quotes, is of the opinion that in cognition by language the concept of inner, sequenceless, indivisible form of language is a being (*vācya*) itself, while its expresser is known as expresser (*vācaka-śabda*) when articulated and heard by the audience. It implies that as language reveals itself as the object of cognition by language, it can be studied or be reflected upon, as it figures in the mind. As this reflecting on language as the expressed (*vācya*) is based on cognition, and as cognition revealed by language is always veridical, because of which communication is accomplished, the verity of the cognition of language by language cannot be doubted. Moreover, as language is ubiquitously given, the objectivity of the cognition revealed by language in the mind of the audience cannot be denied.

Language (*śabda*) reveals itself before it reveals meaning.³⁶ The very distinctive feature of cognition by *śabda* according to Bhartṛhari is that, in a verbal cognition, it reveals itself first and, then, its meaning is revealed non-differently. Phonemes, that is verbal noises/utterances, are only tools in the manifestation of the indivisible, language (*śabda*) given in the mind. It, after being manifested gradually in the sequence of verbal noise, reveals its own nature (*sphoṭa*). To reveal itself in cognition is the characteristic of language, which distinguishes it from the sense. Showing their difference Bhartṛhari writes, 'senses need not be cognised themselves before they know the objects. They do so by their mere existence when they come into contact with the objects. But this is not the case with language (*śabda*). It reveals itself before it reveals meaning and, that is the reason, Bhartṛhari defines, it as *grāhaka - grāhya* or *prakāśaka - prakāśya* (expressed and expresser).³⁷ If language, like senses, is taken only as tool in the accomplishment of cognition, there would be no need for knowing the language itself before knowing the meaning but this is not the case with the cognition by it. Language given in the mind when manifested by utterances, is known first and, then, the meaning is known when expressed non-differently by the real language.³⁸ If the language that is the expresser (*vācaka*) is not revealed, no cognition will be possible because all cognition is cognition expressed by language.

Objecting to the aforementioned position of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Naiyāyikas*³⁹ may say that we perceive a thing by senses without perceiving or knowing the senses themselves beforehand, similarly, language is a means of cognition and, therefore, there is no need for accepting its prior cognition. According to Bhartṛhari, language is an active principle. It is the nature of language to reveal its own nature (*vācaka*) before it reveals meaning (*vācya*). As meaning is what the language non-differently reveals, it cannot be revealed if the language (*vācakā*) itself is not revealed in the mind first.⁴⁰ Language (*vācakā*), like sense-data in perception or verbal-noises, cannot be taken only as a means of cognition. Language is the light or consciousness (awareness); it reveals itself and the meaning is revealed non-differently by it.

There is a fundamental difference between the processes involved in the perception and the cognition by language. In perception and inference, the senses and the indications (*liṅga*), like smoke, etc. stand at a distance from each other. After expressing knowledge, they are separated from the object (external) to be known, while in verbal cognition, the language is not separated from the cognition. Meaning, for a Bhartṛharian, is not a picture either of the *śabda* or of external-things, and, also, the two are not mutually independent facts, as a Wittgensteinian would say. Language (*śabda*), for Bhartṛhari as mentioned earlier, is a being (inner and ubiquitously given), which is manifested by verbal-noises, and, when manifested, it reveals its own nature, that is, *sphoṭa*. The meaning is also an inner being but is not an independent being in the sense that it is revealed non-differently in the mind by the former. Thus, the two beings, as revealer and revealed or as expresser and expressed, are naturally related by the fitness of the former to reveal meaning non-differently.⁴¹ Bhartṛhari elucidates cognition as shot through-and-through with language (*śabdānuviddha*).⁴² Language infuses not only verbal but all sorts of cognition, e.g. perceptual, inferential, etc.⁴³ The difference between the cognition by language and that by preception, etc. is rooted in the very process of cognition.

Denying the basic position of *Vaiyākaraṇas*, *Naiyāyikas* and *Mīmāṃsakas* object that 'cognition as shot through-and-through with language' cannot be proved. In their opinion, the language is a tool in the indication of the meaning and the cognition of the meaning as

well. As an indicator stands always at a distance from what it indicates and is separated after performing the act of indicating, the indicator (*siddha*) and the indicated (*sādhya*) cannot be taken to be intertwined. Is it proper to say that the senses (eyes, etc.), which are a means for accomplishment of cognition of an object and the object (pot, etc.) cognized through them are infused? It can also be argued, on behalf of those who take language only as a means of cognition that the word 'pot', the meaning 'pot' and the cognition 'pot' are indicated by the speaker by the same word 'pot', because there is no other instrument or means except language to indicate it. They hold that it is only due to the limitation of the speaker that he uses the same word 'pot' as an indication of all of them, and this limitation cannot be taken as a ground for accepting cognition as infused with language. They say the *Vaiyākaraṇas*' theory of 'language infuses cognition', that is, the infusion of the means and the end, is inconsistent, because it is not, as such to be proved by any means. There is no infusion of senses (means of perception) and the object perceived by them. On the basis of this reasoning, they conclude that the *Vaiyākaraṇas*' theory of sentence-holism based on the infusion of cognition and language is ignorance.⁴⁴

The Bhartṛharian's response can be that the above objections, raised by *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Naiyāyikas*, are based on their oversight of the difference between perception and cognition. It is, as we have seen in the earlier pages, distinctive feature of cognition by language that it, unlike the senses, plays a different role. It is the very nature of language that it reveals before, it reveals meaning.⁴⁵ As nature cannot change, and as it is based on cognition or comprehension, one is bound to accept that which is cognized directly; otherwise, there would be a case of violation of cognition and communication.⁴⁶ Cognition, as such, is discriminative by nature and discrimination is not possible without language. How can the sense of 'pot' be distinguished from that of 'cot', if their cognition is not taken as infused with language? Even 'the sense datum' of 'pot' if separated from the language, cannot be known, as it will not then be the object of cognition. The cognition, the 'pot is there', acquired either by perception or by inference cannot distinctly be understood isolated from language.

Objecting to the above position of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāya Mañjarī*⁴⁷ has argued that between the two types of perceptual cognition, determinate (*savikalpaka*) and

indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*), the former would not and the latter could not be taken as intertwined with language. Indeterminate perception, as they say, is cognition void of the association of language (*śabdasaṃsarga śūnya*), and there is only association (and not infusion) of language in determinate perception. *Naiyāyikas*, in general, take it contradictory to accept cognition as infused with language on the one hand and to refute the existence of indeterminate cognition on the other. If both determinate and indeterminate cognition are infused with language, how will the two be differentiated? According to grammarians, the objections raised above are based on a wrong idea that language is confined to verbal utterances/noises. In reply to the objections raised above, it can be said on behalf of *Vaiyākaraṇas* that all objects of cognition are cognized as objects revealed by language (*sphoṭa*). Bhartṛhari's theory of *sphoṭa* views cognition as essentially (*tattvataḥ*) and cognitively (*jñānataḥ*) shot through-and-through with language. The *śabda* is the only expresser. It expresses itself and the meaning. Can these objects be known separately from the language? No, they all are revealed by language. Cognition ceases to be cognition if separated from language.

Incentives to perform or not to perform an action are not possible without cognition, and no cognition is possible if isolated from language. The cognition, if taken, for a moment, as isolated from language, will be unknown and unfounded. Even the cognition, indeterminate as *Naiyāyikas* assume, in a newborn baby is intertwined with language.⁴⁸ The activities like crying, tittering, sucking, vibrating of the vocal organs, etc. of a newborn baby cannot be accomplished, if there is no incentive, and, as the incentive to act or not to act cannot be denied, cognition as the cause of them (incentives) must be accepted. As there is no possibility of a newly born baby being taught the language we speak, read or write, those who take language as confined to these tokens learnt gradually after birth, fail to understand the nature of cognition and deny it to the newly born baby. Bhartṛhari is quite clear on the issue of cognition as intertwined with language. If the inner language as potency (*bhāvanā*) for incentive is not accepted as given in the mind of the newborn baby, its activities of crying, tittering, etc. would not be possible. Thanks to modern psychologists and scientists who have also proved the presence of cognition as the cause of the incentive to crying, tittering, smiling, etc. of the baby. Nothing but the given *śabda-bhāvanā* (impression or the speech-dispositionality

of its consciousness) can be accepted as the revealer of the cognition that causes incentive in a baby. There is no other means by which it can acquire knowledge. Its audio-video organs are not matured enough to be taught or even to grasp from outside.⁴⁹ The *śabda-bhāvanā* is given since its birth and that is the reason it tries naturally to communicate by crying, etc. and gradually learns to communicate with little effort; otherwise, it would not be possible for it to make efforts for learning and communicating. Thus, the cognition of the baby who is completely unaware of language-meaning relation is elucidated, by Bhartṛhari, as a cognition infused with language. Similar is the case with the cognition in the dumb and deaf who cannot speak or hear verbal utterances/noises. In their case, when they intend to communicate, the inner *sphoṭa* is manifested through their bodily gestures and the gestures by the audience manifest the *sphoṭa* given in the mind through which meaning is revealed in their mind. Putting the ground for differentiating the determinate from indeterminate cognition, Bhartṛhari says that infusion with language or otherwise is not the ground for their difference, because all cognition is infused with language. In the case of determinate cognition, the expresser (*sphoṭa* = *vācaka*) is fully revealed and its meaning (*vācya*) is distinctly cognized. Contrary to it, in cases of indeterminate cognition, the expresser is not fully revealed in the mind, and in the state of non-apprehension or misapprehension of the expresser in its completeness and distinction, its meaning, with all its distinctive characteristics, is not revealed or revealed otherwise.⁵⁰

No cognition *can distinctively* be known as cognition if not infused with language.⁵¹ *It is the* language on account of which inferential cognition is distinctively known. Dream-objects (*svapna*) of deep-sleep (*suṣupti*) are distinctively known, as they are also intertwined with language. Knowledge is not knowledge in isolation, and, hence, not without illumination. This illuminating nature of cognition is not possible if taken separate from language. Nothing can be expressed isolated from language.

Unlike Bhartṛhari, some propositionalists accept propositions as abstracted fact - abstracted from several instances and occurrences of sentences (sentence-token) signifying the same proposition. Opposite to them, a sentence (indivisible, inner, meaning-revealing unit) for Bhartṛhari is not an abstraction from occurrences and instances

perceived, but are foundationally given as awareness itself. Verbal-noises, tokens, etc. are tools only in the manifestation of the given inner-meaning-revealing unit, that is, sentence. It is neither an abstraction from the outside, nor a mental construction in its popular use of the term, but is awareness that reveals both itself and the meaning, *Sphoṭa* ceases to be *sphoṭa* if taken as abstracted, it will lose its expressive character (*vācakatva*). Even thought as an abstracted unit (if accepted for a moment) implies *sphoṭa* in order to be revealed, otherwise, how could it be known? If thought itself is abstracted from language, it cannot reveal itself and the meaning also, and, then, no knowledge will be accomplished, and no abstraction will be possible. The idea of abstraction may lead to undesirable metaphysical presumption of the things from which it is abstracted, the mind which abstracts and the relation between them. An abstracted proposition may be taken as that signified by sentences, but how can it signify meaning if it does not signify itself first as a signifier and hence, the idea of proposition as abstraction is, cognitively and logically, inconsistent. Contrary to it, *sphoṭa* (language) for Bhartṛhari is not a unit abstracted from language tokens, but a self-restrained being. The idea of language as a self-restrained being that acts for expressing thoughts of itself and of its meaning, inevitably implies the non-difference of language and thought. The non-difference of language and meaning as thought may not be acceptable to those who take that the law of language and that of thought are different. While western and Indian schools of philosophy, other than *Pāṇinian Grammarians*, take only the meaning as thought and make a difference between the two, by taking language only as a referring tool of thought, Bhartṛhari's philosophy expounds language also as thought/concept. If language and thought are different, then it will be contradictory to accept philosophy as a system of analysis of language for clarification of thought. The analysis of language (separate from thought) will not then, be the analysis of thought, and hence, it will be an aimless intellectual game. If language and thought are taken as different, how can the clarification of the latter by analysis of the former be achieved? Not only philosophy but analysis will also be a useless task if language and thought are taken as separate. It is rather contradictory to assume language and thought as different on the one hand and to accept analysis of language as a basis of the clarification of thought, on the other. This difficulty is equally applicable to all those philosophies who take

language as confined to language-token that is, verbal utterances/noises, gestures, etc. (which for us are only tools in the manifestation of inner meaning revealing language) and also to those who take language as abstracted from verbal utterances. For a Bhartṛharian, the same idea from the point of view of expressibility is language and from the point of view of cognition is the meaning (thought-object) and, hence, language is also thought and different from the thought as meaning. Both of them are restrained by the same law - language as expresser and expressed, law of non-difference of language and cognition, that is, cognition as revealed and shot through and through by language. The idea of infusion of language and thought and language and cognition serve as the basic ground of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of sentence-holism.

If it is taken that the proposition reveals itself and the meaning is revealed by it non-differently, it, as such, cannot be taken as an abstracted being but a **foundational being** (luminous-illuminating principle). There is no philosophical and logical need of accepting proposition as an abstraction. The thesis of proposition as an abstraction underestimates the expressing/revealing power of language on the one hand and such an abstraction amounts to unnecessary metaphysical assumptions on the other. Language, for Bhartṛhari, is a foundational being of awareness in nature. It reveals and its meaning and, hence, the primary being of the **cognitive world** of communication. The luminous and **illuminative character of cognition** and the expressive nature of **language, according to Bhartṛhari**, are sufficient cognitive grounds for accepting cognition as infused with language.

Conclusively, we can say that philosophy, for Bhartṛhari, does not have room for a copy-theory of cognition, as he conceives language not merely as a designation/representation but as expression. Language does not infuse thought only but it is thought itself, and for that reason it is foundational (that is, it reveals itself and the meaning is revealed non-differently by it). Verbal utterances tokens, gestures, etc., and the sense-data acquired by senses like eyes, ears, etc., are tools only in the manifestation of the expresser (*spṛṣṭa*) and, hence, the representative theory of cognition is inconsistent with the distinctive nature of language and cognition itself.

We, in the previous pages have presented a critique of language as the object of cognition by language and have argued in favour of

language infusing cognition. Presently, we propose to discuss the objects of cognition that figure in the mind by language. We in this regard, think it necessary to mention, for avoiding unnecessary confusions regarding the nature of what figures in the mind by language, that the language itself and the meaning are revealed in the mind by language, through the garbs and, hence, they are objects of cognition. What figures in the mind by language independently of external Being is also a being, that is, *upacāra-sattā*.⁵² As *upacāra-sattā* is not abstracted, but is a being revealed by language itself independently of external existents and as it is a being of awareness in character, it is a self-restrained being which from the point of view of communicability is language (*sphoṭa*) that is, expresser, the meaning-revealing unit and from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition is *pratibhā* (flash of understanding) revealed by language, that is, thought-object which form the ontological point of view is secondary being (*upacāra-sattā*) as taken in contrast with the external Being (*mukhya-sattā*).⁵³ As external-entity is popularly known by the word Being (*sattā*), it is called *mukhya-sattā* (primary-being). In contrast to *mukhya-sattā*, the being revealed in the mind by language is taken by grammarians as *upacāra-sattā* (secondary being). The being for Bhartṛhari, is universal and as he accepts 'universals in the universal' there is no logical difficulty in accepting the universal inhering in the universal of objects (the idea of language and that of the meaning revealed by it as well). Even the cognition of an object like 'pot', etc., is also taken by Bhartṛhari as universal but he does not accept cognition itself as universal. If it is universal it will be an object of cognition but cognition, as we have indicated earlier, is not an object in cognition. Though cognition of the objects like language and meaning is also taken as an object of philosophical reflection, it is not itself an object in that cognition.⁵⁴ There is a difference between the idea of cognition and the cognition itself. The idea of cognition is the object/being of cognition and of philosophical reflections, but cognition does not figure or is not cognized as an object or another in that cognition. It is itself awareness and, hence, foundational. It is contradictory to accept cognition simultaneously as object of its own.

Coming to an analysis and examination of Bhartṛhari's views on the nature and philosophical significance of *upacāra-sattā* (being figured in the mind in communication as accomplished by language), it seems necessary to begin with *Mahābhāṣyakāra* Patañjali's view on Being

(*sattā*). *Mahābhāṣyakāra* has classified all beings into two categories⁵⁵: *vāhya-sattā* (external being) that is Being and *Buddhistha-sattā* (intellegible/philosophical being). Philosophical being (*upacāra-sattā* or *buddhistha-sattā*) is that which figures in the mind non-differently by language and, hence, eternally related with the expresser. Defining being, *Mahābhāṣyakāra* writes '*na padārtho sattām vyabhicarati*'⁵⁶ (the meaning is never deprived of being). All external 'pots' may be destroyed, even then, the meaning of the word 'pot' is non-differently revealed in the mind by the word 'pot' (that is, the being of 'pot' is not dependent on Being, the external pot).

Now, if meaning is never deprived of its being, the opponents may ask as to what is the need of qualifying an eternally existent or Being by the use of the word '*asti*' (exists)? The uses like '*sattām asti*' (being exists) will be contradictory if it is not taken as externally existent. Actually, such problems arise out of the opponent's objections regarding the *Pāṇini Sūtra* '*tadasyāstyasminniti matup*'.⁵⁷ If the *padārtha* is never deprived of its being, there is no need of using the word '*asti*' in the *sūtra* for qualifying the being as existent. An adjective (*viśeṣaṇa*) is significantly used with a being only if it, sometime, is associated and, at other times, is dissociated with the being to be qualified (*sambhavavyabhicārābhyām viśeṣaṇamarthavat*).⁵⁸ As being (that is, the qualifier '*asti*' specifically, for expressing its existence. *Mahābhāṣyakāra* does not feel any need for the use of the word '*asti*' for qualifying the external Being and elucidates that the use of the word '*asti*' in the *sūtra* under consideration does not stand for being but for Being which is existent neither in the past, nor in the future, but in the present only. For example, the term '*gomān*' derived by the use of the suffix '*matup*' expresses 'the person possessing a cow at present'. The person who possessed a cow (in the past) or will possess it (in future), will not be termed '*gomān*'. Clarifying the issue *Mahābhāṣyapradīpakāra* Kaiyaṭa says that the use of the word '*asti*' as qualifier, in the *sūtra* under consideration, stands for Being (*samprati-sattā*) having existence only in present (*sampratisattāyāmiti vartamāna sattāyām vāhyāyāmsattāyāmityarthāḥ*).⁵⁹ As the beings pertaining to the past and future also figure by language, the use of the qualifier '*asti*' is not intended for them, and, therefore it stands for external-Being (*samprati-sattā*), that exists only in the present.

Taking beings (*buddhistha-sattā*) as different from Being (*vāhya-sattā*), Bhartṛhari has observed the former as the only being revealed by language, and the latter, the *mukhya-sattā*, is transcendental to cognition.⁶⁰ The former, in contrast with the latter, is *upacāra-sattā* (being figured in the mind by language).⁶¹ Though the former, from the point of view of cognition and accomplishment of communication, is primary, yet as the word *sattā* is popularly used for the latter, its use for the former is taken for secondary being. Clarifying the reason for the use of secondary-being for intelligible being and primary-Being for transcendental Being, Kaiyaṭa⁶² has remarked that the use of the suffix (*sat + tā*) in the place of *laṭ* (present tense) in the derivation *sat + tā = sattā* suggests the existence in present, and, as external-Being is existent only in the present, the use of the word *sattā* is primarily taken for external Being (*vāhya-sattā*). The mention of existence of intelligible being (*buddhistha-sattā*) in present is not significant, because it is an existent that is presented in all tenses. Past and future beings are existent only in the mind and are revealed by language in communication. Thus, it is relative to the popular use of the word *sattā* for external Being that the intelligible being is called secondary-being (*upacāra-sattā*) and, hence, the use of the word *upacāra-sattā* for being cannot be taken as of a being deprived of its existence in the present. It is from this point of view that *Mahābhāṣyakāra* has defined *upacāra-sattā* as being existent in the past and in future as well (*bhūtabhaviṣyat sattā*). This does not mean that *upacāra-sattā* is not existent in the present. It is not justified to say that both of the external - Being and being (*upacāra-sattā*) cannot exist simultaneously, that is, in the present. For Bhartṛhari's philosophy, both kinds of beings from the point of view of cognition are not mutually separate (*anyonyavyāvṛta*), because the external - Being, in order to be known, also requires to be revealed as being, which is the only object of cognition. It is contradictory to accept that 'inner-being is never deprived of existence' on the one hand and 'to deny its existence in the present' on the other hand. The inner-being is existent in all the divisions of time (*abhinnakālāḥ*), that is, it figures positively by the words as of past, present and future (*etām sattām padārtho hi na kaścidativartate*).⁶³

Having a fixed character, the external - Being cannot move into the different changing or opposite characters of being and non-being, existence and non-existence, and it is only the intelligible being that figures in the mind by language as being and non-being as well. As it

is the being revealed in the mind by language, it is equally revealed as being, non-being, existence, non-existence, etc. since it is expressed so when presented by language. If meaning is taken as externally existent, it cannot be non-existence and vice versa. If 'pot' is taken as externally existent, it cannot be non-existent and, thus, expression like pot is non-existent (*ghaṭonāsti*) will not be possible. The external existents can be revealed neither as existent nor as non-existent, nor as existent and non-existent both at the same time. As intelligible being (*upacāra-sattā*) figures equally as being and as non-being by respective words, Bhartṛhari calls it is 'bhāvābhāvasāddhāraṇa'. It is not true to say that the idea of being figures positively and the idea of non-being figures negatively by the respective words. All ideas figure positively as idea in the mind and so is the case with the idea of non-being. Bhartṛhari has clarified the issue of figuring of the ideas equally as being and as non-being by the example of crystal, mirror and jewel.⁶⁴ Being transparent, they configure as the form and colour of the things kept near them. Similarly, the idea or being is revealed as both the being and non-being by the respective expressers (*vācakas*). As meaning, for Bhartṛhari is that which figures by language (*śabdyāt iti śabdārthaḥ śabdah*),⁶⁵ the idea 'it is pot' and the idea 'it is not pot' both are known so as they positively figure thus in the mind by respective sentences. The law of contradiction is not applicable to the being (*upacāra-sattā*). Even the idea by the term 'contradiction' also figures positively as the idea of it, on account of which it is so cognized.

Discussing the purpose of accepting intelligible being (*upacāra-sattā*) as that which figures equally as being and as non-being, Helārāja says⁶⁶ as crystal mirror, etc., do not undergo any change with the association of different things of different colours, though they configure things kept near them, *upacāra-sattā*, without a change in its nature, figures always positively as being or as non-being by the respective expressions and that is why they are known so. *Upacāra-sattā* figures positively even by negative sentences. If otherwise, no knowledge, by negative expressions and, hence, by the word 'non-existence', will be possible and then, there will be a case of denial of negative sentences.

According to Helārāja, the being by the sentence 'it is pot' is not transferred as existent (*asti*) on the one hand and is not deformed as 'non-existent' by the expression 'it is not pot (*ghaṭonāsti*)' on the other

hand. Being of awareness in character, it is revealed by language equally as being and as non-being. Is it not proper and justified to say that it is a meaning if revealed by the word 'beings', and non-meaning, if revealed by the word 'non-being'. Meaning according to Bhartṛhari is universal – it is the meaning of being and of non-being, meaning of meaning and of the non-meaning as well.

Objecting to Bhartṛhari's theory of meaning as inner-being, it can be said on behalf of *Naiyāyikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas*, for whom language is the expression for external existents or non-existents, that inner-being or non-being of pot is not expected by the expression. It is not capable of even doing so. If it is taken as idea, then, negation of it would not be expected and, hence, negative expressions could not be possible because of its presence by expressions in all tenses (*sarvakālika*). If the negation of it (*buddhistha-sattā*) is accepted, it will, then, be a counterpart (*pratiyogī*) of negation. As a counterpart (*pratiyogī*) and its negation (*abhāva*) are opposite to each other, both of the two cannot co-exist simultaneously. They say as intelligible being, according to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, figures as both: as being and as non-being: the word negation (*nāstī*) cannot be taken as the negator of the inner being 'pot', etc., and similarly *asti* cannot be taken as the expresser of its existence. On the basis of the arguments mentioned above, they accept the terms exists (*asti*) and non-exists (*nāstī*) as expressions for Being and Non-Being of external-existents.

Replying to the objections raised above, Bhartṛhari and his commentator Helārāja exemplify intelligible being (*upacāra-sattā*) by the analogy of *Vaiśeṣika*'s notion of *sattā*. As *sattā*, for *Vaiśeṣikas*, is the unity of substance (*dravya*), quality and action (*karma*), intelligible being is the unit that figures equally as being and as non-being. Bhartṛhari, different to *Vaiśeṣikas*, accepts *upacāra-sattā* as the universal that figures in both the expresser and the expressed, being and non-being, opposite and non-opposite, positive and negative beings.⁶⁷ *Upacāra-sattā* according to *Vaiyākaraṇas* is like a crystal that configures as the things kept near it. As it is, the being revealed by the language in the mind, it according to *Vaiyākaraṇas* figures equally as the idea of negation, affirmation, emptiness, non-existence, etc., by the respective expressions. That which is common to both in figuring as being and as non-being (*bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*) by language can be opposite neither to a being nor to a non-being. External-existents can

be perceived only as existents, but not as non-existents. It is only *upacāra-sattā* that figures in the mind equally as being, non-being, positive or negative when presented or revealed so by language in the mind.

Expressions, not only by negative suffix *nañ* (a) but, as *Vaiyākaraṇas* say, by words like 'birth', 'existence', 'change', 'increase', 'decrease' and 'destruction' also, are possible only on the basis of *upacāra-sattā* as the meaning figured in the mind by them. Keeping different kinds of beings chiefly into three categories (that is, birth, existence and negation) Bhartṛhari has observed that the possibility of expressions and accomplishment of cognition by language cannot be explained as possible, if *upacāra-sattā* is not taken as the meaning of the language. In the following paragraphs, we, in brief, will discuss how Bhartṛhari and his commentators have explained the possibility of expressions regarding negation, birth, existence, etc., on the basis of meaning as figured in the mind by language. It is also noteworthy to mention, here, that if *upacāra-sattā* is denied, and if external-Being is taken as the meaning, the expression regarding negation, birth, existence, etc., will not be possible in the absence of the cause of expectancy for those expressions.⁶⁸ For example, the cognition of negation by the expression '*abrāhmaṇa*' (*a* = prefix) + *brāhmaṇa* (nominal-word) is possible only if the *upacāra-sattā* of *brāhmaṇa* (of the negative expression '*abrāhmaṇa*') is taken into consideration. If the external-Being of '*brāhmaṇa*' is taken into account, it will be contradictory to negate the external-existence of *brāhmaṇa* by the expression '*abrāhmaṇa*'. The external-existents are not perceived as non-existent and simultaneous expression of the existence and non-existence of an external thing is not possible. Thus, if the word '*brāhmaṇa*' is taken as expressive of the external-Being of '*brāhmaṇa*' the negative expression '*abrāhmaṇa*' will not be possible. Not only that, but in the absence of expectancy for negation of that which is already existent, the use of negative prefix will also not be possible. If, for a moment, the non-existence of external-'*brāhmaṇa*' is accepted and, then, we use the negative prefix '*a*' with it, whom, will the negative prefix '*a*' (*nañ*), negate? The negation of that which is already a non-existent is contradiction in terms. Tout are contrarie to it, if the meaning as inner-being is taken into consideration only, then it is accomplished as the being, the external-Being of which in *kṣatrīya*, etc., is negated by the negative prefix '*a*'. Thus, the word

'*brāhmaṇa*', according to Bhartṛhari, reveals the being of '*brāhmaṇa*', which is attributed to *kṣatrīya*, etc., and this attribution of *brāhmaṇa*-hood in external *kṣatrīya*, etc., serves as the object of negation by the negative prefix (*nañ*). The word '*brāhmaṇa*' expresses being, and it is this being that by similarity is imposed on external *kṣatrīya*, etc. The negative prefix (*a*) conveys the natural absence of *brāhmaṇa* in external *kṣatrīya*, etc., through which we know that *brāhmaṇa*-hood is not natural (in anybody, namely, *kṣatrīya*, etc., who is not a *brāhmaṇa*), but is imposed on them by resemblance. In other words, it is not Being but being which can only be imposed on others. The use of the expression '*abrāhmaṇa*' shows that the being of *brāhmaṇa* by the word '*abrāhmaṇa*' in external *kṣatrīya*, etc. is attributed by the word. If the word *abrāhmaṇa* is taken as a compound denoting integration of meaning (*vṛtti*), it like the word '*brāhmaṇa*' serves as an independent expresser and, then it also seems right to say that as the word '*brāhmaṇa*' expresses a *brāhmaṇa*, the word '*abrāhmaṇa*' expresses independently a non-*brāhmaṇa* (anybody who is not a *brāhmaṇa*). But in all the two explanations, the expression of the meaning '*brāhmaṇa*' and '*abrāhmaṇa*' is possible only if the being is taken into account.

The opponents may say that as the being is accepted, by *Vaiyākaraṇas*, as ever existent, it cannot be a counterpart (*pratiyogī*) of negation. In other words, being eternally existent, it can never be non-existent. Contrary to it, external being, for them is non-existent in the past and in future as well. Thus, that of which non-existence is possible can only be negated by the negative prefix = *nañ* (*a*). As non-existence of only being is possible, it is only the being which is negated by the use of the negative prefix.⁶⁹

In reply to the above objection made by opponents of the being as the meaning of language, *Vaiyākaraṇas* say that a negative prefix is naturally expressive of negation. A negative prefix does not negate the external existence, but it expresses the idea of the negation of external existence. Refuting those who take negative prefix as the negator of external-Being, *Mahābhāṣyakāra* satirically comments⁷⁰: 'if the word "negation" were as miraculous as to negate the external-existents, the kings need not have to be equipped with the hoard of horses, elephants, army, etc., for defeating enemies. Their opponents were all removed only by uttering the word "negation" (*nañ*) at the front of them'. It is clear from these lines that negation does not negate

the existence of externals, but reveals the idea of the negation of them, similarly, the negative prefix with the word '*abrāhmaṇa*' reveals the idea of negation of *brāhmaṇa* in external *kṣatrīya*, etc., which by the word '*abrāhmaṇa*' is known by the intention involved in the use of the word.⁷¹ In other words, the idea of the non-existence of some external-existence is revealed by the negative prefix (*nañ*). The negation of the '*brāhmaṇa*' by the prefix (*nañ*) in the expression '*abrāhmaṇa*' will not be possible if external-Being is taken as the meaning of the words. The word *brāhmaṇa* is expressive of inner-being and by the use of negative prefix, the idea of the inner-being of *brāhmaṇa*, which is the object of negation, is negated in external *kṣatrīya*, etc., by the use of the word *abrāhmaṇa*.⁷²

In the previous pages, we have discussed that both positive and negative-beings are cognized as beings revealed by language in the mind. We have discussed that the negative expression cannot be possible if external-Being is taken into account as meaning. Bhartṛhari has very clearly discussed that the possibility of expression regarding *jāyate* (birth), *asti* (exist) and other beings is explained on the basis of meaning as inner-being (*upacāra-sattā*). In brief, he is of the view that all kinds of beings including birth, existence, etc. are known as they are revealed so in language.

Now, we proceed to examine the possibility of expressions regarding 'birth', by taking the example of the expression '*ankurojāyate*' (the sprout comes out).

By the 'birth' of something, we mean acquisition of one's own form - permitted form of what is prevented previously or the form prior to its existence and later to its unmanifested prevented form that is next in sequence and is still prevented. Accordingly, the expression 'the sprout comes out' means the acquisition or permission of the prevented form of sprout - a form prior to its existence that is next and is still a prevented form in the sequence. Birth of something is conceived as a manifested form of one previously unmanifested and prior to the next form, that is existence. Permission of a previously prevented casual form and before its existence (*asti*) is conceived as birth (*jāyate*).⁷³ The agent (acquisitor), the object (acquisable) and the action (acquisition) as congealed together are expected by the expression 'the sprout comes out'. The agent (sprout) of the action

(coming out), object (*karma*) the form to be achieved, that is birth and the action of coming out (of the sprout) must be involved there in the accomplishment of an action (*kriyā*). The substratum of an action may either be an agent or an object. In the absence of agent or object, accomplishment of an action is not possible. The expectancy for expressing external Beings (agent or object of birth = action) is not possible as they cannot exist before their birth, *External Being can be the agent or the object of an action only if they are born first but prior to their birth how can they exist and serve as the object of or as the agent of their own birth?*

Showing the contradiction in the use of 'birth' of an externally existent, Bhartṛhari puts a dialectic, a brief account of which is given as follows: If the sprout is already existent (real) there will be no expectancy for the expression of its birth (*janma*) and if it is non-existent (unreal), the expression regarding the birth of a non-existent is self-contradictory.⁷⁴ Unlike the action of going (*gaman*) in which the external mover (*gantā*) and the place to be reached (*gantavya*) are different, Bhartṛhari observes no possibility for a difference between 'the agent of birth' and the form to be achieved by the action 'birth' of an external-Being and, hence, the expression 'sprout comes out' is not possible if external-existent, is taken as the meaning of the language.⁷⁵

Opposite to Bhartṛhari's position, the *Sāṃkhya* system of Indian philosophy accepts external-existents as the meaning of the word. External 'sprout', for them, is existent even in the time of its taking birth and serves as the agent of the action (of its taking birth). The 'birth' in their theory of *satkārya* (the theory that assumes the unmanifested existence of effect in its cause prior to its birth) is the manifested form of an unmanifested. Objecting to the *Sāṃkhya* theory, Helārāja says that the explanation of birth even according to *satkāryavādins* is not possible, if meaning is taken as external-Being. *Sāṃkhya* also accepts 'birth', and interprets it as the manifested form of an unmanifested. Helārāja pleads if, *satkāryavādins* accept birth; they have to also accept that which is to be achieved by birth, that is, the result (*phala*) of the action. If it is otherwise, the uselessness of action has to be accepted. As the sprout, in their theory, as Helārāja observes, is existent (in an unmanifested form), there will be no cause of expectancy for the expression for its birth (to be manifested as yet).

In brief, Bhartṛhari and Helārāja want to show that the expression like 'sprout comes out' cannot be possible if external-existents are taken as the cause of the expectancy for the expression. In other words, the expression of the birth of external (already existent) cannot be expected as the object of expression, 'sprout comes out', and hence impossibility of the expressions as concerned with 'birth'.

Bhartṛhari explains the expression 'the sprout comes out' by taking the intelligible being (*upacāra-sattā*) of sprout and of the act of its birth as well. Helārāja says⁷⁶ as the sprout has not completely come out, the expression '*ankurojāyate*' is used for communicating its later form, in which it comes out fully. Had it fully come out, it would not be expected as an object of birth (*jāyate*) but of existence (*astī*). As the sprout has not fully come out, it can be taken as that which has not accomplished its own form, that is, non-existent (*asattā*). An action by a complete void or by unreal cannot be expected while the 'sprout' in the expression 'sprout comes out' is expressed as such that gets birth (*jāyamāṇa*). Thus, the sprout can be taken as both existence and non-existent. In other words, it is non-existence (*asattā*) in the sense that it has not fully come out as yet and, is existent (*sattā*) as it is there in an incomplete form and comes out fully later on. In other word, sprout as the cause is taken as non-existence (*asattā*) and as the effect as existent (*sattā*). The preceding and following states of the sprout (*ankura*) out' as the agent and the object of the expression 'sprout comes out' at the time of its 'coming out', is not externally existent. It, at not externally existent, no expectancy for the expression 'sprout comes out' is possible. According to Helārāja, the precedent and subsequent states of the sprout figure in the mind, and these inner-beings, figured in the mind, are taken into account for the expression 'sprout comes out'. If the inner beings of permitted and prevented sprout are accepted, only then the significance of the use of instrumental case (*karṭṛkāra*) with the verb (*jāyate*) may be expected on the one hand and the meaning of 'birth' (act of coming out of the sprout) may be expressed by the word exists (*jāyate*) on the other hand. If the following state of the effect 'coming out of the sprout' (*jāyate*) is already existent, it can be asked as to what is the need of saying its 'coming out' (*jāyate*)? According to Bhartṛhari, the objection mentioned above does not arise if 'existence or being of sprout' is taken as intelligible-being. Conclusively, it can be said on behalf of Bhartṛhari that an expression

like 'sprout is coming out' is expected on the basis of the inner-beings of the following state, without negating its preceding state.⁷⁷ In the expression 'sprout comes out' the intelligible-beings of the preceding and the following states are congealed, and the congealed state is expected by the expression 'sprout comes out'.

The difficulty in explaining expressions like '*ankurojāyate*', arising out of taking external-existents as the meaning of words, does not arise if intelligible-being is taken into consideration. The being (*ankura*), not fully manifested, figures first, which serves as the agent (*kartā*) of the being of the action 'comes out' (*jāyate*), on account of which the agent (the idea of '*ankura*' figured first in the mind) and the object (achievement of its next form, that is, 'coming out' that figures in the mind) of the verb '*jāyate*' by the expression '*ankurojāyate*' are cognized. The agent (*ankura* before its coming out), the object (the form of the sprout to be achieved) and the action '*jāyate*' (coming out) are inner-beings. The substratum of an action may either be an agent or an object, and if both of them are ideas, the action is also idea. Being idea, the prior and the latter forms of sprout are taken into consideration as the agent and object of the action '*jāyate*', respectively, for the expression of '*ankurojāyate*'. Grammatically, the use of a verbal tense (*lakāra*) with '*jāyate*' is possible only if the agent and object of the action '*jāyate*' are taken as intelligible-beings, if not, the use of the tense, as we have mentioned above, is not possible.

The expectancy for the expression of existence (*asti*), the second mode of being, can also not be possible if external-being is taken into consideration for the use of the language. The word 'exists' (*asti*) is a verb denoting action of possessing or holding one's own being. The being departed from its 'birth' but has not reached as yet the third stage of it, that is, 'change' (*vipariṇamate*), is called 'to hold itself' and that is expected by the word exists (*asti*). As agent (*kartā*) in *Pāṇinian* grammar is taken as independent (*svatantra-kartā*) and the object (*karma*) is taken as dependent (*paratantra*), and as they are mutually contradictory in nature, an external-being cannot be taken as both an agent and an object simultaneously, and, therefore, there would be no ground for the expression '*ankuro asti*' (the sprout exists), if external-being is taken as the cause of the expectancy for the use of the words. It is only the intelligible-being, which, as a single unit flashes forth and is expected or imagined by the mind differently

as both the agent and the object, on the basis of which the expression 'ankuro'sti' is expressed (*ātmānamātmanābibhṛadastīti vyapadiśyate*).⁷⁸

Asti (exists) is a verb (*ākhyāta-pada*) expressive of a being of a non-accomplished character (*sādhya*). It, like the verb cooking (*pacatī*), expresses a collection of many actions involved in a sequence. As there is no external agent who would perform the external action of existing (*asti*)? The expression 'ankuro'sti' cannot be possible if external-Being is taken as the meaning of words. In the act of 'existing of the sprout' there is no external agent (finished-character) and, then, what would serve as the substratum of the action '*asti*' (unfinished-character)? In the act of 'existing' the being of existing figures in the mind, but the same being cannot simultaneously be of a finished and of a non-finished character. An agent and object are the beings of an accomplished character and the being revealed by the verb (*asti*) is of a non-finished character. How can that which is just going to achieve its 'existence', be taken as of a finished character? If, for a moment, it is accepted to be of a finished character, it cannot, then be expected as of a non-finished character (that which *has to be* finished as yet). The external-Being cannot, at the same time, be both of the opposite characters of finished and of non-finished. An external-Being is always of an accomplished character (*siddha*) and, hence, it cannot be a Being of a non-finished character (*sādhya*). Bhartṛhari and Helārāja elucidate that the verb '*asti*', denoting non-accomplished-being, cannot be the expression of external existence, which is always of a finished character.⁷⁹

From the discussion made in the previous pages, it is clear that all beings - positive, negative, birth, existence, change, increase, decrease, destruction, etc., - are intelligible-beings. They are beings revealed by language in the mind. The intelligible-being (*upacāra-sattā*) of a finished and of a non-finished character figures in the mind non-differently by language and independently of external-Being. It is the being that causes incentive in a speaker for communicating through verbal utterances and which, in a hearer, is cognized as figures in the mind through verbal-noises/utterances. External-Beings which are generally taken as the object of perception, inference, etc., are in themselves beyond the grasp of language and the sense data acquired in perception by the senses are only tools in manifesting the intelligible being of language. Manifested by them, the inner language is revealed as an expresser

(*vācaka*) that non-differently reveals the meaning/expressed (*vācya*) and, thus both - the expresser and the expressed are intelligible-beings (*upacāra-sattā*), which are awareness in character.

According to Bhartṛhari, the being as qualifier-qualified⁸⁰ is also cognized as is figured by language in the mind. For example, the expression 'blue-lotus' (*nīlotpalam*) expresses the lotus (*utpalam*) qualified by the colour 'blue' (*nīla*). It cannot be expected so if external being is taken as the meaning of the expression. From the point of view of external-Being, the same lotus (*utpalam*) cannot be blue (*nīla*) also. The blue (*nīla*) is a quality and is not seen separate from the external lotus (*utpalam*) and, thus, the qualifier-qualified being by the expression 'blue lotus' will not be expected if external-Being is taken as meaning. This is not the case with inner being. The same meaning (being) is divided by intellectual device or by the mind as a qualifier (blue = *nīla*) and that, which is to be qualified by blue, that is, lotus (*utpalam*) also. The inner meanings-qualifier blue (*nīla*) and the qualified lotus (*utpalam*) congealed together are taken into account for the expression blue lotus (*nīlotpalam*), the being denoted as qualifier-qualified character.

The intelligible-being revealed in the mind by language is universal – in the sense that identical cognition by language in all occurrences and instances is accomplished. It may be asked, if non-existence or non-being (*abhāva*) and other empty-concepts like hare's horn, barren's son, etc. (as there are no individual existents for the inherence of universal) cannot be admitted as universal and, hence, the denial of them as universal is the denial of their being. Solving the problem, Helārāja elucidates '*abhāvasyā'pi buddhyākāreṇa nirūpaṇāt*'.⁸¹ According to this statement of Helārāja, 'non-existence' (*abhāva*) in all its occurrences figures in the mind and that which figures in the mind is a being and it is that being because of which identical cognition by the word non-existent in its several occurrences and instances figures. Not only that, but because of how '*abhāva*' is presented by words in the mind, it is classified into different kinds that is, *prāgabdhāva*, *pradhvansābhāva*, *anyonyābhāva*, *atyantābhāva* and, hence, it, inhering in all of its kind, is taken as universal.⁸² Non-being (*abhāva*) in the system of *Vyākaraṇa* is accepted as an idea of negation (non-existent) and, hence, a being and thus, to accept it, as a counterpart of Being, is a futile idea. Like being, non-being also figures in the mind by the

words and that is why cognition by the word 'abhāva' is accomplished. For example, dative case is taught with verb 'dadāti' as in the expression 'viprāyagām dadāti' (he gives a cow to the *brāhmaṇa*). The same case is taught with its negation, as in the expression 'viprāyagām na dadāti' (he does not give a cow to the *brāhmaṇa*). The same rule is taught for both the being and the non-being, and cognition by both – the being and the non-being figures positively and, hence, to accept the intelligible-being of non-being (*abhāva*) like being (*bhāva*) seems justified from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition in communication.

The possibility of the eternity of relation between language and meaning, on which the *Vaiyākaraṇas* theory is based, can also not be explained if external being is taken as the meaning of language.⁸³

A *śabda* is eternally related to meaning, because meaning, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is that which is revealed non-differently in the mind by it. If meaning as external-Being is taken into consideration, the relation between a linguistic unit (language) and the external-Being/thing (that is, Being which is beyond the grasp of language) will be difficult to explain. Moreover, physical things that are existent only in the present, cannot be taken as eternally related with another thing or with language. As the meaning according to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is non-different from the eternally given, the question regarding the relation between the two, that is between *śabda* and the meaning, arises significantly as expresser-language is eternally related with it by the natural fitness of the mind by This eternal relation, according to *Vaiyākaraṇas* is the eternal fitness (*yogyatā*) of the language. The eternal relation (*yogyatā-sambandha*) is naturally there with all meanings, because it, in the system of *Vaiyākaraṇa*, is taken as the expresser of all meanings (*sarvesarvārtha vācakāḥ*) and it is convention (the observation of the uses by elders) by which the *yogyatā* of a word is defined, on account of which a fixed meaning (*artha*) is known by a fixed word.

The picture-theory of Wittgenstein, according to which a proposition is a fact and the meaning supposed to be pictured by proposition, that is, 'fact pictured', is also a fact and the two are mutually independent, distinct and discrete facts, has no sound, logical and epistemological, ground for explaining the relation between the

prepositional fact and the facts pictured. His theory of structural-commonness between prepositional fact and the fact pictured is not a solution to the problem of the relation. According to his own theory, the commonness may be a fact to be expressed by a further proposition since it is also an experience. Thus, the fact of commonness will be just an addition to the number of discrete facts, and then it will be of no help in solving the problem of relation between the discrete facts - except - amounting to infinite regress. As his picture-theory rejects causal relation as a mark of superstition, the relation between the two facts (by accepting that the preceding fact causes the following fact) cannot be taken for relation.

Bhartṛhari solves the problem of relation between language and meaning by taking it as natural-fitness of language-fitness to reveal meaning non-differently in the mind. Meaning is not a discrete fact. It is a being non-differently revealed by language and, hence, the two are eternally related.

What is revealed in the mind by language is a clear, distinct and complete indivisible unit, a flash of understanding (*pratibhā*). The cognition or flash revealed in the mind by language (*sphoṭa*) is always veridical cognition, because communication is accomplished by it. According to Bhartṛhari's trend of philosophy, the cognition revealed even by the terms non-veridical, indistinct, etc. is veridical, if otherwise, the communication cannot be accomplished. By the term 'veridical cognition' Bhartṛhari means the cognition revealed or figured in the mind by language, and that which by itself functions as an incentive to an action. The clear and distinct cognition revealed by language in the mind is always veridical cognition, and that is why Bhartṛhari calls it by the term '*pratibhā*'. He accepts the cognition (sentential and word-meaning) as veridical and does not reject the possibility of their further examination through reasoning and experience for men who seek verification or confirmation for believing in the veridical cognition revealed by language in the mind.

Verification and confirmation of a veridical cognition revealed in the mind are central epistemological problems for those who take language as that which stands by proxy for things. They decide and accept the truth of cognition revealed by statement on the basis of the state of affairs, that is, 'A statement is true if it has a referent in the empirical word, otherwise, false'. Contrary to them, Bhartṛhari observes

no need for external objects for explaining the expressions and the world of communication, that is, the world of expressions and of the meanings. The verifying experience as a complete independent unit of experiential event, as a Bhartṛharian would say, has no connection whatsoever with the earlier experience which are supposed to verify it and, thus, the testability theory of meaning based on the comparison of it with referable entities, is of no use or no significance as far as the accomplishment of communication or cognition by language is concerned.

Cognitively, verity is the very character of the cognition accomplished in communication. No communication is possible if the cognition revealed by language in the mind is not veridical. Veridical cognition revealed in the mind is prior to, and functions as, a base of verification, falsification, confirmation, etc. involved in the explanation of it. These are means required for convincing the persons governed by stereotyped perception and practice. Persons having stereotyped attitudes regarding cognition consider language as name/designation of things or of action. The explanation of the veridical cognition revealed by language is useful for facilitating a discursive understanding of man taking it as that which stands by proxy for the things meant. Such an understanding inevitably demands verification of a statement based on reason and experience for believing.

Verification is a logical criterion applied for the examination of a statement on the basis of referents as meaningful or meaningless or even as true or otherwise. It has a referential value and is based on the theory of language as a representative or referring tool, for which a sentence is meaningful if it has a referent in the empirical world, or if it can be described in terms of empirical experience. But how can verification or the referential truth of the statement, 'the sentence is true if it expresses the true state of affairs or things in the empirical world' be possible? For the lack of verification, the statement under example will be accepted either as presumptuous or as meaningless. Meaninglessness itself is known as the language reveals it. It will be embarrassing for positivists to accept their theory as inconsistent or as presumptuous. Empiricists, in general and logical positivists, in particular, stand self-contradicted if they submit themselves to verification as the cause of the verity of cognition, which for Bhartṛhari, is revealed by language.

Verity of cognition revealed by language in communication cannot be denied without a veridical cognition revealed by the word 'denial', and empiricists and positivists cannot deny the verity of cognition revealed by their basic proposition 'the meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification'. Taking the verity of cognition revealed by the statement for granted, further explanation of it through the instances of statements and subsequent examination of them in terms of meaningfulness or meaninglessness and truth or falsity is made on the basis of referents to be referred to in the empirical world. The verity of cognition and the examination of its truth based on verification are issue different from each other. In the case of the former, language occupies a foundational status (it is the expresser and the expressed) while in the case of the latter, it is merely a referring tool. The language in the case of the former is basic, while it in case of the latter is tool. Bhartṛhari's approach seems justified from both points of view of accomplishment of communication and its explanation in terms of validity. It considers the cognition revealed by language as veridical and estimates verification, confirmation, etc., as devices for further explanation/examination of the verity useful for convincing and believing those who seek referential evidence for the certainty of the verity of cognition by language.

Those who take perception and other allied sources as the cause of cognition and consider language as representative of the cognition by perception, take it as a tool through which the cognition by perception is articulated to the audience. Contrary to their view, Bhartṛhari considers it as the only expresser of cognition. It expresses itself and the meaning as well.

Perceived sense data are tools in cognition, which are shot through-and-through with language. If not, then it will be just incommunicable private feelings with the things, on the basis of which communication cannot be accomplished. According to Bhartṛhari's system of thought, the perception by different senses and the senses themselves are distinguished by language expressing them. There is no knowledge that is not infused by language; all knowledge is knowledge shot through and through by language and what is revealed by it in the mind is always veridical knowledge, which, irrespective of verification, confirmation, etc. accomplishes communication. The examination of the cognition revealed by it in the mind through experience and

reasoning forms a subject matter of a distinct logic, for which the veridical cognition revealed so is valid if there is a possibility of a corresponding referent in the empirical world.⁸⁴ What counts in communication is not the validity based on empirical evidence and epistemic justifications but the verity, and this verity is the nature of cognition as it is directly revealed by the language. All cognition is revealed by language and is veridical. It is awareness and not predication, perception by senses or feelings.

As far as cognition by fantasy, allegories, myths, factual, non-factual and other expressions are concerned, their distinction, for Bhartṛhari, is relative to communication. It is communication on the basis of which their differences are known by the expressions themselves. Those who are not well versed in communication, as in the case of children, may take fantasy, myths, etc. as expressions of real-life situations, but upon growing up, they see the differences in cognition through communication. The cognition by the expression 'A is a myth' is a veridical cognition and that is why it is known thus. Verity of cognition is based neither on referents nor on empirical evidences and epistemic justifications, but on the accomplishment of communication itself.⁸⁵

METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND OF SPEECH

The central problem of the *Vākyapadīya* is cognitive, Bhartṛhari aims at explaining communication as it is accomplished by language. As all cognition is cognition revealed by language, as our cognition is confined to the beings revealed by language in the mind, he, as a philosopher of language, does not feel any need to accept metaphysical substances for the explanation of the world of communication. It is also true that he, particularly in the first part and also in some context in other parts of *Vākyapadīya*, has discussed metaphysical issues from which it appears that it is a book of metaphysics based on a non-dual, indivisible language-principle (*śabda-brahman*), as the ultimate reality of all diversities.⁸⁶ Now, the question is: if our cognition is confined to the beings revealed in the mind by language and if metaphysical reality or things-in-themselves are transcendental Beings, i.e. if they are beyond the touch of language, how can they be accepted at all?

Bhartṛhari's approach to the explanation of metaphysics is different from that of those who explain the world of physical-things by accepting a metaphysical reality as ultimate and who take relation between things and cognition as the basic problem of philosophy. Contrary to them, Bhartṛhari considers explanation of cognition by language in usual communication, as the basic problem of philosophical reflections that is restricted to beings only.⁸⁷ Language for his philosophical reflection is not a metaphysical, but a cognitive being. He accepts things-in-themselves by implication as the metaphysical substratum (*tāttvika samānādhikaraṇa*) of the cognition revealed by language. Thus, metaphysical entities, for Bhartṛhari, are not beings to be revealed and cognized directly by language, but are logically inferred Beings or entities. They are a logical necessity for those who seek a metaphysical principle of the beings, revealed in the mind by language, as their metaphysical substratum or for those who seek an external referent of the cognition revealed by language and take language as that which stands by proxy for external entities. For the explanation of the cause of cognition, the existence of mind, soul or consciousness, is implicated as the substratum of the cognition revealed by these words in particular and that of language in general. Taking these matters of fact in consideration, he has accepted the existence of mind or soul as the metaphysical substratum of the cognition revealed by language.

As we have seen in earlier pages, philosophy, for Bhartṛhari, is confined to the objects of cognition that, according to him, comprises the cognition of the ideas or beings of the language, the meaning and their awareness. Cognition is shot through and through by language, and language and meaning are the objects of cognition. External things are implicated as the external basis (*ālambana pratyaya*) of the beings revealed by language and so is the mind as the metaphysical basis of cognition itself.⁸⁸ It is by such a presumption or reasoning that speculative philosophy by putting the transcendental things in the domain of language considers the existence of things also as speakable by words and it is with this consideration that they assume language as a pointer to Beings.

Speculation on *śabda-brahman*, in the first part of *Vākyapadīya*, may be accepted as elucidation in praise (*arthavāda*) of the language-principle, the nature and laws of which are to be interpreted by the rest of it. It discusses mainly the nature and origin of language in relation

to the *śabda*-principle, by knowing which the aspirant may take utmost interest in learning the cognitive beings discussed mainly in second and third parts of it. On the other side, those who take *Vākyapadīya* as a system of metaphysics and have a metaphysical understanding of language try to interpret it as an Advaitic metaphysical system for which the language-principle is the Reality, the cause of all beings, becoming, mind, matter, language, cognition, etc. But if one goes through the *Vākyapadīya*, one finds that Bhartṛhari has a cognitive understanding of language, though he has not viewed the metaphysical understanding of it as contradictory to the former. However, this kind of the evaluation of the *Vākyapadīya* faces most perturbing problems of reconciling the metaphysical Beings that are beyond the grasp of language and the beings that are revealed by language. Moreover if, *śabda-brahman* is the ontological reality, which is consciousness or mind, and the ideas revealed by language in the mind are taken as thought objects or meaning, the relation between mind as a thing-in-itself and ideas as intelligible beings may be interpreted by inference as the base and the based. Any ontic substratum beyond ideas is not an object of cognition revealed by language. It, as Bhartṛhari assumes, is the object of *yogins'* realization and, hence, a subject-matter of *sādhana* (religions). The gap between the objects of cognition or ideas and transcendental things, i.e. the world of metaphysical, physical and psychological entities and the world of communication can well be explained only if the *śabda-brahman*, as the ontic substratum of the cognitive beings is presumed on the basis of cognition *revealed by language*.

The specific entities (*vāhyavikalpa*) are inferred as the external substratum of meaning revealed by language and the language-principle is inferred as the ontological substratum (consciousness as Being) of the cognition revealed by the language. The language revealed in the mind and its meaning revealed non-differently by it are different ideas that serve as the basis of the inference of its substratum (*things-in-themselves*). Bhartṛhari has emphasized the problem of the unity and *diversity of beings and Beings not as they are but how they are* presented by language in communication. However, his observation on language-principle as the ultimate Being, briefly mentioned in earlier pages, finds that it is not only the substratum of the cognition by language, i.e. mind or consciousness, but the ultimate cause of all the minds and the matters, the expresser and the expressed also. Encyclopaedia of Indian philosophy very nicely puts the significance

of the divine language-principle, by saying that the entire creation of the world was attributed by some sages to divine language, and it was generally recognized that the ordinary speech of mortals was only a fraction of that language.⁸⁹ In order to throw sufficient and legitimate light on the metaphysics of his *Vākyapadīya*, I shall take up next for discussion the concept of language-principle.

Conception of Word-principle (Śabda-Brahman)

We have concluded in the previous pages that Bhartṛhari has tried to reconcile the metaphysical problem of reality with the cognitive problem of meaning by explaining things-in-themselves as inferred as ontological substrata of cognition revealed by language. *Advaita Vedāntins* accepts *Brahman* as the ultimate Reality and deduce the logical solution of other problems of their philosophy on the basis of their holistic conception of, *Brahman*. Opposite to them, Bhartṛhari aims at explaining the world of communication by taking it as a cognitive problem, and, then, he accepts *śabda-brahman* as the ontological substratum of the cognition revealed by language in communication. The language principle, according to him, is known by inference or by implication made on the basis of beings revealed in the mind by language. As per his metaphysical speculations on the Reality of the language-principle, it seems right to say that Reality for him, is an all-pervading consciousness, ubiquitously and eternally existent in all forms of Being and becoming as their very soul.

Out of the three levels of speech,⁹⁰ utterances or verbal-noises (*vaikharī-vāk*), for Bhartṛhari, are perceived entities which manifest the intelligible-language (*madhyamā-śabda*) that reveals itself first when manifested by utterances and then its meaning is revealed non-differently by it. The articulated speech (*vaikharī*) is known by perception while intelligible-language (*madhyamā-śabda*) revealed in the mind is cognized as a unit of awareness from which meaning (*pratibhā*) is revealed. Intelligible-language is subtler than the articulated form of it. According to Bhartṛhari, there is also the subtlest form of speech called *paśyantī*, which is known by implication as the ontic substratum of intelligible-language (*madhyamā-vāk*). *Paśyantī*, the ontic substratum of intelligible-language, is the subtlest of all forms of speech and it, for Bhartṛhari, is *śabda-brahman*, non-differentiated consciousness or soul. So far as, the

question of explaining things-in-themselves is concerned, Bhartṛhari accepts them as objects beyond cognition, because what figures in the mind, for him, i.e. (*upacāra-sattā*) is the only object to which our cognition is confined. He accepts *Brahman* is the substratum of cognition and is known by implication made on the basis of the cognition revealed by language. Worldly things ontic in nature are presumed as substratum of the thought-object or ideas figured by language in that cognition. Metaphysically, things-in-themselves are not independent existents but are manifested out of the spontaneity of *śabda-brahman* identified by him as *mūrti-vivarta* and *kriyā-vivarta*.⁹¹ It is time, space and others powers which function as limiters of the power of *Brahman*, on the basis of which the non-dual reality is diversified differently as different things.

Before clarifying Bhartṛhari's attitude on the issue as to the necessity to admit metaphysical reality and values in a philosophy that aims at explaining sentence, word (*vākya* and *pada*) and their meanings as they are revealed in the mind by language, we have to observe first the reasons why the language-principle is called *Brahman*.

Grounds for Designating Śabda as Brahman

1. Being the luminous and illuminating principle of Beings and beings, the *śabda* is called *Brahman*. The consciousness itself, as the ontological principle of all Beings and beings (*vikalpas*) is taken by the term *śabda-brahman*. Thus, *śabda* is viewed by *Vaiyākaraṇas*, not only as a means of communication, but also due importance is given by them to its cognitive and spiritual significance, in so far as it is taken as the conscious principle of all that is known and is knowable by language. In its pure Being or consciousness, it is called *paśyantī*, in the form of inner ideas revealed in the mind it is intelligible-being (*madhyamā*) and in the form of articulated utterances, noises/marks which are spoken, heard and read by audience, it is the articulated form of language (*vaikharī*). Thus, being the place of origin of different layers of language, from subtle to gross, as well as being the same reality from subtle to gross it is called *Brahman*.
2. It, being the nature (*prakṛti*) of every Being and becoming, is called *Brahman*.⁹² On account of being the ontological substratum

of beings, language is called *Brahman*.⁹³ *Śabda* by nature is consciousness. Cognitively for Bhartṛhari, it is the indivisible awareness and metaphysically, consciousness itself. It is not a product of anything. The theory of the production of utterances (*dhvani-śabda*) by air, atom and knowledge is not applicable to the explanation of the creation of intelligible-language that is ubiquitously given. It is not produced by *ākāśa* (sky) as *Naiyāyikas* assume. Though it, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is sky-pervading, it is not produced, but simply manifested by human efforts in the form of verbal-utterances. As it is not produced and destroyed, because destruction implies production as a prior stage of it, language (*śabda*) is eternal; it has neither a beginning nor an end, and, hence, not subject to birth and death.⁹⁴

The philosophy of *Sāṃkhya* and *Advaita-Vedānta* that believe in the *pañcīkaraṇa* theory of the production of the five elements (*mahābhūtas*), also accept *śabda* as the indivisible cause of the production of the indivisible sky. For Bhartṛhari, the verbal-utterances are the external manifestation of the indivisible language and, it indivisibly, without addition to other elements (*tanmātras*) produces sky. In the production of other *tanmātras*, the language plays a vital role, because other elements cannot produce anything without the association of it. For example, the touch-element (*sparsā-tanmātra*) with the association of the language-element (*śabda-tanmātras*) produces air that possesses the qualities of both the elements (*tanmātras*) that is language (*śabda*) and touch (*sparsā*). The form element (*rūpa-tanmātra*), with the association of *śabda* and *sparsā-tanmātra* produces fire, which possesses the quality of language, touch (*sparsā*) and form (*rūpa*). The *rasa-tanmātra* associated with *śabda*, *sparsā*, and *rūpa* (form) produces water that possesses the qualities of all the four components. Similarly, the (*gandha-tanmātra*) associated with other four elements, including *śabda*, produces earth (*prithivī*), which possesses the qualities of all the five components.

It is clear that the language-principle (*śabda*) is inevitably required for the production of elements (*bhūtas*), but it does not need any association with any other elements for producing sky. It indivisibly and singly produces sky. Everything is produced through the process of *pañcīkaraṇa*, but there is no *pañcīkaraṇa* in *śabda*. *Śabda* is an indivisible and eternal element that acts on for causing all elements

(*bhūtas*), but it is uncaused. From the discussion made above, it is clear that Bhartṛhari has accepted *śabda* as the nature (*prakṛti*) of all things: existing or non-existing. The conscious-principle is subtle and pervasive than the physical principle (*prakṛti*) of the *Sāṃkhya* system and is comparable to *Brahman*, the foundational metaphysical reality of the *Upaniṣads* and *Vedānta* as a whole.

A question as to how *śabda* can be taken as the nature (*prakṛti*) of every thing, may be asked. Eyes, for example, perceive the colour and form, but *eyes do not perceive śabda* and similar is the case with other senses. In order to answer the problem, it can be said that *śabda* pervades all. *All are of the nature of śabda, and that is why everything is expressed by it. If they had been of a different nature, their expression by it would have not been possible.* In the system of *Vaiyākaraṇa*, *śabda* being the expression of all is taken as of the nature (*prakṛti*) of all beings.⁹⁵ *Nirūktakāra* by the statement '*vyāptimatvatu śabdasya*',⁹⁶ has elucidated *śabda* as *Brahman* because of its all-pervading and illuminating nature. As it is illuminative of all Beings and beings and is itself luminous by nature, it seems logically justified to accept it as the origin essence (*prakṛti*) of everything.

Śabda-Vṛṣabha

One of the reasons behind accepting *śabda* as *Brahman* lies in perceiving the system of grammar as a royal road to spiritual enlightenment. As a means to the spiritual realization of the language-principle (*śabda-brahmah*), *Vaiyākaraṇas*, like the *Upaniṣadic* seers, have initiated a kind of meditation known as *pratīkopāsanā* (meditation on a symbolized form). In *pratīkopāsanā* the whole cosmos or some or any power of it is symbolically represented as a deity. The '*vṛṣabha*' (bull) is projected as a symbol of the spirit, the cosmic reality, that is the language-principle. The meaning of the word '*vṛṣabha*' in the derivation '*varṣati kāmān*' is that who fulfils the aspirations of the aspirants and that with whom aspirants aspire to commune and that is 'the great all-pervading soul' which, for meditation, is taken symbolically as *śabda-vṛṣabha*. The Vedic verse '*catvāri'sṅgā trayo asya pādā dve śirṣe sapta hastāsoasya. Triddhā baddho vṛṣabho roravīti maho devo martyām āviveśa*',⁹⁷ that has four horns (marked as four kinds of words i.e. *nāma*, *ākhyāta*, *upasarga* and *nipāta*) (the kind of the word that is post-position (*karmapravacanīya*) is included in these four). Some interprets

the four horns of *śabda-vṛṣabha* as *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* popularly known as the four levels of speech-language. The present, past and the future of the *śabda-vṛṣabha*, on which it stands, is marked as its feet. The *vṛṣabha* has two heads indicated as eternal (*nitya*) and effectuated (*kārya*). The seven terminations (*vibhaktiyān*) are taken as seven hands of it. It is taken as tied from three places, namely the thigh, the throat and the head. This *śabda-vṛṣabha* that fulfils the aspirations of all aspirants and who utters frequently and excessively, is the great deity with whom the human being desire to commune with. The *śabda-vṛṣabha* dwelling in the human beings is the individual-self (*jīvātmā*), and as it pervades the whole cosmos it is *paramātmā*. The aim of this *śādhana* lies in promoting the aspirants for communion of himself or herself with the *śabda-vṛṣabha*.

As all incentives to do and not do are caused by language, language is the revealing force; it is the dynamism, the *śabda-vṛṣabha*. The form of the *śabda* i.e. verbal-utterances perceived by auditory sense in communication is the outer manifestation (*kārya-śabda*) of the *śabda-vṛṣabha*, the *nitya-śabda*.⁹⁸

Different modes of beings that are language and meanings classified chiefly into six, i.e. *jāyate* (birth), *asti* (exists), *vipariṇamate* (change), *vardhate* (increase), *apakṣīyate* (decrease) and *vinasyati* (destruction), are taken as different aspects of *śabda-vṛṣabha*. The aspirant, by knowing the correct (*sādhū*) and incorrect (*asādhū*) forms of language, and by discriminating what is original and what is derived through agreement and disagreement (*anvayavayatireka*), gets wisdom and by contemplating on which he realizes the *śabda-vṛṣabha*, which is the substratum of the ontic and cognitive world as well. This realization in the system of *vyākaraṇa* is the realization of the language-principle (*paśyantī*) or the realization of the all-pervading luminosity.⁹⁹

Śabda-Brahman as one and Non-dual Reality

Metaphysicians traditionally consider the problem of 'Reality as one or many' as a philosophical problem. In the realistic interpretation of diversities perceived by the senses, all individuals are considered separately as real. In such an interpretation of reality, the problem of their natural relation stands significantly. There may be a relation between different equal, unequal or even contradictory objects, but the relation between independent realities always stands unsolved. In

order to abstain from the perturbing problem of duality, philosophers have taken a monistic stand, according to which the things of the world and the world itself are relative to the ultimate reality that creates them out of itself. The materialists on the other hand assume everything as a production of matter, which for them is the only real. They do not accept any reality over and above the material elements. The monists by taking some basic unity in diversities have preferred to interpret the ontic oneness of them differently on the basis of Reality as a consciousness principle. According to *Advaita Vedāntins* and some holists, the same Reality from the sense of duality is perceived as different and from the sense of unity as non-different.

The word 'one' used for reality (ultimate) is taken in the sense of non-dependence of Reality. This independence is limited or contradicted, if the presence of the two or more than one is accepted (because of the logical possibility of one being limited by the other). The philosophy that assumes the reality as independent tries to theorize the one as pervading all, or the one who on account of its divergent powers is treated differently as diversity or who appears in diversity.

Actually the general use of the word 'one' for Bhartṛhari is relative. The use of words is always relative to a meaning different from other meaning. Even the word 'independence' is also used relatively to its counterpart, i.e. dependence. Similarly, the use of 'one' specifies that Reality is not more than one. Moreover, even the use of the Reality as 'one' is improper if Reality-in-itself is taken as beyond the grasp of language or is a transcendental Being. Taking the limits of language in view, Bhartṛhari has elucidated that, being transcendental, Reality-in-itself can be said neither as 'one' nor as 'many'.¹⁰⁰ It is contradictory to the nature of reality in itself to limit it by the use of the words 'one' or 'many'. The words 'one and many' are applied for limiting things, and, thus, it is improper to calculate the reality-itself in the category of limited things, as one or many. In the holistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari it is logically difficult to assert the reality as one or as many, because 'one' comparable to 'many' is also a number and the number cannot be separated from the reality numbered. If the number is accepted different from what is numbered, then the problem of duality of reality and number arises.¹⁰¹ According to Bhartṛhari, reality beyond the approach of human mind, can be said neither as one nor as many, neither as existent nor as non-existent,

neither as composite nor as separate, neither indivisible nor made of division. It cannot be expressed in any other ways or forms.¹⁰²

It is relative to communication that the reality, beyond the grasp of language, is called differently as one, many, existent, non-existent, Being, non-being, changing, unchanging, etc. It is improper with the nature of reality in itself to say it is one or two separate-beings or non-beings, transcendental or empirical. In designating reality as 'one', the merging of all opposites – two, many, etc. – is taken into account and it is called many from the point of its divergent distinctions.¹⁰³ Even when Reality is represented by the word 'unqualified', the unqualified is presented by the word 'unqualified', as qualified by the 'unqualified'.

In the holistic trend, language (*śabda*) and knowledge are taken as non-different. The knowledge is indivisible, but treated analytically as the formation of parts. As knowledge is knowledge by expression, which infuses it, everything is known as presented by language. Language pervades all: the objects of cognition and their cognition as well, and, hence, being the nature of all, it is designated as *Brahman*.

Śabda as Beginningless, Endless Brahman (Anādi-nidhanam)

Bharṭṛhari has defined *Brahman* as '*anādinidhanam brahman śabda tattvam adakṣaram*'.¹⁰⁴ Eternal (*nitya*) in philosophy, is that which has neither a beginning nor an end, that which is not subjected to beginning and end is an indestructible/unchanging character (*akṣara*). In Indian philosophy, it is accepted that the whole spacio-temporal phenomenon is subject to birth and perish. The indivisible language having the nature of awareness is only eternal. It has neither a beginning nor an end.

Why there is neither a beginning nor an end of language? The simple reply is that we do not create *śabda*, but we make use of it. *Śabda* is eternally given and we, from the observation of its uses by elders, through some or the other form of tokens/garbs popular in the language community, know its use. Language, and the meaning, revealed non-differently by it, are given and that is one of the reasons it is eternal. *Vaiyākaraṇas*, on the basis of experience and speculation,

have also tried to show the eternity of *śabda*. All things and their modes may be destroyed, but the language expressive of the meaning is not destroyed. It is used even for the meanings the external correspondents of which are destroyed or are not yet to be found in the empirical world.

In communication, the language-tokens we speak or articulate are destroyed in the sequence of uttering, but the language (*śabda*), given as the unity of them, is not destroyed with the destruction of those tokens. It, as illuminating principle, is ubiquitously and at all times given in the mind. On this ground *Vaiyākaraṇas* have accepted language as eternal.

Eternity of language (*śabda*) is the theory of the eternity of knowledge. Language infuses knowledge and, hence, is non-different. As indivisible knowledge, it has neither a beginning nor an end and therefore it is defined as '*anādi-nidhanam*'. A question, even in those theories that assume knowledge as a produced entity, arises as to how do we know knowledge as a produced entity, if knowledge is not given there beforehand. And, thus, they are also bound to accept that knowledge is not a created or produced entity, but is given and serves as the cause of incentive for expressions, when revealed in the mind. The theory of eternity of knowledge cannot be denied, and so is the eternity of language (*śabda*), because the latter is infused with language and the former is itself awareness in nature. It is the language that illuminates everything – light, non-light, eternal, non-eternal, existence, negation, etc., and, therefore, the prior existence of the language as the cause of the illumination of them, as objects of knowledge and of incentive for action, cannot be denied.

Eternity of communication, implies eternity of language; else, a communicationless stage has to be presumed. The question of eternity/non-eternity of language in a stage beyond communication does not arise and if there is any possibility of communicating even at the 'stage of utter void', it cannot then be denied that it is performed by language, and this implies the eternal existence of language. It is justified to say that the communication of 'eternity' or 'non-eternity' by language implies the given being of it.

Language, for Bhartṛhari, is awareness, and the cognition of existent or of non-existent being is a cognition shot through and through by it. Nonetheless, irrespective of cognition, the question of existence

or non-existence of anything does not arise and, thus, even the rejection of the eternity of it implies the prior existence of it. On the basis of this logic, *Vaiyākaraṇas*, in general, and Bhartṛhari, in particular, elucidate the eternity theory of language. As the existence of air is known on the basis of burning of fire, similarly, language is known on the basis of its articulation through palates, lips, throat, etc. If the existence of it, prior to its articulations, is not accepted, then in the absence of the cause of incentive, expectancy to speak or to articulate will not arise. If thoughts are taken as imagination, that imagination is not possible isolated from language because the language infuses them.

Substance, non-substance, real, unreal, existent, non-existent, positive, negative, etc. are communicated through language. They are expressed by language, the prior existence of which is, thus, a prerequisite of the beginningless world of communication.¹⁰⁵

In view of Bhartṛhari's *Kāla Samuddesāḥ*, a chapter on Time, it is obvious that the language-principle plays the game of permission and prevention through its independent power called time. In every form of communication and creation, time, as Helārāja says, is an eternal and independent power of the *śabda-brahman*, on account of which permission and prevention of the things in the empirical world and the manifestation and non-manifestation of the intelligible language (*sphoṭa*), or its manifestation in the form of articulated sounds, take place.¹⁰⁶ It is the cause (*upādāna*) of the manifestation of verbal sounds, through which communication is accomplished. It, before and after its manifestation through verbal-utterances, remains prevented and the prevented form is known as negation (*abhāva*), which when permitted is known as existence (*bhāva*). On the basis of the perceived sequence of permission and prevention, the eternal presence of language as the cause of the incentive to these activities is accepted by *Vaiyākaraṇas*. The word 'cow' is not destroyed after its single or frequent articulations in times, it, as the cause and unity of the articulated sounds, is eternally present.

From the point of view of cognition, and the accomplishment of communication, Bhartṛhari elucidates the eternity of *sphoṭa* that is the real, the expresser, indivisible and intelligible language. As it is manifested gradually by utterances, Bhartṛhari takes it as universal.¹⁰⁷ The universal is eternal; it is not destroyed, but is prevented after and

before its articulations. It is eternally present, and by itself serves as the cause of the incentive to speak when revealed by language in the mind.

Bhartṛhari has taken the word 'eternal' in two senses. According to the first, eternal is the absolute – the absolute Being (*śabda-brahman*) which is not subject to birth and death. According to the second, the *śabda* is eternal in the sense of the beginninglessness of communication. However, in both the senses, it is eternal; it is never destroyed through the changing divisions of time, i.e. past, present and future. Destruction is just the act/state of prevention of the power in operation.

Bhartṛhari's explanation of the absolute is different from that of others. According to his interpretation, reality is beyond the grasp of language. As cognition is cognition revealed by words, we cognize only the beings (*upacāra-sattā*) revealed in the mind by language. The indivisible *śabda-brahman* is inferred as the ontological substratum of indivisible cognition revealed in communication. What is cognized is indivisible and is not a construction out of parts and similarly the *śabda-brahman* is not a construction out of a collection of external things or their qualities. Cognitively, external things are known by implication as creation by permission and prevention of the time-power of the *Brahman*. *Brahman* plays these functions through time-power, but it and its time-power are not subject to the process of permission and prevention themselves. Similarly, the sentence in his philosophy is indivisible, a unit of awareness in nature that is manifested by utterances/noises. This idea of indivisibility of language, at both ontological and cognitive levels forms holism, according to which an absolute is eternal and is the uncaused of all which is caused. This uncaused cause, for Bhartṛhari is consciousness which, from the cosmic point of view, is the cause of all macrocosm and microcosm and from the point of view of cognition is the cause of all beings figured by it in the mind. Similarly, the indivisible sentence (*sphoṭa*) is artificially analyzed into different subordinate sentences/phrases/words, etc. but remains indivisible in spite of the analytic remedy useful for making the indivisible understandable to beginners. Taking it only in this way, the relation between the things-in-themselves and thought-objects cognized by language, can be explained properly, otherwise, the relation between things-in-themselves and thought objects, and between *śabda-brahman* and its expressions may lead to a many-level, unsolvable

dualism. Conclusively, it can be said that the real language is intelligible; it is *sphoṭa*, as cognition is revealed by it. Mind or consciousness is itself a ubiquitous principle which is inferred as the ontological substratum of beings revealed in it.

Śabda as Creative Force

The concept of language (*śabda*) as the creating-force is inevitably a logical necessity for the interpretation of the problem of diversity in a holistic philosophy, for which the same reality by its divergent powers is taken as creator of all the diversity. According to *Kāśmīra-Śaivism* of the *Āgamika* tradition, Reality (*śiva*) is dynamic and, out of its spontaneity diversities come into existence.¹⁰⁸ Brahman, in the philosophy of *Upaniṣads*, is accepted as almighty, omniscience and who, due to the power called *māya*, is taken as the material and efficient cause of the universe. Bhartṛhari, impressed by the concept of reality as power as, propounded by the *Upaniṣads* and by the *Tantric* tradition as well, has elucidated language (*śabda*) as power. The word '*śabda*' itself signifies that reality is power. Cognitively, it is due to it as *śabda* that meaning is revealed non-differently by it. If, otherwise, the figuring of meaning inevitably by it is not possible. It is power, on account of which it expresses itself differently in the different capacities of verb, substantive, adjective and so on.

Metaphysically, it operates with its different powers among which time, direction, action, and means are four principal powers.¹⁰⁹ The time power is again analyzed into six different powers of permission, prevention, present, past, future, decomposition, and the action in accordance with time is expressed differently in different tenses.¹¹⁰ '*Dik*' is analyzed into powers comprising ten different directions.¹¹¹ The power entitled 'means' operates with seven different case-terminations. These powers are taken as, grammatically and ontologically, the individualizers of the sequenceless, indivisible and independent language-principle; Bhartṛhari has given much importance to the time-power of *śabda-Brahman*, because of the reason that action is dependent on time. It is with time that action takes place. Metaphysically, it, by its powers of prevention, permission, etc., causes all the manifold transformation of birth, existence, change, increase, decrease and destruction, through which the nature of the cosmos is

determined. The metaphysical theory of power (*śakti*) is the theory of creativity or dynamism of Reality; Reality endowed with the powers is understood as the creator of everything. All actions are known as accomplished in sequence, and sequence is the property of time, and time, by permission and prevention of all power is the creativity of *śabda-brahman*.

Is *śabda-brahman*-in-itself dynamic or static? The question has been a very controversial problem in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. We would not like to add some more points to the controversy and would like to clarify that things-in-itself, according to Bhartṛhari, are beyond the grasp of mind, as language does not reveal Beings, and, hence, nothing can, categorically, be said about them. So far as experience, reasoning and speculation regarding *śabda-brahman* are concerned, Bhartṛhari accepts it as consciousness, which by reasoning is known as the ontological substratum of cognition revealed by language.¹¹² Mind-in-itself, as the ontological substratum of the cognition revealed by the language 'mind', is inferred. No mind or consciousness without thought is conceivable and, hence, as the expresser of thought, the dynamic nature of it cannot be denied. A static reality cannot figure in the character of both the expresser and the expressed. The expresser, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, reveals itself before it reveals meaning, and, hence, its dynamic nature cannot be denied. Consciousness ceases to be consciousness if it does not reveal itself as thought, and thought ceases to be so isolated from language that reveals and infuses the thought. The denial of the dynamic nature of consciousness is the denial of the revealing character of it and, hence, the denial of cognition. Thus, it is concluded that the *śabda-brahman*-in-itself is beyond the grasp of language and, therefore, it-in-itself can categorically be said neither as dynamic nor as static. In relation to communication, it is inferred as a dynamic force that reveals itself and others. *Śabda*, being the illuminator of all light and non-light, being and non-being, is the power of powers. Bhartṛhari, by taking it as power, aims at elucidating that all that is there in this empirical or transcendental world or all that can even be imagined, are dependent on *Śabda* for their illumination. In regard to creation and cognition, it is the expressive power (*śabda*).

Modern scientists observe everything as forms of power and hold that the same power, on account of different effectuating factors

(*prabhāva*), is observed as the various forms of heat, light, electricity, magnetism, etc., similarly, language in the system of Sanskrit grammarians, is power. It is to be found in every shape and form known or to be known. These elucidations by Bhartṛhari are acceptable even to the modern scientists. What distinguishes Bhartṛhari from modern scientists is the solution of the question of cognition, as to from where does the power come, and what do we actually mean by the word 'power'. If the question is put against modern scientists, it cannot be answered only on the basis of the existence of physical powers. But on Bhartṛhari's behalf, it can well be said, as the question implies information regarding the basic (ultimate) power, the answer implies awareness. As awareness is shot through and through with language, and language itself is awareness by nature, it is taken by *Vaiyākaraṇas* as the basic power that is the very nature of all beings.

Śabda as the Cosmic Seed

Brahman, in the speculative philosophy of *Advaita Vedānta*, is characterized as microspore (*bīja*) of the macrocosm and microcosm. As the mind is the cause of all that is created in dreams, similarly it is consciousness that illuminates itself in the forms of enjoyer, enjoyment and enjoyed. It is the material and efficient both of the causes as we find in the dream creations. It sports in all the forms of birth, existence, growth, decrease, change and destruction and hence, from the point of view of communication it is the substratum of all that is conveyed and of all that is cognized. It, being foundational to the world (ontological as well as cognitive) is also called the seed (*bīja*) of all.¹¹³

Śabda Realization

In the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, the realization of *śabda* is the *summum bonum* of life. It is to be realized by aspirants with their utmost efforts. In order to achieve this religious end, Bhartṛhari has prescribed the proper use of language by distinguishing correctness (*sādhutā*) from incorrectness (*asādhutā*) of it as a ritual (religions practice) necessary for the purpose. Bhartṛhari has prescribed the *sādhanā* of *vaikharī*, *madhyamā* and *paśyantī* for realization. Realization for *Vaiyākaraṇas* is a state, which is described in positive and negative ways. Positively, it is a state of the achievement of the discriminative knowledge or

wisdom (*viveka*) and, hence, bliss, and, negatively, it is a state in which the aspirant enjoys illumination and freedom from all sorts of allegiances, ignorance and limitations caused out of them.

Vaiyākaraṇas have started their investigation into the real nature of language, from the gross *vaikharī*, which is what we speak, read or write. However, this being transitory, cannot be the real language and is, therefore, a token or garb. These garbs are tools in the manifestations of the real, expressive unit of language (*sphoṭa*).

Language (*śabda*) is indivisible; it cannot be explained as a cognitive unit if it is taken as constituted of the association of letters. In order to explain meaning, the givenness of the language that reveals it must be accepted. The meaning-revealing language is *madhyamā-vāk* (the language as idea revealed in the mind). The language in the state of an idea (*madhyamā-śabda*) is a cognitive or intelligible being known as revealed. It cannot be its own ontic substratum, which is, why *Vaiyākaraṇas* have accepted consciousness (*paśyantī*) as its substratum. *Paśyantī* is ubiquitously given to all living beings as their ownself, which when manifested by utterances/noises reveals itself as idea (*madhyamā*) in the mind from which meaning is revealed non-differently and after realization one realizes all pervading, all comprehensive consciousness.

The subtle state of language from the point of view of it as a revealing force is *sphoṭa* (language as awareness or idea), from the point of view of cognition is called *pratibhā* (meaning as idea) and from the point of view of the ontological substratum of cognition revealed in the mind, it is called *paśyantī* (consciousness itself) or *śabda-brahman*. *Vaiyākaraṇas* have accepted eternal *paśyantī* in order to solve the problem of the substratum of cognition by language.

The ontological process of creation of physical entities of the empirical world are not clearly mentioned in *Vākyapadīya*, but it seems that the things in the world by Bhartṛhari are accepted as the external substratum of the meanings of language and is known by implication made on the basis of them, that is ideas or meanings. The *paśyantī* is called *sphoṭa*, as it bursts forth as different beings when instrumented through articulated forms of language (*vaikharī*). On this plane, language and meaning are understood as different. The ignorants accept it as the only form of language and do not try to peep into the deep-nature of its

meaning revealing or awareness character. The articulated form of language (*vaikharī-vāṇī*) is important for communication because of its two functions in cognition: manifesting the inner, indivisible, meaning-revealing language; and distinguishing correct and incorrect uses of the given words. Language is distinguished through it which is also considered as a step to the meditation of language (*śabda sādhanā*). The inner, meaning revealing, indivisible and given *śabda* (*madhyamā-vāk*) is manifested gradually through the utterances/noises (*vaikharī-vāk*) and the meaning is revealed by the language awareness in nature (*madhyamā-vāk*). Unlike *yogins* who cognize ideas of other minds, without hearing utterances by them, those who are well-versed in the system of thought, may know the meaning only through idea-revealed (*madhyamā-vāk*) when manifested by verbal utterances/noises. The *yogins*, being the realizers of the deep and subtlest form of language (*paśyantī*) know even the indivisible in its true nature without the help of the articulated form.

The means of realization called *dhyānayoga* by *Vedāntins* that contains the *sādhanā* of hearing (*śravaṇa*) reflecting (*manana*) and meditating (*nididhyāsana*) is comparable to the '*Vaiyākaraṇas*' *sādhanā* of *vaikharī*, *madhyamā* and *paśyantī*. This technique is popularly known as *śabdapūrvakayoga*. The realization of *paśyantī* is liberation. It is this sort of *Vaiyākaraṇika* meditation of the language-principle that is indicated in the *Upaniṣads* by the great saying, '*vāgaīva brahman*'.

The Concept of Causality

Bhartrhari's discussion on causality is significant from the point of view of not only interpreting the creation of the world by *śabda-brahman* and the cognition of meaning by language, but also from the point of view of the modern scientific interpretation of causality. He discusses causality in a way the ontological causation of the world by Reality and the cognition of the meaning by language can consistently be explained. He accepts that the expresser-expressed (*vācaka-vācya*) relation between language and meaning is given (*yogyatā-sambandha*), which will be discussed in detail in chapter VIII. The expresser-expressed relation (*vācakavācya-sambandha*), as per the expectancy of cause and effect as a necessary connection, is neither perceived by the senses nor is revealed by language in the mind, and, on the basis of the cognition of prior and latter beings, revealed by language in the

mind, the cause-and-effect relation as a necessary connection between them is presumed.

In order to throw proper light on the concept of causality, we think it necessary to see how Bhartṛhari defines action (*kriyā*). Bhartṛhari in *Kriyā-Samudddeśaḥ* defines¹¹⁴ action as a universal of several actions produced in a sequence and conceived as one identified with parts inhered by it. He says 'whenever something of finished or unfinished character is presented as that to be accomplished (*sādhya*), it is called action (*kriyā*), because of its having assumed the form of sequence.'¹¹⁵ For example, in the expression '*dhvanati*' (it sounds), 'sound' is presented as having an inner sequence on the basis of relation of causality; when there is no sequence, it is called just 'sound' in a very general sense. Similarly, in regard with the quality 'white', the verb (*śvetate*) presents it as having a sequence, and it means 'it shines (as something) white'.¹¹⁶ Just as the whole word 'cow' is not perceived simultaneously to the ears but, after letters are perceived, it is understood as a whole, similarly, action is not perceived but is known when manifested, after its parts are perceived, as a whole.¹¹⁷ The designation 'action' cannot be applied to a solitary point revealed by subdivisions.¹¹⁸

Causality is defined in a way that explains action. If action is the collection of moments in sequence from beginning till the completion or the accomplishment of that action, and if sequences are only known, how can causality as a necessary connection be explained on the basis of sequences? If it, on the basis of prior and latter sequences, were not known then it would be only accidental and cannot be the basis for explaining communication. The understanding of the concept of causality for explaining communication (*vyavahāra*) plays a very significant role. It can be said that we impose the view of causality of natural sciences on successive moments, and then presume a necessary connection between the former and the latter. Causality is explained on the basis of the relation of cause and effect. What is that relation? For some, it is a necessary connection between phenomena, for some others it is the sequence of human sensations. For still some others, it is a cognoscente's subject-matter of *a priori* character, and for some an idea independent of cognoscente's subject-matter. Bhartṛhari considers the concept of causality on the basis of how it is known in verbal cognition. In the expression 'language (*śabda*) is the cause of

meaning', the genitive case is used to demonstrate the causal relation, but the case is not the expressive meaning of causality; it is merely suggestive of it. Now, the questions: what is that meaning which the genitive case suggests? If it is said that causality is the suggestive meaning of succession (*pūrvāpūrvā*), then it will be accepted as that which is implicated or inferred on a basis of succession that is only perceived. It seems, epistemologically, justified to say that causality as a necessary connection is not known by words and what is known by words is the hearing of verbal noises in a succession first, and accomplishment of cognition by them later on. Metaphysically, the prevented state (*samvṛtā-vasthā*) of *śabda-brahman* is taken as prior, and the permissive state (*vivartāvasthā*) as a latter state. The prior state comes in a specific form (*vivarta*), i.e. in the permitted form of what is prevented previously. The relation between the prior and latter forms is assumed in terms of a necessary relation of cause-effect.

The prior and latter forms are moments cognized in sequence. That which is prevented is permitted and the permitted is prevented later on, and the cosmic process of permission and prevention is constantly operated by the time power of language. The prevented form according to expectancy is taken as the cause of permission and the vice versa. Though there is no element introducing causality as a necessary connection, between the sequences of prior and latter, one assumes the prior as the cause of the latter which as such are known as two consequent moments, and, it is only the cognition of these sequences, congealed as necessarily related, which is presented by the word 'causality'.

There is expectancy of prior and subsequent, preceding and following between the cause (*pratipādaka*) and the caused (*nimitta*) that is with expectancy to some effect that something is taken as its cause and it is with some cause that something is taken as its effect. For example, between intelligible-language and verbal-utterance/noises, it is from the point of view of the manifesting *sphoṭa* that the latter are taken as its cause and it is from the point of view of a cause of incentive to communicate that the former is taken as the cause of the manifestation of the latter. In order to see how causality is understood between them, we have to observe the meaning of the verse, '*araṇisthamyathā jyotiḥ*',¹¹⁹ according to which as the fire, inherent in the wood, is the cause of the fire that burns, similarly, the sequenceless *sphoṭa* is taken as the cause of word (*pada*), root (*prakṛti*),

suffixes (*pratyaya*), etc. According to the traditional way of interpretation, the fire in the wood in an unmanifested form is inherent, and the same unmanifested fire is manifested as flame due to some factors. The unmanifested and manifested beings are known in a sequence, but with the allegiance to an outlook of natural sciences, that is, things as related necessarily as cause and effect, we presume the latent form as the cause of the manifested form, that is revealed/expressed so in the mind by language.

In explaining causality, both of the *satkāryavādins* and *asatkāryavādins* equally accept the causation of an effect from a cause. Epistemological questions arising, in connection to it, are equally important for both the ontological and the cognitive explanations. In communication, the happening of one action after the other is revealed. The *śabda* inherently and unmanifestedly is there given in the mind, and it is in communicating that it comes into a specific sequence of utterances which when heard causes the manifestation of sequenceless *sphoṭa* given in the mind of the audience and then the manifested indivisible *sphoṭa* reveals itself and its meaning non-differently in the mind of the audience. Ontologically, the *śabda* is *Brahman*, is unmanifested power, and being power it manifests itself into the specific world of things and thoughts of which the former is related to ontologists' enterprise, while the latter to philosophers'. The manifested world of things and thoughts are the specific forms (*viśeṣas*). Bhartṛhari indicates manifested forms of it by the word 'vivarta' (*vi* = *viśeṣa* = *varta* = *vartate*). The relation of causality in between the former form and the latter, that is, manifested or specified form is assumed on the basis of the sequence as a necessary connection, according to which the former determines the latter (effect). The sequences denote time as a constant flux. Its functions of prevention and permission are constantly operative, and consequently resulting in creation or manifestation of the unmanifested and vice versa. But, we do not know the external relation between prevention and permission, because we know only the sequences. Even though we presume a basic causal dependency between them, epistemologically, the sequences or the moments of the time in a succession are known only by language.

In the metaphysics of Bhartṛhari, the language-principle (*śabda-brahman*) is consciousness itself and is creative by its own nature. It is the creativity of the language-principle, on the basis of which permission

and prevention of things in the world are continuously operated. *The creativity or dynamism is known as moments and thus prevention and permission are known in succession (the understanding of one after another), in which the former is taken as the cause of the latter by inference.* Actually, there is no necessary connection known between the idea of the cause and that of the effect, because the former does not cause the latter and vice versa. If causation as a necessary connection is accepted, and if permission is taken as cause, it will always be operative as cause, and then it will not be prevented any more, but prevention is also taken as the cause of permission. On the basis of these clarifications, it seems justified to say that cause and effect are relative terms and it is the expectancy on the basis of which a cause (former state) from the point of view of a particular effect (latter state) is taken as its cause and from the point of view of it as caused by another cause is taken as an effect. The ideas of former and latter (*pūrvāparabhāva*) are revealed beings, and by the word 'causality' they are known as relatively connected as cause and effect. Causality as a basic necessary connection between them is neither perceived nor revealed by the word. By presumption, *śabda-brahman*, as a complete cause, is taken as the unity of all sequences and by spontaneity of its time-power, it gives rise to sequences. The specific causes (*vivartas*) are only communicable. They are ideas known one after the other, out of which the former is taken as the cause of the latter by habit or by presumption of a necessary connection of the latter with the former. For example, meaning is revealed by language, and the two are naturally related as expresser and expressed (*vācaka-vācya*).

Conclusively, it can be said that language, as such, for Bhartṛhari, is sequenceless. Trans-empirically, the question of causality does not arise. Similarly, it is relative to communication that *Brahman* is taken as the cause of everything. It illuminates everything. Without illumination, the existence of anything cannot be affirmed or denied. Thus, the illuminative force (complete or specific) is basic and prior to anything it illuminates (effect). The sequences of illuminator (*vācaka*) and illuminated (*vācya*), which are only known by language, are taken by inference as necessarily connected by causes-effect relation. Language and meaning are the whole beings on which the world of communication is founded. The things or entities of the world of our empirical experience and the world itself are inferred as the ontological substratum of those that figure in the mind (i.e. consciousness). Mind

as the substratum of cognition and external things as the substratum or external-basis of objects figured by language in the mind, are inferred. The world of entities is the specific form (*vivarta*) of the *śabda-brahman*, i.e. consciousness which, from the point of view of a cognizer is individual consciousness (*jīvātma*) and from the point of view of the cosmic cause is the basic principle of everything, i.e. *śabda-brahman* (*paramātmā*).

Concluding Remarks

Whether Bhartṛhari is a *vivartavādin* in the sense of the term as taken by Śaṅkara, has been a highly controversial problem among scholars of *Vākyapadīya*. 'Vivarta' can be also taken for falsity (*mithyātva*), only when the relation between the cause and the effect is false. Some philosophers, in order to interpret the independence of Reality, take relation between the independent ultimate Reality and the dependent world of mind and matter as false. Bhartṛhari's position is different from theirs. For him, though reality is independent, it is power, and the reality as power is responsible for all sorts of creation and manifestation. The power is not false, but the natural fitness (*yogyatā*) of the independent Reality. If the relation between Reality; and its powers is taken as natural fitness of an independent Reality it will be contradictory to accept the relation between the two as false. It is the *yogyatā* of the *śabda-brahman* (the potential or unmanifested form of reality) on account of which it manifests in specific forms (*viviśeṣavartate*) of diversity. Taking this matter of fact in view, it can be said that Bhartṛhari's 'vivarta' cannot be taken for falsity but for the manifestation of the unmanifested and this process in the beginningless world of communication is incessantly operated by the natural-fitness of the reality of which time, space, action and means are given much importance, in the philosophy of *Vākyapadīya*, as the powers specifying natural fitness (*yogyatā*) of the language-principle. Nothing can be said trans-empirically.

Conclusively, it can be said that the beings revealed by language are taken by Bhartṛhari as self-sustained beings of awareness in character. Being awareness in character, they do not require any other cause of incentive in order to be revealed; rather, what is revealed by language serves itself as the cause of incentive (not for revelation but for articulation). It is light, the awareness itself and it is only in this sense

that it is self-restrained. Awareness is the cause of all expectancy and no expectancy is possible isolated from language that reveals it. They are self-restrained also in the sense that they are revealed beings, beings revealed independently of any sort of metaphysical or psychological entities. Any substance or law of substance except awareness, that is their very nature, does not restrain them.

Bhartṛhari does not accept a passive, but an active theory of language, for which language, before it reveals meaning, reveals itself and for that reason it is self-restrained. Language is eternally fit to reveal beings by itself. Not only that, as all knowledge is knowledge infused by language, identical cognition of the beings revealed in the mind by language is accomplished in communication independently of physical or psychological entities, and their allegiances. *Upacāra-sattā* is a self-controlled being as it is revealed independently of any Being and is not something abstracted from beings but beings themselves. By self-restrained being we mean to say that the objects of cognition are not abstracted but foundational. The beings are not constructions of the mind, but are beings revealed non-differently by language itself into the mind. However, Bhartṛhari maintains a difference between cognition of the object and cognition itself, or between cognition and the cognition of cognition of objects. Cognition is not an object/being. As light does not need another light in order to be illuminated, cognition is foundational in the same way, whereby, the cognition of objects (being, the object of cognition, i.e. idea) is relational to cognition itself. As communication is the accomplishment of cognition by language, the objects/beings of cognition are the objects of communication and, hence, of philosophical reflections and investigations as well.

So far as things-in-themselves are concerned, Bhartṛhari does not deny their existence rather he accepts them. For him, they are beyond the grasp of language, but are known by implication as ontic substrata (*samānādhikaraṇa*) of the cognition and the objects of cognition, as revealed by language in the mind. In cognition, beings are only known, which when imposed on external Beings by habit, practice and perception are indiscriminately taken as the object of cognition. Even in the case of the representative theory of perception, only sense data (and not the things-in-themselves) are grasped. The sense data like verbal-noises, as a Bhartṛharian would say, are tools only in the manifestation of the inner-language, which when manifested reveals

itself first as expresser (*vācaka*), and then the meaning/expressed (*vācya*) is revealed by it non-differently. We are so accustomed to perception by eyes that we do not usually mind their actual role of only tools in the manifestation of real language. We do not mind the foundational character of cognition shot through and through with language.

Things-in-themselves are not beings revealed by language. There is no room for admitting them as Realities in his holistic philosophy of language. Even the sense data in order to be differentiated and distinguished as sense data require language. It cannot be known even as sense data if isolated from language. Things-in-themselves whether eternal or transient are of no philosophical significance, because philosophical reflections are concerned with and are confined to the objects/beings figured in the mind by language. The theory of objects of cognition as being figured in the mind when presented so by language (*upacāra-sattā*) seems justified on the plane of cognition, as it does not take the objects of cognition as abstracted/constructed from or as imagined by the mind. It does not take them as ideas hypostatized as external-thing. Nonetheless, the basic premises of the sentence-holism hold objects of cognition neither as ontic nor as psychic entities, but as cognizable and communicable beings figured/revealed in nature.

To sum up, we can say that language in Bhartṛhari's philosophy is expressive by nature. It is on the basis of the expressive nature of language that he interprets the most controversial problem of the relation between language and meaning, language and being and between being and Being in a very natural way. He, by taking cognition as intertwined with language, resolves the problem of relation between language and meaning in a verbal cognition. What figures by language in the mind, for Bhartṛhari, is the being, i.e. thought object, which is identified by him as meaning or intelligible being that is awareness in character. His concept of meaning as inner being revealed non-differently in the mind by language and his holism may be taken as his real contribution to the history of philosophy. It is on the basis of inner being only that the expressions regarding birth, existence change, negation, etc., are made possible. Empty concepts like hare's horn, barren's son (having no external being), future (the being yet to be born) and past-beings (externally non-existents), cannot be explained if inner being as revealed by the expressions is not taken into account

as philosophical beings. Not only that, words generally taken as having only a syntactical significance, and many others words also cannot be taken as expresser and, hence, cease to be words if what figures by these words is not taken as their meaning (being). Above all, no expression, even expressions, regarding external things (existing only in the present) can be possible if meaning as inner being is denied. Expression implies a prior expectancy and expectancy prior to the expression is not possible, unless inner being as its cause is accepted.

The theory of sentence-holism, in very brief, is a philosophical theory of the primacy of language-infused cognition. Language is ubiquitously and foundationally given as a luminous and illuminating being of the world of communication, to which our cognition and reflections are confined. Cognitively, it is the intelligible-being (*upacāra sattā*) that figures in the mind, and that is the reason that he insists on reflecting even on metaphysical objects as they figure in the mind, presented by language. External-Being, as a Bhartṛhari would say, is known only by implication/presumption/inference, as the external substratum of the inner-being revealed in the mind by language.

Bhartṛhari accepts cognition as a truth revealed by language. It is always veridical cognition (*prakāśita*). Communication cannot be accomplished if cognition by language is not taken as veridical, and cognition cannot be taken as veridical if it is not accepted as revealed by and intertwined with language. As language is luminous and the illuminating principle of cognition, and as cognition is revealed and is shot through and through with language, the cognition revealed by it is veridical.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Throughout the book, a difference has been maintained in using the terms 'Being' and 'being'. I have used the term 'Being' for thing-in-itself. They are transcendental Beings in the sense that they are beyond language or that they are not revealed/expressed in the mind by language. I use the term 'being', for the ideas or thought-objects that figure in the mind by language. With contrast to the former they are termed secondary beings. These beings are not ontic but cognitive beings of awareness in nature (*upacāra-sattā*). Cognitive beings, for Bhartṛhari, are only intelligible or philosophical beings to which our knowledge is confined, and on which our philosophical investigation and reflection are based on.

2. According to Bhartṛhari, philosophical reflections provide wisdom that leads to bliss. This is clear from the two verses quoted below. 'Prajñāvivekam labhate bhinnairāgamadarsanaiḥ, Kiyadvā śakyamunnetum svatarkamanudhavatā. VP, 2/484. Also paramabrahmādhigamyate. VP, 1/22.
3. Śabdapramāṇakānām hi yacchabdāḥ tat paramārtharūpam. Helārāja on VP, 3/1/11.
4. Language, the expresser, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is *madhyamā śabda*, the inner, indivisible unit of awareness (*sphoṭa*) that reveals the meaning (*pratibhā*) non-differently. Helārāja writes: Śabdārthaḥ śabdyata itikṛtvā. Yadvā śabdo 'syam pratyāyaktve nāvasthito 'rthadvāreṇa śabdāntara vācyai dharmaiḥ sambadhyate. Helārāja on VP, 3/3/40-41.
5. Tathā hi buddhyānirūpitavastuviśayāḥ śabdāḥ. Helārāja on VP, 3/3/39.
6. Śabdasya ca nirūpitārthaviśayatvānnirūpaṇāpratyayaḥ kāraṇam na hi vikalpena yathātattvam vastu sprśyate. Helārāja on VP, 3/3/54.
7. Padena varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayavā eva. Vākyātpadānāmatyantam praviveko na kaścana. VP, 1/73.
8. Vaiyākaraṇanām tu vyāvṛttavastuviśayatā tathādhyavasāyāt, tatraiva pramāṇyam iti darśanabhedāḥ. Helārāja VP, 3/7 Sādhana samuddeśaḥ, kārīkā 6.
9. Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādrte. Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsatē. VP, 1/123.
10. Helārāja on VP, 3/1/19.
11. VP, 1/123.
12. VP, 2/484.
13. Śabdānāmeva sā śaktistarko yaḥ puruṣāśryaḥ. Śabdānanugato nyāyo, nāgameṣvanibandhanaḥ. VP, 1/137.
14. Vṛtti on VP, 1/137.
15. Mahābhāṣyadīpikā 1/1.
16. Ibid., 1/1.
17. Mahābhāṣya Āhnika 1/1.
18. VP, 2/141.
19. For detail, see the paper entitled 'Possibility of Disinterested Knowledge: A Bhartṛharian Approach', by the same author. JICPR, Vol. XV, No. 3. 1998, pp. 47-48.

20. *Rṣiṇām darśanamyacca tattve kincidavasthitam. Na tena vyavahāro'sti na tacchabdanibandhanam.* VP, 2/139. Also *sākṣācchabdenajanitām bhāvanānugamena vā, itikartavyatāyām tām na kaścīdativartate.* VP, 2/146.
21. Ibid., 1/123
22. Ibid., 1/55.
23. *Vṛtti* on VP, 1/12.
24. VP, 2/142 and Puṇyarāja's commentary on it.
25. *Artharūpam tathā śabde svarūpam ca prakāśate.* VP, 1/50.
26. *Pratipatturaśaktiḥ sā grahaṇopāya eva saḥ* VP, 1.85.
27. *Vṛtti* on 1/121.
28. *Upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānām bālānāmapalāpanāḥ, Asatye vartamanisthitvā tataḥ satyam samīhate.* VP, 2/238.
29. *Buddhipratibhāṣyeva hyākāraḥ śabdārthaḥ na vastvārthaḥ.* Helārāja on VP, 3/3 *Śādhana-samuddeśaḥ, Kārikā 5.*
30. *Tadevamastināstijāyata iti prayoga upacārasattā samāśryaṇena samarthitaḥ.* Helārāja's commentary on VP, 3/3/48.
31. Saroja Bhate, 'Bhartṛhari on Language and Reality', pp. 67-74, edited in the book 'Bhartṛhari: Philosopher and Grammarian', edited by Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst, M.L.B.D., Delhi, 1994.
32. Sphoṭa, in the system of Vyākaraṇa has been considered chiefly from two points of view. The first is a metaphysical understanding of it while the second is a cognitive understanding of it. Sphoṭa, from the metaphysical point of view, is the conscious principle, all-pervading and uncaused cause of all that is created and cognized. The Sphoṭa as ontological being is beyond the grasp of the language. It from the former point of view is marked by reference or indicator of the things. From the latter point of view, Sphoṭa is real, indivisible, complete-meaning expressing/revealing and inner-language that is ubiquitously given as illumined-illuminating being. It is the being that reveals itself and its meaning is revealed non-differently by it. From this point of view, Sphoṭa, manifested by utterance/noises, reveals itself first and then, it reveals meaning non-differently in the mind. The Sphoṭa as ontological being is inferred or implicated as substratum (samānādhikaraṇa) of cognition revealed by the language, as viewed in the latter stand, in mind. Perhaps, this is the basic difference between the Sphoṭa as ontological Being and it as cognitive being. However, the Sphoṭa as envisaged in the latter point of view is taken in view for the discussion in the present work.

33. *Na so'sti pratyayo lake yaḥ Śabdānugamādṛte, Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate.* VP, 1/123.
34. *The Sphoṭa Theory of Language*, p. 1.
35. *Ghaṭaśabdaśādhāraṇam sāmānyarūpamarthapakṣanikṣiptamartha samānādhikaraṇam svarūpamasya vācyam, arthavattatsāmānādhikaraṇyāt tatrāpi tathā pratīteḥ.* Helārāja on VP, 3/3/2.
36. *Yathā Prayoktuḥ prāgbuddhiḥ śabdeṣveva pravartate, Vyavasāyo grahīṭṛṇāmevamteṣveva jāyate.* Ibid., 1/53.
37. Ibid., 1/55.
38. *Vṛtti* on 1/62.
39. *Na hyupāyadabhinnatvam tadupeyasyayujyate. Vyupasyanahyabhinnatvam dīpādvācakṣus'opi'vā.* Nyāya Mañjarī, Vol. II, p. 100, and see also Śloka-vārttika, Pratyakṣasūtra 182.
40. *Viśayatvamanāpannair śabdairnārthaḥ prakāśyate. Na sattāyaiva te' rthā nāmagrhitāḥ prakāśakāḥ,* VP, 1/56.
41. *For a detailed and clear account of relation between language (Śabda) and meaning (artha) the paper on 'Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Relation between Word and Meaning', by the same author, published in JICPR, Vol. XI, No. 2, 1994, pp. 43-54, may be consulted. See also VP Sambandha-Samuddēśaḥ.*
42. VP, 1/123 and Mahābhāṣya on 1/67.
43. Helārāja (HR) on VP, 3/3/2.
44. Nyāya Mañjarī, Vol. 11, p. 100.
45. VP, 1/121.
46. *Vārtika on Aṣṭādhyāyī of ह य व र ढ*
47. Nyāya Mañjarī, Vol. II, p. 355.
48. VP, 1/121.
49. *Vṛṣabha* on VP, 1/121.
50. *Vṛṣabha* on VP, 1/123.
51. VP, 1/123.
52. Western propositionalists like G.E. Moore, B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein, also accept that all knowledge, even knowledge by sense perception, is nothing but cognition of a proposition. Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Edward Paul, Vol. 5-6, p. 496.
53. Following B.K. Matilal, Perception, 1986, p. 396, many scholars of

Vākyapadīya have taken upacāra-sattā as metaphorical-existence in the sense of abstraction, but in our opinion it is misleading and may cause confusion in understanding Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language in general and his concept of sentence-holism in particular. Bhartṛhari has used the term 'upacāra-sattā' for inner or intelligible-being figured in the mind by language. It comprises of the being of language and of meaning that are only objects of our cognition. Cognition, communication and, hence, our philosophical reflections are confined to the upacāra-sattā which is cognized as revealed by language and is not inferred or implicated existence i.e., metaphorical existence. In contrast with external Beings as primary, intelligible beings are called secondary (upacāra-sattā).

54. *We agree with Ashok Aklujkar in taking upacāra-sattā as 'secondary existence' in contrast with primary existence. This is exactly what Mahābhāṣyakāra and Bhartṛhari want to say by the term 'upacāra-sattā.' Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 5 edited by H.G. Coward and K. Kunjunn Raja, 1990.*
55. See VP, 3/1/98-104.
56. *Mahābhāṣya pīpipā on Aṣṭādhyāyī, 5/2/94.*
57. *Aṣṭādhyāyī, 5/2/95.*
58. *Mahābhāṣya on 5/2/94.*
59. *Pradīpa on Aṣṭādhyāyī 5/2/94.*
60. VP, 3/3/46-48.
61. Ibid., 3/3/39.
62. *Mahābhāṣya Pradīpa on Aṣṭādhyāyī 3/2/94.*
63. Ibid., 3/3/51.
64. Helārāja on VP, 3/3/40-41.
65. Ibid., 3/3/40-41.
66. Ibid.
67. VP, 3/3/42.
68. Helārāja on VP, 3/3/42.
69. *Helārāja on 3/3/42.*
70. *Mahābhāṣya on Aṣṭādhyāyī, 3/2/6.*
71. Helārāja on VP, 3/3/42.
72. Ibid.

73. VP, 3/3/43.
74. Ibid., 3/3/44.
75. Helārāja on VP, 3/3/46.
76. VP, 3/3/45-46.
77. Helārāja on VP, 45-46.
78. VP, 3/3/47 and Helārāja Commentary on it.
79. VP, 3/3/48 and Helārāja Commentary on it.
80. VP, 3/1/40-41.
81. Helārāja on VP, 3/1/34.
82. Ibid., 3/1/14
83. 'Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Relation between Word and Meaning by D.N. Tiwari. JICPR, Vol. XI, No. 4. pp. 43-54.
84. *For ignorants and children's arguments based on Referential Criteria*, VP, 2/287-296.
85. Bhartṛhari is not interested in analysing veridical cognition revealed by language in communication in terms of validity and justifiability and, hence, he has not cared specially for providing empirical evidences and epistemic-justification popularly used by philosophers for analyzing the cognition in terms of objectivity. He aims at interpreting communication as is accomplished by language. He, like a hermeneutist, tries to clarify the concepts as are used in usual communication by the method of interpreting different views given by different thinkers popular at his time. The accomplishment of communication is the basic criterion of cognition. Cognition by language or the accomplishment of communication is itself evidential in its verity. The cognition even derived by reasoning and argumentation which prove or disprove it as valid or invalid may be accounted for the limit of the subjectivity or the objectivity of a cognition or as distinguisher of cognition as verified or others imagination, etc. but so far its communicative value is concerned, it is not worth accepting if it goes against communication.
86. VP, 1/1-4, 118, 120, 126.
87. VP, 3/3/88. *Idam ca laukikānāmeva Śabdānāsamanuṣānam śāstram*. Helārāja on VP, 3/3/88.
88. *Tasya tatsāmānyam na cakṣurādivadadhipatipratyayarūpam kāraṇam, api tvāmbanapratyayarūpam, ālambanamca samvedyamānam*. Helārāja on VP, 3/1/95.

89. *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. III, p. 3.
90. On the levels of speech we in details will discuss in chapter II.
91. *Kuṭasthe parasmin brahmaṇi cidānandarūpe sarvameya jaga jgagratsvapnādyavasthāgatam mūrtikriyā vivarta rūpamasatyam*. Helārāja on VP, 3/2/17-18.
92. *Sa hi sarvesām śabdānāmarthānāṇca prakṛitirīti*. Ambākartrī on VP, 1/10.
93. *Sa hi sarvaśabdārtha prakṛitiḥ*. Vṛtti on VP, 1/10.
94. *Anādinidhanam brahman śabda tattvam yadakṣaram*. Vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ. VP, 1/1.
95. *Śabdasya pariṇāmo'yam... prathamametadviśvam vyavartata*. Saiśā sansāriṇām sañjñā vahirantaśca vartate, tanmātramapyatikrāntam caitanyam sarva jātiṣu. VP, 1/120, 126.
96. *Vyāptimatvattu śabdasyāniyastvācca śabdena sañjñākaraṇam vyavahārātha loke*. Nirukta 1/1.
97. Rk. 2/3/22/5 quoted by Bhartṛhari in his vṛtti on VP, 1/130.
98. Vṛtti on VP, 1/130.
99. *Tasmādyah śabdasanskārah sā siddhiḥ paramātmanaḥ Tasya pravṛttitattvajñāstad brahmāmṛtamaśnute*. VP, 1/131.
100. *Na tadasti na tannāsti na tadekam na tat pṛthak*. Na sansrṣṭam vibhaktham vā vikṛtam na ca nānyathā. VP, 3/2/12.
101. *Eka samkhyopādhīyamānasvarūpaviśeṣam tattvam na bhavati*. Helārāja on VP, 3/2/12 see also Ambākartrī on it.
102. *Sarvavyavahārātūtam*. Ibid., 3/2/12.
103. Ibid., 3/2/13.
104. VP, 1/1.
105. *Saiśā sansāriṇām sañjñā bahirantaśca vartate*. Tanmātrāmapyatikrāntam caitanyam sarvajātiṣu. VP, 1/126.
106. Helārāja on VP 3/9 *Kālasamuddeśaḥ*, Kārikā 62. A brief and clear account of 'Bhartṛhari's conception of time' is presented in the paper 'Bhartṛhari's conception of time' by the same author. Published in *Darshana International*, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, pp. 25-57, Moradabad, UP, 1988.
107. *Anekavyaktyabhivyangyā Jātiḥ sphoṭaḥ smṛtā*, VP 1/93. Bhartṛhari has established the theory of universal as the import of words separately in an independent chapter entitled 'jāti samaddeśaḥ', chapter, first of the third part of Vākyapadīya.

108. *Sarvomamāyam vibhavam ityevam parijānataḥ viśvātmano vikalpānām prasarepi maheśatā. Śvarapratyabhijñā 4/1/12.*
109. *Diksāadhanakriyākāla iti vastvabhidhāyinaḥ. VP 3/Diksamuddesaḥ kārikā-1.*
110. Bhartṛhari's conception of time, by the same author, *Darshana International*, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, pp. 25-37, 1998.
111. A clear exposition of Dik-Samuddesaḥ in Hindi by the same author is published in *Viśvadrṣṭi*, edited by Professor Laxmi Narayan Tiwari, Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi, Vol. I, pp. 453-67, 1993.
112. *Vṛtti on VP 1/126.*
113. *Ekasya sarvabījasya yaśya ceyamanekadhā. VP, 1/4.*
114. *Guṇabhūtairavayavaiḥ samūhaḥ kramajanmanām. Buddhyā prakalpitā bhedaḥ kriyeti vyapadiśyate. VP, 3/8 Kriyāsamuddesaḥ, kārikā 4.*
115. *Yāvat siddhamasiddham vā sādhyatvenābhidhīyate Āśṛta kramarūpatvāt tat kriyetyabhidhīyate. Ibid., 3/8/1.*
116. *Śvetate śvetaityetacchvetatveva prakāśate. Āśṛta kramarūpatvadabhidhānam pravartate. Ibid., 3/8/3.*
117. *Ibid., 3/8/7-8.*
118. *Yaścāpakarṣaparyantamanuprāptaḥ pratīyate. Tatraikasmin kriyā Śabdaḥ kevale na prayujyate. Ibid., 3/8/60.*
119. *VP, 1/46.*

CHAPTER-II

CONCEPT OF SPEECH-ELEMENT (VĀK-TATTVA)

Both eastern and western philosophers, who take the speech element to be verbal-noises/utterances, which for Bhartṛhari are an articulatory form of language (*vaikharī*), consider their nature and function to be the sole content of philosophical investigation. The acumen of Indian grammarian philosophers, in general, and that of Bhartṛhari, in particular, lies in the in-depth investigation of speech-element, not merely as a tool, but also as awareness. Communication, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is awareness revealed by language (*śabda*) in the mind of the audience and that language infuses cognition.¹

Unlike those philosophers of language who consider language to be confined to verbal-noises and the meaning conventionally given to them as the contents of language, *Vaiyākaraṇas* do not confine their thinking to those contents only. Bhartṛhari, who aims at explaining the cognition revealed by language in usual communication, gives primary importance to the cognitive character of it and does not reject even the metaphysical nature of speech (i.e., consciousness or *śabda-brahman* to be known by implication as an ontic substratum (*samānādhikaraṇa*) of cognition revealed by words. Speech embraces all of language – its internal *spṛṣṭa* and its complement in the outward element of sound. The *spṛṣṭa*, for him, is awareness. It reveals itself and the meaning and, hence, is foundational.² This foundational character of language (*śabda*) is almost ignored by those who confine philosophy of language to the analysis and interpretation of verbal-noises (*dhvaniyān*) and their function as indicating/referring tools. This sort of unheeding analysis of the speech-element leads us not only to under-estimate language, the expressive or the creative force, but deprives us of much of the facts of communication performed by it. Nonetheless, the fact of cognition of language and meaning revealed non-differently by language in the mind of the audience, after hearing the fleeting verbal-noises, is ignored by them as a proper content of philosophical analysis of language. If we accept speech-element as confined to verbal-noises, we will not only be deprived of estimating the foundational character of it as awareness, but also be bound to think of the phenomenon of verbal-noises (separate from it as cognitive

being) as the only content of philosophical investigation. In such a circumstance, it will be but natural for one to confine it to verbal-noises and to consider them as that which stand by proxy for things.

The uniqueness of Indian grammarian philosophers is that they start analyzing from the indivisible, come to philosophize the apparent gross aspects of language and move forward to the subtlest state so as to unveil its foundational character, on the basis of which the problem of language in its entirety may clearly be explained. No philosophy of language can overlook the cognitive character of it, because in that case the explanation of beings as revealed (revealed by language) units could not be given properly. Language, and cognition revealed non-differently by it, are not two different entities in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari; rather, they are non-different beings taken differently only from the point of view of the conveyor and the conveyed. The language, in his philosophy, is the inner, indivisible unit of communication, which is manifested gradually in a sequence of utterances/noises, and it reveals itself and its meaning non-differently in the mind of the audience when manifested. This meaning-revealing language (*sphoṭa*) cannot be equated with verbal-noises. Verbal-noises are only tools in manifesting the *sphoṭa* and the *sphoṭa* reveals the meaning. Comparing the difference between knowledge by language and perception by senses, Bhartṛhari says 'the senses need not be cognized before they perceive objects. They do so by their mere existence, when they came into the contact with the objects. But, this is not the case with language. It, when manifested by verbal-noises, reveals its own self (the expresser) and the meaning (expressed) is revealed non-differently by it'.³ The senses are separated from the cognition after sensing, but language infuses cognition and that is the reason he takes it as the foundational being of the world of cognition and communication.⁴ It is necessary to say that as a philosopher he, suggests to reflect on the objects as they are revealed or figured in the mind by language. For the cognitive-holism of Bhartṛhari, language (*śabda*) is the foundational being from which meaning is revealed in the mind non-differently.⁵

Language, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, as we have observed in earlier pages, is an awareness of itself and of its meaning as well. It is a self-luminous and illuminating principle without which no idea, thinking, imagining, remembering, etc., are possible and, hence, no

communication or cognition by expression may be figured out. Dimensions of human creativity and of his own being itself are unthinkable but for language. It is only by virtue of language that we gain self-awareness, knowledge and mastery over consciousness. Language is called so in Sanskrit, because of its awareness or of it as a conscious force, the expresser. Keeping this character of language in mind, Bhartṛhari emphatically propounds that all knowledge is knowledge shot through and through with language and that there is no possibility of knowledge isolated from it.⁶ In order to present Bhartṛhari's account of speech element in its totality, I shall discuss the concept of speech-element from three perspectives, i.e. metaphysical, cognitive and phonetic (*dhvaniyān*).

1. METAPHYSICAL PERSPECTIVE

Taking *śabda* as consciousness, Bhartṛhari has used the words *jñānātmā* (cause of cognition) and *vāgātmā* (cause of expression) for it. For him, *jñānātmā* and *vāgātmā* are identical.⁷ Identity here means non-difference of the language principle and cognition, because the same principle from the point of view of cognition is called *jñānātmā* and from the point of view of verblity is called *vāgātmā*. As cognition is cognition shot through and through by *śabda*, the cause of cognition for Bhartṛhari, is not different from that of expression. Cognitively, cognition is intertwined with *śabda*. It is a revealing being and is not confined to the modes of reflections, thinking and expressing – of which it is an ontic substratum to be known by implication. The ontic substratum from the point of view of languaging is *vāgātmā* which manifests itself in different stages of language: unmanifested (*anukta-śabda*), intelligible language (*baudha*), semi-manifested (*upāṃsu-śabda*, yet to be spoken) spoken or verbal-noises (*ukta*) popularly explained by Indian grammarian philosophers as three levels of speech—*paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*. On the other hand, the substratum, from a transcendental point of view, is *śabda-brahman* which is explained ontologically as a Reality manifested in all cosmic processes, grossly divided by the sage *Vārsyāyaṇīḥ*, as quoted by sage *Yāska* into six—birth (*jāyate*), existence/continuity (*astī*), change (*vipariṇamate*), growth (*vardhate*), decomposition (*hrasati*) and destruction (*vināśyati*), that represent the spatio-temporal universe.⁸ The metaphysics of Bhartṛhari is non-dualistic. Bhartṛhari has actually

adopted his own tradition of *Vyākaraṇa* in discussing the metaphysical nature of speech-element (*vāk-tattva*). It is obvious that his tradition is chiefly based on *śruti* or scriptural-authority propounding non-dualism. He has often quoted the verses (*śruti*) in which the speech principle (*vāk*) has been mentioned as the basic principle of creation. In *Harivṛtti* 1/12, he quotes 'nāmai vedamrūpatvena vavṛterūpamacedam nāmabhāvevatathe. Eke tadekama vibhaktam vibhejuḥ prāgevānye bhedarūpam vadanti'. According to the verse, the whole cosmos is divided into name (*nāma*) and form (*rūpa*). Form in its subtlest form, is not different from name. The Vedic verse quoted by him in his *vṛtti* of *Vākyapadīya* 1/1, expounds that the speech-principle is *subtle* and is non-different from meaning (*artha*), and it manifests in different ways. These few examples show that Bhartṛhari has not only adopted a non-dualistic tradition of thought, but has also based his philosophy on language as a self-luminous and illuminating principle. In his *vṛtti* on the first part of *Vākyapadīya* 1/20, he quotes the Vedic verses teaching speech-element (*vāk*) as illuminator of all. The cosmos would not have been illuminated if there was no language (*vāk*). Language and consciousness are one and the same (*vāktattvarūpamevaciti kriyā rūpamityanye*, VP, 1/126). Language (*vāk*) is *Brahman* and the cosmic process is the manifestation of it (VP, 1/1). How and in what sequence things of the external world are manifested by the language-principle, are not specifically mentioned in the *Vākyapadīya* and it can be said that because of two reasons: 1. He takes for granted the issues discussed with great clarity in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Pāṇini Aṣṭādhyāyī and other non-dualistic teachings popularly known at his time. 2. In *Vākyapadīya*, he aims at explaining cognition by expressions and, therefore, he confines his reflections to the contents of cognition and leaves other issues, not necessarily associated with it, undiscussed.

The word '*vāk*' is derived by *vāc* adding to the suffix *ghañ* to *vac*. The suffix '*ghañ*' is used with a word to denote an accomplished or finished character (*siddha*). The word '*vāk*', derived thus means expression. Expression comprises the act of uttering/hearing and the revelation of cognition by language. Therefore, the expresser (*vāk*) cannot be identified with verbal-noises/utterances. For Bhartṛhari, utterances are gross forms of language and they, by courtesy of being manifestations of it, are also called by the word (*vāk*). On the other hand, he accepts verbal-noises only as tools in the manifestation of

language, which is the ubiquitously given indivisible expresser (*sphoṭa*). The question as to how is an expresser (*vāk*) a cognitive necessity in explaining cognition by language, will be discussed in detail later. Here, it needs mention that he has used the word *vāk* for the indivisible sentence, the expresser given ubiquitously in the mind of the speaker and hearer as thought or idea (*bhāvārūpa*) and is manifested in the form of utterances (*dhvāniyān*) when one intends to speak. It is the sequence involved in uttering, on the basis of which an indivisible sentence is artificially divided into letters and words. Sentence itself is also explained as a construction out of a get-together of words. The manifested language and the manifesting language both are involved in the cognition. However, meaning is revealed in all cases by the intelligible language (*sphoṭa*), which is revealed first after the manifestation of it through utterances, and then reveals the meaning.

How Bharṭṛhari, from the expectancy of the hearer and the speaker, explains the relation of manifested and manifesting language, will be considered in the course of the discussion in this chapter. Let me first discuss different sorts of speech – from gross to subtle – which are popularly discussed by scholars of philosophy of grammar as the three levels of speech. Bharṭṛhari has enumerated only *paśyantī-vāk*, *madhyamā-vāk* and *vaikharī-vāk*.⁹ He expects readers to observe the *Mahābhāṣya*, where the issue is discussed with great clarity. An account of the levels of speech in the light of the *Mahābhāṣya* and the commentaries on *Vākyapadīya* may be given as follows:

i. Articulated Speech (Vaikharī)

Vaikharī are audible utterances articulated by men to communicate meaning in usual life (*Vaikharī vāco manuṣyāḥ vadantī*). Men speak letters, words and sentences formed by association of such words. In the term '*vaikharī śabda*' the word '*śabda*' is used for expression in the form of sentential garb/token, and this expression is explained as a whole constituted by the association of spoken words, i.e. articulated utterances. Language is uttered in a sequence, and the hearer hears those utterances in the sequence they are uttered. Those utterances are accumulatedly understood as words fixed conventionally, and then the set of words as sentence expressive of a unit or complete meaning. There are three chief components of such a sentence, namely—

denoting figured out character (*siddha*), denoting unfigured out character, i.e. to be figured out as yet (*sādhya*) and means (*sādhana*) are connected for a single expression (i.e. sentence-token) conveying a unit (sentential) meaning. The components are also called by the term 'śabda', because they are taken as parts of it and denote a meaning fixed conventionally.

Man, as a species, is a singing creation, though the notes in his case, are also coupled with 'thought' this line of Humboldt, on language p. 60, beautifully depicts the creative and expressive nature of language. *Vaikharī*, in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, is the gross level or manifested form of subtle, indivisible-inner language. It is called so because it emerges from the speaker's efforts involved in the act of speaking when he intends to speak and is audible to the hearer. In the philosophy of *Vyākaraṇa*, *vaikharī* is not a meaning-revealing unit (*sphoṭa*), but a garb of the latter, a tool or instrument in the manifestation of the inner language, which is the only meaning-revealing unit.

From the point of view of *Vyākaraṇa*, articulate utterances are a very significant level of language, because the idea of correctness (*sādhutā*) and non-correctness (*asādhutā*) of the forms of the words are decided on the basis of it. Ordinary persons cannot acquire any cognition without the help of it, and we are so accustomed in our usual communication that we identify it with and confine language to it. However, there are instances of *yogins* and other gifted persons who get knowledge even without hearing the utterances. Such instances cannot be explained if we limit śabda to *vaikharī*.

ii. Meaning-revealing unit (*Madhyamā*)

Madhyamā is inner-śabda, the being revealed in the mind when manifested by articulate utterances. It figures in or is revealed in the mind of the hearer after hearing the verbal-noises and in the mind of speakers when they intend to speak (*antaḥ sanniveśinī śabda*). Śabda in the mind of speakers may be in sequence or without sequence. When it assumes sequence after being revealed in the mind, it is *madhyamā-śabda*. In other words, what is understood by the word 'thinking and reflecting' may be called *madhyamā-śabda*.¹⁰ It is subtler than *vaikharī* and is inaudible to the audience, unless manifested through articulate utterances.

As the cognitive base of fleeting verbal-noises, Bhartṛhari has given utmost importance to *madhyamā-śabda* and has called it *sphoṭa*, on language that is awareness in character. Verbal-noises (*dhvaniyān*) are only tools in revealing the *sphoṭa*, but the meaning, in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, is revealed only by *sphoṭa*. Meaning, in the *madhyamā* stage, is non-differently revealed in the mind and, hence, there is non-difference of *sphoṭa* and meaning (*pratibhā*). There is no possibility of extension as it is inner *śabda* and of the nature of awareness.

iii. Paśyantī

This is the subtlest of the three forms of speech. As it is subtle, there is no occasion for any distinction of language and meaning at the *paśyantī* level of speech. It is sequenceless, pure unity and is manifested (when one intends to speak), at the level of *madhyamā* first and then is articulated at the level of *vaikhari*. *Paśyantī* is the pure consciousness level of speech and is known by implication as the substratum of other levels of speech. As an ontic substratum of cognition revealed by language in the mind, *Vaiyākaraṇas* view the ontological significance of *paśyantī* as pure consciousness itself. Apart from reasoning based on implication, *Helārāja* describes it as a level of speech on the ground that the distinctions of root, etc., of words are cognized by *yogins* even at this level.¹¹

There is controversy among the interpreters of Bhartṛhari on the issue of *parā-vāk* as one of the levels of speech. According to the philosophies of *Tantra* and *Vedānta*, *parā-vāk* is the subtlest form of speech, subtler than *paśyantī*. The commentator, *Helārāja* has not distinguished *parā* from *paśyantī*. According to him, *paśyantī*, being pure unity and undivided consciousness, is called *parā*.

It is striking to note as to why Bhartṛhari, a philosopher well-versed in the Vedic and Tāntrika traditions, has not enumerated *parā* as one of the levels of speech. He might have observed some insoluble difficulties that may creep into the philosophy of grammar, if *parā* were to be taken as a level of speech. It would, perhaps, not be a necessary content of *Vyākaraṇa*, or it would be a thing beyond the limit of cognition revealed by *madhyamā* in the mind to which our cognition and reflections are

confined, or there would be no use of it in the explanation of the world of communication, i.e. the world of words and their meanings. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, one of his commentators, accepts *parā* and points out that up to the three levels of speech, the divisions of roots, stems, suffixes, etc. are cognized. *Yogins* know divisions even in *paśyantī*, that is, a state beyond cognition by expressions. He says, as there is no occasion for cognizing any such division in *parā*, even by *yogins*, it is not enumerated as a level of speech. (*Mahābhāṣyaudyota Paśpasāhnikā*). Helārāja has not observed such a reason for not including *parā* as a level of speech. He has identified *parā* with *paśyantī*.

In my opinion, *parā*, beyond *paśyantī*, cannot be distinguished as a level of speech. Levelling of speech in a consequential sequence of gross, subtle and subtlest is not applicable to *parā*, because that may logically lead to infinite regress. There is no logical need for explaining the substratum of different levels of speech as one of the levels of speech, and even if it is accepted as a level of speech, it, being untouched by words, may hardly be of any importance to the philosophy of grammar. It may be a subject of realization, but then its existence cannot be justified logically and epistemologically. *Vaikhari* is a perceived entity and *madhyamā* is cognized as a meaning revealing being revealed by itself after the manifestation of it through *vaikhari*. Even *paśyantī*, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is accepted as that known by implication based on cognition revealed in the mind, but there is no ground on the basis of which the existence of *parā* may also be accepted by implication as the substratum of *paśyantī*. That will only lead to infinite regress, and the implication of something by that which is itself implicated is miserable logic. Implication requires veridical cognition as a base of it, if, otherwise, it would be an imagination and might cause confusion if applied for the inference of some existence. These are, perhaps, the reasons for Bhartṛhari to not enumerate *parā* as one among the levels of speech.

Once my teacher the Late Pt. Rāmakaraṇa Sharmā explained to me that the position of middle (*madhyamā*) might be justified only when all of the three aforesaid levels are present. In case of a fourth, it will be difficult to decide the middle one. He added that *vaikhari*, as an instrument of manifesting meaning-revealing-language and *madhyamā* as the meaning-revealing unit revealed in the mind and

paśyantī as known by implication (made on the basis of cognition of the meaning-revealing unit) as its ontic substratum are accepted reasonably as levels of speech. There is no need to accept the fourth (*parā*) as a level of speech for the explanation of the world of cognition by language.

2. THE COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE

This perspective is concerned with the reflections on language as a unit of awareness. It aims to define language from the point of view of cognition revealed by it. Language, when spoken, reveals itself first and then its meaning and, thus, it stands as a foundational being. A discussion on the concept of meaning, revealed by the meaning-revealing language, will help us to understand the concept of language explained by Bhartṛhari from the point of view of cognition.

i. The Concept of Meaning Revealed by the Meaning-revealing Unit

The levels of speech from gross (*vaikharī*) to subtle (*paśyantī*) that are, metaphysically, accepted by *Vaiyākaraṇas* as manifestations of the speech-principle, consist of all the roots and stems of the world of communication on which Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language and meaning stands. By the term 'world of communication', I mean the world of cognition by language or the being figured in the mind by language (*upacāra-sattā*). It is the world for which language is the foundational being and the meaning is a being revealed non-differently by it.

Verbal-noises/utterances (*dhvaniyān*), in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, are instrumental; they manifest the language-concept (*madhyamā-śabda*) which is the real language. Real in the sense that meaning is revealed by it, this is also called *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭa*, when manifested gradually through utterances, reveals itself first and then reveals its meaning non-differently. The beings revealed so in the mind are the beings of awareness in character (*upacāra-sattā*). They are self-sustaining and self-governing beings and cannot be confused with an outcome of abstraction from the external world of things. It is a self-retained world of ideas or thought-objects figured, independently of

things ontic in nature, by language in the mind. The ontological difference between the two worlds, i.e. the world of external Beings (*mukhya sattā*) and the world of expressed beings (*upacāra-sattā*) is not significant for *Vaiyākaraṇas* because, ontologically, all are manifestations of the language principle and, hence, one is all. Philosophically, their differences are significant, as they are different in the sense that the metaphysical world, for Bhartṛhari, is untouched by language and is of non-cognitive nature and, hence, non-communicable, meta-cognitive truth, while the cognitive world (*upacāra-sattā*) is the world of language and meaning, which are intelligible and communicable by nature. A philosopher's concern, while philosophizing, is confined to the interpretation of the world of cognition by expressions, which is the only being intelligible in character. So far as habitual practices with the physical world are concerned, the ignorant, children and sages all have a similar involvement with them but, philosophically, language and its meaning are only cognitive beings. He says, a philosopher while reflecting, has nothing to do with non-communicative things, whether they are external or internal, eternal or transient. He writes '*kimasmākam vastugatena vicāreṇa, arthastvasmākam yaḥ śabdenābhidhīyate*',¹² meaning thereby that the being (meaning), for us, is what language presents. Helārāja,¹³ clarifying the idea given by Bhartṛhari, says '*vaiyākaraṇānām śabdārtho hyarthah na vastvā' rtho' rthah* (for grammarians, the object/meaning is what the language expresses; it is not the thing-in-itself).¹⁴ This line of thinking on language is based on the *Mahābhāṣyakāra*'s statement, '*kim na etena idam nityam idam anityam iti*'¹⁵ (how does it matter, for our reflection, whether or not we involve with things eternal or transient in themselves). Philosophy of language and grammar is common to all systems of studies (*śarvasādhāraṇa*), as it is concerned with the reflection on the objects of the cognition or the beings revealed by language in cognition. All cognition is revealed by and infused with language, and persons communicate all sorts of meanings through language.

In this regard, it needs to be mentioned that although Bhartṛhari does not reject the external existence of things, rather, he accepts it as the ontic substratum of ideas revealed by language, yet he emphasizes that the world of communication is the sole concern of philosophical reflections, and a philosopher is required not to go beyond the limit in

order to get rid of confusions caused by a misunderstanding of the nature and function of cognition and language as cognized. In this connection, he gives further details about philosophy of language as the apex court (*paramapada*) that helps men to get rid of all sorts of confusions regarding the world of beings/ideas, i.e., the world of language and meaning (*upacāra-sattā*).¹⁶ 'It is true that communication in ordinary usage is instrumented through verbal-noises/utterances (*dhvaniyān*), but these are not meaning-revealing units. In the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, verbal-noises/utterances/tokens we use for writing or speaking, are only tools in the manifestation of the meaning-revealing unit (*sphoṭa*). We can understand the difference between *sphoṭa* and *dhvaniyān* in terms of the soul and the body, through which the soul manifests. This shows that the meaning-revealing unit is prior to and serves as the cause of verbal-noises/utterances. When one intends to speak, sequenceless *paśyantī* reveals itself as a flash in the mind (*madhyamā śabda*), which, by effort involved in speaking' is articulated in a sequence or manifested as verbal-noises/articulate utterances. It is verbal-noises/utterances through which '*paśyantī*' is communicated to the audience. The uttering of the word '*paśyantī*' instruments the manifestation of the being of '*paśyantī*' and it as Being is known by implication as the substratum of the being of it as figured in the mind by language. We are so accustomed to using words, that we generally overlook the involvement of the expresser (*madhyamā*) and the consciousness level (*paśyantī*) as well in communication and habitually take verbal-noises/utterances as expresser or as meaning-revealing language. For Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* reveals meaning and, no cognition is possible without it, because cognition is not confined to the acts of uttering and hearing, rather the cognition of those activities also requires the given expresser *sphoṭa*, in order to be known.

All cognition is cognition shot through and through by language. Even the meaning made known sometimes by sounds other than verbal-noises, like thundering, chirping, rippling, etc., are also explained by Bhartṛhari as meanings by language. This fact is explained by him on the ground that the meaning of gestures – of hate, love, jealous, etc. – made by the dumb or newly-born, whose speech organs are not matured enough to speak, are also the meaning of language, because no meaning is possible without it.¹⁷ In those cases, gesture function as the tool for the manifestation of the expresser which by itself reveals meaning of them in their mind. The cognition of meaning by gestures and signs

apart from verbal-noises may not be explained if *madhyamā-śabda* prior to and over and above verbal-noises is not accepted as given in the mind. Meaning is inevitably the meaning of *śabda*. The meaning of gestures may not be explained without accepting meaning-revealing language. One will be bound either to reject them as meaning or to deny the fact that the dumb and children accrue cognition if one denies the existence of *sphoṭa*. Either of the positions is unacceptable and one is bound to accept language (*sphoṭa*) as meaning revealing language for explaining cognition even by gestures, etc. also.

To conclude, meaning is a unit of awareness. It is *bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa* because it is revealed positively not only by positive but also by negative sentences as well. As it is awareness there is no possibility of any division or part in meaning. It is indivisible unit and the unit that expresses it is also an indivisible.

ii. The Concept of the Meaning-revealing Unit, The Expresser (*Sphoṭa*)

In the earlier pages, we have discussed the problem as to what is the meaning of the word '*śabda*' and have come to a conclusion that the word '*śabda*', when spoken, reveals itself and the meaning in the mind of the audience. The unit that is revealed after the manifestation may be a *vākya-sphoṭa*, *pada-sphoṭa* or a *varṇa-sphoṭa*. It is important here to note that *Vaiyākaraṇas* have paid much regard to the *Mahābhāṣyakāra*'s definition of *sphoṭa* and have explained their philosophy of language on that basis. It is, therefore, necessary to give an account of *Mahābhāṣyakāra*'s definition in the light of Bhartṛhari's view and that of his commentator's.

Mahābhāṣyakāra has defined *śabda* from two points of view: (1) From the point of *view of verbal-noises/utterances*, and (2) From the point of *view of revelation* of cognition. An account of those definitions is given as follows:

1. Keeping verbal utterances/noises (*dhvaniyān*) as language in view, he, on two occasions, has given two definitions of it:
 - (i) He, while interpreting the *Vārttika* '*Adityavatsyuh*' of sage Kātyāyana on the *Māheshwara Sūtra* अ, इ, उ, ए, has defined *śabda* as '*śrotropalabdhi budhinirgrāhyaḥ prayogenābhijvalit*

ākāśadeśaḥ śabdaḥ,¹⁸ according to which *śabda* is sky-pervading, it is manifested through utterances, receptive to the auditory sense and understood by the mind. One may observe that *Mahābhāṣyakāra* has emphasized two matters of fact in this definition. Verbal-noises/utterances are not a quality of sky but a quality of language (*śabda*). This idea of grammarian's distinguishes them from other who accept articulate utterance as a quality of sky, atom, etc. as we find in the Nyāya school of Indian philosophy.

The idea of articulate utterance as sky-pervading throws sufficient light on the fact as to how it is heard by the audience even spoken from a distant place. The modern scientific inventions have also proved seers' observation on articulate utterances as sky-pervading. Before coming to the second definition given by *Mahābhāṣyakāra*, we think it is necessary to mention here that this definition of *śabda* by him characterizes verbal-noises (that to be heard and understood by the audience) as the cause of the attainment of cognition.

- (ii) '*Pratīta padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabdaḥ ityucyate.*'¹⁸ According to this definition, verbal-noises in usual communication are taken by perception and practice as the expresser (*śabda*).¹⁹ In expressions like *śabdam kuru* (please, utter the language), *śabdam mā kuru* (do not make a noise), *śabdakārī ayam māṇavakaḥ* (this child makes a noise), etc., used in day-to-day communication, *dhvani* is popularly taken as the expresser of meaning. According to this definition of language (*śabda*), the technical grammatical names like *ti*, *dhi*, *dhu*, *bha*, etc. do not convey meaning in usual communication, thus, such verbal-noises which are conventionally given for a meaning are called language. Articulate utterance (*dhvaniyān*) produced by mutual friction of the parts of body is not the expresser (*śabda*). Verbal utterance in this sense is language only if vocal organs of the speaker produce it when one intends to speak for communicating meaning. In this sense, the ringing of bell, thundering, etc. are not language (*śabda*) though hearers understand some or the other meaning of them.

Vaiyākaraṇas have made a distinction between language as verbal-noises and it as meaning-revealing unit and have assumed the former as tool only in the manifestation of the latter, which is the real language (the expresser = *vācaka*) in their philosophy.

2. The definition of *śabda* by *Mahābhāṣyakāra* is chiefly based on characterizing the meaning-revealing unit or the expresser (*śabda*). In the very beginning of *Mahābhāṣya*, sage Patañjali has himself raised the question as to what is the expresser in the articulate utterance '*gauḥ*'? Is it a thing possessing dewlap, tail, horn, hoof, etc.? He says: no; that is substance. Is it the gesture and efforts made by the speaker while uttering *gauḥ*? He says: no; that is an action. Is it colour-white, etc.? No; that is a quality. Is it common and essential property of different individual cows (*gauḥ*)? No; that is universal. Passing through this dialectical reasoning, he conclusively defines it as '*yenocāritena sāsṇālāṅgūlakakudā khuraviṣāṇinām sampratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ*'.²⁰ According to this definition, the expresser (*śabda*) is that which, when manifested in the mind after hearing verbal-utterances, reveals an idea/concept, that is, intelligible being.

Concept (*sampratyaya*) of the cow is universal in character. This universal is not a property, but the being, an indivisible whole. The expresser, according to the definition, is concept (*sampratyayātmaka*) or meaning revealing unit. *Mahābhāṣyakāra* gives this definition from the point of view of cognition revealed in the mind by the expresser and as such it comprises both the verbal-noises/utterances as the body, more specifically garb and the meaning = revealing unit or the expresser as the soul more specifically the constant content of awareness in nature on the ground of which communication is figured out.

The word '*uccāritena*' used by *Mahābhāṣyakāra* in his definition distinguishes the phonetic element and the word '*sampratyayaḥ*' emphasizes the expressive or cognitive element involved in cognition. The momentary phonemes alone cannot cause cognition. They, discretely or collectively, are not a meaning-revealing unit, and, hence, not expressive of meaning. An expresser (*sphoṭa*), for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is that which is the inner meaning-revealing unit and which when manifested gradually by phonemes reveals itself first and then its meaning is revealed non-differently in the mind of the audience.

The *sphoṭa* for them is not a tool like verbal-noises/utterances, but is a revealing force that expresses itself and the meaning as well. Bhartṛhari writes, the expresser (*śabda*), like senses, does not illuminate the objects only, but like soul it illuminates itself and the meaning as

well and that is why it is defined as the luminosity and the illuminative force (*grāhaka-grāhya*). The use of words '*uccāritena*' and '*sampratyayaḥ*' by *Mahābhāṣyakāra* in his definition of *śabda*, aims at characterizing it as both the expresser and the expressed. As cognition of meaning by language may properly be explained on the basis of meaning-revealing unit. *Bharṭṛhari*, from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition, has given much regard to this definition of *śabda*. He seems right in explaining the meaning as the expressed (*vācya*) and language as expresser (*vācaka*) of it, which, when uttered (*uccāritena*) by the speaker's effort and heard by the audience, reveals cognition (*sampratyayaḥ*) in the mind. How can the revelation of cognition be explained if *spṛṣṭa*, the expresser is not accepted different from the verbal-noises/utterances, which are tools only in its manifestation?

It is obvious from the aforementioned analysis of the definitions, that the first defines it on the basis of perception, habit and practice as verbal-noises uttered for communication in day-to-day practice. *Mahābhāṣyakāra*, as we have already mentioned in the second definition, has characterized language (*śabda*) as awareness, the concept or idea, which, in usual communication, is manifested by utterances (*dhvaniyān*) and, then, reveals itself and the meaning in the mind.

Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, the author of *Vyākaraṇa-Maṇjuṣā*, has interpreted '*pratīta padārthakaḥ*' used by *Patañjali* in the first definition, in terms of cognition of meaning.²¹ According to his interpretation of this definition, a *śabda* is a word, a collection of or a set of phonemes to be heard that are capable of conveying meaning. According to *Bharṭṛhari*,²² the definition of it as '*pratīta padārthakaḥ*' is given on the basis of perception, popularity and practice. In day-to-day practice, articulate utterances/noises (*dhvaniyān*) through which communication with the factors like context, etc., is performed, is popularly called the expresser (*śabda*). As the meaning revealing unit (*spṛṣṭa*) is manifested by verbal utterances/noises, it, by proxy or practice (*upāya*), is also taken, by him, as *śabda*. We are so accustomed to this practice, that we overlook the inner, meaning-revealing unit involved in the cognition and consider it as confined to the audible verbal-noises/utterances only.

In brief, it can be said that Bhartṛhari wants to show that both the verbal-noises and the *sphoṭa* are involved in the accomplishment of communication. Verbal-noises manifest the meaning-revealing *sphoṭa* and the *sphoṭa* as expresser of meaning is known as a revealed being, which reveals meaning non-differently.²³ The meaning is non-differently revealed by the expresser on the basis of which identical conception in all occurrences and instances by a set of verbal-noises/utterances (*dhvaniyān*) are singled out in spite of difference of tone, etc. incurred in uttering. In order to clarify Bhartṛhari's position on language, his verse '*dvā upādāna śabdeṣu śabdau śabdavidoviduḥ. Eko nimittam śabdānām aparō'the prayujyate,*²⁴ must be taken for deliberation. According to this verse, a *śabda* is, in fact, a totality of the two—the inner meaning-revealing unit, that is *sphoṭa*, and the verbal-noises/utterances, that is *dhvani*. The former is of the nature of awareness and the latter is that of the tool or instrument in revealing the former.

Bhartṛhari explains²⁵ the cause and caused relation between them from the point of view of both the speaker and the hearer. *Sphoṭa*, from the point of view of the speaker, is the cause of production of *dhvani* and *dhvani*, being produced by *sphoṭa*, is the caused of it. From the point of view of hearer's *dhvani* is the cause of *sphoṭa* because it causes manifestation of *sphoṭa*. Communication is neither a sheer activity of hearing nor that of uttering. It is **not confined** to the act of uttering and hearing only, **rather, it is the accomplishment** of cognition in which uttering and hearing serve as tools. What is heard and what is uttered are articulate utterances (*dhvaniyān*), which from the cognitive point of view, is only a tool that invokes revelation of *sphoṭa* while the *sphoṭa* is a cognitive unit and, hence, foundational to communication. Accomplishment of cognition is possible in some cases as of Yogins, etc., even **without the invoking by** verbal-noises (*dhvaniyān*). How can a Yogin's cognition be explained only on the basis of discrete momentary sounds? *Dhvani* is an effect of the expresser (*sphoṭa*) because it is produced by it. Similarly, the latter is, the cause of the former (*dhvaniyān*) because it effects the former through the speaker's effort and because of the limited reason that the latter (*sphoṭa*), in the mind of the hearer, is manifested through the hearing of them. It is clear from the lines mentioned above that the determination of being cause and effect of one another of them is relational to the expectancy of the speaker and hearer.

The *sphoṭa* is an inner-unit of cognition and, as such, sequenceless, while verbal-noises, as a collection of discrete phonemes, are uttered in sequence. Now, the problem is: how the sequenceless *sphoṭa* is manifested into sequences and that how sequences manifest sequenceless *sphoṭa*? In order to clarify the problem Bhartṛhari gives instances based on established experiences of seers and sages (*āgama*). According to the first sort of instances—the fire, lying potent in pieces of wood, is produced when the pieces are kindled to produce fire that burns, similarly, by the expectancy for speaking, the inner, sequenceless *sphoṭa* is manifested through the organs of speech in the form of verbal-noises/utterances (*dhvaniyān*).²⁶ The sequences involved in uttering and hearing of articulate utterances are imposed on the sequenceless *sphoṭa*; just as the different colours of a peacock are sequencelessly potent in its egg and is manifested in a sequence when the egg is hatched, *sphoṭa* is manifested through articulated utterances produced in a sequence by speaker's effort, when he intends to communicate.²⁷ Manifested thus, *sphoṭa* reveals itself as well as its meaning non-differently. Showing how *dhvani* is manifested by the sequenceless *sphoṭa*, Bhartṛhari says²⁸ just as different parts of a statue are perceived in a sequence first and, then, the unitary cognition of a single statue is cognized, similarly, different phonemes, when heard in a sequence, manifest sequenceless unitary *sphoṭa* in the mind of hearers and then manifested so, it reveals itself in the mind.²⁸ Verbal-noises/utterances spoken to convey meaning are produced by the efforts of vocal-organs of the speaker and, a child, born in a society, observes the modes, tones, length (short, long, prolonged) and contents, etc., of the verbal-noises used by the elders of that society and, then, follows them in the manner when he intends to communicate. There are three factors involved in communication in the way a child learns it: (1) The observation of gestures, tones, etc., occurred in verbal-noises made by the elders when they communicate meaning. (2) Things external or internal for which the verbal-noises/utterances, by proxy, are made by elders, and (3) Posed relation between the verbal-noises and the things on account of which the word, by proxy, is taken to stand for them. But for a philosopher, investigating into the cognition revealed by language, there are two other utmost important elements involved in communication. They are (1) *Sphoṭa*, the inner, meaning-revealing unit, and (2) The meaning revealed, non-differently by it, in the mind.²⁹ These two are not conventional but foundational

elements of communication and according to Bhartṛhari, they, in fact, are not two but non-different. In his philosophy, meaning is not a separate being, but that which is non-differently revealed by the expresser and, thus, Bhartṛhari, by accepting the expresser (*sphoṭa*) as the being that non-differently reveals meaning, explains, '*sphoṭa mayam viśvam*' (the world of communication is the world of *sphoṭa*).

From the discussions made earlier, it can easily be seen that Bhartṛhari's problem in defining language (*śabda*) is, basically concerned with the explanation of cognition as revealed in day-to-day communication and that he has explained the problem of cognition by speeches, by accepting *sphoṭa* as an inner meaning-revealing unit which, is awareness in character. It is justified to say that his philosophy of language is the philosophy of *sphoṭa*. The concept of *sphoṭa* stands, as the bedrock of his philosophy of *Vākyapadīya* and it can authentically be said that his philosophy cannot be understood by one who does not understand his concept of revealing unit as an intelligible or philosophical being. The reason is that he has observed all the contents of his *Vākyapadīya* from the point of view of cognition as figured out in the mind and, hence, *sphoṭa* as a cognitive-being, is a being of awareness in character. In order to investigate into the concept of *sphoṭa*, it is desirable to give an account of nature, significance and different associated elements of it.

Sphoṭa: The śabda-dispositional of Mind (*śabda-bhāvanā*)

Modern scientific inventions have proved that even a newly-born baby comprehends the feelings of its pain and pleasure. From the side of Bhartṛhari, it may be asked as to how can cognition of the baby be explained if language (*śabda*) is not accepted as given to it since birth. As Bhartṛhari propounds cognition as a cognition shot through and through with language, the explanation of a baby's cognition, whose auditory and vocal senses are not yet matured to an extent of hearing and speaking, cannot be given without accepting the innate position of language. As such, it for Bhartṛhari is ubiquitously given in the mind as a potency on account of which the mind comprehends its pain and pleasure.³⁰ Not only that, its efforts to communicate its pains

and pleasures can well be observed in its acts of crying, smiling, etc. It knows, though it cannot speak, because its organs of speech are not matured to that extent. It cries, for what? Is it not that it, by crying, communicates its feeling? This matter of facts cannot be explained properly if speech dispositionality (*śabda-bhāvanā*) of mind is not accepted.³¹ Professor B.K. Matilal rightly observes 'if it is cognitive, then it has speech-potential. The speech-potency is an essential trait of human consciousness. Even babies would have it'.³² *Śabda-bhāvanā* is given in it and is cultivated progressively by the observation of the use of words by elders of the society in which it is born. Speech dispositionately (*śabda-bhāvanā*) of man, being a cultural arena of consciousness, is renderable in different language-tokens of one's own touch without a change in its awareness character. It is not justified to accept the rendering of utterances or marks (*dhvaniyān*) that are momentary instantaneous individuals or garbs differing in different communities, even from speakers to speakers. Rendering implies a constant content (universal) and that constant universal is given ubiquitously. According to Bharṭṛhari, *sphoṭa* is the constant content which when manifested by different tones and speeches of the same sense of different language, reveals itself first and then meaning is revealed non-differently by it. Garbs/tokens like 'gauḥ' in Sanskrit, 'gāya' in Hindi, 'cow' in English, as Bharṭṛhari would say, manifest the same *sphoṭa* on account of which the same meaning (cow) is cognized by the persons having the observation of the uses of those garbs. This shows that the same content is manifested through different garbs of different language communities and, manifested by them, it reveals itself as the expresser from which its expressed (*vācya*) is revealed non-differently.

Pāṇini in his *sūtra*, '*avaṃ sphoṭāyanasya*'³³ has referred to the name of an ancient seer *sphoṭāyana* who, perhaps, was the founder of the theory of *sphoṭa*, but his theory is now not traceable. Patañjali, while explaining the *Pāṇini Sūtra* '*taparastatkālasya*'³⁴ in his *Mahābhāṣya* has used the word *sphoṭa* for real-language (*madhyamā-śabda*) and in another passage he has mentioned 'dhvani' aspect of it (*athavobhayataḥ sphoṭa mātram nirdiśyate ra śruteḥ laśrutiḥ bhavatīti*).

In the history of philosophy, *sphoṭa*, as a theory of language, is

attributed to sage Bhartṛhari. Taking *sphoṭa* as real-*śabda* into consideration, he has explained the distinction of language as awareness in character and verbal-noises/utterances as tools in manifesting it. In other words, language is not confined only to verbal-noises/utterances; it is the expresser (*sphoṭa*) ubiquitously given, indivisible and inner unit of cognition, by which expectancy of cognition for a unit or for a complete meaning is caused. Verbal-noises/ articulate utterances are instrumental in manifesting the *sphoṭa*.³⁵

Sentence, in his philosophy, is an inner unit, which reveals a complete unit (meaning). It is noteworthy here to say that the criteria adopted by Bhartṛhari for the explanation of unit of language is the revelation of a complete meaning, and as it figures with the help of indivisible sentence, it is called *sphoṭa*, the expresser.

Sphoṭa: Sentence or Word?

Sphoṭa, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is an indivisible, complete meaning-revealing unit, the expresser that is sentence. The Sanskrit word *śabda* is generally translated into English as 'word' and, as such, one may ask: whether *sphoṭa* is a word or a sentence? For Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa*, being a complete meaning-revealing unit, is a sentence. It is added that, as a sentence is an inner and indivisible unit, it is difficult for ignorants and children to understand and in order to make it understandable to them, it is divided, artificially, into different components of it by the process of grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*). The concept of grammatical analysis will be discussed in detail in Chapter VII. Here, I wish to clarify that the divisions of the indivisible sentence, acquired through grammatical analysis, are conventionally taken as real components of the indivisible sentence. Children and ignorants understand the indivisible through the divisions conventionally taken as real and, thus, the indivisible sentence is explained as a get-together of such components. Chapters III and IV have been assigned to the concept of 'sentence' and 'word'. It can, authentically, be said that Bhartṛhari has used the word '*śabda*' for an indivisible unit, which from the point of view of accomplishment of communication, is sentence and from the point of view of explaining the structure of language to ignorant and children is 'word'. In the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, the word '*śabda*' and '*sphoṭa*' are synonymously used for a complete expresser that is sentence, and

the word 'pada' for words. However, if there is a use of the word 'śabda' for word (pada) or for suffixes, etc., it is used only with a sense that they are parts of the śabda, i.e. sentence or language, and that they are also language (śabda) if a complete meaning is revealed by them. This fact can well be distinguished from his observation on indivisible sentence which is awareness in character, and the grammatical analysis of it in words, and words into roots and suffixes. Explaining cognition by words in usual communication, he strongly states that a word, or even a letter, functions as sentence, if they successfully perform communication. An isolated word cannot be expressive of a specific or complete meaning and if only a single word causes cognition of a complete meaning that meaning cannot be the meaning of an isolated word but of a sentence. In those cases the words are used either as compound which are explained as integrated sentence (*vigraha vākya*) or as single-word expressions, by which the complete unit is revealed.³⁶ Thus, it is clear that when the word 'śabda' is used for an unit conveying a complete meaning (a specified universal), it, for Bhartṛhari, functions either as a sentence or as a compound, conveying integration of meaning, but when it is taken as a discrete word, its independent meaning is decided as universal in a very general sense. In cases of the former, expectancy for the completion of a unitary meaning is satisfied, but in case of the latter, the expectancy for the completion persists. Only this way, the difference of the terms, 'śabda' and *pada* and their meanings can be distinguished in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari.

Background for Bhartṛhari's Sphoṭa/Sentence-holism

Bhartṛhari is a sentence-holistic. The basic argument that influenced his holistic theory of language most is found in Kātyāyana's *Vārttika*, 'na vā śabdapūrvako hyrthe sampratyayaḥ. [The meaning is always a meaning revealed by śabda (language), on *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 1/1/67], and in Patañjali's *Bhāṣya* 'śabdapramāṇakāvayam, yacchabdāha tadasmākam pramāṇam' (we are the upholders of the authority of language. 'What language expresses is our guide', *Mahābhāṣya*, *Paspaśāhnika*, 1/1). Throughout the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari is seen conscious of maintaining that the philosopher's concern is confined to the objects revealed or figured in the mind by language, particularly in the statements—'kim asmākam vastugatena vicāreṇa. Arthastu

asmākam yaḥ śabdenābhidhīyate (Dīpikā on Mahābhāṣya 1/p. 28), 'na so'sti pratyayo loke. Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāṣate' (VP, 1/123), 'etām sattām padārtho hi na kaścidativartate' (VP, 3/3/51). In his commentary on VP, part III, Helārāja has repeatedly reminded us of this fact. See his statements, *vaiyākaraṇānām śabdārtho'rthaḥ, śabdapramāṇakānām hi yacchbda āha tat paramārtharūpam* (HR on VP, 3/1/11), 'sarva pārśadam hīdam śāstram, iti, śabdārtho'rthaḥ' (HR on VP, 3/1/19), *tathā hi buddhyānirūpita vastuviśayāḥ śabdāḥ, śabdārthaḥ śabdyata iti kṛtvā* (HR on VP, 3/3/41), *iha hi vyākaraṇe na vastvārtho'rthaḥ apitu śabdārtho'rthaḥ* (HR on 3/9/1). For this kind of holism, *sphoṭa* is a sentence, and it is a unit that is awareness in character. It is inner, indivisible and meaning-revealing language and reveals its meaning non-differently.³⁷ Accordingly, all those entities that are not revealed by language, i.e., things-in-themselves are beyond the grasp of knowledge. In very brief, it is argument that serves as the basis of Bhartṛhari's theory of language as expression, meaning as philosophical/intelligible-being (*upacāra-sattā*) and of non-difference and infusion of meaning with language.

In order to understand Bhartṛhari's concept of *sphoṭa*,³⁷ one has to be aware of the distinction he maintains between *śabda* and *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*. Out of *śabda* (with a capital 'S') and *sphoṭa*, the former, for him, is an ontological-Being to which everything including the latter is ontologically subordinated. It is *paśyantī*, the *śabda*-principle.³⁸ *Paśyantī* is a metaphysical being. He accepts its Being as the ontic substratum of the beings, revealed in the mind, by the latter that is *sphoṭa*, which is a revealed and, hence, cognitive or intelligible-being (*madhyamā-śabda*). Thus, *sphoṭa* is not identical to *śabda*. For Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* is the *Śabda* at the *madhyamā* level, the middle stage in the metaphysics of the *Śabda*-principle. The *Śabda*, at this level, is not an ontological but a cognitive-being. It is a concept, ubiquitously given as an indivisible idea and is cognitive and communicable by nature.³⁹ It is universal but not a universal as an abstracted-being that is abstracted by several occurrences and instances of the *vaikharī-śabda* (language-token including verbal utterances/noises, written letters, words and sentences, symbols, signs and gestures). Helārāja observes: '*asyām ca madhyamāvasthāyāṃ parāmarśanātmāvācakaḥ śabdo'bhinna caitanyodrekātmī kām vāgāvasthāmatyajanneva svarūpavācyamukhena tatsambhinnamartham*

parāmrśati sāmānādhikaranyena gaurayamarthaiti... sphuṭībhavati etāvati śabdavyāptiḥ (Helārāja on VP, 3/3/2).

Bhartṛhari maintains a difference⁴⁰ between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*, out of which the former, for him, is a cognitive-being and, hence, foundational, while the latter is instrumental only in manifestation of the former. The former is cognized independently of the latter while the latter, as the cause of the manifestation of the former, is inferred. The latter is perceived as verbal-noises while the former, is revealed. The latter is perceived as verbal-noises while the former is known directly as revealed in the mind. The former produces the latter, which is the cause of incentive not only of production of *vaikharī*, but also of expectancy of its articulation for communication of the former. Language-tokens, for Bhartṛhari, are only instrumental in the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. Manifested so, it reveals itself and reveals its meaning non-differently.

Precisely, the *Śabda*-principle is the only ontological-being at different levels of *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī* out of which *Paśyantī* is transcendental to other levels of *Śabda* but it is accepted, by him, as the ontological substratum of the *Sphoṭa* revealed in the mind by itself. *Madhyamā-Śabda* is a cognitive being, a being of awareness by nature.⁴¹ It is on the basis of this view of language as cognitive-being that he philosophizes all cognition as cognition shot through and through by language.⁴² It is the concept or *sphoṭa* as universal, on the basis of which he explains the identical cognition by language in its several occurrences and instances of the tokens that differ from community to community. These sounds/tokens, as they are learnt by observation of their uses by elders, are uneven in their shape, size, tone, accent, diction, pronunciation, etc. but the *sphoṭas* they manifest are constant.⁴³ It is the constant *sphoṭa* which is manifested by those garbs.

In connection to the levels of speech-principle, it is notable, here that Bhartṛhari's theory of these levels is based on a cognitive ground. The *śabda*-principle, in his holistic philosophy, is the only Reality pervading the different forms and levels of beings, known by the different sources of knowledge, i.e., verbal tokens (*vaikharī-śabda*) by perception, language as idea (*madhyamā-śabda* or *sphoṭa*) as a unit directly revealed or figured in the mind in communication and *paśyantī*,

being beyond our knowledge, is neither a perceived nor a revealed unit but is known by implication/inference or by presumption as the ontological substratum of the language revealed by itself in the mind. It is not a philosophical-object because it is not a being revealed; it is a metaphysical Being, an object of realization by *sāadhanā*.

*Sphoṭa*⁴⁴ is the depth of atomic utterances/noises, which die the moment they are born, but with a difference that there is no logical possibility of unity of sounds, uttered in the sequence, by synthesis either by themselves, as they cannot do that, or by mind because in that case the synthesized unit will not then be the unit of them but of their impressions as resurrected in memory and, hence, different. In case of it as a unit of memory, all verbal cognition will be memory and this will be a case of under-estimation of the foundational value of language in cognition. There is no possibility of them being synthesized themselves or of a simultaneous articulation or grasping of more than one sound atom. Bhartṛhari has accepted two kinds of sounds, namely (1) *prākṛta*, and (2) *vaikṛta*, out of which the former causes the latter. The former may be accepted as the depth of the latter,⁴⁵ but then what will serve as its cause? It is not self-caused but caused by the *sphoṭa*, which is an indivisible unit of awareness given ubiquitously in the minds, on the basis of which not only the expectancy for the production of sounds is made possible, but which serves as the depth of them also. It is the *sphoṭa* on the basis of which cognition and communication are accomplished. Cognition, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is self-awareness of the revealed or cognitive objects and it is always a veridical cognition.⁴⁶

Etymological Derivation of *sphoṭa*

The term *sphoṭa* is derived from the root *sphut*, which means manifested, displayed, burst-forth, opened, expanded, expressed, etc. In different derivations it is taken for different meanings. In the interpretation '*sphuṭati asau'rthaḥ sphoṭaḥ*', it is that by which meaning is revealed; in this interpretation *sphoṭa* is a meaning-revealing *śabda*. According to the interpretation '*sphuṭati sphuṭībhavati*', it is that which is revealed when manifested by verbal-noises. Mādhavācārya in his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* takes it as '*sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇāḥ*' it is that which is manifested by phonemes. Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, in his

Vyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra, has interpreted it as 'sphuṭatyartho yasmāt', according to which it is the unit from which meaning is revealed. Bhartṛhari defines *sphoṭa* as 'anekavyaktyabhibyangyā jātiḥ sphoṭaḥ',⁴⁷ according to which it is the universal revealed by itself when manifested by several individuals (*dhvaniyān*). From the point of view of communication, it is sentence explained as manifested by a set of language-token and from the point of view of learning language, it is the letter/word-*sphoṭa* to be manifested by several occurrences and instances involved in articulations and, hence, universal in all cases.⁴⁸

Further Clarifications

Many critics of *sphoṭa* have misunderstood the theory of *sphoṭa* and have considered it as a dead theory. They say that *sphoṭa* is a metaphysical entity and that it is not justified to intrude into such an entity for explaining the problem of cognition by language. T.R.V. Murti, in his paper entitled 'The Philosophy of Language in Indian Context', makes a very confusing and baseless remark on the grammarians' concept of *sphoṭa*. He writes 'in addition, the grammar school makes a gratuitous assumption of a mythical entity like the *Sphoṭa*. (p.388, *Studies in Indian Thought*, edited by H. Coward, 1983). It is true that Bhartṛhari has observed *śabda* as a metaphysical reality and, in specific cases, he has accepted the metaphysical understanding of language as reference for explaining some grammatical concepts like substance, but only on the basis of these instances it is wrong to evaluate his philosophy as a metaphysical theory of language as reference, because language, for him, is expressive. *Sphoṭa* is neither a metaphysical nor a mythical entity. It is the unit of cognition, a revealed entity and thus it is presumptuous to accept a revealed entity as mythical and a cognitive unit, that is the unit of awareness, as a metaphysical entity. In the active theory of knowledge, the *sphoṭa*, when manifested by garbs, reveals its own nature first, and then its meaning is revealed non-differently by it in the mind and that is the reason Bhartṛhari defines it as *grāhakagrāhya* or *prakāśakaprakāśya*. In other words, *sphoṭa* is the expresser, and the expresser reveals its own nature before it reveals the expressed. The expressed it expresses is non-different from the expresser. Both of them are revealed beings and thus the charge that it is a mythical entity, is baseless.

Bhartṛhari's attempt is neither to form a metaphysics of *Vyākaraṇa* nor to interpret a given system of metaphysics, but to explain cognition as it figures in communication, and that too only on the basis of cognition as revealed in the mind by language. The language which is expressive and which reveals its meaning non-differently is real-language, that is *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭa* is *śabda* ubiquitously given in the mind, and it, when flashes forth, serves as the cause of incentive to articulations in the speaker and when manifested by hearing those articulations it reveals itself in the mind of the audience. Its being and the being of meaning are cognitive beings, beings that are awareness in nature and are non-different, as the former is revealed by the latter.

It is the ubiquity of *sphoṭa* on the basis of which communication is made possible and, therefore, the charge of language as a private being does not arise in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. Language is given ubiquitously in the mind of all and is revealed when manifested by tokens varying from community to community. The meaning is revealed non-differently by it. What is revealed in the mind is also a being that is cognitive and communicative in nature. *Sphoṭa* and its meaning revealed by it, for Bhartṛhari, are such beings on which our cognition, communication and philosophical reflections are based, and also to which they are confined. As *sphoṭa*, for Bhartṛhari, is an indivisible flash, a complete unit expressive of a complete meaning and indivisible sentence (*vākya*). The sentence is an expresser (*vācaka*), which expresses its meaning (*vācya*) non-differently. It is artificially divided into parts, that is words, and words into stems/roots/suffixes, prefixes and letters to make it understandable to those who can understand it only through a piecemeal scheme, and the meanings of the parts are decided accordingly as parts of the indivisible sentence and sentential-meaning.⁴⁹ The units derived by grammatical analysis are also taken as indivisible units that are universal in nature. In a very general sense, they are universal because it is they on the basis of which identical cognition, by them, in several occurrences and instances is accomplished.⁵⁰

The world of *Śphoṭas* and *Pratibhās* is the world of *Upacāra-sattā* (beings/ideas figured in the mind by language) and it is the *Upacāra-sattā* that, for him, is the world to which our self-conscious or philosophical activities are confined. *Upacāra-sattā*, as Bhartṛhari and,

his commentator, Helārāja observe, in *Sambandha-samuddeśaḥ*, VP, 3/3, figures equally as being and non-being as well (*Bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*) and that is why identical-cognition, not only by assertive but by negative expressions also, figures.⁵¹ The revelation of being and non-being is made possible because they are revelations by *Sphoṭa* which, in his philosophy, is the only being expressive by nature. The *Śabda*, as an ontological being (*paśyanti*), is beyond not only from articulate utterances (*Vaikharī*) but from intelligible (*madhyamā*) *śabda* also. It is important, here, to note that what is known even by the word *paśyanti* is not the *paśyanti*, an ontic being, but the intelligible being that figures in the mind by the word (*madhyamā-śabda*, i.e. *sphoṭa*). The meaning that is revealed non-differently by *sphoṭa*, for Bhartṛhari, is *pratibhā*. Both of the *sphoṭa* and *pratibhā* are revealed and, hence, are secondary-beings (*upacāra-sattā*) in contrast with the primary beings (*mukhyā-sattā*). The only difference between them is that out of the two, *sphoṭa* is called so because it reveals itself, when manifested by tokens, and reveals its meaning non-differently (*prakāśya-prakāśaka*) and the latter is called *pratibhā* because it is revealed (*prakāśya*) non-differently by the former. *Pratibhā*, in Bhartṛhari, is not the mind or intellect but that which is revealed in the mind by *Sphoṭa*. As *sphoṭa* is also a revealed-being, i.e. a *vācya* in a verbal cognition, it is *Pratibhā*. Indivisible *sphoṭa* is the language universal as it is revealed by the articulate utterances in their several instances and occurrences and *Pratibhā* is the indivisible meaning, universal in nature, and the two are eternally related as *vācaka-vācya*. There is no possibility of a *vācya* without a *vācaka* and a *vācaka* is called so only because a *vācya* is expressed non-differently by it. Conclusively, *sphoṭa*, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is both the *vācaka*, as it expresses the *vācya*, and the *vācya*, as it expresses its own self first, in a verbal-cognition. Taking this point in view that *Vaiyākaraṇa*'s statement '*Pratibhāmayam ayam viśvam*' seems true to the holistic position of Bhartṛhari.

Nature of *Sphoṭa*

In this section an exposition is given of the discussions on *sphoṭa* as mentioned in *Vākyapadīya*:

Sphoṭa: Inner, Indivisible śabda

Sphoṭa is not a created or produced entity. In fact, for Bhartṛhari, it is the inner, indivisible, ubiquitously and eternally given being which is awareness in nature. Is it possible without it to request a grammarian to create a word for us as we intend to speak? Obviously not. Is intention to speak without language possible? Expression is the *sphoṭa*, a prerequisite of all verbal cognition and, hence, cannot be denied because even the denial requires expression. Convention itself implies the prior existence of it.⁵² In cases where the expectancy for the completion of meaning persists, Bhartṛhari would say, the indivisible complete unit (*sphoṭa*) in that case is not fully revealed. It is ubiquitously given and an indivisible unit of cognition, and in ordinary communication it is manifested gradually in the sequence of verbal-noises.⁵³ If the verbal-noises are not up to the extent of manifesting complete *sphoṭa*, the expectancy for completion of meaning persists, if otherwise the cognition of indivisible unit (*sphoṭa*) and of meaning non-differently revealed by it is cognized. We now propose to mention Bhartṛhari's logic behind accepting it as inner and indivisible unit. We have already seen that articulate utterances (*dhvaniyān*), for Bhartṛhari, are only instrumental in manifesting *sphoṭa*. The expression of meaning, as such, cannot be explained only on the basis of fleeting verbal-noises/utterances. Expression implies an expresser and so is an expressed a given expresser and the *sphoṭa* as a given expresser is accepted by him as inner language.⁵⁴ The cognition, recognition and memory in order to be recalled, known and interpreted so also require the given position of language if otherwise, no cognition, no memory or recognition of it will be possible as it is awareness and awareness can not be divided, it is indivisible.

Sphoṭa The Expresser

Though uttering and hearing both are inevitably involved in the act of communicating, the accomplishment of cognition by the process of uttering and hearing is dependent on the manifestation of the meaning-revealing unit that is *sphoṭa*. Meaning, as we have seen, is not an external entity but a being revealed non-differently by *sphoṭa* in the mind. Thus, those which figure by language, are the beings to which our communication is confined. Bhartṛhari says that the utterances

manifest the meaning revealing unit (*sphoṭa*) which when manifested so by them reveals its own nature from which the meaning is revealed non-differently.⁵⁵ *Sphoṭa* as a meaning-revealing unit, in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, is the awareness of itself and of the meaning as well and, hence, a cognitive unit on the basis of which cognition and communication is accomplished by it independently of Beings or our allegiances to them.

Sphoṭa is Universal

Universal has been defined, by Bhartṛhari, in two ways. The universal, according to the first, as we have seen in earlier pages, is that which is manifested by many individuals falling under it. *Sphoṭa* is a universal, and the many individuals that manifest it are words and letters (*aneka vyaktyabhivyaṅgyā jātiḥ sphoṭāḥ smṛtā*).⁵⁶ According to this definition, sentence is the universal of words, words universals of letters and letters are universal of letterence. According to the second interpretation, it is that on account which identical cognition in its several instances and occurrences are revealed. This definition is wide in its range and as such is applicable not only to sentence-*sphoṭa* but to word and letter also. The logic behind accepting *sphoṭa* as universal is very plain. The same word, take 'pot', is used for a number of individual pots (long, sort, etc.). It is used even for individuals, past or destroyed, and also for those yet to be produced. This matter of fact cannot be explained if *sphoṭa* as universal is not accepted. It is not only I who is using the word 'cow', and it is also not that the word 'cow' is destroyed after my use. The cognition of word as word and identical conception revealed by the word in all its occurrence and instances may not be explained without admitting it as universal. Not only that, but it will be difficult to answer as to how can one be intended to speak at all if '*sphoṭa*' as universal is not accepted as the cause of incentive to speaking. Universal, for Bhartṛhari, is the cause of incentive to speak, or not to speak a word for a meaning.⁵⁶ It is the *sphoṭa* that is the cause of speaker's incentive to speak when he intends to speak and, thus, it is universal.

Sphoṭa as Śabda-brahman

As an ontic substratum of *sphoṭa* as awareness, Bhartṛhari, especially in the first part of his *Vākyapadīya*, has elucidated it as the substratum

of cognition and has called it the ultimate principle (*śabda-brahman*). On the concept of *śabda-brahman*, we have already discussed in the first chapter, and, hence, it is useless to repeat here. The logic behind designating *sphoṭa* as *Brahman* is that it, like the *Advaitin's Brahman*, is self-luminous and illuminates itself and its meaning and hence, a foundational Reality of the world of cognition and communication. As *Brahman*, for the *Advaita* metaphysics is the ultimate Reality of the universe, language (*śabda*), for Bhartṛhari, as a philosopher of language, is the ultimate principle of the world of communication and of the metaphysical world as well. Harivṛtti quotes a very illuminating verse from *śruti*,⁵⁷ according to which there are three sorts of illuminating principles, which illuminate themselves and others. The first of the illuminating principles is the light of sun, etc., that belongs to fire. The second belongs to the self (*svāntara*) and the third is language itself that illuminates not only light (*prakāśa*) but non-light (*aprakāśa*) as well. Fire, self, etc. are also known as they are presented by language. All those beings are cognized as language (*śabda*) presents them. *Śabda* being the illuminating principle of all occupies the ultimate position. It is *Brahman*, philosophically, as *śabda* is the sole reality of the world of communication or that of the beings that is language and meaning (*upacāra-sattā*), Bhartṛhari designates it *Brahman*.

Sphoṭa, the Expresser and Dhvani, the articulated utterances that are tools

It is obvious that *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* both, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, are involved as soul and body in the accomplishment of communication. However, their status is different. *Sphoṭa*, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is a meaning-revealing-inner unit that is the expresser. It is the cause of cognition of meaning while *dhvani* (verbal-noises) is only a tool in the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. The indivisible sequenceless *sphoṭa* is revealed by itself when manifested by *dhvani* that is articulated in a sequence. *Dhvanīyān* may be short, middle or prolonged in duration. Sequence and durability are properties of *dhvani* which are wrongly known by imposition as the property of the indivisible *sphoṭa* also.⁵⁸ As a crystal, with the association of things kept near it, is perceived as having different forms and colours, similarly, *sphoṭa*, as it is manifested by

the verbal-noises, is understood as having their properties.⁵⁹ According to Bhartṛhari,⁶⁰ the relation between *sphoṭa* and meaning is that of a revealer and a revealed or an expresser and an expressed but that between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* can be understood as the cause (*nimitta*) and the caused (*pratipādaka*). From the speaker's point of view, the *sphoṭa*, when one intends to speak, is taken as the cause of the articulate utterances (*dhvaniyān*), while from the hearer's point of view, the heard articulated utterances serve as the cause of the manifestation of *sphoṭa* in the mind of the audience. We, while discussing the definition of *śabda*, have already seen that the cause-caused relation between a *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* is essential for the explanation of the accomplishment of cognition and communication between the hearer and the speaker. The minds of both the hearer and the speaker dwell first on the *sphoṭa*. The mind of the hearer first dwells on *sphoṭa* for communicating meaning and so is the mind of the hearer for revelation of meaning communicated through the utterances of the speaker.⁶¹

According to Bhartṛhari, communication involves identical cognition of three elements which being non-different from the complete unit, are also known by the word '*śabda*'. For example, take the word 'pot'. The cognition by word 'pot' involves (1) The utterances P, O, T, made by the speaker, which distinguish them as verbal-noises different from other noises like ringing, etc., (2) Word-universal (*śabdatva*), on the basis of which a word is cognized to be a word, and (3) 'Pot-word universal' on the basis of which the identity of a particular word is cognized as different from other words. As we are habitual in using words, we do not mind these elements and assume the apparent utterances as language. According to Bhartṛhari, the cognition of the latter two is cognition of *sphoṭa* or cognition of the *svājāti-śabda*, the cognition of *śabdatva* (word-universal) and *svarūpa-śabda* of the word = pot-word universal, and the former (*dhvani-śabda*) is instrumental only in the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. In brief, *sphoṭa*, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is the constant expresser and the articulate utterances are garbs through which the former is manifested. He is, perhaps, the first philosopher in the history of philosophy of language who sought philosophy of language as a system of interpreting communication on the basis of cognition by expressions. This cognitive analysis of communication, for clarity and conception is a distinct character of his *Vākyapadīya* and, it can well be said that no one can understand his *Vākyapadīya* properly if he does not consider it as philosophical

investigation into cognition by expression. It is suggested here to read the first chapter of this work where the issue has been discussed in detail.

Emergence of Articulated Utterances (*Dhvaniyān*)

According to Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* embraces all of the language both its internal form of *sphoṭa* and its complement in outward form of articulate utterances (*dhvaniyān*). For him, *sphoṭa* is eternal (in the sense of given) and *dhvani* is transient. The fleeting *dhvaniyān* are means of *sphoṭa* and help in its manifestation. How do utterances (*dhvaniyan*) emerge from *sphoṭa* or how does *sphoṭa* produce them? Vaiyākaraṇa's answer to this accounts to the teachings concerning the emergence of verbal-noises/utterances given in *Pāṇini-sīkṣā*,⁶² according to which when one intends to speak for communicating meaning, the light of the luminous soul (*ātman*) associates the mind (*mana*) with intellect (*buddhi*), on account of which the digestive fire (*jaṭharāgni*) is stimulated. With the stimulation of *jaṭharāgni*, the vital air is stirred. The stimulated vital air moves upward, separately or collectively, fast from the navel to the head through the throat and when knocked from the top of the head, the air, vibrating the vocal organs by their friction, takes a turn down to the mouth from which it is externalized. The friction of vocal organs with air vibrates them and then verbal utterances/ noises (to be distinguished as palatal, etc. with the distinction of organs vibrated by the friction of them with air) are produced by those vibrated organs. As we are so accustomed and habitual in the act of speaking and hearing that we do not mind these cognitive subtleties involved and operative in the emergence of verbal-noises/ utterances. We will discuss these issue after few steps, presently, we take the issue of emergence of verbal-noises for further exposition. Bhartṛhari has referred to at least three views regarding the emergence of verbal-noises.

1. The Theory of Air

For the theorists believing in this theory, the air is a force (*teja*). Presenting their position, Bhartṛhari writes '*labdhakriyaḥ prayatnena vakturicchānuvartinā. Sthāneṣv-abhihato vāyuḥ śabdatvam pratipadyate*'.⁶³ According to this verse, the vital air, stirred up by the speaker's effort and specific effort (*yatna-prayatna*) when, he intends

to speak, strikes the speech centres (palates, etc.). The striking vibrates the speech organs. These vibrations, when externalized, are distinguished as verbal-noises (*dhvaniyān*). The air is a force and as such it is capable of producing noises/utterances. Bhartṛhari writes 'even the objects like mountain, etc., that have enormous strength are broken by the force of air possessing the capacity of speech and accumulation, the blowing of air, when it strikes with mountain and leaves and branches of trees, produces sound, similarly, the vital air stirred up and articulated by speaker's effort produces verbal-noises.'⁶⁴

2. Theory of Atoms⁶⁵

In the Indian tradition, Buddhism, Jainism and *Sāṃkhya* accept the atom theory of the production of verbal-noises/utterances (*dhvani*). According to *Bauddhas*, the atoms of speech (*śabdāṇu*), having the properties of uniting and separating, are changed into speech when grasped by the auditory sense. According to *Jainas*, as Bhartṛhari presents them, the atoms possessing a number of powers including association and dissociation are changed themselves into different entities like shadow, light, heat, darkness, speech, etc. As atoms, for them, have the capacity to be transferred into different things speech, etc., they accept speech as a mode of *pudgal* (physical atom). They are to be found as atoms, but when associated by a certain cause, they emerge as noises (*dhvaniyān*). It is the differences in the causes of association and disassociation, on the basis of which different entities like shadow, speech, etc. are caused. As the accumulated atoms of water forms the cloud that rains, the atoms associated by the efforts of the speaker are transformed themselves, with their capacity, into speeches. The *Sāṃkhya* system also describes the transformation of physical atoms (*tanmātras*) into speeches.

3. Theory of Knowledge or Consciousness⁶⁶

On the basis of the theories mentioned above, it is difficult, to explain the identity and difference of verbal-noises and to distinguish the awareness character of language as well. It is a fact that verbal-noises/utterances (*dhvaniyān*) are physical entity but it is improper to accept that it is a product of physical elements. How can verbal-noises be distinguished from other sounds like thundering, ringing, etc., It can

be said that they are not products of human speech centres. But can all noises produced by human speech centres be called verbal-noises? Obviously not. Then, what is it on the basis of which they are distinctively known as verbal-noises? Those who assume verbal-noises as a product of material elements only cannot answer these questions. In articulating them for communicating meaning, there is an involvement of conscious incentive and the awareness of communicating meaning, as well. Can someone articulate verbal-noises, if he does not intend to speak or if he does not have the awareness of what he has to speak? What is the cause of incentive of the emergence of verbal-noises? Bhartṛhari replies, it is the awareness or knowledge. Knowledge causes incentive in the speaker to speak for communicating. The inner, meaning-revealing unit, awareness in character, provides incentive to speak in order to manifest itself into audible speeches. It is an involuntary emanation of spirit that flashes forth in sound when one intends to communicate meaning. Awareness is revealed when manifested through the individual speeches/utterances (*dhvaniyān*). This theory accepts the significance of the verses of *Paṇīni-śikṣā* regarding the process of manifestation of consciousness as verbal-noises. It is useless to repeat here. Articulate utterances (*dhvani-śabda*), for Bhartṛhari, are not the quality of sky (*ākāśa*), air or atoms. It is a quality of *sphoṭa* and Bhartṛhari seems justified in accepting *sphoṭa* as the cause of manifestation of them because in articulation, a synthesis of words uttered is presented, though, they differ from one language to another, according to men's energy, liveliness and allegiances involved in giving it expression. It is at the moment of articulation that the differences of garbs appear.

Kinds of Articulated Utterances (*Dhvaniyān*)⁶⁷

Articulate utterances (*dhvaniyān*) on the basis of its function in the manifestation of *Sphoṭa* by it, are divided into two: (1) Original or natural noises (*prākṛta-dhvanī*), and (2) Modified noises (*vaikṛta-dhvanī*). The former is called so because it is the actual cause of manifestation of *sphoṭa*. Without it, the unmanifested *sphoṭa* cannot be manifested and, hence, *sphoṭa* in usual communication may not be revealed if unmanifested. The distinction of short, long and prolated sounds are caused by it and that of quick (*druta*), moderate (*madhyama*) and suspended modes (*lambita*) of it are caused by the latter (*vaikṛta-*

dhvani). The fact of the continuity of cognition of *sphoṭa* till the cognition of meaning by it cannot be explained if endurance of verbal-noises in succeeding moment (in which meaning is cognized) is not accepted. We have already mentioned that the manifestation of *sphoṭa* is operated by the former (*prākṛta-dhvanī*). The modes of *dhvani*, persisting even after manifestation of *sphoṭa*, on account of which *sphoṭa* is distinguished as different from verbal-noises, is modified sound (*vaikṛta-dhvanī*). On the basis of modified sound quick, moderate and prolated articulate utterances are distinctly apprehended. *Vaikṛta-dhvanī* persists even after the manifestation of *sphoṭa* and is destroyed after the revelation of cognition. According to Harivṛtti, *vaikṛta-dhvanī* like *prākṛta-dhvanī* is also a manifestation of *sphoṭa* and it is wrong to take it as a product of *prākṛta-dhvanī*. In other words, *sphoṭa* is the cause of both sorts of *dhvaniyān*—the former and the latter. According to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, the basic difference between the former and the latter is that the properties of the former are imposed on or wrongly understood as that of *sphoṭa*, but the properties of the latter, even after the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, serves as evidential in the cognition of the difference of *sphoṭa* from verbal-noises and of verbal-noises itself from non-verbal sounds.

Three Theories Regarding Manifestation of *Sphoṭa* by Articulated Utterances

Bharṭṭhari accepts the manifestation of *sphoṭa* through verbal-noises (*dhvaniyān*) and their production by *sphoṭa*. From the point of view of the hearer, the manifestation of *sphoṭa* is performed, gradually, in the sequence of hearing verbal-noises and from the point of view of speakers verbal-noises are manifested by *sphoṭa* when he intends to speak but, in both of the cases of hearer and speaker, meaning is revealed by *sphoṭa* which is only meaning-revealing unit. *Sphoṭa* is not a produced entity but a given revealing being. It is not the *sphoṭa* but the manifestation of *sphoṭa* that takes place progressively in the sequence of the hearing of utterances.

Coming to the theory of manifestation of *sphoṭa*, it needs mention that the efforts made by speakers, when they intend to speak, are very significant in understanding Bharṭṭhari views on the manifestation of verbal-noises/utterances. It is the through effort of different speech centres of speakers on account of which different kinds of verbal-noises are manifested for articulating different *sphoṭa*. On the

manifestation of verbal-noises, we have already discussed under the topic entitled 'emergence of *dhvani*'. Here, we wish to present manifestation of *sphoṭa* from the point of view of hearers.

Bhartṛhari, regarding the manifestation of *sphoṭa* by articulate utterances, has given three theories based on different patterns. A brief account of his interpretation is given as follows:

1. *On the Pattern of Universal* ⁶⁸

For Bhartṛhari, universal is the incentive to the effectuation of individuals (*dhvani* = letters) which, when articulated, manifest their respective universals. From the point of view of cognition by language, the universal (*sphoṭa*) is manifested, gradually, in the sequence of the utterances heard. *Sphoṭa* in his philosophy is universal and articulate utterances (*dhvaniyān*) are individual. The *sphoṭa* (universal) is gradually manifested in a successive order in accordance with the sequence of the verbal-noises. In order to clarify it, we may take the example of the word 'pot' and 'top'. Bhartṛhari says: the sound (letter 'p' when spoken restricts words to be started from other letters, the utterance 'o' after 'p' restrict all others which are not started from 'po' and finally, the uttering of the last word 'T' excludes all other words different from 'pot' and the word 'pot' (universal) is singled out. Manifested so it (*sphoṭa*) reveals itself and then its meaning 'potness' as well. It is the way that all words are distinctly known so as revealed in the mind in all their instances and occurrences.

2. *On the Pattern of Light* ⁶⁹

According to it, manifestation is understood in the sense of being known. As the light of the lamp illuminates the object, verbal-noises (*dhvaniyān*) when heard, makes the *sphoṭa* manifested. Manifested so, it reveals itself and then its meaning is revealed non-differently. A lamp does not illuminate anything from within the lamp but a *sphoṭa* illuminates itself and the meaning. Unlike light, it is manifested through verbal-noises first. Cognition by language is an active process while lightening by a lamp is static.

3. *On the Pattern of Action*

In order to explain the manifestation of *sphoṭa* by the hearing of verbal-noises, Bhartṛhari has given the example of lifting (*utkṣepaṇa*). The

universal 'lifting' is manifested by the secondary activities falling under (*utkṣepaṇa*). The action 'cooking' is universal inhering in different secondary activities like washing the 'pot', putting the pot on the fire, etc., falling under the head activity 'cooking'. As the action (*kriyā*) is manifested from several secondary activities⁷⁰, *sphoṭa* is manifested progressively in the order of sequence of hearing the verbal-noises. Just as a crystal stone is manifested with the forms and colours of the things kept near it, *sphoṭa* is manifested by the verbal-noises together with the properties of them. If the *sphoṭa* and verbal-noises are taken as quite separate beings, the fact of manifestation of *sphoṭa* together with the properties of verbal-noises may not be explained. This is why Bhartṛhari does not consider verbal-noises as existences, independently of *sphoṭa*, and considers them as tool in the manifestation of it.

Three Theories regarding the Process of Manifestation of *sphoṭa* by articulated utterances

The act of manifestation of *sphoṭa* by verbal-noises, involves different theories that throw light on the function of verbal-noises (*dhvaniyān*) causing manifestation of *sphoṭa*. Ordinarily, it is taken that communication is performed through verbal-noises audible to the audience. As such, it may be asked: do the verbal-noises act on the auditory sense or on the *sphoṭa*, the object of manifestation, or on both so as to cultivate them for revelation. He has discussed three views regarding the process of manifestation of *sphoṭa* by verbal-noises⁷¹ an account of which is given here below:

1. *Articulated utterances acts on the auditory sense only*⁷²

According to some, verbal-noises act on the auditory-sense (*śrotendriya*) in a way either to actify the power of it or to transmit the *sphoṭa* to the auditory sense or to impute an unseen power in the auditory sense. Modified, thus, by verbal-noises, the auditory sense acts on for the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari gives an example based on eye-perception. As eyes, being modified by application of ointment and attention, perceive the objects more clearly, similarly, the auditory-sense, being modified by verbal-noises, acts on for the manifestation of *sphoṭa*.

2. *Articulated utterances acts on Sphoṭa only*⁷³

Analogous to a theory of smell-perception, some theorists consider the manifestation of *sphoṭa* by verbal-noises. As modification of heated earth, by sprinkling water on it, enables us for the cognition of its smell (saundha), *sphoṭa* modified by noises/utterances, is manifested in the mind of the hearers. This theory does not feel any need for accepting the cultivation of auditory sense like the first theory and considers that verbal-noises cultivate *sphoṭa* that is manifested when modified by them. Manifested so, *sphoṭa* reveals itself and its meaning.

3. *Articulated utterances acts on both the auditory sense and Sphoṭa*⁷⁴

This theory tries to reconcile the theories mentioned earlier. According to it, both, the auditory sense and the *sphoṭa* that is the object (*viśaya*) of manifestation, are modified by verbal-noises. Bhartṛhari writes 'when a light is lit to perceive a thing, kept in dark, the light acts simultaneously on both, the object (for making it able to be seen) and the eye (which otherwise is not capable of perceiving the object kept in the dark), similarly, verbal-noises act on both—on the auditory sense and on *sphoṭa* as well which otherwise cannot be revealed to ordinary persons. This theory considers other two of the three theories mentioned earlier as partial (*ekāṅgī*). If we take only the modification of auditory sense by them (*dhvaniyān*), manifestation of *sphoṭa* (*viśaya*—object of *dhvaniyān*) will not be possible but, in fact, no knowledge is possible without the cognition of *sphoṭa* first, which is the expresser (*vācaka*). On the other hand, if we accept only the modification of *sphoṭa* alone by them, it will be difficult to explain the accomplishment of communication because the hearer will not be in a position to grasp the articulated word and its meaning without hearing the verbal-noises. On the other hand, the hearing of verbal-noises implies cultivation of auditory sense. On the basis of the first theory, the accomplishment of cognition to a person whose auditory sense is defective cannot be explained and according to the second the perceptibility of verbal-noises will not be a necessary element in the accomplishment of cognition. Thus, both of the above theories are not acceptable separately as adequate in explaining the possibility of ordinary communication that is accomplished by *sphoṭa* manifested gradually and progressively by hearing the verbal-noises made by the speaker in a sequence. The

person whose auditory sense is not acted on may not hear the noises made by the speaker and the person whose sense are acted on but the object (*sphoṭa*) of verbal-noises are not acted on may not cognize the meaning which is revealed by *sphoṭa*. Only manifesting instruments, i.e. *dhvaniyān*, would not reveal knowledge and the object of knowledge (*sphoṭa*) would not be manifested without them. From the point of view of ordinary communication, verbal-noises are blind without *sphoṭa* and *sphoṭa* is lame without verbal-noises. So far the auditory sense is concerned, it performs only the function of grasping the verbal-noises and, as such, it in-itself is incapable of revealing cognition. Cognition is not a mere act of hearing. It is not a heard but a revealed fact. The hearing of utterances, for Bhartṛhari, is instrumental in modifying auditory sense and the *sphoṭa* as well and the *sphoṭa* and the meaning expressed by *sphoṭa* are revealed afterwards when the *sphoṭa* itself is revealed. Bhartṛhari does not believe in the theory of get together of verbal-noises as impression of fleeting sounds retained and resurrected in memory. He believes in the progressive manifestation of *sphoṭa* according to which phonemes (heard in a sequence in a progressive manner) manifest the *sphoṭa* which is fully revealed after the grasp of the final phoneme that binds up the sequence. Bhartṛhari has tried to make it understandable with the example of learning Vedic verses by throat.⁷⁵

Kinds of *Sphoṭa*

Bhartṛhari in *Kārikās* of *Vākyapadīya* has mentioned the term *sphoṭa*, in general, without any distinction of its kinds. It is only in his *vṛtti* that three kinds of it are clearly mentioned as ascriptions on it due to its association with language-tokens through which it is manifested. Actually all *sphoṭas* are indivisible flashes and it is on the basis of sets of tokens, i.e., letters, words and sentences, through which it is manifested, that they are classified in different kinds of *varṇa-sphoṭa*, *pada-sphoṭa* and *vākya-sphoṭa*.⁷⁶

All *sphoṭas* are ideas/concepts given in the mind and the universals in their kind. It is according to their association with different sets of token that they are classified in different kinds. A *varṇa-sphoṭa* is accepted as the cause of identical cognition of a letter as letter in all its occurrences and instances. Similar is the reason behind *pada-sphoṭa* and *vākya-sphoṭa*.⁷⁷

As division of an indivisible is impossibility, it is analyzed artificially and that it may be classified in more kinds for helping the beginner's understanding of the indivisible but through these divisions and analysis the *sphoṭa*, itself, is not divided. However, Bhartṛhari has mentioned only three of its kinds as mentioned earlier. It is with Nāgeśa, the author of *Sphoṭavāda* and *Kṛṣṇamācārya*, his commentator (in his *Subodhinī Tīkā*) that we find the mention of eight and more than eight, approximately twelve kinds of *sphoṭa* with two primary, namely (1) *Vyakti*, and (2) *jāti*. *Vyakti-sphoṭa* is divided in two: (1) *sakhaṇḍa*, and (2) *akhaṇḍa*. *Sakhaṇḍa-sphoṭa* is divided in three: (1) *varṇa-sphoṭa*, (2) *pada-sphoṭa*, and (3) *vākya-sphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa* is divided in two: (1) *pada-sphoṭa*, and (2) *vākya-sphoṭa*. Similarly, *jāti-sphoṭa* is divided in three: (1) *varṇa-sphoṭa*, (2) *pada-sphoṭa*, and (3) *vākya-sphoṭa*. The basic logic behind these divisions of *sphoṭa* is based on the view that *Vyakti* (individual) like *jāti* (universal) is accepted as eternal and, thus, *varṇa*, *pada* and *vākya* in the theory of individualists are eternal archetypes of the fleeting atoms of sound. Again the *pada* and *vākya*, in the system of *Vyākaraṇa*, are taken: (1) as indivisible unit having no sequence, and (2) as units constructed out of association of letters and words respectively. From the constructionist's point of view these units are depths of language-tokens on the basis of which identical cognition of them in their several occurrences and instances is accomplished.⁷⁸

Three theories regarding Cognition of *Sphoṭa* and articulated utterances

We have frequently said that both of the verbal-noises and the *sphoṭa* are involved in the cognition by language. The verbal-noises (*dhvaniyān*) manifest the *sphoṭa* and the meaning is non-differently revealed by it. Now the problem is: Are *sphoṭa* and sounds cognized simultaneously or separately? Bhartṛhari has discussed three views⁷⁹ on the issue. An account of his discussions on these three may be given as follows:

1. Some theorists view that cognition of verbal-noises and *sphoṭa* is revealed simultaneously and non-differently. When we perceive 'pot' in the light of a lamp, the cognition of 'light' and 'pot' is not cognized separately but simultaneously. As the cognition of 'redness' is not known separately from red crystal stone (*sphaṭic*), the cognition of verbal-noises and *sphoṭa* is revealed non-

differently. However, out of them, the latter is taken as the cause of former and the latter itself is taken as non-caused (*akārya*).

2. According to some other verbal-noises, being imperceptible (because it is destroyed after uttering), is not cognized at the time of manifestation of *sphoṭa*. According to the commentator Puṇyārāja, verbal-noises are inferred as the instrument of manifestation of *sphoṭa* consequently after the cognition of it. Just as senses do not perceive themselves before they perceive objects but they, on the basis of the activities performed by them, are inferred, similarly, verbal-noises (*dhvaniyān*), as the cause of manifestation of *sphoṭa*, are inferred and *sphoṭa* is cognized, independently of them, as revealed by itself.
3. According to still some others, verbal-noises (*dhvaniyān*) are cognized independently of the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. Clarifying the position of this view, Bhartṛhari gives the metaphor that from a distant places, as we find in the cases of uproar and quarrel, noise independently of *sphoṭa* is cognized. He further gives the example of light and the flame of light. The flame is not expanded more in extension than the light. We, from a far distance, perceive the flame and not its light expanded in a far distance, similarly, verbal-noises, being audible, are cognized from a distance but not the *sphoṭa*. We perceive utterances and not *sphoṭa* just as the ringing of the bell is heard from a far distance but not its vibrations.

According to Bhartṛhari, perception of verbal-noises (*dhvaniyān*) is only an act of hearing and is tool only in manifestation of *sphoṭa*. It is due to human perception, habit and practice that verbal utterance is taken as the cause of cognition. Bhartṛhari does not accept simultaneous cognition of articulate utterance and *sphoṭa*. Actually, the former instruments the manifestation of the latter. Manifested thus, the former reveals itself and its meaning in the mind of the audience non-differently. The former is cognized when the verbal-noises (*dhvaniyān*) are destroyed and the meaning is cognized by the former non-differently. Even verbal-noises are also cognized as the former in the mind reveals them. The whole process of accomplishment of communication comprises the expresser, effort of the speaker to communicate meaning, emergence of sound-letters, utterances, and grasping of utterances by the hearer's auditory sense. The revelation of the expresser and the expressed can be put from the speaker and hearers point of view as follows:

1. From the speaker's point of view:

- (i) The *sphoṭa*, given in the mind, is revealed that causes incentive to speak.
- (ii) Intention to communicate.
- (iii) Efforts (*yatna*) and special effort (*prayatna*) involved in producing utterances through which communication takes place.
- (iv) Utterances comprising original and modified verbal-noises.

2. From the hearer's point of view:

- (i) The grasping of utterances by auditory sense of hearer,
- (ii) The manifestation of *sphoṭa* in the mind of the hearer by hearing the utterances,
- (iii) The cognition of the *sphoṭa* and the meaning revealed non-differently by it in the mind of hearer,
- (iv) Cognition of the intention of the speaker in speaking and, finally,
- (v) Incentive to do or not to do something.

The action-oriented theory of verbal-noises of *Vaiyākaraṇas* can, to a limited extent, be compared with *J.L. Austin's* theory of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts of speech. Though they have different ways of interpretation having different outlook on the nature of language (*śabda*), one thing can fairly be said that Austin's theory of speech act is specially intended to explain communication by sentences and so is Bhartṛhari's analysis of speech also. It can equally be applied to words, if they accomplish communication as we find in certain cases of single word expressions. However, Austin's analysis of speech-act emphasizes syntactical-cum-psychological elements while Bhartṛhari's analysis of speech is based on cognition for which verbal-noises are tools in the manifestation of the meaning-revealing language (*sphoṭa*), which is the cause of the incentives to do (*pravṛtti*) or not to do (*nivṛtti*) an action.

SPHOṬA AND THE PROBLEM OF IDENTICAL-COGNITION

Verbal-cognition comprises identical-cognition of the *sphoṭa* and the meaning it reveals non-differently. Identical-cognition, only by fleeting instants of tokens, cannot be possible because in that case they will either be discretely different atoms unable to form a word or a sentence or be different objects of cognition in all their occurrences. It is on the basis of *sphoṭa* as universal that Bhartṛhari explains not only the identical-cognition of letter/word/sentence as thus in their several occurrences and instances but the identical-cognition of the meaning of them (a letter/word/sentence) also. The indivisible meaning cannot be explained as the meaning of the association of tokens because the meaning is not an association but an expressed (*vācya*), a unit of awareness, indivisible in it. Association itself requires to be determined and in that case verbal-cognition will be no more than inference. Explaining the expression of an indivisible meaning and the identical-cognition of the expression and the expressed as an indivisible expresser is not only a logical necessity, but also a revealed fact because there is no possibility of accepting an awareness of a revealed character as made of association by several atoms. Identical-cognition of a word through different garbs in several occurrences, its meaning and the relation between the two can be explained well only if *sphoṭa* as a constant content, capable of being manifested by tokens, in all their occurrences, as a foundational being of the character of awareness and as a being which reveals its meaning non-differently, is accepted. It is a universal concept, an idea, a thought-object that serves as the cause of identical-cognition by language in its several occurrences and instances. Only on the basis of verbal utterances/noises no cognition is possible because cognition is not confined only to speaking and hearing. It is revelation of language and its meaning.

In clearer words, *sphoṭa*, as universal, is not the synthetic unity of discrete atoms of sounds/letters or of the words formed by them. Universal is not an outcome of abstraction or an abstracted entity - abstracted from several occurrences and instances of bit of tokens but an indivisible, inner, ubiquitously given, self-revealed, and hence, self-restrained being that is awareness in nature, which reveals meaning non-differently. It is in this sense that it is derived as '*sphuṭatyartho yasmāt*'. There is no possibility of any division in awareness and as awareness is different

from another, one *sphoṭa* is different from another *sphoṭa*. As several awareness may have the same object or may have different objects according to which the sameness, identity and difference of them are distinctly known. Several occurrences of any bit of language-token manifest the same *sphoṭa* and different bits of language-token in their several occurrences manifest their own respective *sphoṭas* on the basis of which identical-cognition, by them, is accomplished. In this sense it is the universal, not abstracted out of several occurrences of tokens but indivisible being of awareness in nature.

Sphoṭa, for Bhartṛhari, is an indivisible flash. As it is manifested through language-token, it is taken differently as: (1) *varṇa-sphoṭa*, (2) *pada-sphoṭa*, and (3) *vākya-sphoṭa*. But it is not a fixed rule that a *vākya-sphoṭa* is called so because it is manifested by a sentence-token and similar is the case with *varṇa-sphoṭa* and *pada-sphoṭa* because in some cases a sentence (*vākya-sphoṭa*) may be manifested by a letter or by a single word-token and a letter or word (*pada-sphoṭa*) may require a number of sentence-tokens. Manifestation of *sphoṭas*, by them, varies from person to person as it depends on the fact as to how far the person is versed in communication. The basic reasoning of Bhartṛhari is that the long or short size and shape of the tokens are not significant in communication.⁸⁰ What is significant for communication is the revelation of *sphoṭa* because it is the *sphoṭa* from which meaning flashes forth non-differently.⁸¹

Sphoṭa, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is universal and sounds/tokens are individual. He introduces the concept of gradual manifestation of *sphoṭa* by sounds in a successive order in accordance with the sequence of them.⁸² We have clarified the issue earlier by the example of the manifestation of the words 'pot' and 'top'. Though the manifestation of all words and sentences can be understood in the same way it is not a fixed rule but relative to the fact as to how much the person is versed in communication. Accordingly, it may be revealed even without help of any language-token as in the case of cognition of *Yogins*.

In some other cases it may be manifested only by a letter, a word, or by a sentence-token or may not be manifested even by a large number of sentence-tokens but in every case the cognition is revealed only when *sphoṭa* is revealed, i.e. cognition is the revelation by the *sphoṭa*. All *sphoṭas*, for Bhartṛhari, are distinct; they unlike the cognition

by senses that is perception, inference, etc., reveal their nature first and, then, their meanings are revealed by them non-differently.⁸³ Thus, he is of the view that cognition is not a passive but an active awareness and this awareness cannot be aware of if the *sphoṭa* is not expressed. In precise, *sphoṭa* is the cause of identical cognition by language, the unity of objects of verbal-cognition⁸⁴ and a constant content of the tokens, varying from community to community, by which they are manifested.

IS *SPHOṬA* INTRINSICALLY UNEXPRESSIBLE?

Such types of questions arise due to overlooking the distinction of Bhartṛhari's concept of *śabda* and of *sphoṭa* that are not identical concepts in his philosophy. The unexpressibles, in his philosophy, are only those entities which are not expressed (*vācya*) and which are beyond the grasp of mind. *Śabda* (*paśyantī*), as an ontological reality, the mind itself, and the external things - physical, psychical and others having ontic-being, are unexpressibles because they are not the expresseds of expressions and the expressed of expressions are cognitive and hence intelligible-beings revealed in the mind by *sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa* are also called so because they, themselves, are revealed beings; they are self-sustained beings of awareness in nature. In brief, all expressed are universal and universals are only expressed by language, which is also universal because it, as Bhartṛhari⁸⁵ accepts, reveals itself, first, in a verbal-cognition and, hence, it is not proper to say that they are unexpressible intrinsically or extrinsically. The terms intrinsic and extrinsic imply ontological character and are not applicable to *sphoṭa*, which, as such, is a cognitive being par excellence.

SPHOṬA AND THE PROBLEM OF TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS

It can be said that Bhartṛhari, on the basis of the concept of non-difference of *vācaka-vācya*, has succeeded not only in explaining the theory that all cognition is shot through and through by language but also in explaining the possibility of analysis of language by language and of translation of a content in different garbs without accepting the concept of a transcendental-signified which is accepted by ontologists as independent not only from language but from the signified of the

garbs of the translation.⁸⁶ In Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* is the constant content capable of being manifested by different garbs which are only tools in the manifestation of it.⁸⁷ Manifested by them, it reveals itself and its meaning as well. The garb 'svān' in Sanskrit, 'dog' in English, 'kuttā' in Hindi manifest the same *sphoṭa* on the basis of which identical-cognition by those tokens is revealed to those who have observed their uses by elders. The knowledge of the original, the translated and their garbs are different but the object/content, i.e. universal or individual, is required to be the same for a good translation. The identical-cognition of the original and the translated is possible because of the universal revealed by the original and by the translated as well. In other words, the constant-content is not the transcendental-signified but the signified (*vācaka*), revealed in its several occurrences in different garbs. The revelation of the same content, that is *sphoṭa* through garbs differing from community to community, is the cognitive ground for a good translation and if, otherwise, or deviated it is a bad translation. Translating or rendering implies a constant-content, universal in nature, which, according to Bhartṛhari, is *sphoṭa*, i.e. the signifier that reveals its signified (*vācya*) non-differently. The relation between the two is eternal fitness of the signifier. Such an eternal relation between an expresser (*vācaka*) and an expressed (*vācya*) is not possible in case of transcendental signified and, hence, it may be the signifier neither of the text as it is accepted by realists as independently of language, nor of the signifiers in translating garbs that according to theorists convey only the copy of the original. The signifier, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is isolated from our allegiances but not from the language as it is itself the language that reveals the signified non-differently.

Analysis of language by language itself is a very intriguing problem for those who take language as marks that stand by proxy for the things. Analysis cannot be a philosophical activity if it is an analysis of language-tokens. It may be a self-conscious activity only if it is an analysis of language as thought-object. In the theory of Bhartṛhari it is not an analysis of language-token but of the indivisible *sphoṭa*, given in the mind, which serves not only as the basis of analysis of tokens but of that through which the indivisible *sphoṭa* is understood in an abstracted way also. Analysis of language for clarification of thought, i.e. meaning is also not possible if meaning is taken as different from language. As meaning, for Bhartṛhari, is the being revealed non-differently by *sphoṭa*, the analysis of language is inevitably the analysis

of meaning or thought and vice versa; if otherwise, analysis of thought, independently of language, will be an impossibility and analysis of language independently of meaning, as ontic being, will be a purposeless activity and in that case the purpose of clarification of thoughts by analysis of language and vice versa will be defeated.

Conclusively, *sphoṭa* is not a collection of bits of verbal utterances/noises; it is not a memory element, not a synthesis by mind but a self-restrained unit of awareness ubiquitously given as an indivisible being, which when manifested by written/verbal tokens, reveals itself, and then its meaning is revealed non-differently by it. As written/verbal tokens, gestures, etc. are produced by the *sphoṭa* and have a confined function of instrument in manifesting it only, *sphoṭa* may be termed the depth of them. Manifestation is not the cause of emergence of meaning because the meaning is always a being revealed by *sphoṭa* which reveals it only if it reveals itself first. As concepts/ideas, *sphoṭa* are innumerable sequenceless-units but are classified as *varṇa-sphoṭa*, *pada-sphoṭa* and *vākya-sphoṭa* on the basis of the association of bits of written/verbal tokens, gestures, etc., by which they are manifested. These *sphoṭas*, being the beings of awareness in nature, are cognitive-beings; they are cognized directly. *Paśyantī-śabda*, being transcendental to it, is not cognized directly but is known by presumption or inference made on the basis of *sphoṭas* as their ontological substratum. In Bhartṛhari's holistic philosophy, *sphoṭas* are indivisible and, hence, not divided. Divisions are only an artificial remedy by which the indivisible is made understandable to those who can understand it only through piece-meal. Cognitively, *sphoṭas* are infinite in number because cognition of and by all words/sentences is determinately and discretely accomplished; they are existentially the same level of secondary being (*upacāra-sattā*—the being revealed or figured in the mind by language). As *sphoṭas* are universal-beings of awareness in nature and Bhartṛhari accepts 'universals in universal' there is no logical difficulty in explaining the non-difference of language and meaning on one hand and in explaining the identical-cognition of both of the language and its meaning on the other hand. The *śabda*, as ontological substratum of awareness of awareness (ideas—*sphoṭa* and *pratibhās*) or as consciousness itself, is non-dual *paśyantī*, the flashes (*sphoṭas*) of which are innumerable beings of awareness in nature. Ontologically all are one indivisible *śabda*-principle.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST BHARTṚHARI'S MANIFESTATION THEORY OF *SPHOṬA* AND THEIR SOLUTION BY BHARTṚHARI

Now, we put the objections raised against Bhartṛhari's theory of manifestation of *sphoṭa* and their solutions given by him and his commentators. The arguments follow thus:⁸⁸

1. Manifestation requires sameness of space (*samānadeśa*). For example, the light of the lamp manifests only the things given in its compass but in regard with manifestation of *sphoṭa* by *dhvani*, sameness of the space is not observed because the manifestor (*vyañjaka dhvaniyān*) is grasped by the auditory centre while the *sphoṭa* is revealed in the mind by itself. According to the theory 'sky is space', verbal-noises are received in auditory centre (*ākāśadeśa*), but *sphoṭa* does not belong to it. As both of them are associated with different spaces, it is not justified to accept the manifestation of *sphoṭa* by *dhvani* and its reception in the auditory organ.⁸⁹

According to Bhartṛhari, this objection is not steady because the sameness of space is required only for the manifestation of corporeal things (*mūrta*) while both the *sphoṭa* and the *dhvani* are incorporeal (*amūrta*) and that sameness of space is not required necessarily for the manifestation of incorporeal (*amūrta*) *sphoṭa*. Not only that but even corporeal (*mūrta*) things like the sun, lamp, etc.; manifest every thing belonging to different spaces in spite of being fixed in a particular space, similarly, the differences of space are not obstacles at all in the way of manifestation of the *sphoṭa* by the *dhvani*.⁹⁰

2. Critics of the theory of manifestation of *sphoṭa* say that objects like pot, etc. are seen to be manifested by different manifestants like sun, lamp, crystal-stone and other lights while the theory of manifestation of *sphoṭa* accepts the manifestation of a fixed *sphoṭa* by fixed *dhvani*. Verbal-noises causing manifestation of the *sphoṭa* 'gauḥ' (cow) are different from that of the 'aśvaḥ' (horse). 'That a fixed *sphoṭa* is manifested by a fixed set of *dhvani*' must not be an invariable or constant rule because some thing may be manifested by different manifestants. Bhartṛhari, against this problem says that as senses can manifest their fixed objects, for

example, the eye has a fixed potency only for perceiving form and colour, auditory sense has the potency only to perceive sounds and so on, similarly, the manifestation of a fixed *sphoṭa* by a fixed set of *dhvani* can be understood. As eyes cannot smell or as auditory sense cannot perceive forms and colours, similarly, any *sphoṭa* cannot get manifested by any verbal-noises and, thus, it is justified to accept the manifestation of a fixed *sphoṭa* by a fixed set of *dhvani*.⁹¹ If otherwise, the communication will not be performed through them and for explaining regularity in accomplishment of communication it is inevitable to accept the manifestation of fixed *sphoṭa* by a set of fixed verbal-noises. However, it is popularity of using noises that are conventionally taken as fixed to manifest the fixed *sphoṭa*. In fact any *sphoṭa* can be manifested by any set of verbal-noises as per the capability of the audiences, contact, context, etc.

3. According to critics, *sphoṭavādins* do not accept any change in what is manifested with the change of manifestants (*abhivyañjaka*). Is it right to accept that the dark and bright of light do not cause any change in the manifestation of objects like pot, etc.? The critics say that *sphoṭavādins* do not accept changes in *sphoṭa* like increasing, short, middle, prolonged, etc. of *dhvaniyān*, but difference of word is observed with the changes of uncaring pronunciation based on the negligence of rules of compound (*sandhi*). Even the words in different strikes are different, and thus, it is not justified to accept that the manifested (*sphoṭa*) is not changed with the change of manifestants (*dhvaniyān*). Answering this objection Bhartṛhari says: as reflections (*pratibimba*) of the same face in a concave mirror is observed to be high (*unnata*) and in a convex mirror, it is low (*avanata*), in a sword, it is oblong and in saffron oil it is dark, similarly, *sphoṭa* is taken to be different with the difference of reflecting mediums (sounds).⁹² Refuting the atomist's position of the manifestation of speech by physical atoms, Bhartṛhari says that external concrete objects like mountain having unmeasurable quantity cannot be produced inside the diamond, mirror, etc., that have incompatible sizes. Similarly, *sphoṭa* is manifested by *dhvani* but *sphoṭa* does not change with the changes of *dhvani*.⁹³ According to Bhartṛhari the changes of *dhvani*, which is the medium in the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, are wrongly understood in the *sphoṭa* also, but, actually, there is no possibility of changes,

caused by them, in *sphoṭa* which is indivisible and sequenceless unit of awareness. This sequenceless *sphoṭa* is mistaken to be divided into letters, words and sentences with the differences of length, sequence, tone and variations in the form of strikes which are the properties of *dhvani* and through which manifestation of *sphoṭa* takes place.⁹⁴

4. Some critics of the theory of manifestation of *sphoṭa* take it as a produced entity like pot, etc. It is produced by *dhvani* and, hence, not eternal. They say as transient objects like pot, etc. are manifested by lamp, etc.; similarly, *sphoṭa* is a manifested object and, hence, transient. Defending his position of eternity of *sphoṭa* Bhartṛhari says, it is not acceptable, in principle, that that which is manifested by transient entities are inevitably transient. For example, universal, which is manifested by transient individuals is eternal.⁹⁵ Those who deny universal as eternal accept it as transient in order to avoid the logical fallacy of *anaikāntika* (inconclusive irregular reasoning for which no instance is available, for enabling it to show it concomitance either by presence or by absence with the probandum) but they fail to avoid the fallacy of *vyatirekasiddha* (according to which the word will not be applicable to all of its instances and, hence, the unitary conception by the application of the word will not be explained).
5. Objecting to the theory of manifestation of *sphoṭa*., Kumārila Mīmāṃsakas say: how can the revelation of cognition without of dumb, deaf and children who have not yet learnt the art of speaking? For lack of hearing and speaking manifestation of *sphoṭa* will not be possible, and, hence, the cognition by the dumb and children may not be explained possible. From the side of Bhartṛhari, it can be said that this is not at least a problem for those who believe in the eternity and given position of *sphoṭa*.⁹⁶ The given *sphoṭa*, in a child or in a deaf person, acts on for cognition. Other instruments like signs and gestures perform the manifestation of *sphoṭa* in their cases. Not only that but manifestation of *sphoṭa* is possible, in some other cases as in the case of *yogins*, even without any tool like verbal-noises, gestures, etc. It is only in ordinary communication that the manifestation of *sphoṭa* is performed by verbal-noises. Here, manifestation does

not mean production, but the permission of what was previously prevented. Manifestation helps in permitting. Manifested by noises, the *sphoṭa*, reveals first its own nature and then reveals its meaning non-differently. In any case, Bhartṛhari does not endorse manifestation only as a sufficient ground for the revelation of cognition. Manifestation acts on *sphoṭa* and the *sphoṭa* manifested by verbal-noises, reveals itself and its meaning.

SPHOṬA AND MEANING OF WORDS LIKE NON-EXISTENCE (ABHĀVA), ALĪKA AND OTHER SUCH CONCEPTS

We frequently use words like hare's horn, barren's son, non-existent, negation, etc., which have no referents in the world of experience. Those who are habitual in observing a referent for explaining words may take them as empty-concepts. In our opinion, the term 'empty-concept' is ambiguous—and it is difficult to understand its meaning. If by 'empty-concept', we mean the concept having no content or content-free awareness, and if by content we mean attributes of things or things in themselves, i.e. referents then that sort of being cannot be accepted as that revealed by language. On the contrary, it is obvious to all that these words (empty-concepts, etc.) are expressive by nature. In other words, they are expressive of their meanings. Do their meanings not figure positively in the mind when these words are listened to? Do these words, when manifested by verbal-noises, not reveal their meanings in the mind? If yes, how can objects of cognition revealed by these words be denied? Do they figure by words in the mind as empty-concept in contrast to concepts with content? In order to answer these questions, we may start our discussion by putting a counter question: does the cognition revealed by the word 'existent' figure positively and that of by the word 'non-existent' does not figure or figures otherwise? For Bhartṛhari meaning figures in mind non-differently by *sphoṭa*. The utterance 'existent' and 'non-existent' manifest their own *sphoṭas* and from *sphoṭas*, revealed after manifestation, meaning is revealed non-differently. All words including negation, non-existent, non-entity, empty-concept, etc., express their own meanings. Distinctions of them as empty-concepts and concepts-with-content are opposed to the cognition revealed positively by all words. Even the cognition by terms 'without content' or contentless,

meaningless, etc. also figures positively in the mind as their expresseds (*vācya*) and what figures in the mind is a being, a thought object or an expressed being (*upacāra-sattā*). No verbal cognition is possible in such conception-free language. Just as illumination is the nature of light, just as the consciousness is the nature of mind, likewise *sphoṭa* is the nature of awareness. Even in a state of slumber, there is persistence of the infusion with *sphoṭa*.

They are not mental construction, as *Yogācāra-Buddhists* say; rather, they are thought-objects or concepts for which Bhartṛhari uses the term *upacāra-sattā*. Can a concept as such be marked as an empty-concept? From the point of view of cognition as revealed by words such distinction of concepts are not founded. A concept, for Bhartṛhari, is not what is abstracted or generalized on the basis of the attributes that comprise the content of the things, but that which is revealed non-differently by *sphoṭa*. It is the expressed of the expresser and it (*sphoṭa*) being an illuminating force, illuminates the meaning independently of attributes of the things or of things-themselves. Concept as a self-restrained being is given as an indivisible being. The concept revealed is an indivisible awareness and there is no other content of it except what figures in the mind. It is only for making this indivisible awareness understandable to ignorants and children that the concept is explained through artificial analysis made on the basis of contents of the objects.

The concepts, for Bhartṛhari, are universal—universal in the sense that identical cognition in all their instances and occurrences is accomplished. It is said that in case of negation (*abhāva*) and other such concepts like hare's horn, etc., there are no individuals for the inherence of universal in them; they, if universal, as the meaning of words is taken, cannot be meaning at all, and hence, these words would be meaningless. Solving this problem, Helārāja writes '*Abhāvasyāpi buddhyākāreṇa nirupaṇāt*'.⁹⁷ According to this statement '*abhāva*' in all its occurrences figures in the Mind and, hence, the accomplishment of identical cognition by the word '*abhāva*' in its several usages implies it to be a universal. Not only that, but on the basis of how the words present *abhāva* in the mind, it is classified into four of its kind (i.e. *prāgbhāva*, *pradhvanśābhāva*, *anyonyābhāva* and *atyantābhāva*), and hence, '*abhāva*' as universal inhering in all its instances is admitted as its meaning.

Non-existence, in the philosophy of *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is not a counterpart (*pratiyogī*) of existence and, in communication, it is communicated not as a counterpart of existence. In the *Nyāya* system of philosophy of *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī* the question which one is original, arises. If both of them are original, then the question of one as *anuyogī* and other as *pratiyogī* is inconsistent. Both of them are not accepted by *Naiyāyikas* themselves either as *pratiyogī* or as *anuyogī*. In case they accept only the former, then there will be no ground for the acceptance of the latter, and in case of the latter no being will be founded, but this is not acceptable to them. In grammar, the dative case is taught with the verb '*dadāti*' (for example '*viprāyagām dadāti*'). If there is negation of '*dadāti*' even, then the same rule is taught for and is applicable to the non-existence also because the communicative-being (*upacāra-sattā*) of being and non-being, for him, is intelligible-being (*upacāra-sattā*).

JAYANTA'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST *SPHOṬA*

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāya Mañjarī* has refuted the *Vaiyākaraṇas*' concept of *sphoṭa*. A brief account of Jayanta's arguments against the theory of *sphoṭa* may be given as follows:⁹⁸

1. *Sphoṭa* cannot be accepted as a perceived fact because only the last letter of a word is perceived. The simultaneous cognition of letters of a word is not possible and, hence, it is not justified to accept the *sphoṭa*, which for *Vaiyākaraṇas*' philosophy is an indivisible unit. *Sphoṭa* being non-perceptible cannot be proved by inference also because there is no occasion for concomitance (*vyāpti*).
2. If *Vaiyākaraṇas* say that the *sphoṭa*, like a letter, is an indivisible unit, a unit without a part (*anāmśa*), it must be manifested only by the first letter spoken and then, the uttering of the rest of the letters of a word will be unnecessary. As partless letters are not meaning conveying units, partless *sphoṭa* will also not be an expresser.
3. According to *Sphoṭavādins*, as Jayanta observes, *sphoṭa* apart from the collection or a set of letters cannot be accepted as a separate meaning-revealing word. Meaning is conveyed by the collection of letters heard in a sequence and resurrected in the mind by memory and, thus, *sphoṭa*, as a meaning-revealing word,

apart from the collection of letters, cannot be accepted on the basis of presumption. *Sphoṭa*, which is not a perceived fact, is not required for meaning and conveyance of meaning may well be explained only on the basis of collection of letters, which are perceived facts. Thus, on the basis of the ground mentioned above, Jayanta tries to show that expressiveness of *sphoṭa* is not proved by perception, inference, presumption, etc. As it is not grasped by auditory sense, the *sphoṭa* is nothing but merely a fiction and that the conveyance of meaning may be explained even by the utterances (letters) which are grasped by auditory sense.

VAIYĀKARAṆA'S SOLUTION

Answering the objections raised by Jayanta, it can be said that the *sphoṭa* is not a memory-element over and above the *śabda*. It is ubiquitously given and pervades auditory sense also. That is why *śabda* is cognized through auditory sense. Helārāja boldly says that *sphoṭa* is a perceived fact. It is cognized as the substratum or cause (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of the cognition of meaning revealed in the mind through utterances/noises and that without accepting the *sphoṭa*, it will be difficult to refer to it as imperceptible.⁹⁹ Jayanta's idea of the word as a collection of letters spoken in a sequence is not proper. If we accept the expressiveness of collection of letters, as Jayanta accepts, it can be asked as to whether letters are expressive of meaning discretely or collectively? Bhartṛhari says: there is no expressiveness in 'p' or 'o' or 't' discretely and the discrete momentary letters cannot be uttered and perceived together simultaneously as the word 'pot', hence, the word 'pot' is a unit not made of part p, o, t, but a unit without parts and, cognitively, the unit as a whole without part is the expressive word. This expressive unit is the inner word, which is manifested progressively through the utterances heard in a sequence and when manifested it reveals itself and its meaning is revealed non-differently by it. As hunger satisfaction is accrued progressively with swallowing each mouthful quantity of food and is fully satisfied after taking the last quantity, similarly, *sphoṭa* is manifested progressively with the hearing of each phoneme and when manifested fully, it reveals itself and its meanings well. Thus *sphoṭa*, as a meaning-revealing unit, is not a collection of phonemes but an indivisible being of a cognitive character. For the explanation of indivisible cognition, intertwined with language,

indivisible *sphoṭa* is inevitably required. It is a self-revealed being by which meaning is revealed non-differently in the mind. There is no part in meaning and, therefore, there is no part in *sphoṭa* that reveals it.

KUMĀRILA'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST BHARTRĤHARI'S THEORY OF SPHOṬA

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathi Mishra, Nārāyaṇa Mishra and other Mīmāṃsakas have refuted the *Vaiyākaraṇas'* concept of *sphoṭa*. A brief account of the arguments against *sphoṭa* as mentioned in *Mīmāṃsāsālokavārttika*¹⁰⁰ is given as follows:

1. Experience does not allow it to accept *Vaiyākaraṇas'* view that *sphoṭa* is manifested by phonemes. How can the parts (letters) manifest the indivisible *sphoṭa*? It can be manifested neither by a single letter nor by a collection of them and as such there is no need to accept *sphoṭa* apart from the collection of phonemes resurrected in memory as impression (*saṃskāra*), as the cause of cognition of meaning.
2. *Sphoṭavādins*, as Kumārila says, reject the expressiveness of not only letters but that of the collection of them, i.e. of *padas* also. However, they accept that *sphoṭa* is manifested by phonemes. Now the problem is: does each letter manifest *sphoṭa*? If yes, it suffices to accept the manifestation of *sphoṭa* by only the first letters spoken and then other letters of the set will be useless. If the progressive manifestation of *sphoṭa* by each letter in a sequence is accepted and it is taken that the *sphoṭa* is fully manifested after hearing the last phoneme, then, as the last letter is only perceived, it alone will be the manifestor of *sphoṭa*. In such a situation, the idea of gradual and progressive manifestation of it, by the sequence of phonemes uttered, will not be justified, and then the letters spoken first will be of no use in its manifestation.
3. If *Vaiyākaraṇas* say that the last phonemes associated with the impression of the phonemes destroyed earlier manifests the *sphoṭa* fully and clearly, then one is bound to accept the potency (power), causing manifestation, only in the last phoneme and then the cognition of meaning on the basis of impression of the departed letters (*vyutkrānta-varṇa*) will not be possible. What is the need of accepting *sphoṭa* apart from impressions for the interpretation of

cognition of meaning? Even *sphoṭavādins*, as Kumārila says, feel the necessity of impression (*saṃskāra*), for explaining the possibility of cognition of meaning. The cause of meaning, Kumārila argues, must be that after hearing of which meaning is cognized. The meaning is cognized after hearing the last phoneme uttered at last and associated with the impression of past phonemes as resurrected in the mind by memory, and, therefore, it is not justified to accept *sphoṭa* apart from the collection of letters as meaning-revealing *śabda*.

4. *Sphoṭa*, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is indivisible. Kumārila objects: if *sphoṭa* is an indivisible unit of language, then it may not be more than indivisible letters and, thus, he infers that *sphoṭa*, being non-different from the letter is not expressive of meaning—pot, etc. (*sphoṭaḥ artha vācakaḥ varṇabhinnatvāt ghaṭādivat*). *Sphoṭa* being non-different from the letters is not expressive. He finds no contradiction in the inference mentioned above and remarks that *sphoṭa*, different from letters, is not self-proved and, hence, it is not acceptable.
5. If *sphoṭa* is an indivisible sentence that expresses a complete (indivisible) meaning, the question arises as to how can meaning, a whole without a parts, be possible. Is a sentence having no letters and words possible? A sentence, without letters and words as Kumārila says, is *unthinkable*.

VAIYĀKARAṆAS' SOLUTION

It may well be observed that *Mīmāṃsakas*' arguments against the *Vaiyākaraṇas*' concept of *sphoṭa* are based on their presumptions that only a letter is indivisible, that it is not an expressive unit, that the impression left by the fleeting sounds in the mind and collected as resurrected in memory, is the cause of meaning, that a sentence is a get-together of words, that the sentential-meaning is a get-together of the meaning of words, and that words are constructions out of an association of letters. It can be asked, on behalf of the *Vaiyākaraṇas*, that if the word 'pot' is the collection of letters, p, o, and t, then, the meaning of the word 'pot' should also be the collection of the meaning of its component letters, but *Mīmāṃsakas* themselves do not consider isolated letters as expressive and, thus, the meaning revealed by the word cannot be explained on the basis of the word as a collection of

meaningless letters. The meaningless letters cannot discretely be accepted as expressive of meaning and if they are taken to be eternal, as *Mīmāṃsakas* themselves accept, what will be the manifestants of them? It is logically justified to accept that the universal (*sphoṭa*) is manifested by individual letters but there is no ground to accept the manifestation of discrete letters. Is it not logically justified to accept that discrete individual is manifested by universal? If it is accepted that the spoken letters manifest each other, then it will be difficult to distinguish one from the other. In that case the function performed by individual should also be the same as performed by the universal and, thus universal will not be distinguished from individual, and, then, universal apart from the individual will be a useless presumption. Without accepting generality as the cause of identical-cognition, even the individuals, as *Vaiyākaraṇas* assume, may not be known thus. Bhartṛhari¹⁰¹ says that there is no awareness of letters in the accomplishment of communication by the indivisible *śabda* and the indivisible unit that is by *śphoṭa* itself reveals the meaning. The unity of discrete letters as they are not uttered simultaneously cannot be explained without *sphoṭa* and as *sphoṭa* is the meaning-revealing unit, the cognition of meaning cannot be possible without it.

Sphoṭa, according to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is not a link (impression) between meaning and letters destroyed. It, in fact, in an indivisible being of *grāhya* and *grāhaka* by nature but *Mīmāṃsakas* has understood it differently in terms of impression which, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is transitory. Impressions are destroyed before conveyance of meaning and then how can the meaning be revealed by destroyed impressions? Meaning is non-differently revealed by *sphoṭa*, which is eternally and ubiquitously given in the mind. *Sphoṭa* is not an object like pot, etc., which are perceived by senses, but is an indivisible cognitive being of awareness in character. It cannot be called *abhāva* (non-existent) only on the reason of its imperceptibility. Consciousness, Bhartṛhari says,¹⁰² is not perceived by senses but it cannot be taken as non-existent. Similarly, *sphoṭa* cannot be taken as non-existent because it can be distinguished (*viśeṣya*) even by the word non-existence (*abhāva*) also. Existence, non-existence, etc., all are revealed by *sphoṭa*, i.e. non-existence is also a being revealed by *sphoṭa* and that is why it is known thus in communications.

Mīmāṃsakas' objection that the problem of substitution (*pratinidhi*) of meaning of a word in a sentence which, for him, is based on the reality of word as the unit of language, will not be possible, if *sphoṭa*, which reveals a complete sentential-meaning, is taken as an indivisible unit. So far as the problem of substitution is concerned, Bhartṛhari does not deny it; rather, he accepts the reality of words for grammatical purposes. If once the words, acquired by grammatical analysis, are accepted as real for any grammatical operation, the purpose performed on their basis, their form, meaning, substitution of meaning and other related practical issues are considered real.

Concluding the whole discussion, it can fairly be said that *sphoṭa* cannot be taken as Being. It is called so because of it as a revealed/cognitive-being. As cognitive-being, *sphoṭas* are innumerable units. They are constant contents of cognition and serve as the unity/depth of several occurrences and instances of various sorts of tokens/garbs, used by different language communities, helpful for manifesting the same *sphoṭa*. But it, as a unity, is neither a synthesis nor an abstraction nor a memory element like the *samsakāra* of the *Mīmāṃsaka*, because it is known directly as a revealed-being. As an indivisible unit, it is a complete unit and reveals a complete meaning satiating further expectancy involved in the completion of a complete sense. The indivisible *sphoṭa*, by grammatical analysis, is divided into different smaller units but, through these divisions, the *sphoṭa* itself is not really divided. The *sphoṭas* are manifested through different sets of tokens by the association of which they are taken primarily as of three sorts, i.e. *varṇa-sphoṭa*, *pada-sphoṭa* and *vākya-sphoṭa*. It is *varṇa-sphoṭa* if it serves as the universal of the letters, *pada-sphoṭa* if it serves as the universal of *padas* and *vākya-sphoṭa* if it is manifested by sentential-token. It may be categorized in many more sorts as per ones analytic scheme which varies from person to person, but by this analytical device the *sphoṭa*, as such, remains undivided in the holistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari. There is no question of ontological diversity of them because they are cognitive beings. The question of ontological unity of them arises only by implication of *paśyantī* as the ontological substratum of them. *Paśyantī* is the ontological unity of cognitive *sphoṭas* and *sphoṭas* are the cognitive unity of language-tokens. As a cognitive depth of them they are universals and serve as the cause of identical cognition in all their occurrences and instances.

COMMUNICATION, CONVENTION AND HABIT

We have repeatedly said that communication, for Bhartṛhari is not just an act of hearing and speaking of verbal-utterances/noises only. It is the accomplishment of cognition by language. Verbal-noises are only tools through which communication is performed. *Sphoṭa*, the meaning revealed by it, relation between the word and its meaning and convention are essential elements in the accomplishment of communication. Relation between the word and its meaning is not conventional, but eternal. Bhartṛhari defines the relation as *yogyatā-sambandha* (fitness of the word to convey meaning). This fitness is given and is restrained by convention. Elders understand convention, as the observation of the use of the word. Convention is not a meaning-conveying factor because the word, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy is the only expresser of meaning; it is expresser by nature. Elders use a word in different senses of primary, secondary and tertiary, out of which the primary is taken as the basis of others. Convention is a very significant factor in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. His notion of meaning is meaning of a word or there is no meaning without a word and a word is expressive of all meanings (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*) cannot be understood properly without understanding his concept of convention. Actually, in his philosophy, an expressive unit is *sphoṭa* and not any other factor like context, etc. Convention does not produce meaning. A word being potency is fit for expressing all meanings and, it is convention that specifies the use of the word to a specific or fixed meaning. Thus, in his philosophy, convention is a delimiting factor of relation. It delimits the use out of various meanings expressed by language. Thus, in his philosophy, convention functions as a restraining and not as a foundational factor, because the meaning-revealing unit, for him, is always the *sphoṭa*. The relation of a child to his mother is given by his birth, though he knows it through the observation of the use 'she is your mother' by his elders.

Communication develops socially, so it must necessarily be a joint possession and, is in truth, the property of mankind: The user of the language understands only when he has tested the intelligibility of his words by trial upon another. Convention, for Bhartṛhari, is not an agreement of the group of people who at a time sat down together, invented marks/noises and thereafter decided meanings of various sorts of verbal-noises. If we think of the first use of a word, it is not with the

force of convention but with the *yogyatā* that the word comes into use and, then, that use, followed continuously, acquires conventional value. Thus, even convention presupposes a given relation between a word and its meaning. The given words, for Bhartṛhari, come into use with their fitness, which is also given.

The given and the convention of given are different positions. The word, meaning and the relation between the two are given, but communication of a meaning by the word is subject to convention. Convention does not mean agreement that stems from consideration of habit based on perception and practice with things. Habit is a stereotyped involvement of men who take the word as that which stands by proxy for things. But, for Bhartṛhari, such practices, as based on habitual involvement, are not concerned significantly with philosophical investigation.¹⁰³ Philosophical investigation is concerned with the interpretation of cognition revealed by words in communication, and *sphoṭa* is more than what is conventionally understood by grammar and practice. It is the **foundational** being which is awareness in character and is understood by convention as the unity of utterances. Thus, it is clear that from the point of view of accomplishment of communication, the idea of language leads to an interpretation of language that can equally be fruitful in understanding cognition by *sphoṭa*, and it by different sorts of language-tokens as well, because it observes a moment of articulation only as the cause of differences. The differences are there at the garb level and not at the cognition level, of which *sphoṭa* is a constant content.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Apart from its metaphysical, grammatical and psychological significance, Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, to me, is a treatise on the philosophy of usual communication. It aims at explaining cognition as revealed by language in the mind. My discussion, in earlier pages, clearly distinguishes Bhartṛhari from other philosophers of particular languages in so far as it emphasizes that *sphoṭa*, in spite of all the differences in language-tokens, is given indivisibly and ubiquitously and flashes forth through all the diversities of articulate utterances popular in a language community. It considers the moment of articulation, according to liveliness, energy and allegiance of men

involved in giving it expression, as the cause of the diversity of language. For Bhartṛhari, verbal-noises are instrumental only in manifesting the *sphoṭa* and the *sphoṭa* reveals the meaning non-differently in the mind. Thus, *sphoṭa*, for him, is the foundational being of the world of communication,¹⁰⁴ and it is emphasized in the previous pages as a cognitive-being from which the meaning is revealed non-differently in the mind and not as a metaphysical or psychological entity that is inferred as the ontic substratum of it as the being of awareness in nature.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugmāḍṛte.*
Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvaṁ śabdena bhāṣate. VP, 1/23.
2. 'Thinking and speaking form so close a union that we must think of them as being identical.' On language: Introduction.

This view of Humboldtian philosophy of language can be compared to Bhartṛhari's view of infusion of language and meaning as thought-objects or ideas. Bhartṛhari differs from Humboldtian's view in so far as he does not assume thought as construction by language. For him, thought is not creation or construction of language but given in the mind as a revealed unit. The same is the case with inner/real-language that when manifested through verbal-noises/utterances, reveals itself and its meaning (thought-objects). To reveal and to be caused are different philosophies. B.K. Matilal while estimating Bhartṛhari's view of thought and language remarks 'however the critical point here is that the concepts are in fact generated by words. Here generation is to be understood as transformation-words are transferred into objects' (*Perception*, 1986, p. 395). These lines of Matilal emphasize the non-difference of the language and objects both of which are thought-objects (ideas = concepts) and, hence, the term 'generated' in the context of these lines has a meaning different from its usual meaning. Even the term 'transferred' should also not be confused by linking it to a process of transformation. The clear position is that the real language (*sphoṭa*), given in the mind, reveals itself first and then meaning is revealed by it non-differently. It is only for the sake of explanation in terms of cause and caused that the thought, in relation to speakers point of view, is taken as the cause of language and from the point of view of audience, the language is taken as the cause of thought. In any case there is no room for interpreting the natural relation between a word and thought as an ontologically cause-effect relation because it is not an ontic but cognitive unit and it is this fact on the basis of which the analysis of language may will be taken as analysis of thought and vice versa.

3. *Ato'nirjñātarūpatvāt kimāhetyabhidhiyate.*
Nendriyāṇām prakāśye'r the svarūpam grhyate tathā. VP, 1/57.
4. *Viśayatvāmanāpannaiḥ śabdenārthaḥ Prakāśyate'.*
Nasattayaiva te'thānamagrhītāḥ prakāśakaḥ. VP, 1/56.
5. *Śabdārtho' rthaḥ na vastvarthaḥ* Helārāja on VP, 3/8/2.
6. VP, 1/123, see also '*Loke praṇisamūhe saḥ pratyayaḥ anvayabodhaḥ nāsti yaḥ śabdānugamāt śabdanirūpita viśayitvātmaka sambandhāt ṛte vinā tadabhāvavāna iti yāvat, asti. Sarvam jñānam śabdabodhātmakum dṛśyate. Gūdhārthadīpikā vyākhyā* on aforesaid verse of VP, Quoted by Gokulnath Uphadhyaya in his *Padavākyaratnākara*.
7. *Vāgrūpatācedutkrāmedavabodhasya śāśvatī, Na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta Sā hi pratyavamarsinī.* VP, 1/124.
8. *Ṣaḍabhāvavikārabhavanti iti vārsyāyaṇiḥ jāyate, asti, vipariṇamate vardhate' pakṣīyate vinaśyati.* *Naighanṭukakaṇḍa, adhyāya 1, pada 1, Kāṇḍa 3-4.*
9. *Vaikharyā Madhyamāyāśca paśyantyāścaitadadbhutam. Anekatīrthabhedāyāstrayyā vācaḥ paramampadam.* VP, 1/142, see, also '*Saiśa trayī vāk caitanya granthivivartavadanākhyeya Parimāṇā turīyeṇa manuṣyeṣu pratyavabhāsatē. Tatrāpi cāsyāḥ kincideva vyāvahārikam. Anyattu sāmānyavyavahārātītam.* Harivṛtti on VP, 1/142.
10. Compare. So quite regardless of communication between man and man speech is a necessary condition for the thinking of the individual in solitary seclusion; On language, p. 56.
11. Helārāja on VP, 3/2/11.
12. *Tripādī on Mahābhāṣya* 1/1.
13. Helārāja on VP, 3/8 *kriyāsamuddesaḥ, Kārikā 1.*
14. Bhartṛhari is a unique example in the history of philosophical reflections who in Vākyapadīya has reflected on the problem of cognition by confining reflections to the language and the meaning it reveals non-differently.
15. *Mahābhāṣya* edited with Hindi Commentary on *Paspasahnika* by Cārudatta Śāstrī, p. 28.
16. *Prajñāvivēkam labhate bhinnairāgamadarsānaiḥ. Kiyadvā śakyamunnetum svatarkamanudhavatā.* VP, 2/484.
17. The sensory organs of a baby are matured later gradually after birth but inner śabda is given as his mind and that is the reason the child cognizes pleasure and pain, and reacts against feelings of love and hatred without any determinate mediacy of sensory organs.

18. *Mahābhāṣya, Paspasāhnika. I/II, āhnika, p. 65*
19. *Ibid. Paspasāhnika-1.*
20. *Ibid. Paspasāhnika-1.*
21. *Vyākaraṇa Mañjuṣā. sphota nirūpaṇam.*
22. *Grahaṇopādhibhedena vṛtti bhedaṃ pracakṣate. VP, 1/75.*
23. *Pratyairanupākhyeyairgrahaṇānuguṇaistathā. Dhvaniprakāśīte śabde svarūpamavadhāryate. VP, 1/83.*
24. *VP, 1/44.*
25. *Vṛtti on VP, 1/144.*
26. *VP, 1/46.*
27. *VP, 1/51.*
28. *VP, 1/52.*
29. *Ambākartrī on VP, 1/52.*
30. *Yām pūrvāhitasanskāro bālo'pi pratipadyate. VP, 1/121.*
31. *Ādyaḥ karaṇavinyāsaḥ prāṇasyordhvam samīraṇam. Sthānānāmabhighātaś ca na vinā śabdabhāvanām. VP, 1/122.*
32. *Perception, B.K. Matilal, 1986, p. 391.*
33. *Aṣṭadhyāyī 6/1/123.*
34. *Ibid., 1/1/70.*
35. *Sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ dhvani śabdaguṇaḥ. Mahābhāṣya on Aṣṭadhyāyī 1/1/70.*
36. *For detailed, see, the paper entitled 'Bhartṛhari on single word expressions and subordinate sentences'. Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, 1997, pp. 197-217.*
37. *S.D. Joshi in his English translation and notes of Sphoṭanirṇaya pp 36-40 Pune 1967, observes that Bhartṛhari has never used the term sphoṭa in the context of meaningful speech unit but for the whole (sanghāta) unconnected with isolated phonemes. If we rely on Joshi's observation, Sphoṭa will not be different from sansakāra of Kumārila Mīmāṃsakas. It, for Bhartṛhari is a meaningful unit which reveals itself when manifested by language-tokens and reveals its non-differently. Bhartṛhari writes 'kṛtsnamapi śabdarūpam prakāśīkṛtam yāvadvīkṛtākāram-anupagrhitaviśeṣam buddhāvasanniviṣṭam tāvadanupalabdhenaiiva tenavyavahāro na kaścidapi prakalpate'. (no cognition and communication is possible if sphoṭa is not revealed) VP, 1/82, Sampurnanand Sanskṛta*

Visvavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1976. K. Kunjhunni Raja in 'Indian Theories of Meaning', Adyar, Madras, 1963, observes *Sphoṭa* as an integral linguistic symbol manifested by *prākṛtadhvani*, p. 120. He writes 'it is, in fact, *prākṛtadhvani* considered as a meaning bearing linguistic sign'. It is not clear as to why K.Raja uses the term symbol and linguistic sign for *sphoṭa* that is not a sign or symbol but is, that which is simply manifested by them. *Sphoṭa* cannot be equated with *prākṛtadhvani*, which is caused by vocal organs as per expectancy to articulate, but it cannot be the cause of expectancy; it is itself produced. The cause of expectancy is the *sphoṭa* that causes it when revealed. K.A.S. Iyer in 'Bhartṛhari', Pune, 1969, p. 180, is right in viewing that it is only in *Buddhi* stage that the word can be called *sphoṭa*. In pre-buddhi stage, it is the word '*śabda-tattva*' which is used. In his observation of Bhartṛhari's concept of *aphoṭa*, Iyer takes it as inner, indivisible and meaning revealing being. One cannot understand Bhartṛhari's concept of *sphoṭa* if one confines one's observation only to the first part of VP. The second and third parts of it take it as *vācaka-śabda* (expression) that reveals its meaning non-differently. The issues pertaining to the different meanings, revealed by it, constitute the whole subject-matter of these parts. The first part of it successfully differentiates *sphoṭa* from *dhvani* on one hand and from *Śabda-Brahman* and *Paśyantī* on the other hand. It also clearly shows how it is manifested by *dhvaniyāns*.

38. In VP, 1/142 Bhartṛhari has mentioned three stages of *śabda* only. He has not mentioned *Parā* as a stage and in its *vṛtti* he has accepted *Paśyantī* as the highest Reality (*Śabda-Brahman*). Helārāja, his commentator in VP, 3/2/11 clearly says that it is *Śabda-Brahman* (*saṃvicca paśyantīrūpā pāravāka śabdabrahmamamayīti. Brahmantattvam sabdāt pāramāthikānnabhidyate. Vivartadaśāyām tu vaikharyātmanā bhedaḥ. Tatra ca tadeva nityam jātyādirūpeṇa śabdavācyam*).
39. The term 'communicable by nature' is used in the sense that that which is awareness by nature can only be communicated through *dhvaniyāns*. As *sphoṭa* is ubiquitous, the communication that is the accomplishment of cognition by language between speakers and audience, is made possible. This also indicates that language is not private but given to all on the basis of which communication between them is possible.
40. *Avikāraśyaśabdasya nimittairvikṛtodhvaniḥ, Upalabdḥau nimittatvamupayāti prakāśavat. VP, 1/94.*
41. The *Śabda* as cognitive unit, i.e., concept/idea, is universal and is called *sphoṭa* because it reveals itself first and its meaning is revealed non-differently by it afterwards. The whole discussion in *Jāti* and *Sambandha samuddeśaḥ* is based on the view that *śabda* is universal and the meaning it reveals non-differently is also a universal. Helārāja uses *Jāti-śabda*, *vācaka-śabda* and *sphoṭa* in the same sense. HR on VP, 3/1/7-8.

42. *Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugmāḍṛte. Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate.* VP, 1/23.
43. *Helārāja on VP, 3/1/100.*
44. *Śabdasyordhvamabhihvyaktervṛttibhedam tu vaikṛtāḥ, Dhvanyaḥ samupohante sphoṭātmā tairnabhidyate.* VP, 1/77.
45. Dhvani produced through the vibration of vocal organs is prākṛta and it when replicated and triplicated is vaikṛta-dhvani.
46. *Helārāja on VP, 3/1/104.*
47. *VP, 1/93.*
48. *Eka eva nityaḥ padā'bhivyañgyo'khaṇḍo vyakti-sphoṭo jātishoṭovā vācako' ngīkārya itisiddhāntaḥ.* Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/29.
49. *Tasmādevam bhūtād vākyādabhedyañnirbhāgacchabdātmano varṇānām padānām ca atantamaviveka iti.* Vṛtti on VP, 1/73.
50. For a detailed account of Bhartṛhari's concept of identical cognition, the paper entitled 'Bhartṛhari's reply to Vaiśeṣikas objections to universal as the import of words' by the same author. Darshana International, Vol.xxxvii, No. 4, pp. 22-34, October 1997.
51. *Bhartṛhari has discussed the concept and importance of Upacāra-sattā, specifically in Sambandha and Jāti Samuddeśaḥ. For an account of these chapters, JICPR, Vol.XI, No. 2, pp. 43-55 and Darshana International, Vol.xxxvii, No. 4, pp. 22-34, October 1997.*
52. *Eko'nvayaḥ' śabdaḥ.* VP, 2/1.
53. *VP, 2/25.*
54. *Idānīmantarevānavayavam-buddhyanusanhṛti.* Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/30.
55. *Pratyairanupākhyeyairgrahaṇānugūṇaistathā Dhvani prakāśīte śabde svarūpamavadhāryate.* VP, 1/83.
56. *VP, 1/93.*
57. *Iha trīṇi jyotīṇṣi trayāḥ prakāśāḥ svarūpa pararūpayoravadyotakāḥ, tadyathā—yo'yam jātavedā yaśca puruṣesvāntaraḥ prakāśo yaśca Prakāśāprakāśayoḥ prakāśayitā śabdākhyāḥ prakāśastatraitat sarvamupanibaddham yāvat sthānu carīṣṇu ca.* Vṛtti on VP, 1/12.
58. *Pratibimbam yathānyatra sthitam toyakriyāvaś āt tatpravṛttim ivānāveti sa dharmāḥ sphoṭanādayoḥ.* VP, 1/49 and VP, 1/75.
59. *VP, 1/75.*
60. *Vṛtti on 1/102.*

61. *Yathā prayoktuḥ prāgbuddhiḥ śabdeṣveva pravaratate, vyavasāyo grahīṭṛṇāmevam teṣveva jāyate.* VP, 1/53.
62. *Ātmā buddhyā samarthyārthān manoyunkte vivakṣayā. Manaḥ kāyāgnimāhanti sa prerayati mārutam.* Pāṇini Śikṣā 6/7.
63. VP, 1/108.
64. *Tasya kāraṇasāmarthyād vegapracayadharmaṇaḥ sannipātād vibhajyante sāravatyō'pi mūrtayah.* VP, 1/109.
65. VP, 1/110-111.
66. VP, 1/112-118.
67. Ibid., 1/75-77 and Harivṛtti on them.
68. Ibid., 1/93.
69. Ibid., 1/94.
70. Vṛtti on 1/88.
71. VP, 1/78-81.
72. *Indriyasyaiva sanskāraḥ śabdasyaivobhayasya vā, kriyate dhvanibhirvādāstrayo'bhivyaktivādinām.* VP, 1/78.
73. *Indriyasyaiva sanskāraḥ samādhānāñjanādibhiḥ. Viśayasya tu sanskārastadgandhapratipattaye.* VP, 1/79.
74. *Cakṣuṣaḥ prāpyakāritve tejasā tu dvayorapi. Viśayendriyayoriṣṭaḥ sanskāraḥ sa kramo dhvaneḥ.* VP, 1/80.
75. VP, 1/82.
76. *Varṇapadavākya viśayāḥ prayatnaviśeṣasādhyā dhvanayo varṇa pada vākya khyān sphoṭān punaḥ punarāvīrbhāvayanto buddhiṣvadyāropayanti.* Vṛtti on VP, 1/82.
77. *Anekavyaktyabhivyañgyā jātih sphoṭa iti smṛtā.* Ibid., 1/93.
78. Ibid., 1/92.
79. *Sphoṭarūpāvibhāgenadhvanergrahṇamiṣyate. Kaiścid dhvanirasamvedyaḥ svatanthro'n aiḥ prakalpitāḥ.* VP, 1/81.
80. Ibid., 1/103, also VP, 1/75-76.
81. Ibid., 3/3/32.
82. Ibid., 1/83-84.
83. The senses need not be cognized before they reveal the objects. They do so by their mere existence when they come into contact with the objects.

Unlike the knowledge by senses, sphoṭas do not reveal objects by their mere existence. They reveal themselves first before they reveal the meaning (object). *Ibid.*, 1/56-57. Two types of hetus (causes) are associated with knowledge by inference: (1) kāraṇa (instrumental) for example, stick is the kāraṇa hetu in the production of pot, and (2) Jñāpaka (indicative) for example, smoke is the jñāpaka hetu in the inference of fire on the mountain, and are separated after the accomplishment of knowledge but this is not this case with knowledge by language in which the latter is never separated from the former because language, for Bhartṛhari, infuses cognition.

84. 'Unity of object of verbal-cognition' means identical-cognition of the sphoṭa, which is a constant in several occurrences and instances of the uses of bits of verbal/written-tokens, and the meaning revealed by it. For Bhartṛhari, sphoṭa is also a revealed unit and, hence, an object (vācya) of cognition. In contrast with meaning as vācya (pratyaya), revealed non-differently by it, is designated as vācaka (pratyāyaka).
85. *Svā jātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvairvābhidhīyate, tato'rthjātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā.* *Ibid.*, 3/1/6.
86. This is an observation in contrast to B.K. Matilal, who on the basis of transcendental signified as a constant, denied the possibility of translation in Bhartṛhari's philosophy of non-difference of language (vācaka) and meaning (vācya). *The Word and the World*, pp. 122-3, Oxford University Press, 1990.
87. While dealing with the concept of sādḥuta and asādḥuta of the words, Bhartṛhari has clearly mentioned that the real word (sphoṭa) is revealed by different sorts of garbs and it is it from which meaning is revealed in the mind and communication becomes possible. He writes, 'Ambāmbeti yathābālaḥ śikṣamāṇaḥ prabhāsate, avyaktam tadvidām tena vyakte bhavati niścayaḥ'. *Ibid.*, 1/151.
88. Bhartṛhari has given different theories of manifestation of sphoṭa by air, atom and knowledge and has himself raised the arguments against the manifestation-theory of sphoṭa and has answered them. *Ibid.*, 1/78-115.
89. *Ibid.*, 1/96 and *Vṛtti* on it.
90. *Deśaikatvam deśanānātvaṃ kīyavatāmeṣa dharmāḥ. Amūrtayostu dhvani—śabdayordeśadeśivyavahārātikramāt satyapi deśabheda vikalpābhīmāne naivā sautayorbhedo vidyate iti.* *Vṛtti* on VP, 1/96.
91. VP, 1/97-98 and *Vṛtti* on them.
92. *Ibid.*, 1/99.

93. *Alpe mahati vā sabde sphoṭakālo na bhidyate, Parastu śabdasantānaḥ pracayāpacayātmakaḥ.* Ibid., 1/103.
94. Ibid., 1/95.
95. *Iti kartavyatā loke sarvā śabdavyapāsryā, yām pūrvāhitasanskārobālo'pi pratipadyate.* Ibid., 1/121.
96. *Vṛtti on VP, 1/121.*
97. *Abhāvaścatvāraḥ ityatrāpi nirupākhyatvam sāmānyam kalpanīyam. Mahābhāṣya dīpikā, 1/2/46.*
98. *Nyāyamañjarī, Jayanta-Bhaṭṭa, pt. II. Vākyaprakaraṇa, edited by B.P. Tripathi, S.S. University, Varanasi, 1979.*
99. *Helārāja on VP, 3/1/95.*
100. *Mīmāṃsāslokaavṛttika, Śabdanityatva and vākyadhikaraṇa, pp. 884-1150, edited by K.S.D. University, Darbhanga with Hindi translation.*
101. *Vākyādashedyānnirbhāgacchadbātmano varṇānām padānām cātyantamaviveka iti. Vṛtti on VP, 1/73.*
102. *Tasmāt sarvamabhāvovā bhāvovā sarvamiṣyate, natvavasthāntaram kincidekasmāt satyataḥ sthitam. VP, 3/3/63, commenting on it Helārāja writes, Sāmvṛttena tu rūpeṇa sarvam bhāvātmakam, prathamānasya vastutvāt, avastunaḥ prathanāyogāt,.... tathā ca vidyāvidyāpravibhāgamaprabhāgam brahma.*
103. *Prayogadarśanābhyāsādākārāvagrahastu yaḥ, Na sa śabdasya viśayaḥ sa hi yatnāntarāśrayaḥ, VP, 2/120.*
104. Compare—language is a voluntary emanation of spirit, mind of a mental power or as called is French as *Espirit* Creature that suddenly flashes forth with miraculous unexpectedness of a spark, lighting or a thunder. On language, introduction, p. xix.

CHAPTER-III

THE CONCEPT OF SENTENCE (VĀKYA)

Some considerations of Bhartṛhari's philosophy need mention, in order to understand his way of explaining the concept of sentence (*vākya*). Bhartṛhari, as we have discussed in the previous chapters, bases his reflections on ordinary communication and investigates language on the basis of cognition as it is revealed in the mind. A proper understanding of his philosophy of sentence is difficult, if one overlooks his aim of interpreting cognition as revealed in the mind by expressions. His uniqueness can be observed in his interpretation of language from two different points of view. These two points of view will be discussed in the course of the present chapter. The following paragraphs present a brief account of the views.

1. LANGUAGE AS BEING OF AWARENESS OR THOUGHT OBJECT

Sentence, for Bhartṛhari, is a concept. It is *sphoṭa*, the inner and indivisible unit ubiquitously given in the mind. This inner and given unit, as we have discussed in previous chapters, is the expresser or meaning-revealing unit, a unit of awareness. The indivisible *sphoṭa* is manifested by verbal-noises and when it is manifested it reveals itself and its meaning as well. It is an awareness of both—itsself and its meaning (*grāhya-grāhaka*).¹

Accomplishment of cognition or communication by language cannot be possible if it is not accepted as a meaning-revealing unit (*sphoṭa*). As verbal-noises are destroyed before causing cognition, the question arises: what is the expresser of meaning (*vācaka*)? As no expressed (*vācya*) is possible without an expresser (*vācaka*), and as verbal-noises are only tools in the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, how can the expressed be explained without an expresser? Therefore, *sphoṭa*, as an expresser of an expressed, cannot be denied. It, for Bhartṛhari, is the indivisible sentence (*vākya*) and it cannot be identified with the concept of sentence conceived by western analytical philosophers. Western philosophers make a distinction between a sentence and a

proposition. A sentence, in a particular language, is a concrete series of ink or chalk marks, or verbal-noises meant for communication, none of which can be predicated to a proposition. Moreover, different sentences in the same or in a different language can have the same meaning and can express the same proposition. For example, 'time flies' and 'tempus fugit' (*Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, vol. 5-6, p. 500). Thus, a sentence, for them, is a sign vehicle and it expresses a proposition. A sentence is a tool in manifesting the proposition that, for them, is a thought entity or an idea. What Western philosophers say about sentence is applicable only to verbal-noises/utterances that, according to Bhartṛhari, are tools only in the manifestation of the indivisible sentence (*vākya*). Bhartṛhari's concept of sentence may be understood in contrast with the western concept of proposition. It has been mentioned in the previous chapter that *sphoṭa*, for Bhartṛhari, is inner, indivisible and meaning revealing being that is manifested by verbal-utterances/noises. Manifested so by verbal-noises it reveals itself in the mind and the meaning is revealed non-differently by it.² Verbal-noises/marks, in his philosophy, occupy a position of a set of sign-vehicle having the qualities, like long, short, width ect. which are wrongly understood in the sequenceless indivisible sentence (*sphoṭa*). Proposition and *sphoṭa* do not occupy the same level of reality, though both are accepted as thought-object. Bhartṛhari observes both of the *sphoṭa* and the meaning (*pratibhā*) as objects of cognition. *Sphoṭa*, for him, is a foundational being that is self-luminous and that illuminates objects by itself (meaning). Frege used the word *Gedanke*, which may be translated as proposition, and said that a sentence that is uttered or written expresses a proposition. However, the difference between their concept of proposition and Bhartṛhari's concept of indivisible sentence (*sphoṭa*) is very fundamental.

A proposition for Western analytic philosophers is an abstract entity, while *sphoṭa*, for Bhartṛhari, is not an abstract but self-sustained and revealed being, an idea, a unit of awareness by nature, or a being that reveals itself and its meaning non-differently. Abstraction implies concrete instances on the basis of which it is made, but *sphoṭa*, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language, is not an abstraction out of several instances of verbal-noises that are tools only in its manifestation. *Sphoṭa* is not a construction, but a given unit of awareness. In ordinary communication, it requires signs, symbols, gestures, verbal-noises, etc., in order to be manifested, but in cases of *yogins* and other gifted

persons, it reveals itself without any such mediums. What is cognized as a revealed object, as an indivisible flash, can in no way be underestimated as abstraction. *Sphoṭa* is a foundational being in Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language, which aims at explaining cognition as revealed by expressions. *Sphoṭa* ceases to be so if it is an abstraction. An abstracted thought also implies it in order to be revealed so, if, otherwise, how could it be known so. If *sphoṭa* is accepted as abstracted thought, all knowledge (that which *sphoṭa* reveals in the mind in communication) will be no more than abstraction, which without *sphoṭa*, the expresser, cannot be expressed and, hence, will be unfounded. The idea of abstraction may also lead to undesirable metaphysical consequences. For Bhartṛhari, who limits his philosophical reflections to language and meaning, knowledge by *sphoṭa* is not an abstraction, but determinate and veridical cognition, as it is revealed and shot through and through by language. Else, it cannot be known even as an abstracted being.³ Philosophically, *sphoṭa* is a cognitive-being, and meaning is what is non-differently revealed by it, that is also a cognitive-being and non-different from the former. The being revealed by language is a unit of awareness in character, and so it cannot be taken as abstraction from external entities that lie beyond the realm of language.

2. LANGUAGE AS TOKEN/GRAB

Since Bhartṛhari's aim is to interpret the cognition revealed by expressions, and the interpretation demands analysis, he clearly says that the scheme of different component-letters, words and sentences, acquired by grammatical analysis of the indivisible whole, is helpful for one who cannot understand the indivisible sentence without parts. He seems always true to and conscious of his aim in showing that the interpretation of cognition on the basis of verbal-noises helps in making the indivisible (cognition) understandable to the ignorant and children. Analysis is a device, an artificial way to explain the indivisible at a grammatical plane. *Sphoṭa* and verbal-noises are two aspects involved in the accomplishment of communication. Verbal-noises act as a tool for the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, which reveals meaning. Though verbal-noises (language-tokens) are tools in the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, they are taken to be the expresser (*sphoṭa*) out of habit and perception. From the point of view of speakers, verbal-noises are the gross

manifestations of *sphoṭa* that are perceived and are taken by proxy as the expresser, while the meaning-revealing unit is the inner and indivisible sentence (*sphoṭa*) itself. With this preliminary note, we begin our observations on Bhartṛhari's interpretation of sentence.

There is a controversy that arises out of the interpretation of the maxim '*padaprakṛti saṃhitā*' of the ancient text entitled *Rk. Pratiśākhya*.⁴ In the Indian tradition, the word-theorists (*padavādins*) and the sententialists (*vākyavādins*) interpret this maxim differently, which gives rise to rival theories. Bhartṛhari⁵ has tried to reconcile the two extreme views in his holistic interpretation of the maxim.

A brief account of the different interpretations of the maxim may shed sufficient light not only on the understanding of Bhartṛhari's interpretation of this maxim, but also on his concept of sentence. Generally, the Sanskrit word '*pada*' is translated as 'term', but throughout the discussion the word has been taken in the sense of 'word'. However, the difference between '*pada*' as a word and it as a term, is well maintained. According to the interpretation *padāni prakṛtiḥ yasya sa padaprakṛtiḥ*, words (*padas*) are the original units of a sentence (*saṃhitā*). Words are given, and sentences are constructed out of their association, or emerge out of their synthesis. The theories that believe in this interpretation hold that sentence (*saṃhitā*) is called so because it is constructed out of words (words precede sentences). Sententialists interpret the maxim as '*padānām prakṛtiḥ padaprakṛtiḥ*', which means sentence (*saṃhitā*) is the origin of words. In this view, sentence is the original, eternal and indivisible unit, while words are acquired by grammatical analysis of the indivisible sentence (sentence precedes words). Sentence, for Bhartṛhari, is *sphoṭa*, an indivisible whole without parts, from which words emerge as parts in our artificial analysis. It is indivisible and can be conceived in terms of the mechanical addition of words to words and letters to letters emerging as a synthetic unit having meaning.

Apart from these two popularly known interpretations, Puṇyarāja interprets this maxim in two more ways.⁶ According to the first, both the word (*pada*) and sentence are 'given', but with a difference that words are given as effect and the sentence as a cause (*pratipādyā*). According to the second theory, a sentence, as knowledge (*Veda*), is given indivisibly, and it is distinguished in terms of cause and effect as sentence and words respectively.

Sentence (*samhitā*), if considered from the point of view of teaching language to a child, is a collection of words according to a syntactical rule and conveys a qualified meaning. If this definition of sentence (*samhitā*) is accepted, then it will be logically difficult to take words as the original unit of language, because in that case they will be a collection of letters, and so on *ad absurdum*. Sentence, on the other hand, if taken from the point of view of learning language by convention, is an indivisible unit conveying a unit meaning, and words (*padas*) are explained as indivisible units acquired by the grammatical analysis of indivisible sentence. Therefore, the controversy is basically rooted in the theorist's assumption of the real unit of language.

In Indian philosophy of language, there are three popular theories regarding the real/original unit of language. In order to throw sufficient light on the controversy a brief account of the theories is given as follows:

1. Theory of Letters as the Original Unit of Language

This theory considers the issue of the original unit of language from a syntactical point of view. For *Mīmāṃsakas*, letters are eternal (in the sense of *apauruṣeya*) unit of language. They interpret words as a collection of letters, and sentences as collection of words. Śābaraswāmī in his commentary on *Jaiminisūtra*⁷ has commented that the word cow (*gauḥ*) is nothing but the association or letters *g+a+u+visarga* (a symbol marked by two perpendicular dots (:)). According to letter-theories, there is no word independent of letters and sentences independent of words. Letters constitute words, and sentences are constituted by words. For this theory, letters are original units, though they are not expressive, because only words are expressive. The expressiveness of a word is due to the power caused by the association of the letters.

2. Theory of Word (*pada*) as the Original Unit of Language

Word-theorists (*padavādins*) reject the position of letter-theorists (*varṇavādins*) on the ground that letters independently are not expressive (*vācaka*), and association of discrete letters as a unit is not possible. Any association of meaningless letters may not be taken as expressive of a

meaning. A unit of language is a meaning-conveying unit, and words being so are the original unit of language and that this position would be acceptable to letter-theories as well. The assumption of association of letters in order to explain the expressiveness (*vācakatva*) of a word, is unnecessary. For example, the word cow means cowness, but if the sequence of letters is reversed, the association 'woc' is not a word at all. According to word-theorists, an irregular association of letters may not be a meaningful word (*vācaka*). As no simultaneous articulation of letters is possible, and as articulated utterances, being momentary, do not exist in succeeding moments, there is no occasion for an association of discrete letters. Criticizing the letter-theorists' position, the followers of word-theories put up the following dialectic against them: What is the expressive for a letter-theorist? Is it discrete letters, or the association of letters? The former clearly is not, as theorists themselves deny the expressiveness of letters; and the latter could not be, as meaningless momentary letters would not cause a meaningful word. If a word is an association of letters, the meaning of the word should also be an association of the meanings of the letters of the word. The letter-theorists' position cannot be established logically in any way.

It is worth noting here that English empiricism, likewise, for a long time, has accepted 'term' as the primary unit of language and considered a proposition as a combination of terms that are independently meaningful units. Only after F.H. Bradley, who reacted, for the first time, against the theories of term as the primary unit, that propositions were accepted as the primary unit. Following the tradition of F.H. Bradley, Wittgenstein considered that only propositions had sense: only in the context of proposition a name had meaning (*Tractatus* 3:3).

Indian word-theorists consider the word as the ultimate indivisible unit of language, because it is an expressive unit and the association of such meaningful units in a syntactic unity constitutes sentence (*vākya*). On the basis of the same logic, they explain the meaning of a sentence as an association of the meanings of its words. They think that there is no case of irregularity in accepting word as an expresser expressing an expressed independently. While accepting word as an independent expresser, word-theorists explain the meaning of a sentence differently. After the Kumāṛila and Prabhākara's controversy, this difference can be grouped into two main categories: expression

precedes relation (*abhihitānvayavāda*) and relation precedes expression (*anvitābhīdhānavāda*). These two theories will be discussed in detail in Chapter III.

3. Theory of Sentence as the Original Unit of Language

This theory considers the issue of the original unit of language on the basis of accomplishment of communication. As communication is accomplished by sentences, they are the original units of language. The sentence is the inner and indivisible unit expressive of a unit retiring expectancy of the completion of a unit meaning which is awareness in character. As indivisible sentence is not understandable by ignorants, it is artificially divided by grammatical analysis into different component words, and words into different roots, stems, suffixes, etc., and then by the association of those parts the sentence token is understood as a syntactic whole. These divisions, according to *vākyaavādins*, are tools in making the indivisible understandable to those who can understand it only piecemeal.⁸ Words, derived through grammatical analysis of indivisible sentence, are also indivisible, though they are explained on the basis of analysis in further parts and then the word is understood as a synthesis of those parts (letters, suffixes, roots, stems, etc.). For example, '*Gauḥ asti*' (It is a cow) is an indivisible sentence expressive of an unit meaning, independently of the parts associated so. It is only on the basis of grammatical analysis that the indivisible sentence is divided into words like '*gauḥ*' and '*asti*', and then the sentence '*gauḥ asti*' is explained as an association of the words '*gauḥ*' (nominal word) and '*asti*' (verb). But this explanation of sentence, by analysis, is only an expedient remedy and the sentence as such is a unit of awareness in character and, therefore, cannot be constituted out of different words. Bhartṛhari adopts both the cognitive and syntactical points of view in explaining language. The issue will be discussed in subsequent pages of the present chapter.

A CRITIQUE OF EIGHT FOLD DEFINITION OF SENTENCE

This section is an exposition of Bhartṛhari's discussion on the concept of sentence. In the very beginning of the second part of his *Vākya-padīya*, he has discussed at least eight theories on the concept of sentence popular at his time.⁹ It is necessary to discuss and examine

each of these theories of sentence in order to understand Bhartṛhari's verdict on the concept of sentence.

1. Ākhyātaśabdovākyam

The theorists following this view interpret language in terms of an imperative to do (*pravṛtī*) or not to do (*nivṛtī*). Since an action is expressed by verb, they define verb as sentence. According to them, a verb, apart from an action, expresses time, means, agent, person and mood (*upagraha*) in general. Thus, they believe that since the incentive to do or not to do qualified with time, etc. is cognized by the verb, the verb is sentence. They define 'verb' as sentences, as it is expressive of action that is a qualified meaning. As an action cannot be performed without a means (*kāraka*), the means are also cognized by the (implication made on the basis of) the meaning of verb itself. The meaning of the verb is a primary word in a sentence, and as it is not the means that implies action rather action implies means, therefore, the verb is considered by them as sentence.

Vārttikakāra Kātyāyana has defined *ākhyāto śabdaḥ vākyam* and as '*ākhyātam sāvyayakāraka viśeṣaṇam vākyam ekatiṃti*'¹⁰ which means a verb qualified with means (*kāraka*) and indeclinable (*avyaya*) is sentence. This definition gives importance to indeclinables (*avyaya*), in addition to verb and means, as a qualifying component of a sentence, but later thinkers reduce the importance of the particle (*avyaya*) and means (*kāraka*) as those only to be implied by the verb. They hold, in some cases, complete sense is cognized only by the verb, without the use of particles and means, which is why it is proper to accept verb as sentence. In brief, to say that a verb is a sentence is to assume that the means and the particle are also cognized by the verb, or by implication to it.¹¹ Word holists (*ākhyāta śabdavādins*), unlike *Naiyāyikas*, interpret the verb as expressing the qualified meaning of a sentence.

Now, coming to an examination of the view, it is not justified to accept a single-word verb as sentence, from the points of view of both cognition by expression and the syntactical form of an expression. It is not conducive to all cases of expression, because the particular agent, etc. of an action are not cognized by the verb alone. It functions as sentence only in the cases where a fixed agent and accessory of

particular action is popularly and inevitably associated with it. For example, the expectancy 'who is the reader' and 'which book is being read' are not distinctly extincted only by the verb 'reads' (*paṭhati*). By the verb 'reads', a *general* agent and object are cognized, but no cognition of a clear and *specific* agent and object is distinctly revealed. As the verb, independently may not function for an imperative to an action, which is possible only by a specified cognition, communication cannot be possible only on the basis of a verb as sentence. Communication is accomplished by specific or particular cognition, and not by cognition of a meaning in general. It is true that in some cases a verb, if it has a fixed agent and accessory, functions as a sentence. For example, the agent the deity (*devam*) and the object (*jalam*) are cognized by the verb 'rains' (*varṣati*), but this is not true for all the cases of cognition. A verb is a word and according to word-theorists, especially *Mīmāṃsakas*, the word is expressive of a universal while the meaning of a sentence according to them is a specified meaning. In these circumstances, it will be self-contradictory to characterize a single-word verb as sentence. A word, conveying a universal cannot be expressive of a qualified meaning, that is individual, at the same time.

If word-theorists say that the verb, being a principal word in an expression, is treated as a sentence, then other words used in the sentence will be useless. If they say that other words used in a sentence only qualify the meaning expressed by the verb, then those words must be admitted as a necessity for explaining the cognition as qualified-qualifier, which means that they do have use in the revelation of cognition.

According to Bhartṛhari, a verb is sentence, only if a fixed agent and accessory are cognized by it. *In some other cases it is defined as sentence only because it occupies the principal position in a sentence of an imperative type.*¹² Thus, '*ākhyāto śabdaḥ vākyaṃ*' is not a general definition of sentence. If we consider verb (*ākhyāta*) as a word, it will be expressive of a universal and, hence, will not be a sentence expressive of a complete specified meaning. If we consider it as a unit conveying complete meaning, then it ceases to be a word. *Vaiyākaraṇas* give importance to the verb as sentence only if an indivisible complete meaning is revealed by it. The theory 'a verb is a sentence' is a kind of *anvitābhīdhānavāda* (relation precedes expression), about which we shall discuss in the next chapter.

2. Sanghātovākyaṃ

A sentence is an association (of words) conveying a connected meaning. For the holders of this view, words are expressive of their own independent meaning, and even in a sentence they convey their own meaning first. However, when words are associatedly used in a sentential form, a new meaning emerges, and that emerged meaning is the sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*). No discrete word, according to this view, can be called sentence.¹³ The association of words conveying complete meaning is sentence, and the meaning of the words associated through expectancy, proximity, capability, etc. are collectively considered as sentential meaning.

Bhartṛhari and his commentators have critically analyzed the views of *sanghātavākyavādins*, a brief account of which follows: If it is accepted that the words first express their own independent meaning (universal) and afterwards, when related, they convey its connected meaning (individual), then a word, as it abandons or loses its independent meaning when associated, will be a word without meaning. Hence, it will not be a word at all. So far as the idea of association of words is concerned, discrete words, being momentary, would not stand in the next moment in order to be associated, which puts the issue of their association in question. For example, the word *saḥ* (he) in the expression '*saḥ paṭhati*' (he reads) denotes its own meaning first and disappears at the moment the word '*paṭhati*' (reads) is uttered. Do they, for a single moment, stand together in order to be associated? If they stand simultaneously, there will be no need for associating them. From the point of view of cognition, the theorists can say that the word '*saḥ*' denotes its meaning (universal) that disappears when the universal denoted by the word '*paṭhati*' is cognized. Now, the question is: when are their meanings associated? The question of association of one that is destroyed and another that is yet to come, does not arise. However, if they are assumed to be associated, the question arises: how can a qualified unit (the meaning of sentence) be explained if it is the association of word-meanings (universal)? It is incongruous to accept the association of two universals '*saḥ*' and '*paṭhati*', of which one is of an accomplished character and another is of a non-accomplished character. Are the two associated expressively, or by memory? The two are not simultaneously

expressed and cannot be associated, because one is destroyed before the other comes then *all knowledge will be reduced to knowledge by memory, and the verity of cognition by expression will be put in question.*

If once a sentential meaning without an expression (*śabda*) is accepted, then, on the basis of the same logic, it can be said that word-meaning (*padārtha*) is also a meaning without a word because words are association of letters. *This assumption may give rise to a false conclusion of an expressed without an expresser, on the basis of which the original position of language for which meaning is always a meaning of a word and that there is relation between the word and its meaning, may not be explained.*¹⁴ *Vaiyākaraṇas* are of the view that if all meanings are expressed of meaning-conveying units that is the expresser, and if sentential-meaning is a meaning, then it must also be a meaning of a meaning-conveying-unit, which is the sentence. It is inconsistent to accept a meaning over and above the meaning of an expresser and, thus, the expresser of the specified meaning is the sentence and not the word. If a specified meaning is revealed by a word-token, that is also a sentence, because the expresser of complete sense is the sentence and not a word.

3. Sanghātavarttinījativākyaṃ

According to this view, a sentence is the universal inhering in an association of words. As movement is the universal inhering in all particular activities falling under it like vibrating, throwing up, throwing down, etc., and as the universal (movement) is manifested by each of those particular activities, sentence is that universal inhering in the association of words.¹⁵ The sentence '*saḥ pustakam paṭhati*' (he reads a book) is articulated differently by different persons in different language-tokens, and the expression '*saḥ pustakam paṭhati*' is identified as the same sentence in all its different occurrences and instances at different times and in different garbs. It is admitted as the universal inhering in all those occurrences and in all the words associated in that unitary set. Similar is the case with sentential-meaning that inheres in all the instances and occurrences of an expression. A sentence is the universal inhering in the association of words (cow grazes), on account of which it is cognized as the same sentence conveying identical

cognition in different occurrences and instances. This theory is a theory of sentence as an indivisible unit, which we shall discuss later in this section.

Now, on a critical examination of the view, it can be said that the universal may only be accepted as a tie for the explanation of the unity of word-meaning. But, only on account of being a cause of unity of meanings of words, it may not be defined as sentence. Not only that, but as the universal of words and the universal of sentence are different, the association of word-universals would not be the sentence-universal. The universal of a whole (*avayavī*) independently of the universal of part (*avayava*), and vice versa, are also different. For example, the universal of 'horse' and the universal of 'horseness' are different. Does the theory not intend to say that the universal of an object is separate from the object itself? But how can the universal of an object be separated from the object? If a sentence is taken as a universal, it may go against communication that is accomplished by a particular (sentences and not by words). As all expressions are particular, a sentence cannot be taken to mean a word universal. For example, the expression 'he reads' is not the same when different persons utter it at different times. If it is said that the unitary or identical conception of meanings of different words of a set cannot be explained without admitting a universal, then that universal will be the cause of a unitary meaning of the expression and cannot be accepted as a universal conveyed by the expression itself. However, if the sentence as universal, inhering in the collection of words, and so is the sentential meaning, inhering in the collection of word – meanings, are taken in view, identical cognition by it may properly be explained but from syntactical point of view both—the sentence and sentential-meaning will be no more than imaginary.

4. Kramovākyaṃ

For this view, sequence of the words used is the cause of the cognition of sentential-meaning and, thus, the theorists feel no need for accepting sentence over and above the sequence of words. It is not the sentence, but the sequence of words based on expectancy, proximity, capability and intention that causes the cognition of sentential-meaning (*vākyaārtha*).¹⁶ A sentential-meaning is specified (*viśeṣa*) and that is caused by sequence. Certain sequence of words emerges certain

meaning and, hence, sequence is sentence. The expressive power of sentential-meaning, according to this view, is neither a sentence nor a word but the sequence of the words in a set. They accept sequence as the property of time and explain that the words are expressed by the power of time. The verbal cognition over and above the meaning of words is conveyed by sequence and, hence, there is no need to admit sentence other than the sequence. The logic behind accepting sequence as sentence is that the uttering of words in a sequence effects particularity, and if particularity is the meaning of a sentence, it is not different from sequence.

Bhartṛhari and his commentators have criticized the sequence-theory of sentence by saying that if sequence is sentence then with the change of sequence of words, a change of sentence has to be accepted. But as we know, in Sanskrit, a change of the sequence of words does not cause a change in the sentence. With the sequence of words changed, '*Rāmaḥ gṛham gacchati*', '*Gṛham Rāmaḥ gacchati*' and '*Gacchati Rāmaḥ gṛham*', do not express different sentences, but the same sentence.¹⁷ In other words, the identity of the sentence and of the meaning is cognized in the same ways, even in cases of changed sequences. Bhartṛhari observes as sequence (*krama*) in itself is not a sentence and as a sentence is only an expresser, how can sequence be the expresser of meaning? Sequence is a property of time and in itself it is not a sentence or word (*śabda*).¹⁸ How can sentential-meaning (expressed) be explained on the basis of sequence which in itself is a non-expresser.¹⁹ The theory, therefore, does not give a satisfactory answer to this problem and underestimates the expressive nature of language.

5. Ādyampadamvākyaṃ

According to the theorists who follow this view, the beginning word of a sentence is a sentence, as it construes the connected meaning of other words of the set. They believe that an action (*sādhya*) has a fixed means (*sādhana*) and vice versa. The meaning 'action' is cognized by expectancy even by the meaning of means (*sādhana*) only and vice versa. As a sentential-meaning is an association of the meaning of a verb and have means, agent, etc., and as their relation is accomplished only by the beginning word (may be a verb or a nominative word), the latter is called sentence, as it expresses mutually related meaning.²⁰

In this view, the beginning word, as an expresser, has the power to express meaning, and the meaning of the whole sentence is cognized only by that word. Other words of the sentence are used only for distinguishing the same expressed, and so the theorists think it justified to accept the beginning word as sentence. For example, addressing 'Rāma' if 'Rāmaḥ paṭhati' or 'paṭhati Rāmaḥ' is said, the words 'Rāmaḥ' and 'paṭhati' in the respective instances convey the meaning of the complete sentence 'Rāmaḥ paṭhati'.²¹

Critics say that it is absurd to accept only a word (of a sentence) first spoken as the whole sentence. If the first word is itself the complete expressed, what is the need for expectancy of other words for a complete particular meaning? A word is a word, how can it be identified with a sentence? Are they synonymous? They are not synonymous either in grammar or in principle. The meaning of a word, as these theories themselves accept, is different from the meaning of a sentence. Moreover, if the beginning word is a sentence, other words will be useless. The expressions 'Rāmaḥ gr̥ham, gacchati' and 'Gacchati Rāmaḥ gr̥ham' have different beginning words, but they express the same sentence revealing identical meaning. The problem here is which should we consider as the beginning word of the sentence. 'Rāmaḥ' in the first instance is the beginning word and, hence, expressive and the next word *gr̥ham* is suggestive but in the second instance it is the first word and, hence, expressive, and then 'Rāmaḥ' functions as suggestive. This shows that if beginning word is taken as sentence, confusions about the meaning of the sentence will arise. A word, at the same time, cannot function in the same sentence both as an expressive and as suggestive. This theory of sentence is not steady, because it goes against the theory of independent meaning of words. To deny the independent meaning of a word is to disprove their own original position, because, for them, a word is a meaningful unit of language. If a word is taken to express a mutually related meaning of a set, the theory is self-contradictory. How can, then, the meaning of a word and that of a sentence be distinguished? It is not proper to accept that a word expresses the meanings of both a word and a sentence simultaneously. A word is expressive of sentential-meaning, only if it implies a verb (to be). But, in that case it ceases to be a word and functions as a single word expression, the idea of which leads to the notion of indivisibility of sentence. If it is said that the first word spoken is the central or principal word, and other words are used only as qualifiers

of the same meaning (conveyed by the principal word), it will not be a steady definition. Someone may take the nominative as principal while another may take the verb as principal, and it will be difficult to determine the character of the first word. Is it a qualifier or qualified? That which is qualified may also be interpreted as qualifier and vice versa in the same sentence. The word expressive of a finished character cannot express the non-finished character and even so at a time.

6. Pṛthakasarpapadam Sākākṣam Vākyaṃ

In order to understand this theory properly, we have to keep the fact in the mind that this theory is a form of the 'relation precedes expression (*anvitābhīdhānavāda*)', according to which the convention is word-oriented, and, hence, words are independent expressers of a complete meaning/sense. Being independent expressers of complete sense, all words of a sentence are independently different sentences. Even in the case of the use of many words in a sentence (in the popular sense), all words are different sentences, but as expected collectively for a unitary meaning, they are called a single sentence.²² For example, 'Ramaḥ' and 'paṭhati' in the expression 'Rāmaḥ paṭhati' (Rāma reads) are independent expressers. They independently express the mutually connected meaning of the expression. The word 'Rāmaḥ' if used for communicating meaning, expresses the connected meaning of the sentence 'Rāmaḥ paṭhati', and similar is the case with the word 'paṭhati'. *The agent (Rāmaḥ) and verb paṭhati independently express mutually connected meaning and they, when expected collectively, are called sentence.* Again, as, for *Vaiyākaraṇa*, more than one sentence are considered one if they all are expected collectively for a unitary meaning, similarly, all words, which are independent sentences, are considered one sentence if expected collectively for the cognition of complete sense.

The followers of this view, like theorists of view No. 5, assume that an action is never found without an agent, or the agent without action and, thus, they feel satisfied in assuming words as independent expressers of a sentential-meaning.²³ The primary and secondary levels of sense of the words in expression are decided as per the expectancy involved in the cognition conveyed by the expression.

Kumārila Mīmāṃsakas, who believe in the idea 'expression precedes relation', and *akhaṇḍavākyavādin Vaiyākaraṇas*, who believe in the indivisibility of sentence, criticize this theory of sentence. The former may say that the word expressive of agent does not necessarily express the particular action and vice versa. Thus, they think that complete meaning of a sentence cannot be explained only on the basis of a single word. According to *Mīmāṃsakas*, there are cases of single word expressions, but in those cases the imposition of the unspoken word and its meaning by expectancy are accepted to explain the cognition of a complete meaning. *Vaiyākaraṇas* assume convention with sentences and not with words. For them, communication is accomplished by sentence and not by word, and, thus, sentence is the expresser of completely distinguished meaning. They say, if the words of a set are considered as different sentences, they should express sentential-meaning, but that is not the case. On the contrary, 'the unit (sentence) expresses the unit meaning', which is cognized in communication. Moreover, the expectancy, as the theorists accept, for cognition of the oneness of the meanings of different words of a sentence will be purposeless if words are independent. What is the need of accepting expectancy for association if all words discretely express independent and complete sentential-meaning? The objections raised against theories 2, 3 and 5 are also applicable against this theory.

7. Eko' nvayayaḥ Śabdah Vākyam

In this view, a sentence is an indivisible whole, a whole without parts (*nirāvayava*), and a complete unit of language expressive of a unit meaning satisfying further expectancy for the completion of meaning.

According to this view, a complete being (meaning), in usual communication, is not revealed by words or group of words but by indivisible sentence and, hence, a sentence is the primary unit of language. This view is supported by *Vaiyākaraṇas* in general and by Bhartṛhari in particular. In order to clarify this view, Bhartṛhari gives the example of the cognition of a picture. Just as a picture is cognized first as a homogeneous unit and then is explained differently through the various divisions of it as blue, green, etc., similarly a sentence, revealed in the mind, is an indivisible unit and is explained by grammatical analysis into different words – means, verb, etc.²⁴ Bhartṛhari writes 'as it is difficult

for the ignorant and children to understand the indivisible (sentence and sentential-meaning), it is explained through the grammatical analysis of it into different words in order to make it understandable to them as an association of words'. In other words, the indivisible is explained as a construction of those words, roots, stems, suffixes, etc. It may be asked if the word 'gām' (cow) used in the expression *gāmabhyāja* (herds the cow in) is separated from the expression by grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*), and if it is taken as separated from the 'gām' (cow) used in the expression 'gāmabhāyaja', why both of them appears to be the same? For *Vaiyākaraṇas*, both of them are different but similar. The word 'gām' of the expression is not independent from the expression itself and, therefore, has no meaning independently of the expression while the separated word 'gām' is considered, by analysis, as expressive of an independent meaning. The meaning of the words, acquired by grammatical analysis, is decided on the basis of association (*anvaya*) and dissociation (*vyātireka*). Bhartṛhari says – the wise knows the indivisible in its wholeness or completeness without passing through divisions.²⁵ In order to make the point more clear, Bhartṛhari gives the example of a compound word (*samastapada*) 'Brāhmaṇakambalam'²⁶, in which the components 'brāhmaṇa' and 'kambalam' have no independent meaning of their own. The whole (or else combination of the two) is an indivisibly expressive of an indivisible meaning (*brāhmaṇakambalam*). If it is taken that *brāhmaṇa* and *kambalam* express their own independent meanings first, and then, they are associated together by expectancy for the meaning *brāhmaṇakambalam*, a question regarding their association arises. The meaning of a compound is not the association of the meanings of the words, i.e. the association of *brāhmaṇa* and *kambalam*, but the integration of the meaning *brāhmaṇakambalam*. He further adds,²⁷ 'nara' and 'siṃha' in the compound 'nṛsiṃha' are not two independent words. If they are two independent words, they should be expressers of two independent meanings, but it expresses an integration of meaning only. To sum up, it can be said that *Vaiyākaraṇas* assume the indivisibility as real and accept that this indivisible is explained through division for those who cannot understand it indivisibly.

Now, coming to an examination of this view, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa²⁸ has criticized the concept of sentence as an indivisible unit by saying

that a sentence cannot be a whole without parts, but a whole made of parts, (*sāvayava*) because the words and their meanings are cognized independently of sentence and of its meaning. The sentential-meaning, he observes, may not be revealed if the meanings of parts (words) of the sentence are not cognized and, thus, the meanings of words should not be taken as unreal. If they are accepted as unreal, there must be a base for such acceptance. Jayanta says, similarity cannot be taken as the base of unreality of words because which two are similar is not clear. If we accept that even if there is no other similar elsewhere, the parts pre-exist with the similarity of which the part in question is considered to be unreal, we reject the existence of part without a veridical cognition of it. Jayanta says that the parts '*nara*' and '*siṃha*' are perceived independently even in the compound '*Nṛsiṃha*' and, thus, the existence of words in a sentence may not be denied. He contends that the example of the picture given in favour of indivisibility of sentence is also not appropriate, because parts are perceived in a picture as well. Cardamom, sugar, etc. are distinctly known by taste even in *pānaka* (a drink), and different kinds of tones are cognized even in homogeneous music. Similar is the case with indivisible sentence.

Answering the objection raised by Jayanta, it can be said from the side of Bhartṛhari that the sentence, in fact, is indivisible and the division of it in words is the outcome of the grammatical analysis or is due to a sense of duality. It is for practical purposes that the indivisible is understood through the process of words (parts) analyzed. If it is asked that no sentence is possible if it does not contain words, *Vaiyākaraṇas* may reply that the division of sentence, words, roots, suffixes, etc., is an outcome of grammatical analysis. From the point of view of communication, indivisible sentence, as a unit, is cognized as the expresser of indivisible meaning.²⁹ The words of a sentence, independently of the meaning of the sentence, have no meaning of their own.

8. *Buddhyanusanhṛti Vākya*m

The word '*buddhiḥ*' denotes intelligible, inner language as awareness in character, and the word '*anusanhṛti*' denotes its sequencelessness.

Thus, according to the definition '*buddhyānusanhṛti vākyaṃ*', a sentence is an inner, sequenceless and meaning-revealing unit, that is *sphoṭa*.³⁰ This definition of sentence is based on Bhartṛhari's definition of sentence as expresser-expressed (*grāhya-grāhaka*).³¹ In this view, a sentence is not a set of utterances, because utterances (*dhvaniyān/lipiyān*) are only tools in manifesting the inner sequenceless *sphoṭa*. Manifested by them, *sphoṭa* reveals itself and the meaning, which is why it is defined as expresser-expressed. In order to clarify the point distinctly, Bhartṛhari has compared it with the senses. He says, 'senses need not be cognized before they perceive objects. They do so by their mere existence, when they come into contact but that is not the case with words that express themselves and their meanings as well.'³²

According to his philosophy, this inner, sequenceless, meaning-revealing unit is manifested progressively in the sequence of verbal-noises, and when it is manifested, it reveals itself and its meaning, which extincts the expectancy for the completion of a unit meaning. It is an awareness of itself as well as of the meaning. As awareness is indivisible; sentence, for this theory, is also indivisible. It is only for practical or grammatical purposes that the indivisible is divided (artificially) into different components. I have already discussed *sphoṭa* at length in the previous chapter.

The two definitions of sentence as '*eko'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*' and '*buddhyānusanhṛti*' are, to an extent, not different. These theories emphasize the basic character of sentence as an indivisible whole and not as a collection of independent words as viewed by theories, except the last two. According to this theory, a sentence is inner sequenceless unit. Actually, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, *sphoṭa*, the complete meaning-revealing, inner and indivisible unit, is sentence (*akhaṇḍavākya*).

Puṇyarāja groups the eight theories of sentence into three categories: (1) Theories of association and sequence (*Saṅghātaḥvākyaṃ*, and *Kramaḥvākyaṃ*), based on *abhihitānavayavāda* that believes in the idea of 'expression precedes relation', (2) Theories of verb, beginning word and all words expected for a connected meaning (*ākhyāta-vākyaṃ*, *padamādyam* and *pṛthak sarvapadam sākāṅkṣam*) are grouped as *anvitābhidhānavāda*, and (3) The theory

of sentence as universal inhering in an association, the indivisible without part and it as sequenceless unit of awareness (*sanghātajātiḥ*, *eko'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ* and *buddhyanusanhṛti*) are concerned with the indivisibility theory of sentence. The first is supported by *Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas* and *Naiyāyikas*, while the second is supported by *Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas*. Grammarians (*Vaiyākaraṇas*) follow the third. We shall discuss these theories in detail in the next chapter entitled 'concept of sentential-meaning' (*vākyārtha-vicāra*).

Ekatiṅvākyam

In addition to the above-mentioned eight definitions of sentence, Bhartṛhari has often referred to the definition '*ekatiṅvākyam*' (a sentence is that which has one finite verb) given by *Vārttikakāra Kātyāyana*. By this definition, he does not think that a sentence, if it has more than one finite verb, is taken to be many sentences.³³ The opponents may argue that as there are many verbs in the expression '*Deodattam pūrvam snāti pacatibhuñkte*', it should be considered many sentences, if, '*ekatiṅvākyam*' is taken to be the characteristic of a sentence. According to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, in cases of sentences where many verbs are used in a way that the others qualify the principal one (qualified), as we see in the expression under example, such confusion cannot arise. The verb which is qualified is principal, which the other verbs qualify and, hence, a sentence is understood as a unity or the qualified and, thus, the expression may not be confused as many sentences. *Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa*, a commentator of Bhartṛhari, in his *Laghuśabdenduśekhara* has interpreted *Vārttikakāra*'s definition '*ekatiṅvākyam*' as '*ekatiṅ viśeṣyakam vākyam*'. According to him, there may be many verbs in a sentence, but if other verbs are expected as those qualifying the principal verb, the sentence is one.

It does not hold that a sentence, wherein a verb is linked to another or is linked alternatively to another word linked to the principal verb, can be explained exclusively neither as one sentence nor as two. As the verbs are linked and are subordinated to the principal verb, the sentence is one as we find in the expression '*mṛgaḥ paśyat yāti*'.³⁴ Bhartṛhari clearly says that even in cases where other verbs of the sentence serve as qualifiers to the principal verb, the sentence is understood to be one and the doubt regarding suppression of accent (*nighāta*) does not arise as we find in the expression '*Deodattaḥ vrajan*'.

In the expression, the verb 'vrajan' is qualified by other verbs like taking bath, eating, drinking, etc., and therefore, it is a single sentence. According to Bhartṛhari, a finite verb may be used, as a qualifier to another finite verb in a sentence, and that is the reason the expression *pacati, bhāti* is possible. If there are several finite verbs subordinated to a principal verb and are barred by a finite verb (tiñ), there is no case of suppression of accent. Conclusively, as Bhartṛhari observes,³⁵ the definition of sentence as *ekatiñvākya* given by Vārttikakāra is concerned with the explanation of accent (*nighāta*) and, as such it is not a common definition of the sentence.

ARGUMENTS OF PADAVĀDINS AGAINST AKHANDAVĀKYAVĀDINS

Bhartṛhari has very nicely answered the arguments of *padavādins* against the *Vaiyākaraṇas'* theory of indivisibility of sentence, on the basis of cognition by language in usual communication. *Padavādins* have criticized Bhartṛhari's theory of sentence as indivisible unit. The objections of *padavādins* against the theory of indivisibility of sentence, as accounted by Bhartṛhari in *Vākyapadīya*³⁶ are as follow:

1. The cases of substitution of the meaning of a word can be possible only if a word, independently of a sentence, is taken as an expresser. The expressed of an expresser (word) is the primary meaning of the word, and in some uses if the expressive meaning is not conducive, some other meaning similar to the primary meaning is cognized by imposition of the primary meaning on that. The meaning known by imposition of the primary meaning is called a substituted meaning. The substituted one is called '*pratinidhi*'. *Padavādins'* contention is that if words are not taken as independent expressers, and if the whole indivisible-sentence is taken as expresser, then how can the problem of substitution of the meaning of a word in a sentence be possible? For example, we may take the Vedic expression '*aharaḥ sandhyāmupāsīt*' (daily rites are obligatory on the part of man). Now the problem is: if a man performing daily rites (*nityakarma*) has difficulties, e.g. illness, etc., due to which he is not capable of performing the rites, he may commit violation and earn demerit (*pāpa*). In order to save him from the violation of the command or in order to control skipping of daily rites, substitution

(*pratinidhi*) is necessary. But this is possible only if words are taken separately as meaning-conveying units.

Bhartṛhari, in order to clarify the issue of *pratinidhi*, has discussed the *padavādins'* arguments given in favour of word as an independent unit of language. He has taken the expression *vrīhiḥ yajet* for analysis. The verb '*yajet*' in the expression is an imperative to do a sacrifice. The offering of some material (*dravya*) to a deity is called sacrifice. According to *padavādins*, the deity and the material both are known by the verb '*yajet*'. Now the problem is: what is the use of the word '*vrīhiḥ*' (rice) if the material, in general, is also cognized by the verb '*yajet*'. It can be said that the sacrifice can be performed with any material—gram, barley, etc.—but the use of the word '*vrīhiḥ*' restricts other offering materials. The exclusion of other materials is cognized by the word '*vrīhiḥ*', and not by the indivisible sentence. In case of indivisible sentence, the question of substitution does not arise. In order to explain the substitution, it is taken that the verb '*yajet*' conveys material in general and the word '*vrīhiḥ*' distinguishes the particular material, or restricts the material to '*vrīhiḥ*'. *A particular may take place in a universal and, thus, there is not a case of contradictory-contradicted (bādhyabādhakabhāva) relation between the meaning-material in general and vrīhiḥ in particular.*

Now, if the particular material '*vrīhiḥ*' is not available, it can be substituted with any material similar to or belonging to the universal of '*vrīhiḥ*'. If in the absence of '*vrīhiḥ*' the sacrifice is not performed, then, there will be a case of violation of the commandment. It, therefore, seems justified to accept that the act of substituting '*vrīhiḥ*' is accomplished only with consideration to the meaning of the word '*vrīhiḥ*' and not in consideration of the indivisible sentence.

How can those who look upon indivisible sentence as expressive of an action to do or not do explain substitution? Any substitution of the fixed meaning of the sentence will be a substitution of the meaning of the whole sentence but then the substituted meaning will not be the meaning of the fixed sentence because that will be a different action and as no expressed is possible without its expresser, which would, perhaps, require a different sentence. Thus, *padavādins* show that substitution is justified only if word (*pada*) is taken independently as an expression.

2. If indivisible sentence (and not a word) is taken as the unit of communication, why does a person ask for the meaning of a word which is not known to him, despite knowing the meanings of all other words. For example, the person not knowing the meaning of the word peacock (*pikaḥ*) asks only about '*pikaḥ*' (*kaḥ pikaḥ*) when he hears the expression '*Vanātapikamānīyatām*' (bring the peacock from the forest). The expectancy for knowing the meaning of a particular word of a sentence cannot be possible if words are not taken as units having meaning independent of a sentence.
3. According to *Mīmāṃsakas*,³⁷ the meaning of a sentence is decided on the basis of six factors—*śruti* (directly revealed), *liṅga* (reason), *vākya* (expression), *prakarṇa* (context) and *sthāna* (place), in a descending order of strength. Thus, '*śruti*' is the strongest factor and *sthāna* is the weakest. In order to clarify this position, let us take the example of the expression '*vrīhiḥ yajet*'. Here, the verb '*yajet*' conveys the material and the deity in general, but the word rice (*vrīhiḥ*) is heard and revealed directly and expresses a particular material. Which one out of the two (material in general, or *vrīhiḥ*) is conducive to the expression '*vrīhiḥ yajet*'? As per the rule, *vrīhiḥ*, being known directly (*śruti*) is stronger than the others acquired by the capacity of word (*yajeta*) and, hence should be taken to be the meaning of the word.

Mīmāṃsakas say that the determination of '*vrīhiḥ*' as the particular material and the rule of the varying strength of *śruti*, etc. cannot be explained if word as expresser, independent of sentence, is not taken into account. Not only that, divisions of *śruti*, *liṅga*, etc., and the notion of contradicted-contradictory relation (*bādhyabādhakabhāva*) will be useless if word as an independent conveying unit is not accepted.

4. Like word, the subordinate sentence of an expression will also be useless if indivisibility of sentence is taken into consideration. The idea of indivisibility of sentence implies that the sentence, if independently meaningful, will be meaningless if used as a subordinate sentence. According to the holists (*akhaṇḍavākyavādins*),³⁸ the expression '*gauḥduhyatām upādhyāyaḥ payasā bhuktvā māmadyāpayiṣyati*' (the teacher

milks the cow, drinks the milk and then teaches me) expresses indivisible meaning. If it is said that the parts expected as subordinate sentences are also sentences, then two sorts of problem arise: (1) The parts (subordinate sentences), being separate, would not be called sentence, and (2) If the parts, by expectancy, convey the meaning of the whole sentence, they are not different from sentence, then it has to be accepted that they are two or more sentences combined by expectancy for one. But, if indivisibility of the expression is already accepted then it is useless to accept further expectancy for uniting them as one because expectancy for uniting is possible only in the presence of more than one. Thus, they show that on the basis of indivisibility of sentence, the issue of subordinate sentence cannot be explained.

5. If indivisibility of sentence is accepted, the distinction of primary, secondary and tertiary meanings of words, their determinants like context (*prasaṅga*), conjecture (*uha*), rule (*tantra*), etc. and their mutual expectancy will be useless. For them, expectancy is the cause of synthesis of the words in a sentence. The synthesis of words in a sentence through expectancy is observed in verbal cognition, and hence, words independently of the sentence cannot be denied in favour of indivisibility of sentence.³⁹

BHARTṚHARI'S SOLUTION TO THEIR OBJECTIONS

As we have seen, Bhartṛhari is a dedicated proponent of the indivisibility theory of sentence. He has given a host of arguments in order to turn down the *padavādin's* position and to justify his own. He and his commentators have observed language from the point of view of indivisible cognition revealed by language itself. As cognition revealed by sentence is indivisible, sentence as a meaning-revealing unit is also indivisible awareness. It is only for grammatical or practical purposes that an indivisible is divided by grammatical analysis into words and then words into roots, stems, suffixes, etc., which are explained differently by different persons having different allegiances. For example, *Mīmāṃsakas* use words (*padas*), acquired by grammatical analysis, for interpreting Vedic injunctions, and while doing so they do not bestow much importance to whether they are real or are artificial units. Bhartṛhari has clearly said that the picture is cognized as a whole in its entirety, just as there is no actual division in light, yet in lamp, bulb, lightening, heater,

etc., the indivisible light is taken to be different, similarly, a sentence revealing indivisible cognition is an indivisible unit and is made understandable by artificial divisions of it into different words, etc., on the basis of which a sentence is explained as a construction or synthesis.⁴⁰

An account of Bhartṛhari's arguments against the objections of word-theorists is given as follows:

1. Answering the problem of substitution (*pratinidhi*), Bhartṛhari says that substitution is for practical purposes, and the division of the indivisible sentence into words, etc. is accepted as grammatically real even by *Vaiyākaraṇas*. For them, these divisions are artificial but once the artificial is accepted for certain purposes to fulfil, the functions performed on that basis are considered real. From the point of view of cognition and communication, to search a word (*pada*) in a sentence (*vākya*) is similar to searching 'naratva' and 'śiṃhatva' in 'nṛśiṃha', which is a compound word (*samastapada*) conveying an integration of meaning or expressive of a sentential-meaning.⁴¹ *Vr̥hiḥ* and *nivāra* are similar, but they have different universals and, as such, there is no *vr̥hitva* in *nivāratva* or vice versa. Similarly, sentence is an independent unit. Although it is indivisible, it is explained through different components.
2. Regarding asking for the meaning of an unknown word in a sentence, Bhartṛhari says that the person is deluded if he thinks that he is doubtful about the meaning of only a word out of the whole sentence because, in such a case, it is not the single word but the meaning of the whole sentence that is doubted. 'Vanātpikam ānīyatām' and 'vanāt vṛkṣam ānīyatām' are two different sentences, and it is wrong to say that 'vanāt ānīyatām' is common to both, because no distinct cognition of common part is revealed when the two sentence-tokens are heard. For Bhartṛhari, both of the sentences are independent of each other and they express their independent meanings⁴² and, thus, there is no commonness.

Regarding the question: *kaḥ pikaḥ?* (what is peacock?) Bhartṛhari says,⁴³ 'those who do not understand the meaning of a certain word of a sentence are taught the meaning of that word (*pikādi*) through unreal similars, but the meaning of a word in a sentence is related with the

meaning of the sentence and is not only the meaning of an isolated word. It is not the meaning of a word that is doubted in an expression, but the meaning of the whole sentence.⁴⁴ If somebody who does not know the use of the word 'kramelakam' is asked 'kramelakam paśya' (see, a camel), he quickly asks for the meaning. In case he has observed the use of it by elders, he cognizes the meaning of the sentence indivisibly. *The doubt regarding the cognition of the meaning of the expression 'see, a camel' (kramelakam paśya) is a case of non-apprehension of the meaning of the whole sentence. To believe that the doubt is only about a single word in the sentence is based on an attempt to understand the meaning of a sentence with consideration to a common part of similar sentences. There is no room for a common part in an indivisible cognition, which is revealed only by a distinct indivisible sentence.*

3. It is not justified to accept the *padavādins'* assumption that a word expresses a connected meaning of the sentence. *Padavādins* say that the word expresses a connected meaning (*anvitārtha*) and that is why the meaning of a sentence is cognized even by a single or a few words without knowing the whole sentence. Bhartṛhari does not agree with view and argues that as the sentence is uttered in a sequence, one may cognize the full meaning of the sentence even by hearing a single word, but in that case the cognition may be different from the cognition of the meaning known by the word heard in isolation. Not only that, the cognition of meaning accomplished on the basis of a few words or by any one word of a sentence, as Puṇyarāja observes, may even be meaningless or contradictory to the cognition revealed by the complete sentence. For example, the cognition revealed by the expression 'dhava khadira palāśaka cedaniyā na' (dhava, khadira and palāśa trees should not be cut) is not only different, but also opposite to the cognition caused by the word *dhava* or by 'dhava khadira palāśaka cedaniyā' (the last word not uttered yet). In some cases, hearing only one word or a few words of a sentence reveals the meaning 'reproach', while 'praise' is revealed once the whole sentence is cognized. On these grounds, Bhartṛhari and Puṇyarāja ascertain the indivisibility of sentence as a complete meaning-conveying unit.

4. As we have seen, a subordinate sentence (*avāntara-vākya*) according to *Mīmāṃsakas*, can be explained only on the basis of word as an independent meaning-conveying unit. They ask: if the indivisibility of meaning of a sentence is accepted, and the meaning of words is overlooked, how can subordinate sentence be accepted as connected or associated with the principal sentence? The idea that 'subordinate sentences are separate and associated by expectancy' cannot be explained on the basis of the concept of indivisibility of sentential meaning.

Bhartṛhari's solution to the problem of subordinate sentence is that they have no independent meanings over and above that of the indivisible sentence. For example, the expression '*upādhyāyaḥ āgacchati mām pāṭhayiṣyati āsanam ānaya*' (bring the mat for the teacher who has come to teach me) is actually one indivisible sentence expressing a unitary meaning, though grammatical analysis, it is apparently divided and taken as being constituted of three separate sentences synthesized together. If this interpretation of Bhartṛhari is pushed too far, perhaps the *Mahābhārata* or *Rāmāyāna* could be argued to be one sentence divided into subordinate sentences for practical purposes!⁴⁵

5. The nature of the word (*padasvarūpa*), as Bhartṛhari says, is not definite; the same word can be used differently in different sentences. For example, the word *pac* (cook) is used as *pāka* (cooked, denoting a finished character), as *pacati* (cooks, denoting an unaccomplished character), *pacanaḥ* (fire) and in different persons and numbers. How then can the limit of the form of a word (*pada*) be determined? Similarly, a single word can be analyzed in different ways and interpreted differently. For example,⁴⁶ if the expression '*śvetodhāvati*' is analyzed as '*śvetaḥ + dhāvati*,' then the expression means 'white horse runs'. If the expression is analyzed as '*śvāyitaḥ + dhāvati*', then it means 'the dog runs from here'. Likewise, for the holists, the expression '*śvetaḥ*' can be explained as an indivisible as well as an association. On account of association, we understand '*śvetaḥ*' as a combination of the two words '*śvan*' and '*itaḥ*' and it conveys the meaning 'the dog (runs) from here' by *tantra* (rule). But, if *samsarga* (association) is not taken in to account, the word '*śvetaḥ*' is taken for 'white horse'.

In addition to these clarifications against the *padavādins'* objections, Bhartṛhari has also presented some logical difficulties with the *padavādins'* standpoint; and has shown that these difficulties can be met only on the basis of the concept of individuality of sentence. A brief account of his discussion may be given as follows:

1. If *pada-padārtha* is taken as a unit independently of sentence, and if the form of a *pada* is changed or reposed when analyzed, it would be difficult to decide which of the forms, the original or the reposed, is to be taken for the purpose of associating with the next word.⁴⁷ For example,⁴⁸ the expression '*dadhyānaya*' is analyzed into '*dadhi*' and '*ānaya*', where the 'i' of the word '*dadhi*' is destroyed and is becomes '*ya*'. Thus, the word '*dadhi*' does not remain fixed in its own form, which makes it difficult to decide the point (*avadhi*) from which the next word '*ānaya*' is to be attended to. More specifically, is it from 'i' of *dadhi* or from 'ya' of '*dadhya*'? It is not right to say that the fixed form of the word (*dadhi*) should be taken into account because, being destroyed, it is not perceived in the use *dadhyānaya*. If the point (*avadhi*) of a word, to be synthesized with the next word, cannot be decided, how can the meanings of each word be decided? In this situation, it is proper, as Bhartṛhari says, to accept that the word '*dadhi*' is acquired by grammatical analysis of the indivisible sentence '*dadhyānaya*', and then by analysis the meaning of the word '*dadhi*' is taken as '*dadhi*' and it is this word acquired by analysis that is treated differently for grammatical purpose.
2. If all words have their independent meaning as the theorists who believe in the idea 'relation precedes expression' (*anvitābhīdhānavādins*) assume, what will be the expresser of the association? For example, in the compound word *ṛajapuruṣa*, the word '*ṛajan*' and the word '*puruṣa*' are independently expressers of their own meanings. Now, to which one does the meaning of their association (servant of the king) belong? From the point of view of a word as independent expresser, it is not justified to say that the whole sentence conveys the meaning by intention or by association, because the meaning (intention or association) is not the meaning of either or both of the component words. Therefore, it must be the meaning of the indivisible sentence. According to the theorists of this group, the verb in a sentence expresses a

construed specific/individual meaning, i.e. an imperative to do or not to do and the nominal word (*nāma*) expresses universal. Bhartṛhari asks as to how can the universal (the meaning of nominal word *nāma*) and the individual (the meaning of verb in a sentence) both, being different in nature, be associated? From the side of *Vaiyākaraṇas*, it may be asked, if the meaning of the whole sentence is cognized only by the verb, what is the use of other words of the sentence? The position of word-theorists that '*go iti mukhyārthasya bodhakaḥ*' (the word is expresser of an independent meaning) is contradictory to their view that the word, conveying mutually related meaning, is the expresser (*itarānvitaḥ go arthasya bodhakaḥ*). *There is no such contradiction in accepting that the indivisible sentence for practical purpose is divided into words and their independent meanings are considered as real, only for grammatical purpose.* Thus, words, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, serve as a tool in making the indivisible understandable to ignorants.⁴⁹

3. Refuting the *Mīmāṃsakas* theory 'relation precedes expression', according to which a word expresses a synthesized meaning, Bhartṛhari says that the word uttered cannot reveal the meaning of the word not uttered because the word uttered functions only for its own meaning. Being independent from each other, the word uttered cannot be the cause of the cognition of the word unuttered. If it is said by *Mīmāṃsakas* that the word uttered gives rise to the meaning of the word unuttered in the mind, then, that cognition will not be a cognition revealed by the word (*pada*), but by other causes like inference, memory, etc. How can the foundational character of cognition i.e., indivisibility of awareness, be explained if it is cognition revealed by parts? The verity of cognition and the completion of the expectancy for a unit meaning may not be possible if the sentence as an indivisible unit is not accepted as the expresser.

Padavādins are concerned more about explaining the sentence from a syntectical point of view, while *Vaiyākaraṇas* aim at explaining communication. Communication is accomplished by indivisible sentence and, as such, it is not accomplished by discrete words independently expressing very general meaning. As communication is accomplished by specific and distinct cognition satisfying expectancy, words conveying universals of a very general type cannot

be taken to be a complete unit of communication. Indivisible cognition is what is revealed by indivisible sentence.

To sum up, the controversy of constructionists (*padavādins*) and sententialists (*akhaṇḍavākyavādins*) is based on their difference in outlook towards explaining sentential-meaning. The former try to explain sentential-meaning on the basis of the word as the original/real unit of language, while the latter consider it justified to accept it as the meaning of indivisible sentence. From the point of view of word as the expresser of sentential-meaning, the holists' position is criticized as defective while the holists explain the theory of the constructionists as inconsistent. Bhartṛhari has given due importance to both the aspects in defining sentence. Meaning, for him, is clear, distinct and indivisible cognition revealed by sentence; he considers sentence as an indivisible unit on the basis of the cognition is accomplished in ordinary communication. This indivisible meaning-revealing sentence is explained to the ignorant as a construction out of parts (words, etc.). It is quite agreeable to say that language theory is about formation and not about origin in the radical sense. As an explanation of indivisible sentence, the theory of the constructionists is very significant, but from the point of view of cognition revealed in the mind by language, he considers their theory as only an artificial remedy for making the indivisible sentence understandable to them. It is obvious from the discussions in earlier pages that he not only gives importance to the syntactical definitions of sentence, but also successfully philosophizes on the cognitive nature of the sentence (*śabda*). The indivisible sentence is the expresser that expresses itself and the meaning.

No study of language is philosophical or interesting if it does not investigate the concepts as they figure in the mind by expressions. The same applies to the concept of sentence. Mere syntactical diagnosis is non-philosophical and is not different from descriptive linguistics. From the cognitive point of view, Bhartṛhari seems justified in accepting sentence as *sphoṭa* (complete meaning-revealing-unit of communication retiring further expectancy of a specified complete indivisible unit). In this definition, the long or short size or shape of a sentence is not accountable, because it is contradictory to talk about the length or width of an indivisible unit. What is important for this definition of sentence is the cognition of complete indivisible meaning revealed non-differently in the mind by the indivisible sentence (*sphoṭa*). The

long and short in shape and size are the qualities of utterances and are wrongly understood by ignorant as qualities of the sentence (sphoṭa).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Grāhyatvam grāhakatvam ca dve śaktiḥ tejaso yathā. Tathaiva sarvaśabdānāmete pṛthagavasthite. VP, 1/55.*
2. *Artharūpam tathā śabde svarūpam ca prakāśate. VP, 1/50.*
3. *Na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte. Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāṣate. VP, 1/123.*
4. *Rk Pratisākhya, 2/1, and Pada Prakṛti Samhitā: Nirukta, 1'17.*
5. *Padaprakṛtibhāvaśca vṛttibhedena varṇyate. Padānām sanhitā yoniḥ sanhitā vā padāśrayā. VP, 2/58. Padāmnāyaśca yadyanyaḥ sanhitāyā nidarśakaḥ, nityastatra katham kāryam padam lakṣaṇadarśanāta. Ibid., 2/59.*
6. *Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/58.*
7. *Gauḥ iti kaḥ śabdaḥ? Gakāraukāravisaṛjanīyaḥ teṣāmeva vācakatva. Śābarabhāṣya on Jaimini sūtrā, 1/1.*
8. *Upāyāḥ śikṣamānānām bālānāmapalāpanāḥ Asatye vartamani sthitvā tataḥ satyam samīhate. VP, 2/238.*
9. *Ākhyātaśabdaḥ sanghāto jātiḥ saṅghātavartini. Eko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ krarmobuddhyanusanhṛtiḥ, Padamādyam pṛthak sarva padam sākāṅkṣamityapi. vākyam prati matirbhinnā bahudhā nyāyavādinām. VP, 2/1-2.*
10. *Vārttika on Aṣṭādhyāyī, 2/1.*
11. *Ākhyāta śabde niyatam sādhanam yatra gamyate. tadapyekam samāsārtham vākyamityabhidhīyate, VP, 2/326.*
12. *Ākhyātapadavācye 'rthesādhanopanibandhane. Vinā sattvābhidhānena nākāṅkṣāvinivartate, VP, 2/426. Prādhānyāttu kriyāpūrvamarthasya pravibhajyate. Sādhyaprayuktānyāṅgāni phalam tasyāḥ prayojakam. VP, 2/427.*
13. *Guṇabhāvena sākāṅkṣam tatra nāma pravartate. Sādhyatvena nimittāni kriyāpadamapekṣate. VP, 2/48.*
14. *Aśabdo yadi vākyārthaḥ padārtho' pi tathā bhavet. Evam ca sati sambandaḥśabdasyārthena hīyate. VP, 2/16.*
15. *Yathākṣepaviśeṣe' pi karmabhedo na gṛhyate. Āvṛttau vyajyate jātiḥ karmabhirbhramaṇādibhiḥ. VP, 2/20.*
16. *Santa eva viśeṣa ye padārtheṣu vyavasthitāḥ. Te kramādanugamyante na vākyamabhidhāyakam. VP, 2/49 and Varṇānām ca padānām ca kramāmatranivesīnī padākhyā vākyasanjñā ca.' VP, 2/52.*

17. *Ślokavārttika*, Vyādhikaraṇa, śloka 55.
18. *Śabdānām kramamātre ca nānyaḥ śabdo'sti vācakaḥ. Kramo hi dharmāḥ kālasya tena vākyam na vidyate*, VP, 2/50.
19. *Śabdatvam neṣyate tayoḥ*, VP, 2/52. Also, Puṇyārāja on VP, 2/16.
20. *Viśeṣa śabdāḥ keśancitsāmānyapratirūpakāḥ. śabdānatarbhisambandhād vyajyante pratipattiṣu*, VP, 2/17. Also *Teṣām tukṛtsno vākyārthaḥ pratibhedam samāpyate, Vyaktopavyanjanā siddhirarthasya pratipattiṣu*, VP, 2/18.
21. VP, 2/47.
22. *Vākyam ca pṛthak sarvapadam. Dvadaśāraṇayacakra*, p. 426.
23. VP, 2/48 and Puṇyārāja's commentary on it.
24. *Yathaika eva sarvārtha pratyayaḥ pravibhajyate. dṛśyabhedānukareṇa vākyārthānugamastathā*. VP, 2/7.
25. *Śabdasya na vibhāgo'sti*, VP, 2/13.
26. *Brāhmanārtho yathā nāsti kaścid brāhmaṇakambale. Deodattādayo vākye tathaiva syuranarthakāḥ*, VP, 2/14. Also, Puṇyārāja's commentary on it.
27. *Vākyārthānugamastathetyanena hi vākyavākyarthayorakhaṇḍatvam pānakarasamayūrāṇḍa rasacitrarūpanarasinḥagavayacitrajñānavat samānamevetyucyate*, Puṇyārāja on VP, 2/7.
28. *Nyāya Manjarī*, vol 11, pp. 352-53.
29. Puṇyārāja on VP, 2/13.
30. *Yadantaḥśabdatdttvam tu nādairekam prakāśitam tadāhurapare śabdam tasya vākye tathaikatā*, VP, 2/30. See, also Puṇyārāja on VP, 2/29.
31. VP, 1/55.
32. *Viśayatvamanāpannair śabdairnārthaḥ prakāśyate. Na Sattayaiva te'rthānām agrhītāḥ prakāśakāḥ*. VP, 1/56 and Also *Ato'nirjñātarūpatvātkimāhet-yabhidhiyate. Nendriyāṇām Prakāśye'rthe svarūpamgrhyate tathā*. VP, 1/57.
33. *Vārttika on Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 8/1/28.
34. *Tināntāntarayukteṣu yuktayukteṣu vā punaḥ. Mrgaḥ paśyata yātīti bhedābhedau na tiṣṭhataḥ*. VP, 2/444.
35. VP, 2/442.
36. VP, 2/64-71.
37. *Jaimini sūtra*, 3/314.
38. Puṇyārāja on VP, 2/76.

39. Ibid., 2/77.
40. Puṇyārāja on VP, 2/94.
41. VP, 2/90.
42. *Tathā pikādiyogena vākye'tyantavilakṣaṇe. Sadṛśāyevasanjñānam sato'rthasya manyate*, VP, 2/92.
43. Puṇyārāja on VP, 2/92
44. *Eka padārtha sandehe sakalamevājñātam vākyamityucyate*, Puṇyārāja on VP, 2/92.
45. *For a more detailed discussion on this, see D.N. Tiwari, 'Bhartṛhari on Single Word Expressions and Subordinate Sentences', Indian Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXIV, no.2, pp. 197-217, 1997.*
46. Puṇyārāja on VP, 2/96-97.
47. *Rūpanāśe padānām syāt katham cāvadhikalpanā Agṛhītāvadhaḥ śabde katham cārtho vivicyate*. VP, 2/95.
48. Puṇyārāja on VP, 95-96.
49. VP, 2/117.

CHAPTER-IV

THE CONCEPT OF SENTENTIAL-MEANING (VĀKYĀRTHA)

The aim of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language is to explain communication. The fact that communication is accomplished by sentential-meaning is accepted by all popular Indian theories dealing with the philosophy of meaning i.e. semantics. However, on the concept of sentences and also on the very general meaning of it (*vākyārtha*), they differ a lot. In the previous chapter, Bhartṛhari's concept of sentence as the inner, indivisible and meaning-revealing unit of communication has been discussed in depth. This chapter discusses Bhartṛhari's arguments on the controversy between the word-meaning-theory of the constructionists (*padārthavāda*) and the holists' theory of sentential-meaning (*vākyārthavāda*), so as to conclude a clear conception of his theory of sentential-meaning.

On the problem of very general meaning of sentence, Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* has put almost all theories popular at his time, and has analyzed them to show how the theories have not only a natural urge towards, but also culminate in the indivisibility theory of meaning (*pratibhā-vākyārtha*).

Bhartṛhari is a sentential-holist and has established the theory of sentential-meaning as an indivisible unit, by refuting the constructionists' theory. He has also raised a host of objections to holists' theory, on behalf of the constructionists, has refuted them and has established sentential-meaning as *pratibhā* (indivisible flash). By constructionists we mean those who deny the independent being of the sentence and try to interpret sentential-meaning only on the basis of word-meaning (*padārthas*). Bhartṛhari has mentioned at least five types of such theories, has critically examined them and has proved them to be insufficient in explaining sentential-meaning as it figures in the mind through language.

These five types of constructionist theories of sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*) criticized and refuted by Bhartṛhari, as put across by Puṇyarāja¹ are:

1. *Sansarga*—association or relation of word-meanings (VP, 2/42, 2/55, 2/416, 2/428).
2. *Nirākāṅkṣa padārtha*—word-meanings reposed for fulfilling expectancy for the completion of a sense (VP, 2/416).
3. *Prayojana*—purport or intention (VP, 2/113).
4. *Sansṛṣṭa*—mutually related word-meaning (VP, 2/418).
5. *Kriyā*—word-meaning causing an imperative to do or not to do a certain action (VP, 2/326).

These five types of sentential-meaning are different theories of *padavādins* broadly grouped by Puṇyārāja as *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhānavāda* according to their construction of sentential-meaning in terms of 'expression precedes relation' and 'relation precedes expression', respectively. Theories 1, 2 and 3 are based on describing sentential-meaning by assuming 'expression precedes relation', while the latter two believe in 'relation precedes expression'. As the nature of relation varies and is not determined in any of the cases of 'expression precedes relation' on 'relation precedes expression', Bhartṛhari has refuted their views. For him², there is no part in meaning, which is an indivisible unit, and is awareness. Meaning is not a syntactical but semantic unit of the nature of awareness. As there is no possibility of real division in awareness, he propounds a different theory of sentence-meaning, which, in his own terminology, is *Pratibhā-vākyārtha*. *Pratibhā* (the flash revealed language in the mind) is not constructed but given ubiquitously and is revealed non-differently by language in the mind.³ It is not the mind or intellect, because he does not see it as an ontological entity but as cognitive-being or a complete meaning of awareness, which according to him is sentential-meaning.

It is obvious that the controversy between constructionists (*padavādins*) and holists (*ākhaḍavākyārthavādins*) is the concern of Bhartṛhari's discussions in *Vākyapadīya*. Though he has not used the terms *abhihitānvayavāda* or *anvitābhīdhānavāda*, he is seen well aware of the different types of theories popular at his time. Even Puṇyārāja's grouping of constructionist theories into *abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhānavāda* was after Kumārila and Prabhākara's controversy.

Punyarāja has analytically criticized these theories for a proper theory of sentential-meaning. He has simply analyzed them to observe how far different theories are successful in interpreting the indivisible sentential-meaning. To my observation, these theories of the constructionists have also been given due importance by grammarians in interpreting sentential-meaning. It may be concluded that the theory 'expression precedes relation' is proper from the point of view of teaching sentential-meaning to children and the ignorant, the theory 'relation precedes expression' is convincing from the point of view of the interpretation of the purpose of the expression and of figurative meaning, and Bhartṛhari's theory of indivisibility of sentential-meaning (*pratibhā*) is justified from the point of view of cognition satiating further expectancy for the completion of a unit meaning and that of accomplishment of communication without any performance of relating word-meanings or thinking about relations. The number and kinds of words, their meanings and their association are not significant for this view of sentential-meaning, nor are its size or shape. The only significant matter of fact for this theory is the revelation of a unit or complete meaning extinguishing further expectancy involved in the completion of meaning. This is why he has succeeded in interpreting even a single word as a complete sentence, if a complete sentential-meaning is expressed, and also a large number of apparent sentences as no different from words, if complete meaning is not expressed by them. The *Mahābhārata* or *Rāmāyana* is a single sentence conveying a complete sentential-meaning. Sentential-meaning, for him, is the indivisible flash (*pratibhā*), and the different theories of *abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhānavāda* are useful for those who cannot understand it otherwise.⁴

In brief, the controversy between *abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhānavāda* is not significant for Bhartṛhari, as he is not a constructionist (*padavādins*) but a sententialist holist. Meaning, for him, is more than a semantic unit in its popular use. He is well aware of at least five kinds of constructionist theories of sentential-meaning. His theory is different from other sententialists who interpret sentential-meaning as a meaning different from the meaning of a sentence. Meaning, for him, is a cognitive-being, and thus his concern is not only with the controversy among the constructionists or *padavādins* (including *abhihitānvayavādins* and *anvitābhīdhānavādins*), but between them and the sentential-holists. His concern are those who accept a semantic unit different from a syntactic unit and those who

take a semantic unit as a synthetic unity, and those who take it as a cognitive being non-differently revealed by language ubiquitously given in the mind.

Before coming to the discussion on the concept of sentential-meaning, it is necessary to mention that a theorist's interpretation of a concept is inevitably related with his assumption regarding convention. It can undoubtedly be said that the differences of looking at sentential-meaning differently are also based on the differences in the assumptions regarding convention. The role of convention in communication is highly applauded by some Indian and western philosophers of language. Wittgenstein accepted convention as the meaning of words and sentence. Scholars of philosophy of language always quote his line 'don't ask for meaning, ask for the use'. For Wittgenstein, the meaning of an expression is convention, or how the word or expression is used in various contexts. Bhartṛhari's, conception of role of convention in language communication is however quite different from that of Wittgenstein. For him, convention is neither the meaning of a word or a sentence, nor does it produce the meaning of a word or a sentence. Meaning for Bhartṛhari, is always a meaning of language, which is naturally fit for conveying a number of meaning (*sarve sarvātha vācakāḥ*): He opines that convention or observation of the use of words for a certain meaning only specifies the use of the word, or it delimits a meaning out of different meanings conveyed by a word in a sentence. Convention functions as a regulative or a restrainer to the fitness of the word to a certain meaning, but the meaning, in every case, is the meaning of a word or a sentence.⁵ The observation of the uses of an expression specifies only the meaning conveyed popularly or unpopularly by it. In other words, convention specifies that the expression, or the words in the expression retain the popular/unpopular meaning, out of the various meanings likely to be expressed by that word or expression. Thus, convention for Bhartṛhari is instrumental in restraining the fitness of the word on the basis of which a fixed meaning is known by a fixed word. The concept of fitness of language as relation between language and meaning will be discussed in Chapter VIII.

Whether convention is observed with words or with the sentence, is a central problem of Indian philosophy of language, the solution of which gives rise to various theories of language in general and in Indian semantics. The differences of *abhihitānvayavādins*,

anvitābhīdhānavādins and *akhaḍavākyaṛthavādins* are essentially rooted in their different views regarding convention. For *abhihitānvayavādins*, what a child observes as a unit of meaning in the use by elders is a word, and, hence, they accept words as independent units. On the basis of word as the primary unit, they explain sentence and sentential-meaning as outcomes of an association of the words and word-meanings respectively. *Anvitābhīdhānavādins*, though they also assume word as the primary meaning-conveying unit, accept convention with sentential-meaning. They do not believe in the existence of the sentence independently of the word as a meaning-conveying unit. Sentential-meaning for them is not the meaning of a sentence, but of words conveying mutually related word-meanings. There is no need to accept sentence for explaining sentential-meaning.⁶ For *Vaiyākaraṇas*, communication is accomplished neither by one-to-one putting together of word meanings, nor by mutually related word-meanings, but by indivisible sentential-meaning. The expresser of the sentential-meaning is neither association of words nor the words having mutually related meanings but the indivisible sentence. On the basis of communication in day-to-day practices, Bhartṛhari elucidates that convention is with the indivisible sentences, which is the indivisible expresser of the indivisible unit of communication, i.e. sentential-meaning.⁷ We now proceed to an in-depth analysis and evaluation of the different Indian constructionist theories of sentential-meaning as discussed by Bhartṛhari and his commentators.

(i) THEORY OF EXPRESSION PROCEEDS RELATION (ABHIHITĀNVAYAVĀDA) AND OF SENTENTIAL-MEANING (VĀKYĀRTHA)

For a group of *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Naiyāyikas* who consider word (*pada*) as a meaning-conveying unit, sentential-meaning is nothing but an association of meaning of words expressed in a syntactical structure. For them, first the words express their independent meaning and, then, by expectancy, proximity and compatibility the word meanings are associated, and they call that association sentential-meaning. The act (*vyāpāra*) of getting together of word-meanings results (*phala*) in sentential-meaning, which is a newly emerged meaning over and above the meaning of the words. These theorists do not accept sentence and sentential-meaning as an independent unit of communication. For them,

there is no sentence separate from association of words, and there is no sentential-meaning separate from word-meanings. Sentential-meaning, for these theorists in general, is not an expressed (*vācyārtha*). They distinguish sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*) from expressive-meaning (*vācyārtha*). Expressive meaning, for them, is the meaning of words because words are the only expressive units. How do they explain sentential-meaning, is a question on which different *abhihitānvayavādins* reflect differently. An attempt is being made to discuss the theories that fall under this group, in the light of the forms analyzed by Bhartṛhari and his commentator Puṇyarāja.

1. Association of Word-meanings as Sentential meaning (Sansargavākyārtha)

This is a popular form of *abhihitānvayavāda* frequently referred to by Bhartṛhari in the context of interpreting rival theories on sentential-meaning. According to *sansargavādin's* interpretation '*abhihitām padārthānām anvayaḥ vākyārthaḥ*' the meaning expressed by words (in an expression) are cognized first and, then, such known word-meanings are connected together by expectancy, etc. This connection or association of word-meanings (*sansarga padārthas*) is sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*).⁸ If sentential-meaning is neither the expressive-meaning of a sentence nor the expressed of words connected, nor even the meaning of words, how then is it known as meaning at all? For the theorists, sentential-meaning is suggested when different word-meanings, as resurrected in memory, are associated together by expectancy, etc. The theorists do not feel any need for accepting sentence as an independent expresser for explaining sentential-meaning. The words independently express universals, and when these universals are associated in memory, sentential-meaning, which is individual (over and above the meaning or words), is cognized and is known as one that emerges out of association.⁹ For example,¹⁰ the meaning expressed by the word '*vīraḥ*' is 'brave', a universal-quality, and that by the word '*puruṣaḥ*' is man, a universal-noun (*puruṣattva*). However, when these words are expressed in a particular form, the two concepts, '*vīra*' and '*puruṣa*' are connected as qualifier-qualified for an individual, meaning 'a brave man', which stands as a common base (*samānādhikāraṇa*) of the meanings of the words '*vīraḥ*' and '*puruṣaḥ*'. For this theory, the word disappear, after expressing their

independent meanings, but their meanings, as resurrected in memory, are associated, and this association is the sentential-meaning. The expressive-meanings in this theory are the meanings of words and it is not the relation of words but the association of word meanings (*padārthas*) by expectancy, etc., that is called sentential-meaning (*sansargārtha*).¹¹ Sentential-meaning, as *Kumārila Mīmāṃsakas* say, is known by secondary signification (*lakṣaṇā*) of the words, and factors like expectancy, etc. are only instrumental in associating them. *Naiyāyikas*, who do not accept *lakṣaṇā* for explaining association as sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*), object to the *Mīmāṃsaka*'s theory of secondary signification for interpreting sentential-meaning. According to them, if the cognition of association by secondary force is accepted, then sentential-meanings will be figurative (*lakṣyārtha*) and, then, it will not be accepted as authority (*pramāṇa*). Sentential-meaning for them, is the word-meanings connected together by factors like expectancy, etc. However, association (*sansarga*), for both of the schools, is sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*) and is known as association after the cognition of the expressive-meaning (*vācyārtha*) of words (expression precedes association). They do not accept sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*) as expressive-meaning (*vācyārtha*), either of a word or of a sentence, except as an outcome of the association of word-meanings.

2. *Word Meaning Satiating expectancy for completion of a unit meaning as sentential meaning (Nirākāṅkṣapadārthavākyārtha)*

Sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*) is the word-meaning (*padārtha*) satisfying expectancy involved in the cognition of a complete unit meaning. The word-meaning, if qualified by other meanings, is reposed for an individual meaning when, by expectancy, it is connected with the meanings of other words of the expression. This reposed word-meaning is sentential-meaning. *Sansargavādins* take association (*sansarga*) as sentential meaning, while the theorists under consideration do not take association but the meaning of words reposed for an individual meaning as sentential-meaning.¹² For example, the words 'Rāmaḥ' and 'gacchati' in the expression 'Rāmaḥ gacchati' (Rāma goes) express their own meanings (universal) first and then, by expectancy for a connected meaning, the universal is reposed for an individual

meaning (*viśeṣaviśrāntārtha*). The meaning reposed for a culminated meaning is sentential-meaning (*viśeṣaviśrāntārtha*). A number of actions may be expected from the agent (*Ramaḥ*), but, when connected with the action '*gacchati*', the expectancy for action is removed. Similarly, any agent expects the 'action' '*gacchati*' but when connected with the agent *Rāmaḥ*, the expectancy for any other agent except *Rāmaḥ*, is removed. Thus, the word-meaning that removes expectancy for a complete meaning is sentential-meaning. In other words, word-meaning, if qualified, is sentential-meaning. Word-meaning, for these theorists, is expressive-meaning (*vākyārtha*) and a qualified expressed (word-meaning) is sentential-meaning qualified by the connection of other word-meanings.

Sansargavādins do not accept word-meanings, as sentential-meaning, but this theory accepts sentential-meaning as word-meaning (*padārtha*) reposed for an individual meaning. In *sansargavādins'* theory, word-meanings are mutually expected, while in *nirākāṅkṣapadārthavākyārthavāda*, there is extinction of expectancy for a qualified meaning when word-meanings are reposed for individual meaning that is known not by expectancy but by inference.¹³

3. Purport or Intention as Sentential Meaning (*Prayojanavākyārtha*)

For this form of *abhihitānvayavāda*, word-meaning (*padārtha*) is expressive-meaning, and the meaning of a sentence is the purpose involved in the use of words (*Abhidheyḥ padasyārtho vākyasyārthaḥ prayojanam*).¹⁴ Clarifying the purpose theory of sentential-meaning the *Ambākarī Tīkā* of Raghu Nath Sharma¹⁵ gives the example of the expression '*Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ*'. The expressive-meaning of the word '*gangāyām*' is 'on the river Ganges', and the meaning of the word '*ghoṣaḥ*' is residence. The expressive meanings of the words are cognized first. As a 'stream of water' cannot be the substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) of the residence of a family, the purport of the expression reveals the meaning of the word *gangāyām* connected with *ghoṣaḥ* as the 'residence on the bank of the stream of water' (*gāṅgātāṭe*). Thus, for this theory, the intention of the speaker involved in using the words is sentential-meaning, which is known neither by expectancy nor by inference, but by the purpose involved in the use of the expression.¹⁶

Had the intention or purpose of the speaker been otherwise, the word *ghoṣaḥ* could mean 'boat' or 'fish'. In brief, this theory assumes that words express their independent meanings by their natural power (*abhidhā-śakti*) and their connection (*sansargārtha*) is known by the cognition of the intention of the speaker involved in the use of the word for communicating meaning. If we accept sentential-meaning as the intention of the speaker, the question concerning the role of words for such meanings, arises. How is the intended meaning known by words? Kumārila in *Tantravārttika* accepts that the sentential-meaning (*prayojanārtha*) is known by the secondary power of the words (*lakṣaṇa*). For *Naiyāyikas*, it is the intended meaning to be known through the word-meanings associated with the help of factors like expectancy, compatibility, proximity, etc. *Vaiyākaraṇas* think that sentential-meaning, if accepted as secondary-meaning, will not be a source of veridical knowledge. Rather, all verbal knowledge, in that case, will be memory or inference if sentential-meaning is accepted as the secondary meaning known by the secondary force of the words.

Māhima-Bhaṭṭa in his famous work *Vyaktiviveka* has rejected secondary force (*lakṣaṇā*) as the cause of the cognition of sentential-meaning and has accepted that sentential-meaning that is the intended meaning of the words used in a syntactical structure is known not by secondary force but by inference. Sentential-meaning is not always a figurative meaning though it may, in cases of imposition of primary meaning on other meanings, be figurative. If we accept it as figurative, it will not function as authority (*pramāṇa*), but if we accept that a sentential-meaning (purpose) is known by inference or is inferred by the meanings of the words cognized first, then there will be neither a need for secondary force (*lakṣaṇā*) for interpreting it, nor any occasion for doubting its authority.

Now, on the basis of the exposition of the different forms of *abhihitānvayavāda*, we can say that all the forms discussed above admit, in some way or the other, that sentential-meaning is not an expressed one. Expressed-meaning for *sansargavādins* is the association of word-meaning, for *nirākāṅkṣapadārthavākyārthavādins*, it is the reposed meaning of words that satiates expectancy for an individual meaning, and, for *prayojanavādins*, it is the purpose lying in using the expression (words) and is known by secondary force (in case of Kumārila) or by inference (for the *Naiyāyikas*, sentential-meaning is inferred on the

basis of the word-meanings). They are all grouped as *abhihitānvayavāda* because they, in general, accept that words are independently expressers and their expressed (meanings) are known first, and then they are associated for a particular meaning; that is they believe in 'expression precedes relation'. They differ on the issue of the cognition of association, which for them is sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*). Sentential-meaning, for *sansargavādins*, is known by recollection as the association of word-meanings as resurrected in memory, while for *nirākāṅkṣavākyārthavādins*, it is known by expectancy for the completion of meaning. Again, for *prayojanavādins*, it is known by secondary force (*lakṣaṇā*) in the case of *Mīmāṃsakas*, and by inference in the case of *Naiyāyikas*.

An Examination of the Abhihitānvayavāda

Abhihitānvayavāda seems right from the aspect of teaching language to a child. A sentence is taught as a construction by a set of words used in a syntactical order, and so a sentential-meaning is an outcome of an association of different word-meanings related as qualifier-qualified. However, this stand becomes untenable, if observed from the point of view of convention and accomplishment of communication by language. Convention is communication-oriented and communication is accomplished by the sentence as a whole unit without a separate awareness of parts, letters, words, etc. As a complete unit of communication, it is sentential-meaning which is known independently of the meaning of the words.¹⁷ As *abhihitānvayavādins* accept word as an independent unit of language, their theory goes against the fact of convention and cognition by language in communication as well.¹⁸ This theory also involves serious logical problems. If it is accepted that the word-meanings are independently cognized first, and their connection is known only afterwards by memory, questions regarding the verity of verbal-cognition and the existence of an independent expresser of the complete sentential-meaning, naturally arise. What is the ground of connection? Is connection known by another sentence or word additional to those uttered previously? Are they connected one-to-one by the mind of the hearer? As no other sentence, apart from what has been uttered previously, is uttered, the first alternative is not possible. The word which is uttered cannot be the ground for the cognition of connection, which is not uttered.¹⁹ If mind as connector of word-meanings is accepted as

sentential-meaning, then sentential-meaning will be the construction of the mind, and, hence, it will not be logically sound to view sentential-meaning as a construction out of word-meanings. The assumption of *abhihitānvayavāda* that words express universals and universals, when connected, are reposed for individual-meaning, is not logically justified because it does not admit relation between the word-meanings.²⁰ How can a word fixed for a universal convey the individual? If it is said that universals (meanings) are removed when they stand for the individual, how can they be perceived if removed? There is no evidence for accepting their theory that universals are reposed for an individual. There is no justification in accepting that a word abandons its meaning when connected with the meanings of other words for sentential-meaning. Question also arises regarding the disappeared word-meaning. If sentential-meaning, over and above the meaning expressed by words, is accepted or if it is accepted as a meaning without word, then on the basis of the same logic it can be said that word-meanings like sentential-meaning are also meanings without the word.²¹ In order to avoid the problem of meanings without words, it is said that sentential-meaning is a syntactical or logical connection between the words expressed in a sequence (and not the meaning of words themselves that suggests sentential-meaning), then it has to be accepted that the meaning of the sentence is mutually connected words, which may go against the fundamental position of *abhihitānvayavāda*.²² If sentential-meaning as association (*sansarga*) is explained on the ground 'expression precedes relation', then the question of associating word-meanings as sentential-meaning does not arise. If a sentence is accepted as the association of words in a syntactical rule, and words as the collection of letters, then the question regarding the meaning of a word as the association of meanings of letters arises. As constructionists themselves deny the expressiveness of discrete letters, the meaning of words cannot possibly be explained by the same logic.²³ This may lead to an absurd position of atomism on the basis of which words will not be explained as the real independent meaning conveying unit. A problem may naturally arise—whether association (*sansarga*) is the relation of words or of letters or of their meanings. How can connection, which is non-verbal, be taken as meaning, if meaning is always a meaning of language?

In order to maintain the position that words are an independent expresser in a sentence, and that word-meaning is sentential-meaning, *nirākāṅkṣapadārthavādins* say that, even in a synthesized structure,

words and word-meanings have independent existence, though this position is also not sound. Just as, even in writing, we know the meaning of a word without yet being certain of its alphabetical composition, similarly, a sentence and sentential-meaning are an indivisible whole, and the mind of a learner proceeds thus in the first stage of understanding.²⁴ As we have seen earlier, the difference between *sansarga vākyārtha* and *nirākāṅkṣavākyārtha* is that for the former word-meaning is not sentential-meaning, while for the latter sentential-meaning is reposed word-meaning. However, both theories deny sentence as an independent expresser (*vācaka*) and sentential-meaning as its independent expressed (*vācya*). Now, it can be asked²⁵ if the word, independently, expresses word-meaning and, as the expressed (word-meaning), is not qualified as individual sentential-meaning, how can the reposed word-meaning of the word be accepted as a certain qualified meaning, i.e. sentential-meaning? How can there be any expectancy for associating independent word-meaning if word-meaning retiring expectancy is sentential-meaning? It is not determined as to, with whom it will be associated. Thus, the theory fails to interpret the fundamental questions regarding association of word-meanings of *abhihitānvayavāda*.

The assumption of the *prajñānavādi-abhihitānvayavādin*s that words express their independent meanings, and the sentential-meaning is known by the cognition of the intention of the speaker involved in speaking the words, is not defective in the case where sentential-meaning is not accepted as expressed (*vācārtha*). For example, the word '*ghoṣaḥ*' may be used for any meanings like house, family, boat, etc., and the word '*Gangā*' may be used for a stream, the bank of the river Ganges, or a cool and sacred place; but, when the expression '*Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ*' is used, its meaning 'the village on the bank of the Ganges, is known as the meaning of the complete sentence. This meaning if taken as the purpose involved in the use of the words '*Gangāyām*' and '*ghoṣaḥ*', then it will be difficult to determine the nature of the relation between the two.²⁶ The meaning, then, will not be the meaning of the words, independently or collectively, and then it may be a figurative meaning and that will not serve as authority (*pramāṇa*), because, the meaning which is revealed immediately by word can only be accepted as veritable, and hence authentic. If sentential-meaning independent of word-meaning is not accepted (*vācya*), it will be difficult to relate different related sentences by

expectancy. For example, only with sentential-meaning as expressive meaning (*vācyārtha*), the sentences *Rāmaḥ vidyālayam gacchati* (Rāma goes to school) *Ten kim?* (So what?) *Tvamihānīyatām* (You, please, bring him here) can be synthesized by expectancy. Communication, by these sentences, cannot be accomplished if they are not expected as related by their expressiveness.²⁷ For *abhihitānvayavādins* sentential-meaning is not known by the expressive power of a sentence, because only a word and not a sentence is expressive. Sentential-meaning is a collection of word-meanings as resurrected in memory. Thus, sentential-meaning, for them, is cognized not by word or sentence (*śabda*), but by memory. Sentential-meaning as memory is unacceptable not only to Bhartṛhari, but also to *Naiyāyikas* and *Mīmāṃsakas*. If it is otherwise, they will fail to explain the authority (*āptatva*) of expressions. If sentential-meaning is accepted as cognition by expectancy as *nirākāṅkṣapadārthavādins* accept, what will then serve as the cause of the expectancy in the absence of sentence as a complete meaning-revealing unit? Not only that, there will be no ground for the incentive to expectancy if sentence as expresser of sentential-meaning is not accepted as existing priorly. Expectancy is satiated not by word-meaning but by sentential or complete-meaning. To accept that it is expectancy that operates for the sentential-meaning is to reject the power of the expresser (*śabda*) for the cognition of sentential-meaning,²⁸ and, lastly, the theory of cognition of a meaning (sentential) without a sentence will be an unfounded theory.

In order to meet the problem of sentential cognition, *prayojanavādins* assume that word-meanings are known by the expressive power of the words themselves, and sentential-meaning is known by *tātparya* or *prayojana* (intention) involved in speaking. Their theory is also not sound because intention, like association, is not known by words themselves, but by inference.²⁹ In brief, *abhihitānvayavādins* are bound to accept sentential-meaning as figurative if they reject the existence of unitary sentence as expresser of a sentential-meaning. It would be worse for them to accept the implications of intention, as mentioned above.

(ii) THEORY OF RELATION PRECEDES EXPRESSION (ANVITĀBHIDHĀNAVĀDA)

Like *abhihitānvayavādins*, this theory also assumes word as an independent unit or expresser of meaning, but unlike them, this theory

presumes that a word does not express a discrete meaning of its own, but a related word-meaning. In this theory, it is held that although words have their own independent meanings, yet when they are used for communication, they express a related meaning, which for them is sentential-meaning. The theory 'association precedes expression' is quite the opposite of 'expression precedes association'. For the former, association is not an outcome of a mental exercise or an inference made on the basis of the expressed (word-meanings as resurrected in memory), but is conventionally given. Convention is founded on words expressing mutually connected meanings, which is sentential-meaning.³⁰ Thus, sentential-meaning to this view is the expressive-meaning of the word. The theorists do not make a distinction between sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*) and expressed meaning (*vāc्यārtha*). They do not accept sentential-meaning as the meaning of a sentence as an independent unit of language.³¹

In order to clarify the position of their theory, *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsasakas* give the example of a child learning a language. A child perceives the words uttered and the consequent activities performed by his elders and thus learns the use of language. The child hears the sentence 'gāmānaya' (bring the cow) uttered by his elder and observes consequent activities performed by the elders and, thus, learns the meaning of the expression as an imperative to carry out the activity of bringing the cow. In other words, he understands that the whole expression (*gāmānaya*) expresses the whole of the expressed (an imperative to bring the cow). Similarly, he understands other expressions like 'bring the horse', 'bring the book', etc., and that the meanings of the word 'bring' is common to all the above expressions. He understands that the meaning of a word is cognized as related with something to be done or not to be done (*kriyā*).³² It is noteworthy here to say that Bhartṛhari does not believe in the existence of common-parts of an object of cognition by language. The word 'bring' in the expression 'bring a horse' is independent from the word 'bring' used in the expression 'bring a book' because of the differences of sentential-meaning and ultimately all the expressions are independent to each other, as they express their own meanings independently.

Forms of Anvitābhīdhānavāda

Word-meaning theorists, who define sentence as 'ākhyātaḥ śabdaḥ' (the verb expressing the action to do or not to do is a sentence) on the

one hand, and *padamādyam* (the beginning-word expressing the mutually related meaning of an expression is a sentence) on the other, explain sentential-meaning as mutually connected word-meaning. For the former, verbal-noises express mutually related meaning and, thus, their theory of meaning is, action denoted by the verb, expressive of a mutually related meaning, is sentential-meaning (*kriyā vākyārtha*). For the latter, the beginning-word expresses connected meaning and, thus their theory is known as mutually related word-meaning as sentential-meaning (*sansṛṣṭa-vākyārtha*). Both these theories will be discussed, in detail, after a few steps, but before that it is desirable to clarify the differences between *sansṛṣṭa-vākyārtha* and *sansarga-vākyārtha*. The difference between the two is: *Sansargavākyārthavāda* accepts sentential-meaning as a meaning over and above the meaning expressed by words, while for *sansṛṣṭavākyārthavāda*, sentential-meaning is a related meaning expressed by the principal word, which is the expression in their view. For the former, sentential-meaning is not the expressed meaning, while for the latter, it is the expressed meaning. Both of them accept sentential-meaning as a qualified meaning. For the former, this qualified meaning emerges out of association of word-meanings, while for the latter words express a mutually related meaning. One thing that is common to all the Indian theories of meaning is that they accept that communication is accomplished by sentential-meaning and not by word-meaning, though all other theorists, except *Vaiyākaraṇas*, deny sentence as expresser (*vācaka*) of the sentential-meaning. We now come to the exposition of the two forms of this theory, as analyzed by commentator Puṇyarāja.

1. *Mutually Related Word Meanings (Sansṛṣṭavākyārtha)*

This theory is based on the assumption that word-meanings, mutually related, are conventionally given (relation precedes expression). An expression is always an expression of mutually related meanings and is defined by the theorists as the beginning word (*ādyapadam*), which is the primary or central word of a set of words used in a syntactical rule. The beginning word spoken conveys the given association of word-meanings and this connected meaning conveyed by that word (*ādyampadam* or *pṛthakasarvapadamsākāṅkṣam*) is defined by these theorists as sentential-meaning.³³ The word expresses connected meaning (*vākyārtha*) and, hence, sentential-meaning is

expressed meaning of the word (*itaṛānvitaḥ padaḥ arthabodhakaḥ*). For example, the speaker speaks the word 'door' for the meaning 'shut the door' or 'open the door' and the listener cognizes the meaning 'shut the door' or 'open the door' only by the word 'door' spoken. This shows that the speaker speaks the word conveying a related meaning and listener understands the same if he hears the word. Even if the speaker speaks the complete sentence '*dvārapidhehi*' (shut the door), the hearer knows the whole meaning (shut the door) only by the word '*dvāram*' (door) because the beginning word '*dvāram*', being the central word of the expression, expresses a qualified meaning, i.e. sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*). The uttering of '*pidhehi*' (shut) after uttering the word '*dvāram*' ascertains or translates the meaning known by the word '*dvāram*'.³⁴

The nominal word, for *Naiyāyikas*, is the principal word in a sentence, and when it is uttered, it expresses an agent (*kartā*), the individual (substance), universal, an action, an object, number, person and gender. For example, when the word '*Ramaḥ*' in an expression '*Rāmaḥ paṭhati pustakam*' (*Rāma* reads a book) is uttered, it expresses an agent of the action '*paṭhati*', an individual which is one in number, masculine gender, first person and, thus, the whole specified or related meaning (*vākyārtha*) is known only by the nominal word '*Rāmaḥ*'. Thus, the beginning word, for the theorists is a principal word and is expressive of mutually related meaning, that is sentential-meaning. The expression 'bring the cow' (*gāmānaya*) does not mean the relation of the meanings of 'cow' (*gām*) and 'bring' (*ānaya*) related together by expectancy, but a mutually associated meaning '*gāmānaya*' (bring the cow), that is the association given before speaking. Mutual relation for this theory is not known by inference or by memory, but is given as expressive power of the word and the connected denotation expressed by the beginning or principal word is sentential-meaning.

2. Action/Imperative to do or not to do (*Kriyāvākyārtha*)

In this theory, an action is sentential-meaning and is expressed by the verb (*ākhyāta*). The theory explains sentential-meaning from the point of view of an incentive to do or not to do (*pravṛtti-nirvṛtti*) an actoin caused by an expression. As action is expressed by the verb, the exponents of this theory define it as sentence and action expressed by

the verb as sentential-meaning. An action is a specified meaning, because the verb expressive of action also expresses an agent (because no action without an agent is possible), an object (because action is inevitably associated by an accusation), time (an action takes place in a time on the basis of which present, past and future of the action is known), number (the action performed is specified as singular, plural, etc.) and a person (on the basis of which the person of the action is known). As the verb expresses a connected denotation or qualified meaning, they take it as expresser of sentential-meaning.³⁵ The theorists explain the expression '*Rāmaḥ taṇḍulam pacati*' (*Rāma* cooks rice), by saying that the verb '*pacati*' itself expresses the connected meaning (of the other words – *Rāmaḥ* = agent and *taṇḍulam* = object). Words other than the verb are only instrumental in the ascertainment of the related meanings already expressed by the verb and their meaning being related with the action are also known by the application of the verb alone.³⁶

According to Bhartṛhari's exposition of this theory, the means and accessories of an action to be expressed by verb are fixed, and that is why they are also cognized only by the application of the verb. He writes, '*kriyā kriyāntarādbhinnā niyatādhāra sādhanā. Prakṛānatā pratipatṛṇām bhedāḥ sambodha hetavaḥ*'.³⁷ It means, an action is of a non-accomplished character and is different from other actions. It is always observed with a substratum/location (*ādhāra*) and the substratum of an action is called abode (*adhikaraṇa*). An action is performed by a fixed means (*sādhana*). Thus, the related meaning-agent, accessory, number, time, person of an action known by the verb is sentential-meaning, which can be interpreted in terms of the incentive to do or not do an action caused by the cognition revealed in the mind of a hearer by the expression.

An Examination of Anvitābhīdhānavāda

Now coming to an examination of this theory, it can be said that while *abhihitānvayavādin*s lay down primary importance to the independent meaning of isolated words and assume sentential-meaning as a secondary signification emerging out of the association of independent word-meanings, *anvitābhīdhānavādin*s emphasize sentential-meaning as having the primary importance and explains words as expressive of connected meaning. It can be accounted for the merits of

anvitābhīdhānavādins that sentential-meaning, for them, is expressive-meaning and that communication is accomplished by it. However, the way they explain sentential-meaning, opens the door for many logical and cognitive problems. A brief account of the problems may be specified as follows.

To us, it does not seem legitimate that they reject the existence of sentence as construction by the association of words, while they accept sentential-meaning as connected meaning of a word. They may reject the need of accepting the concept of sentence as an expresser of the related meaning, but if a word is taken to have its own independent meaning (universal), how can it express mutually connected meaning? It is self-contradictory to accept that a word is expressive of its own meaning 'universal' (*padārtha*) but expresses an individual (*vākyaṛtha*). Two simultaneous denotations of a word is not acceptable, because cognition of two denotations is not accomplished at the same time. And, in case of their consecutive cognition, a problem arises regarding the definition of the nature of the meaning that is known afterwards. What is inferred or known by implication cannot be called denoted, but inferred, because a denotation is that which figures or which is revealed directly by the word in the mind. The assumption of connected (individual) meaning expressed only by a single word goes against their own assumption of word as a unit expressive of an independent meaning of its own. It is contradictory to accept that the verb, expressive of a non-accomplished character, expresses an accomplished character, and the union of the two as well.³⁸

The assumption of *sansṛṣṭavākyaṛthavādins* that the beginning word (*pada*) expresses the meaning of the whole sentence, is not justified, because in Sanskrit, the words in a sentence are not independent, and if their order is changed, it changes neither the sentence nor the sentential-meaning. It is difficult to determine not only the beginning word, but also the word expressive of the connected meaning. For example, '*Rāmaḥ gṛham gacchati*', '*Gacchati Rāmaḥ gṛham*' and '*gṛham gacchati Rāmaḥ*' are the same sentence, but from the point of view of the beginning word as sentence, they should be different sentences conveying different meanings. The meaning of all the beginning words cannot be considered the same, because in that case they all will be synonymous, which is not acceptable to those who

believe in the theory 'relation precedes expression'. If the notion 'the beginning word expresses sentential-meaning' is accepted, other words of the sentence will be useless and, then, it can well be asked: what is the need of the other words if the whole meaning is expressed only by the first word spoken? If the beginning word is not fixed (that a last word may also be a beginning word) is it justified to reject the expressiveness of other words? The rejection of the expressiveness of words, other than the beginning word, goes against the common-sense view also. It is not justified to accept a single-word of an expression as expressive and the other words as suggestive (*dyotaka*) at the same time. Not only that, 'if the beginning word is accepted as the expresser of connected-meaning (*anvitārtha*), cognition of a sentential-meaning must be accepted as revealed directly by that without any expectancy for hearing other words of the sentence, but this is not the case. If it is *accepted* that the beginning word expresses its meaning, which helps to cause the memory of the meaning of other words, then the connected meaning (*vākyārtha*) conveyed by the beginning word will not be an expressed but a memory, which again will not be acceptable to *anvitābhīdhānavādins*, who accept sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*) as expressed (*vācyārtha*).

While deciding sentential-meaning, it is necessary to observe that the tendency of use of words in a sentence is different.³⁹ *How can the beginning word, which for them is nominal or expressive of an accomplished character, express the meaning of a verb that has a non-accomplished character? If it is accepted that action or an incentive to an action is intended by the expression and the verb-word expresses action qualified by means and accessories, even then, the charge of associating word meanings having opposite characters assumes significance.*

These theorists aim at explaining sentential-meaning by assuming words as expressive of mutually connected meaning and centre their arguments around showing how the words express a qualified meaning, i.e. sentential-meaning (*vācyārtha*). Those who believe in the theory of 'expression precedes relation' assume that word-meaning is qualified with association by factors like expectancy, proximity, compatibility, etc., but those believing in the theory of 'relation precedes expression' seem contented with assuming words as expressive of mutually

connected denotation. To accept that the meaning of a word (*padārtha*) is sentential-meaning is to overlook the seriousness of the problem of sentential-meaning and to compute everything by the same measurement (*māpaka*). It is suggested that the explanation of complete indivisible cognition (*vākyārtha*) logically requires an indivisible expresser and the existence of sentence as a complete indivisible expresser cannot be denied. In order to throw sufficient light on the concept of sentential-meaning let us now begin with some other definitions of it.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BHĀVANĀ AND (KRIYĀ-VĀKYĀRTHA)

Mīmāṃsakas have accepted injunction for duty '*niyojya*' also as sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*). '*Niyojya*' is defined as that which charges one with action. '*Niyojya sa ca kāryaḥ svakīyatvena buddhyati*', means the accomplishment of cognition of an obligatory duty is *niyojya*. For example, meaning as '*niyojya*' is known as an obligation on the part of the person who performs the sacrifice for achieving heaven, by the sentence '*svarga kāmo yajet*'.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has explained *Bhāvanā* (thought of an action which serves as the cause or an incentive to a duty) as sentential-meaning and has considered that the meaning of both the Vedic and *laukika* sentences (used in day-to-day life) is '*bhāvanā*'. *Bhāvanā* means incentive or idea of action or effort to be performed for achieving some result, and it is expressed by the verb (*ākhyāta*) or by the verbal suffix - *tiṃ*. In more clear-cut words, *bhāvanā* is the concept (*pratyaya*) and the same is sentential-meaning. I shall not embark upon a detailed discussion here on *bhāvanā* as sentential-meaning.⁴⁰

Vaiyākaraṇas take *bhāvanā* as the meaning of verb-root (*dhātvartha*) and accept '*bhāvanā*' and '*kriyā*' as synonymous. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* writes '*vyāpārobhāvanā saivotpādanā saivo ca kriyā. kṛṇō karmakatāpāternahi yatno'rthaiṣyate*', according to which *bhāvanā* is (action) *vyāpāra* and the same is *kriyā*.⁴¹ Thus, *bhāvanā* for both, *Vaiyākaraṇas* and *Mīmāṃsakas* is action (*kriyā*).

There is a minor difference between *bhāvanā* and *kriyā*. *Bhāvanā* is always to be found as transitive, because the result to be achieved

by the action always stands there as transitive, while verb (*kriyā*) can be intransitive as well, as in the expression '*nadī aiśvate*'. In spite of the difference, *bhāvanā* in *Mīmāṃsā* and *kriyā* in *Vyākaraṇa*, both denote a non-accomplished character and hence they are held to be non-different. This is the reason why *Vārttikakāra* has felt no need to mention *bhāvanā-vākyārtha* independently of the mention of *kriyā-vākyārtha*. As neither injunction (*vidhi*) nor *niyoga* are objects of all sentences but only of those that have gender (*liṅga*), imperative mood (*loṭ*) and nominal- suffixes (*kṛtprayaya*) in the end, they are not taken as separate from *kriyā-vākyārtha*. Nonetheless, as an incentive to an action is caused by *pratibhā*, *Vaiyākaraṇas* in general and Bhartṛhari in particular, take it as sentential-meaning which is the meaning of the verb as well, since the incentive to do or not to do is caused by it.

(iii) AWARENESS OR FLASH THAT FIGURES IN THE MIND BY LANGUAGE (PRĀTIBHĀ-VĀKYĀRTHA)

Different from the views mentioned above, a sentence, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is an inner, indivisible and a real unit of awareness in nature, i.e. *sphoṭa* and a sentential-meaning is that which it reveals non-differently. A flash of awareness in the mind, for which Bhartṛhari uses the word '*pratibhā*', is sentential-meaning. Thus, *sphoṭa*, for Bhartṛhari, is real language and the meaning is a clear and a distinct flash of awareness (*sampratyaya-idea*), which is *pratibhā*,⁴² which is also indivisible, and is non-different from the expresser it reveals.

Some scholars of Bhartṛhari's philosophy interpret *pratibhā* as mind or intellect and explain sentential-meaning as an object that figures in the *pratibhā*. For them, sentential-meaning is, actually, an object of *pratibhā*, but *pratibhā* itself is ordinarily called sentential-meaning. It hardly makes any difference if that which flashes in mind is identified with mind (*pratibhā*), because even in that case sentential-meaning is emphasized as an idea or a clear and distinct flash of awareness, which Bhartṛhari accepts as *pratibhā*. Before entering into the serious discussion of *Vaiyākaraṇas*' theory of meaning as *pratibhā*, it is important to mention that '*sphoṭa*' for Bhartṛhari is sentence, and the meaning it expresses non-differently in the mind is *pratibhā*.

Pratibhā as a sentential-meaning is known as a being revealed non-differently in the mind by language (*sphoṭa*). But it in-itself can be said neither as 'this' nor, as 'that' by indication, because it is not a

perceived entity. In the absence of perception, no concomitance is possible and, hence, it cannot be inferred. The same can be said about other proofs given for it. However, it being awareness itself, cannot be denied only on the ground of its imperceptibility. As a flash or awareness revealed by *sphoṭa* in mind, it is veridical cognition. Even a rejection of it requires *pratibhā*, as a veridical cognition of that. It is *antahkaraṇa-siddha* (self-proved).

K.A. Subramania Iyer⁴³ and Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti⁴⁴ have tried to trace the different meanings for which the word *pratibhā* is used in Indian traditions. Here, we are not interested in the concept of *pratibhā* as religious-experience, or an element of poetic creative-power, poetic-imagination, intuiting faculty, intuitive-mind, *yogic prajñā*, mystical knowledge, instinct, etc. and shall confine to it as meaning directly revealed by *sphoṭa*. *Pratibhā* as the general meaning of all sentences or even words (if complete meaning is revealed by them), is cognition or awareness and non-different from *sphoṭa*. *It is only from the sense of duality that from the point of view of language (expresser) it is called an expresser (sphoṭa) and from the point of view of meaning, it is called expressed (pratibhā) but in both of the cases it is a being figured in the mind (upacāra-sattā) by the language that reveals it.*

Pratibhā as meaning is a communicable being. The same *pratibhā* is revealed and is communicated through different verbal-noises or sentence-tokens. Expressions like ‘*Rāma* reads’ ‘*Rāmaḥ paṭhati*’, and so on in different language-tokens/garbs reveal an identical conception (*pratibhā*) to the person familiar with those verbal-noises or sentence-tokens. If the ubiquity of sentence and sentential-meaning, as being revealed by language in the mind through garbs, is not accepted, how do we know that they all are the same sentence revealing the same meaning? Those who accept garbs or a set of tokens as sentence may not give a satisfactory answer to the question of identical cognition by different garbs. Even the garbs/tokens, in order to be identified themselves, require their constant content. This content is revealed a thought-object, and being ubiquitous, it is capable of being translated or rendered in different language-tokens. The question of translating garbs/tokens or verbal-noises, as they are momentary and are totally different from community to community or even person to person in

the same community, does not arise. Suppose a set of sentence-tokens from a foreign language is put before me to translate into Hindi or Sanskrit, I cannot translate the sentence, if *pratibhā* of it is not revealed, even-though, it is there before me. *Pratibhā* as sentential-meaning is always known as being/idea (*pratibhā*) revealed by language, which not only reveals it but also infuses it.

Pratibhā in Bhartṛhari's philosophy functions for an incentive to an action when it is revealed.⁴⁵ Bhartṛhari and his commentator Puṇyarāja, while dealing with incentive to a proper action or obligations caused by sentential-meaning (*pratibhā*), have given varied examples that may mislead one to compare *pratibhā* as a natural instinct to be found in insects, birds, etc., and also as training-acquired flashes including the digger's or the goldsmith's practices (*abhyāsa*). No doubt, *pratibhā* is the root cause of all the activities in living creatures concerning what they have to do or not to do because, without it (flashes in the mind), there is nothing that causes an incentive to an action. It may even be taken as the cause of the activities performed by the beings that have instinctive or even stereotyped motivation, but it cannot be identified with instinct or stereotyped motivation. In all the cases, *pratibhā*, as an incentive to an action, or as the cause of an action, is the flash revealed in the mind by *sphoṭa*, which is ubiquitously given. It has already been discussed in the previous chapters that *sphoṭa* is the inner meaning-revealing unit and is revealed when manifested by noises/tokens. In cases of living beings that do not use our verbal-noises, gestures, etc., it is manifested by sounds, by *āgama*, by different marks (as in case of animals and insects), or even without any garb (as in the cases of *yogins* and other gifted persons). However, in all the cases, there is nothing but *pratibhā* alone which is the cause of the incentive to action in all living beings. This interpretation seems proper, because the meaning and its expresser both, for Bhartṛhari, are ubiquitously and are non-differently given. This issue will be discussed in further detail, but before that, the question that needs to be addressed is if *pratibhā* and *sphoṭa* as units of awareness are given in the mind, what is the need of convention? Convention plays a very significant role in the cognition by language in ordinary communication, with which philosophers are concerned. *Although sphoṭa, pratibhā and even the relation between the two, for grammarians, are given, yet communication requires convention, or else, it cannot be accomplished.* Convention has already been discussed in Chapter II, and, hence, needs

no repetition. For our present purpose, it suffices to say that 'given' and 'the awareness of given' are two different concepts. Something may be given, but may not be known. The *sphoṭa*, *pratibhā* and their relation are given, but they require convention in order to be known distinctively and also to be communicated. For example, a sentence or a word is given, but may not be cognized if its use by elders is not observed. Convention does not provide meaning to a word or a sentence. It only specifies or restrains (*avacchinna*) the relation given between the language and its meanings. It is through verbal-noises, symbols, signs, marks, etc. that convention is established and communication is accomplished by *sphoṭa* as a flash or understanding, which is distinguished by Bhartṛhari as the meaning or *pratibhā* that burst out by *sphoṭa* in the mind and serves as an incentive for an action. Even an object of intuition of a *yogi*, though it is not revealed by any medium like verbal-noises, gestures, etc., is *pratibhā*. Otherwise, it will not be cognized as an object or meaning and will not be communicable, but that is not the case.

So far, we have discussed *pratibhā* as a complete unitary meaning revealed by *sphoṭa*. It is obvious that throughout the discussion on *pratibhā* as a complete unitary meaning or flash of awareness, we have always kept the accomplishment of communication in view and have come to the conclusion that meaning is cognized in ordinary communication (*vyavahāra*) as a flash of awareness. If meaning is an idea or thought-object revealed in the mind by *sphoṭa*, it is proper to use the term '*pratibhā*' and accept the existence of meaning as being revealed or figured in the mind by language (*upacāra-sattā*). It also seems proper to say that the cognition of meaning as *pratibhā* figured in the mind by a sentence is always veridical, a unitary or complete, clear, distinct and revealed awareness. But, this exposition is limited to Bhartṛhari's discussion on *pratibhā*, as it is revealed in ordinary communication by language. However, his approach is not confined to the explanation of cognition revealed only in communication, because this explains only the cognition or *pratibhā* of *lakṣaṇakakṣuṣka* (who performs communication through mediums), but not the activities of those animals, insects and birds who do not speak our language, or the cognition of *lakṣaṇakakṣuṣka*, which is revealed directly without mediums, i.e., verbal-noises, as we find in the cases of *yogins* and other gifted persons. As a philosopher Bhartṛhari has a goal for explaining the activities of all living creatures as communicated by language.

In order to explain *pratibhā* on the basis of cognition and activities of living beings, he has written *kārikās* 146-152, in which he has explained the activities of animals and birds and has observed that in consideration of the knowledge of do's and don't, no one can transgress the flash of insight which is revealed directly by *sphoṭa* either through verbal-noises, or through perception, recollection, etc. No activity, in a living being, is possible without *pratibhā*. There is nothing except *pratibhā* that can be accepted as the cause of the activities seen in animals and birds. Taking this matter of fact into consideration, Bhartṛhari has accepted nature (*svabhāva*) also as one of the causes of the revelation of *pratibhā*.

Apart from *pratibhā* as complete meaning to be cognized through mediums like tokens and gestures in ordinary communication, Bhartṛhari has mentioned six other kinds.⁴⁶

1. As it is revealed in animals and birds by their very nature,
2. As it is revealed in persons realizing their well-being by constant moral practices,
3. As it is revealed in a person by the practices inherited from his parents,
4. As it is revealed to the *yogins* without any medium,
5. As it is revealed to one by his *adṛṣṭa* (the impression of the merits of previous lives), and finally,
6. As it is revealed when handed down to one by the persons having gifted wisdom,

These six kinds of *pratibhā* will be discussed in detail, but before that, it is desirable to clarify the problem regarding its nature, so as to remove some confusion regarding Bhartṛhari's concept of different kinds of *pratibhā*. We are always conscious that *pratibhā* in the present discussion is taken as meaning and not as mind, intellect or faculty of intuition (*prajñā*). Our contention is that *pratibhā* is confined to cognition that makes communication possible and that communication is cognition by language and is not confined only to uttering and hearing as we find in the cases of newly born babies. A baby cries, laughs. Not only that, we also perceive its speaking organs vibrating. What except *pratibhā* is the cause of these activities? Bhartṛhari believes in the idea

of former births and elucidates that language (*sphoṭa*) dispositionality in a new baby is given by its birth. Babies cannot speak because their audio-visual-organs are not mature enough for speaking, but they transmit meaning by crying and other activities. How is this transmission possible? Bhartṛhari says, it is due to *śābdabhāvanā-saṁskāra* (precept) given in beings, even in babies and mutes, that *pratibhā* is revealed in them. Bhartṛhari technically calls *saṁsakara* by the term *āgama* (precept). According to commentators, *āgama* is of two kinds: (1) Proximate (*āsatti*) and (2) Remote (*viprakarṣa*). In case of cognition accomplished by those who know language-tokens of a community, the precept (*śābda saṁskāra/āgam/sphoṭa*), only when it is manifested through hearing verbal-noises, reveals *pratibhā*, because they are accustomed to know only through that garb. This sort of *pratibhā* is called *āsatti* (proximity). On the other hand, *pratibhā*, in cases of those who do not know that particular garb, as in the case of new-born babies, is aroused only by precept (*āgam/śābda/bhāvanā*) itself.

Sphoṭa, for Bhartṛhari, is ubiquitously given. The *kārika*, 'śakṣāt śābdena janitām bhāvanānugamenavā. Iti kartabyatāyām tām na kaścīdativartate',⁴⁷ elucidates that *pratibhā* is revealed. (1) It is revealed by *sphoṭa* when the latter is manifested by verbal-noises (*āstatti*) as in cases of verbal communication. (2) It may be revealed directly by *sphoṭa* as in cases of *yogins*. (3) It may be revealed by the precept manifested not by verbal-noises, but by the impressions of past lives, as we find in the cases of babies. However, in all the cases, it is revealed by *śābda* (*sphoṭa*).

Apart from flashes revealed in communication and the cognition of babies, there are certain other sorts of flashes, which, as Bhartṛhari has enumerated, are six in number. In order to clarify their significance and nature, a brief account of these kinds of specific flashes (*pratibhā*) is presented here below:

1. Svabhāva

In infra-rational beings, it is revealed not by verbal-noises, but by their very nature and is inferred on the basis of activities performed by them. Birds by their nature (*svabhāva*) incline to construct their nest and the male cuckoo produces melodious sound in spring. Puṇyarāja⁴⁸ has given the example of the monkey who has the natural flash to

jump from one branch to another. According to *Harivṛtti*, as one cognizes without the help of verbal-noises or gestures in dreams, it is the nature of ordinary persons belonging to a linguistically cultured community that *pratibhā*, in them, is revealed through verbal-noises and communication is accomplished.

Pratibhā is nature and cannot be identified as instinct. It is better to say that *pratibhā* in lower beings functions for their instinctive activities and is observed as their very nature.

2. Caraṇa

In case of those who by constant practice of moral conduct acquire a highly cultivated stage of spirituality, a special kind of *pratibhā* or flash is revealed, which is not possible otherwise. These supra-ordinary flashes, for example the *pratibhā* of seers like *vaśiṣṭha*, etc., make their supra-ordinary activities possible.⁴⁹

3. Yoganimittapratibhā

Yoga, in the broader sense, is a necessity in all cognition by language. Without it, grasping of utterances or hearing and the manifestation of *sphoṭa* by the utterances are not possible, and, hence, no cognition or communication may be accomplished. But the term *yoga-nimitta pratibhā* is not used here in the sense mentioned above. Here, *yoga-nimitta* is not used as an instrument but as a specific sort of *pratibhā* (meaning). *Yogins* possess super-human power, on account of which super human flashes are revealed in their mind without any mediation of verbal-noises, gestures, etc.

4. Adṛṣṭa-prātibhā

Bhartṛhari believes that the present life is determined by the unseen impressions of the actions of past lives. This unseen impression, in the some person, causes revelation of extra-ordinary flashes. For example, some persons cognize things hidden in the earth. Some others, like diggers, know (by their *adṛṣṭa*) the source of water in the earth. As these are accomplished by means of flashes caused by *adṛṣṭa* of men, Bhartṛhari calls it *pratibhā*. *Adṛṣṭa* causes flashes in some persons, on the basis of which they perform great activities and inventions.

5. Abhyāsanimittapratibhā

The flashes in the mind of a jewel-smith, on account of which he directly apprehends the worth of jewels, are revealed in him by a particular sort of parental training. Musicians know tonal differences by flashes revealed in their minds through training (*abhyāsa*). These are examples of *pratibhā* caused by training.

6. Viśiṣṭopahitapratibhā

In history, we find cases of *pratibhā* revealed by the power handed down to some by seers, sages and gods. Such a power, as we learn from history, was granted to Sanjaya, the charioteer of Dhṛtarāṣṭra by the sage Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana, on the basis of which he was capable of visualizing the great war in the *Mahābhārata*, expanded in a wide range, without the help of eyes. In Indian theology, it is accepted that God, out of generosity, grants such powers to devotees that reveal to them the flashes by which they perceive God and attain liberation. Rāma Kṛṣṇa Paramhansa endowed such a power to his disciple Vivekānanda, which revealed to him flashes of the Goddess (Kālī).

On the basis of these different kinds of *pratibhā*, Bhartṛhari finds himself in a position to explain not only the cognition revealed by language through tokens in communication and the cognition of *lakṣaikaśuṣkas* (seers and sages) revealed directly by *sphoṭa*, without a mediation of language tokens in their minds, but also the activities of birds, insects, animals, jewel-smiths, diggers and extraordinary activities performed by gifted persons. He boldly accepts that all cognition is cognition by *sphoṭa*. This *sphoṭa*, being a precept, is ubiquitous and is present in all living creatures, on the basis of which incentives to do something or not to do are aroused in them. Thus, he propounds that the world of cognition is the world of flashes figuring in the mind. It is the *pratibhā*, which in all animates serve as the cause of the incentive to all sorts of action (*pratibhāmayam ayam viśvam*).

Pratibhā, as meaning, should not be misconceived as mind, *prajñā*, or the capacity to directly grasp the meaning. It figures in mind when communicated and grasped by hearers as a flash revealed in the mind by *sphoṭa*. This meaning, in lower beings, is taken as the cause of their instinctive activities, in super conscious beings it is their super-sensuous

cognition, and in human beings it is the object of cognition figured in the mind by language. A number of scholars of Bhartṛhari's philosophy have taken *pratibhā* non-discriminately as mind or *prajñā*, but as we have clarified, *pratibhā* as meaning cannot be taken as mind.

Pratibhā as meaning is a cognitive unit, and *pratibhā* as mind or *prajñā* suggests an ontic character. Meaning and mind ontologically may be identical, because ontologically Bhartṛhari maintains 'one is all', but cognitively, meaning is cognized as that revealed non-differently by *spṛṣṭa* in the mind and mind is known by implication as an ontic base of the meaning cognized.

Jayantā's arguments against *Pratibhā-vākyārtha*: A discussion

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāya-Maṇjari*⁵⁰ has refuted Bhartṛhari's concept of *pratibhā* as sentential-meaning. According to his exposition of *Vaiyākaraṇas'* view, *pratibhā* is the object of language and meaning is the object of *pratibhā*, and only in this sense is *pratibhā* called meaning. Now, against this view of *pratibhā*, Jayanta argues that though form (*rūpa*) is the object of eyes, yet the idea of form (*rūpa-buddhi*) is not the object of eyes; similarly, *pratibhā* is caused by language but it is not the object of language. External things cannot be overlooked. It is not right to say that since external things do not really exist, it is *pratibhā* that is the object of language. For example, 'lion has come' has different effects on the brave, the coward and other persons. These effects are not caused by *pratibhā*, but by allegiance of persons to the arrival of lion existing in external world. It is not only the idea or cognition of lion, but the arrival of external lion that is the cause of fear, etc., in persons. Jayanta says, it is not proper to say that at those times the lion is not actually there, because sentences like 'the lion has not come' or 'I told a lie' are not heard, and, hence, there is no statement to contradict the presence of an external lion. *Pratibhā* cannot be accepted as meaning of language merely on the basis of passions (*vāsanā*). Differences of cognition are due to different allegiances to the things existing outside. Therefore, *pratibhā* only as purpose (*tātparya*), as Jayanta says, may be accepted as the meaning of a sentence, but it may not be accepted as expressed (*vācya*) of an expresser (*vācaka*). Now, it cannot be said that *pratibhā*, as a mutually connected expressed (*sansṛṣṭa*) is sentential-meaning, because *pratibhā*, as *Vaiyākaraṇas* assume, is an indivisible

whole and not a connected whole. According to Jayanta, a sentential-meaning is that which is known as the cognition of the purpose involved in using words.

Jayantā's arguments against *Pratibhā-vākyārtha* replied from the side of Bhartṛhari

From the side of Bhartṛhari, it can be said that Jayanta's argument that *pratibhā* is produced or caused by language, and that it is not an object (*viṣaya*) or meaning of language, is based on mistaking the word *pratibhā*. *Pratibhā* is not produced or caused by language but revealed non-differently by it and only in that sense *pratibhā* can be taken as the object of language. Meaning, unlike Jayanta's assumption, is not the object of *pratibhā* itself. The idea that 'meaning is the object of *pratibhā*' is not acceptable to an extent to Bhartṛhari. Though he has not refuted the idea of meaning as the object of *pratibhā*, yet it for him is meaning itself. If we grant a metaphysical value to *pratibhā* and then we explain meaning as its object, his philosophy of *pratibhā* as meaning will be inconsistent. The reason is that: he, as a language philosopher, is always conscious of the limits of philosophical reflections and is very prompt in showing that no metaphysical substance (being untouched by language) is the object of philosophical reflections. Thus, when we limit ourselves to his outlook, we find that he observes *pratibhā* as a clear, distinct flash figured in mind by language as a meaning on the basis of which communication is accomplished. *Pratibhā* is the cause of all incentives to do or not to do and is revealed in the mind by language and only in that sense it is called the object of language and not otherwise.

Pratibhā serves as the cause of an incentive to communicate itself through speaker's utterances. Without figuring the specified *pratibhā*, the expectancy to communicate through language is not possible. Thus, from the speakers point of view, *pratibhā* is understood as the object of language.

In cases of meaning as the object of *pratibhā*, *Vaiyākaraṇas* take *pratibhā* as mind (*prajñā*) and philosophize that nothing can be said about the *pratibhā* as mind. *Pratibhā* as mind or *prajñā* has been discussed with great clarity by M.M. Gopinath Kaviraja. As our approach is limited to exposition of *pratibhā* as meaning, we suggest that though different *pratibhā* revealed in the mind are all specific and

distinct, yet all of them being *pratibhā* are called by the same word. This interpretation of *pratibhā* should be kept in mind while evaluating Bhartṛhari's theory of meaning as the object of *pratibhā* and we are sure that *pratibhā* if looked from this point of view, will not be confused as mind (*prajñā*) as an ontic entity, which is different from meaning as cognitive being, and, thus, it is easy to distinguish between Bhartṛhari's view of *pratibhā* as meaning and *pratibhā* as mind.

Now, coming to the problem of *pratibhā* as meaning or as a cognitive-being, it can be said that *pratibhā*, being indivisible flash revealed by the indivisible *sphoṭa*, is the idea or thought object that cannot be understood by ignorant and children who can understand the indivisible only piecemeal, or understand a whole in steps, which demands analysis. For this purpose, grammarians adopt the technique of grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*). Chapter VII is denoted to *apoddhāra*. At present, I would like to mention that the sentential-meaning, which for *Vaiyākaraṇas* is indivisible flash (*pratibhā*), is analyzed into different word-meanings (*padārtha*) by the process of grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*), and, then, the sentential-meaning is explained to them differently as synthesis, purpose, association of different word-meanings, action, *bhāvanā*, etc. It can also be said that all the theories of sentential-meaning discussed in earlier pages are useful as explanations of the indivisible *pratibhā*, but it will be improper to accept any of the theories as the only principle or definition of sentential-meaning. *Pratibhā is sentential-meaning and being indivisible awareness, it is defined differently as association, purpose, etc.*, because an indivisible cannot be defined in any other way. Definition itself is based on an understanding of part and whole and so is the definition of *Pratibhā*.⁵¹

Among the various definitions of *pratibhā* (*vākyārtha*), the theory of association supported by the theorists who believe in 'expression precedes relation' (*abhihitānvayavādins*) seems proper from the point of view of teaching sentential-meaning to the ignorant through the association of word-meanings. The theory of mutually-connected-denotation, supported by the theorists who believe in 'relation precedes expression' (*anvitābhīdhānāvādins*), seems convincing from the point of view of the interpretation of purpose of speaking words and figurative meanings, while for the theorists believing in sentential-meaning as indivisible (*akhaṇḍavākyavādins*), it seems cognitively

justified from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition removing further expectancy for the completion of a unit meaning in ordinary communication. Sentential-meaning figures in the mind not as one word meaning added with another word meaning but as an indivisible flash for the explanation of which other theories of sentential-meaning, are also important.⁵²

The controversy is not related with supporting or denying sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*), because all the theorists accept it. It is its explanations that cause differences. The theory of indivisible meaning as *pratibhā* seems fit to explain not only the flashes figured or revealed in the mind by *sphoṭa* through verbal-noises, sentence-tokens, gestures, etc., but also the direct flashes of *yogins* or other gifted persons. Flashes can well be acknowledged distinctly as instinctive, rational, supra-rational, etc. Instinctive flashes of insects and animals are known by inference made on the basis of the observation of infra-rational activities of them; rational flashes are cognized as revealed by *sphoṭa* when it is manifested through verbal-noises. They are communicable flashes, which, when communicated by expressions, cause veridical cognition. Supra-rational cognitions are direct flashes; they are seer's visions (*ṛṣyaḥ mantra drṣṭāraḥ*) and are known by the observation of supra-rational divine activities performed by those gifted with it.

Arguments for and against the Indivisibility Theory of Sentential-meaning: A Discussion

It is apparent from the discussion made in the earlier pages that a sentence and sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*), for Bhartṛhari, are indivisible units. Rejecting the indivisibility of sentence, word-theorists (*padavādins*) argue that a sentence is not an indivisible unit, but a get-together of words which are formed also by association of letters. Bhartṛhari, quite opposed to this theory, investigates it and argues for indivisibility of sentence by raising two queries: (i) whether a sentence is an association or collection of meaningless letters or of meaningful words, and (ii) whether or not the association of meaningless letters/meaningful words is meaningful. If it is meaningless, then it will be of no use, because it will be incapable for communication, and, hence, will not be accepted as a unit of communication. Alternatively, if the association is meaningful, then, the basic fallacy, as to how meaningless

parts can form a meaningful whole (sentence), arises. Obviously, the collection of meaningless letters, i.e. words may either be meaningful or meaningless. For example, the collection *gha + ṭa = ghaṭa* is a meaningful unit, but the reverse collection *ṭa + gha* is meaningless. Thus, a meaningful unit (word) cannot be taken as an outcome of association of different meaningless letters. However, if the word is accepted once as a unit not made of parts, but indivisible, then the same logic can be applied to sentence, but even this is not acceptable to constructionist type of word-theorists.⁵³ The association of letters in a particular way may be meaningful, yet, in a different way, it may be meaningless or may be meaningful in all cases. If it is meaningful in all cases, then, it will be proper to take them as different words conveying different meanings in different collections. For example, the collection of letters 'ra' and 'sa' as 'rasa' and as 'sa' and 'ra' as 'sara' both are meaningful but they are different words conveying different meanings – 'juice' and 'pond' respectively. The example shows that the nature of collection being uncertain, needs to be decided beforehand, for otherwise, the word and its meaning will not be determined.

As the collection of meaningless letters may be meaningful or meaningless, the collection of meaningful words may also be explained in two ways: (i) meaningful, because of its connection by expectancy, and (ii) meaningless because of having connection not as per expectancy. In order to clarify the position of the former alternative Puṇyarāja⁵⁴ has given the example of the sentence '*Deodatta gām abhyāja*' (Deodatta herds the cows in). The words used in the sentence are meaningful and their association is also meaningful. For clarifying the latter alternative, he has given the example, '*daṣadāḍimānaya ṣaḍapūyā*'. The words of the set are not mutually connected. All the words of the set are separately meaningful, but their association is meaningless, because they are not mutually expected.⁵⁵ If words and sentences are not distinguished from letters, or if they all are accepted to be of the same character, the letters, like words and sentences, will also be expressive, and, then, they will also be mutually expected for the conveyance of meanings, but constructionists (*sanghātavādins*) themselves deny the expressiveness of letters. If they say that a word is an association of letters, then it may be asked: if the association, less by one letter than the normal, is expressive or non-expressive? Again, if it is expressive of meaning to be conveyed by the normal word, then

it can be asked, if the word, in its normal form, is expressive or the word reduced by one letter, than the normal, is equally expressive? Whether they are different words or the same? If they are not taken different, both of them will be separate expressers of the same meaning but this is not convincing. On the basis of the same meaning expressed by both of them, it may be said that they are one and the same but, then, the issue of their normal and abnormal form, whole and reduced form, does not arise. Explaining the issue of expressiveness of meaning of the word reduced by one letter, Bhartṛhari holds that the complete (normal) or indivisible word is expressive. The word reduced by one letter when spoken, manifests the complete word, (unit) in the mind of the audience and then, the meaning is revealed by complete word. Thus, Bhartṛhari shows that the expressiveness of letters is cognitively and logically unfounded.

If the word is analyzed into stems or roots and suffixes, then one of the two components of the word may be meaningful and the other may be meaningless. If the meaning of stems or roots and the meaning of suffixes are taken into consideration, there are two ways in which they may be interpreted. For example, the meaning 'kuṭīra' for some is expressed when the word, 'kuṭi' (only stem) is connected with 'ra' (suffix), while for others the connection of 'ra' with 'kuṭi', is not required for expressing the meaning of 'kuṭīra' and the meaning of 'ra' is the same as that of the word 'kuṭi', as the word 'kuṭīra', as a whole, is expressive of its meaning. However, in either way, the sentential-meaning cannot be explained as the meaning of word.⁵⁶ The suffixes are considered as meaning-conveying units only in rule, but they have no meaning independently of words. The word with suffix is a complete unit and it is only for explaining the meaning by analysis that the word is analyzed into stem and suffixes and their meanings are considered separately. We are not always aware of the components of words while speaking the words in any case-ending, which is the case with sentences as well. Bhartṛhari is of the opinion that letters, suffixes, etc., are not used as meaningful units in ordinary usage. They are not used for communication that is accomplished only by complete units. The question of associating meaningless letters does not arise in the absence of the cause of incentive for associating.

Explaining compound words, Bhartṛhari has observed that in cases of compound and *svārthika* formations, the meaning they convey

is not the same as what is expressed by the components separately.⁵⁷ For example, the meaning of the compound *rājapuruṣa* is not the sum total of the meanings of the words *rājan* and *puruṣa*, but *rājapuruṣa*, i.e., the servant of the king, is an indivisible unit. Analysing compounds, Bhartṛhari, from the side of word-theorists says that compounds formed by components may be observed from two point of views:

1. There are some compounds having fixed meanings, for example, *samīvrkṣa*, *daḍimīvrkṣa*, etc. In such cases, components convey the same meaning as is conveyed by the compound. The word *samī* and *vrkṣa* have the same basic meaning (tree) and their combination expresses that basic meaning.⁵⁸
2. There are some other compounds, the meanings of which are decided on the basis of the association of the meaning of their components by the device of association and dissociation (*anvayavyatireka*). For example, the compounds *sanjñu* and *prajñu* in which the word *jānuni* is fashioned after observation of the use of *jñu*, and then their meaning is inferred as *sanjñyate jānuni yasya* and *prajñyate jānuni yasya*, respectively.⁵⁹ In addition to these interpretations of compounds, Bhartṛhari has given the example of such compounds the meaning of which is known independently of the meanings of their components. For example, there is no independent meaning of the components *gaurah* and *kharah* in the compound *gaurakharah* and similar is the case with *kṛṣṇasarpah* that expresses a meaning independently of its components *kṛṣṇah* and *sarpah*.⁶⁰

Though the compounds, under example, are added with suffixes (*sup*), there is no independent meaning of the suffixes and the meaning of the compound as a whole is comprehended independently of components, i.e., roots/stems/suffixes.

Defending the indivisibility of compounds and their meanings against constructionists, Bhartṛhari, observes that the meaning of words (disappeared and then recollected and associated by memory) may be combined together for sentential-meaning by memory, but this assumption may be a suicidal for their own theory because if it is accepted once then, all knowledge by language will be reduced to memory cognition. From the point of view of authority of verbal cognition, it is better, as Bhartṛhari suggests, to accept compounds

and sentences, as indivisible and independent expressers of their indivisible meanings. For example, if a compound is taken to convey an aggregate, then, the question as to how can simultaneous presence of unity and diversity, aggregate and parts be explained as the meaning of the components arises. It is contradictory to accept that both of the meanings (synthetic and analytic) are simultaneously cognized by the component, because no simultaneous cognition is possible.⁶¹

Putting the objection against independent status of word-meanings in a sentence, Bhartṛhari argues, if the independent status of word-meanings is assumed, and then if sentential-meaning is taken as the connection of those meanings, how can the meaning of the component 'adhi' of the word 'adhitari' be taken to be in locative-case? How can a *bahubrīhi* compound be accepted to convey a meaning for which a word is not uttered? For example, the components 'citra' and 'gauḥ' of the compound 'citrugu' do not convey the meaning 'the person having citra gauḥ'. Not only that, but there are certain words, the meanings of which are not understood through the association of meaning of their components as we find in case of compounds like 'sanjñu' and 'prajñu'. Therefore, Bhartṛhari thinks it justified to accept that the whole compound, as a unit, without the consideration of its parts, is the expresser of specific indivisible meaning.⁶² *Padavādins*, on the basis of the function to be performed by copulative compound (*dvandva*) have raised the objection against *Vaiyākaraṇas'* theory of indivisibility. They argue, if a sentence is an indivisible unit, how can a copulative compound be explained as expresser of the aggregate of the meaning of the components? A copulative compound (*dvandva*) is called so because its components convey their separate meanings. *Padavādins* may ask: if a sentence is an indivisible whole, how can the expression, 'Deodaṭṭa yajñyadaṭṭa viṣṇumitra ca bhojyantām', made of *dvandva* compounds be explained? If the meaning of the sentence is an indivisible whole, how is it possible to view the aggregate apart from individuals, i.e. *Deodaṭṭa*, etc.? The act of eating is to be performed by individuals — *Deodaṭṭa*, etc. and not by the aggregate, and, thus, the meaning of the sentence must be taken as the association of independent word-meanings.

Answering the objection mentioned above, Bhartṛhari argues that the word 'gārgāḥ' is a single word used in plural number, and by *ekaśeṣa*, it conveys many meanings — the grandson, son, disciples, etc. of the *gārgāḥ*.⁶³ Similarly, in the example of the copulative

compound, mentioned above, there is application of plural number and the compound conveys aggregate yet the meaning is cognized through their association with the verb '*bhojyantām*', with each individual separately. The verb is associated with each individual – *Deodaṭṭa*, etc. – and acts upon each component of the subject denoted by a copulative. Thus, Bhartṛhari shows that the meaning of components separately, is not required for the explanation of the compounds of a copulative type.⁶⁴

For *padavādins*, the general meaning of a copulative compound is aggregate, and it is by their nature that the words used in it are connected for individual meanings also. In order to make the *padavādins*' point clear, Bhartṛhari has given two examples. According to the first, in the expression '*Janapadatadavadhyoḥ*'⁶⁵ the pronoun '*tad*', as *padavādins* accept, is a component of the said copulative and as such it stands for '*janapada*'. Thus, if the word is not taken as independent unit, how can '*tad*' be called a pronoun and then how can the meaning '*janapada*' be cognized by the word '*tad*'? Without accepting '*tad*', as a separate unit, how can it be taken to stand for *janapada*? In order to answer these problems raised by *padavādins*, Bhartṛhari elucidates that there is only an appearance of the pronoun '*tad*' in the cognition of the meaning of the compound '*janapadatadavadhyoḥ*'. The word '*tad*' a component of the expression, appears to be the same '*tad*' popularly known as a pronoun. Owing to similarity, the '*tad*' of the compound is taken as the same '*tad*' (pronoun). Bhartṛhari says that the component '*tad*' may be taken for '*janapada*', without distinguishing it from the pronoun '*tad*'. It can be said that in a copulative compound all the components of it are associated with the action (*kriyā*), as we have seen in the case of '*bhojyantām*', in which the verb '*bhuj*' is understood as associated separately with the components (*Deodaṭṭa*, etc.) but, the sentence remains indivisible, because it reveals an indivisible meanings in the mind of the audience. Clarifying his own position on indivisibility of compounds and sentences, Bhartṛhari says that the action denoted by the verb '*chidyantām*' (cut) in the expression '*khadiraśīchadyatām*' is the single unit, but it implies many sub-actions to be performed for the accomplishment of the action 'cutting', i.e. first, the bark of the tree then the stems, roots, etc., are cut in sequence and the word '*chidyantām*' denotes the unity of all actions falling under the head

'cutting'. Similarly, the sentence and sentential-meaning are indivisible units and that they are explained on the basis of analysis as association of parts.⁶⁶

Objecting to indivisibility of compounds *padavādins* may say that it is by taking the words as independent units into consideration that compounds (*samāsa*) are formed. For example, in some compounds, as in *avyayībhāva*, the former component is considered as primary. For example, *pratidine*, *upakṛṣṇam*, etc., in which the components 'prati' and 'upa' are taken as primary. In other cases, as in '*tatpuruṣa*', the latter component is taken as primary (for example, '*rājapuruṣa*') and in still other cases, as in *bahubrīhi*, the meaning of neither of the components is reckoned but a different meaning altogether is considered as primary, for example, the word '*pītāmbara*' in which the meanings of components '*pīta*' and '*ambara*' are not taken as primary. On the basis of the logic adopted for explaining compounds by components, *padavādins* object to the indivisibility of sentence and sentential-meaning, by saying that the fact of primacy of the meaning of the former or the latter or neither of the components expressed by a compound cannot be decided without taking words as independent units.

Solving the problem raised above, Bhartṛhari⁶⁷ elucidates that a compound word actually expresses indivisible meaning, which, for practical purposes, is explained in terms of their components and then the primacy of the former or the latter component is decided grammatically. Illustrating indivisibility of the meaning of components, *Vaiyākaraṇas* take the help of their explanation of negative-compound (*nañsamāsa*). *Mahābhāṣyakāra* Patañjali⁶⁸ has given three alternative explanations of the meaning of negative compounds. An account of his interpretation of the negative compound '*abrāhmaṇa*' is given as follows:

1. If the component '*brāhmaṇa*' of the compound '*abrāhmaṇa*' is taken as an independent expresser, it expresses '*brāhmaṇatva*', and then the negative component 'a' is expressive of 'void of' and, the compound will be '*bahubrīhi*' in which the meaning of neither of the components (the person void of *brāhmaṇatva*) is considered primary, and a third meaning '*kṣatriya*' is known by the compound '*abrāhmaṇa*'.

2. If the component 'nañ(a)' is taken as compounded with *brāhmaṇa* (*brāhmaṇatve nañ*) then the meaning of negative component 'a' will be primary and in that case the compound will be a *avyayībhāva*.
3. If the word is used for 'kṣatriya' and if, in order to negate the 'brāhmaṇatva' in him, the next component 'brāhmaṇa' is tagged on, then the latter component conveying *brāhmaṇatva* will be primary (*brāhmaṇabhinnah brāhmaṇatvabhāvavāna*). According to Bhartṛhari, the negative compound 'abrāhmaṇa' may be interpreted differently, but the expressive (*vācaka*) in all interpretations is the same. It is for the benefit of those who can understand the indivisible only through piecemeal that the indivisible is explained differently, on the basis of the analysis of meaning of components, but there is no possibility of any actual division of the meaning, which is an indivisible unit.

Exploring the issue Bhartṛhari illustrates that negative sentences, the meaning of which are not cognized as an association of word-meanings, express indivisible meaning. For example, he takes the sentence 'vṛkṣonāsti' (the tree does not exist),⁶⁹ in which the word 'nāsti' is used for negating the existence of tree (*vṛkṣa*). *Padavādins* may say that the meaning of the word 'vṛkṣa' exists as connected with the meaning of the word 'nāsti' (negation) in the mind, and if 'the existence of tree' in the mind is cognized first by the word 'vṛkṣa', itself, the question arises as to what does the word 'nāsti' negate. The negation of that which is cognized as already existent is self-contradictory. If the existence of the tree as idea or a being in the mind (*upacāra-sattā*) is accepted, it will hardly be associated with negation (*nañ*). The existent cannot be negated, and if it is non-existent, there is no need for expressing the negation of an already non-existent. Thus, the word 'nāsti' has no separate meaning – existence or non-existence. As the term 'nāsti' independently of the term 'vṛkṣa' is meaningless, the whole sentence 'vṛkṣonāsti' is taken as an expresser of the meaning 'the tree does not exist there'. The cognition of existence and non-existence of tree is not comprehended simultaneously, because no simultaneous cognition, for Bhartṛhari, is possible and, thus, the meaning 'the tree does not exist' must be the meaning of the whole sentence (*vṛkṣonāsti*) as an indivisible unit.

Clarifying the point further, Bhartṛhari says⁷⁰, if it is assumed that the whole sentence as well as its meaning are analyzed in the mind,

then, it will follow that the meanings analyzed with in the mind are associated by the mind. In that case, the associated will not be the same as expressed by the words, but simply a figment or that which is imagined by the mind. If it is not an expressed (*vācya*) of an expresser (*vācaka*), then how can a non-verbal entity be negated by the verbal expression (*vrkṣonāsti*). Thus, the negation of meaning (tree-exists) fashioned by the mind would not be accepted as that revealed by the word negation (*vācaka*). If it is said that the cognition revealed by the word '*vrkṣa*' (tree exists) of the expression '*vrkṣonāsti*' is falsified by the word '*nāsti*' (negation), how, can the cognition of negation be accepted as revealed, because in that case the function of *nañ* (negation) is changed into falsification. If falsification of the 'existence of tree' is assumed as that cognized by the word '*nāsti*', 'the existence of tree' has to be accepted, and, thus, the word '*nāsti*' will not be expressive of negation, but of falsification and on account of falsification (*mithyātva*) the negation of the existence of tree cannot be accepted as the meaning of the word '*nāsti*'.⁷¹

If *padavādins* argue that 'the existence of the tree' is cognized separately from the cognition of 'the negation of the tree', then, it will just be contradictory to assert the negation of the tree expressing existence, in which case the question regarding two different cognitions by the same sentence will also arise. If it is accepted that the term '*nāsti*' functions independently without a reference to any substantive, then it may be used before the word '*vrkṣa*'. If '*nāsti*' is used before the word '*vrkṣa*', it will be expressive of 'negation of tree' and then it will be proper to accept that the use of the word '*vrkṣa*' functions only for ascertainment (*niyam*) and not for expressing any independent meaning.⁷² This way the term '*vrkṣa*' is taken as a restrictive device and not as an expresser, and, thus, the sentence '*vrkṣaḥ nāsti*' stands as an expression that brings out an implied restriction, i.e. the component '*nāsti*' is expressive of meaning while the component *vrkṣa* is useless.⁷³ In order to avoid these difficulties, *padavādins* have no other alternative except to assume sentence as an indivisible whole. The whole sentence as an indivisible unit is expressive of the indivisible meaning 'the tree does not exist'.

Taking complex formations (*vr̥ttiyān*) into consideration, *padavādins* criticize the indivisibility theory of *Vaiyākaraṇas*. They say if independent meanings of words are not accepted, the alternative

interpretations (*vikalpas*) of complex formations may not grammatically be possible. We have proposed to present an account of complex formations in Chapter VI. Here suffice it to say that according to *padavādins*, complex formations cannot be explained if words as independent expressers are not accepted.

Bhartṛhari⁷⁴, answering to the objection of *padavādins*, argues that as the meanings of components of a *bahubṛīhi* compound are given up and the compound reveals indivisible meaning independently of the meanings of components, similarly, the compounds are indivisible units and are explained as the expresser of an integration of meaning (*vigrahavākya*). They express indivisible meaning irrespective of the meaning of its components. Bhartṛhari writes, 'truth is indivisible' and only for the sake of grammar, the indivisible is explained through analysis.⁷⁵ According to him, the *padavādins*' assumption that the meaning of a word is decided through its analysis into root, suffixes, etc., and, then, by compounding independent meanings, the meaning of a whole is understood, is not justified because in some cases only roots are used for meaning and the meaning of suffixes is taken to be expressed by the root itself, while in other cases only suffixes are used for conveying meaning. In some other cases, the root alone is not treated for meaning and the meaning conveyed by the root is considered as the meaning of the suffixes added with the root. In still other cases, the meaning conveying by a root is also considered as the meaning conveyed by both as a unit.⁷⁶ On the ground of this analysis, Bhartṛhari tries to show that the word is indivisible, and it is for explanation of the meaning of the word that the word is analyzed into roots and suffixes and wherever there is a need, they are taken for support. For example, the word 'iyat' (this much) is only a suffix having no root and the suffix alone functions for meaning. The word 'ahan' (killed) is a root having no suffix and functions for the meaning of suffix also. In some cases, the same meaning is expressed by two suffixes. For example, the same meaning conveyed by the suffix 'sup' is conveyed by the suffix 'tip', as we find in the word (*bhavati = bhū + tip + sup*). Thus, Bhartṛhari shows that the analytic treatment is not based on a fixed rule. The same meaning may be explained differently in different derivations and, thus, the words, root, etc., cannot be accepted as independent expressers. They are acquired by grammatical analysis of the indivisible sentence.

The science of grammar has a function of interpreting indivisible cognition revealed by language on the basis of accumulation and option, association and disassociation. The indivisibility remains unaffected through the grammatical process.⁷⁷

On the utility of the grammatical process, Bhartṛhari has a holistic outlook. He accepts it as device for imparting wisdom to laymen, which they can't acquire otherwise. It may be asked: if ignorance and knowledge are opposite to one another, how can ignorance cause knowledge? Answering the question, Bhartṛhari writes 'a cause exists prior to an effect and, thus, the issue of the connection of a non-produced effect with the cause does not arise'. It is only by some device (*vyapadeśa*) that non-produced effect is also thought as that which is connected with the cause. Similarly, ignorance is not foundational, yet it serves as an instrument in the way to the realization of knowledge.⁷⁸ The real is indivisible, and it is for grammar that the unreal is taken as real. The unreal, through continued practice, occupies its place in the very structure of our being, and that is why it appears as real in ordinary life. It is the habit of persons with the diversity, differences or divisions that we talk even of indivisibles in terms of divisions. For example, *atom by definition is an indivisible particle of a thing. It is imperceptible and, hence, can be proved only by reasoning. But, those who are not aware of the nature of it may also imagine parts, quarter etc. of the atom. Not only that, but such expressions as 'a part of an atom is connected with some part of another atom', are also used by them. They talk about the beginning of an eternal, the divisions of an indivisible and so on. Bhartṛhari says, the instrumental-real is taken by ignorance as foundationally real.* The seekers of truth/ the aspirants of truth investigate into wisdom and distinguish them all in order to remove the uncertainty and ignorance.⁷⁹ If word-meanings connected for sentential-meaning are taken as independent units, and, as there is no fixed rule for association, any word-meaning can be connected with any other word-meaning, and, then, it will cause difficulty in cognizing the true meaning of the sentence. Puṇyārāja⁸⁰ clarifies it with the example given as follows: '*Bhagini*!' *yā tvam śīrasānāivāham vahasi sātvaṃ prācīnam kumbhamabhidhāvantamadrākṣīḥ*'. There are several words associated together in the sentence, but if they are connected in a reverse order, the arrangement may be meaningful in some cases and meaningless in other cases of association and, then, the nature of association will be uncertain, and this

uncertainty of the nature of association may cause difficulty in understanding the meaning of the sentence.

From the point of view of words as independent expressers, the sentence⁸¹ *'indorlakṣmasmaravijayinaḥ kaṇṭhamūlam murāirdignāgānām madamalamaṣībhāñji gaṇḍasthalāni, adyāpyuravīvalayatilaka! śyāmalimnā' nuliptānyudbhāśantevada dhavalitam kiṃ yaśobhistvadiyāiḥ*, means—'O king! What is brightened by your glory, if the dark spot of the moon, the darkness of Lord Śiva's throat, the cheeks of the elephant and the colour black (*kṛṣṇa*) are all still black'. But if the sentence as independent unit is taken into account, then, the sentence means kings' glory has brightened everything and that which are black are so by their very nature. The example clearly shows that the understanding of meaning through words as independent expresser may be 'blame' but it may be 'praise' if sentence as a whole is taken as the expresser. If words and their meanings are taken as real, the meaning expressed by them must be the same, what is expressed by the whole sentence, but this is not the case with Bhartṛhari's view of sentence holism. The meaning of sentence as indivisible whole is observed to be different from its meaning explained through the collection of word-meanings. *Ambākartrī* shows these differences by the example⁸² of the sentence: *'Upakṛtam babu tatra kimucyatesujanatā bhavatā prathitā parama'*. If the sentence as whole is taken as expresser, the sentence means 'wickedness', but if its meaning is understood as sheer collection of word-meanings, the sentence means 'greatness'. Raghunath Sharma in his commentary *Ambākartrī* has quoted a very popular verse from *'Aucityavicāracarā'*. The verse⁸³ reads *'bhrama dhārmika! viśvastāḥ sasvā'dya mārītastena, Godānadī kacchakuñjavāsinā drpta sinhena'* (O gentleman! go and move freely, there is no fear from the dog dwelling on the bank of the river Godāvarī, because a furious lion has killed the dog). Now, if the word-meanings are taken in view, the verse means 'O Piousman! Go and move freely without the fear of dog, for it is now not alive'; but if the whole sentence is taken as expresser, it expresses just a reversed meaning (O wretched! there is a risk of losing your life to a furious lion, if you go to the bank of the river Godāvarī).

To sum up, we can say that Bhartṛhari, on the basis of arguments mentioned above, has established his theory of indivisibility of sentence against the word-theorists' (*padavādins'*) arguments. The chief

argument given by him, in support of indivisibility of sentence and sentential-meaning is grounded on the cognition of meaning in usual communication. As the meaning is known as a flash of understanding, it is an indivisible whole. There is no question of parts in the awareness or in the flash.

Conclusively, it can be said that *anvitābhīdhānavādins* and *abhihitānvayavādins*, while discussing the concept of sentential-meaning, have not gone beyond their limitation of viewing meaning as universal and individual. Bhartṛhari also accepts sentential-meaning as specified universal, but his point of view is quite different from theirs. He is clear on the issue of word-meaning that is universal. Individual, according to him is known by implication as the substratum of universal, but while defining sentential-meaning as *pratibhā*, *Puṇyarāja* emphasizes a new fact. *Pratibhā* as such is awareness that cannot categorically be defined as individual or universal, which are adjuncts (*upādhis*) of it. *Pratibhā*, as awareness is not an entity, and it is interpreted as universal or individual only for the sake of grammar (*vyākāraṇa*).⁸⁴ Grammatically, the meaning of the verb in a sentence is taken by *Vaiyākaraṇas* as the central meaning, which is qualified by the meanings of the other words of the sentence and hence, is an individual, but *pratibhā* as such is an indivisible flash or awareness. Taking *pratibhā* only in this way that its foundationality as indivisible knowledge can be estimated properly.

According to Bhartṛhari's system of thought, sense-data acquired by sense-perception/verbal-noises/tokens serve as tools in the manifestation of language, and the meaning is revealed non-differently by it. The perception by different senses and the senses themselves are distinguished by language, which is the illuminating principle of senses. There is no knowledge that is not intertwined with language; all knowledge is knowledge revealed by it and what is revealed by it is always veridical knowledge that, irrespective of verification and confirmation expresses knowledge. The examination of the cognition revealed by sentences in the mind, through experience and reasoning, forms a distinct subject-matter of logic.

Intended (Gaunārtha) and non-intended meanings (Nāntarīyakārtha) of a word in a sentence

The chief problem of Bhartṛhari, a strong follower of the *Vaiyākaraṇas'* thesis of 'a fixed (*niyata*) word denotes a fixed meaning', is to interpret the world of communication, i.e., the world of language and meaning. According to him, a word is a meaning-revealing, inner (*bauddha*) and ubiquitously given (*nitya* or *siddha*) language (*sphoṭa*) and the meaning is what is revealed non-differently by it in the mind. The world of language and meaning is a self-restrained world of ideas or thought-objects revealed by language itself. It is a self-restrained being as it is not an outcome of abstraction from external existence, but a being revealed or figured in the mind, by language, independently of external things. The relation between the given language and the meaning is also given.⁸⁵

In the sententialism of the *Vaiyākaraṇas'* philosophy, the inner, meaning-revealing language is sentence. As the *Vyākaraṇas'* function is to interpret all systems of thought,⁸⁶ it, by assuming the word and its meaning obtained by grammatical analysis of the indivisible sentence as realities, interprets the problems concerning it and its different meanings. If the word obtained by grammatical analysis of a sentence is accepted as real, there can be two perspectives to observe its meaning: (i) the meaning of the word as an independent meaning-conveying unit; (ii) the meaning of the word in a sentence.

i. The Meaning of a Word as an Independent Unit

From this perspective, a word is an expresser (*vācaka*) of an expressed (*vācya*) that is given, and hence, the fixed or primary (*mukhya*) meaning of a word. The word, separated from the sentence, by grammatical analysis, is considered fit for expressing a fixed (*niyata*) meaning, without any effort, logical implication, recollection and other factors.⁸⁷ For Bhartṛhari, the expressive meaning of a word is universal (the word cow denotes cowness), on the basis of which the meaning of a word from that of other words is distinguished. Chapter VI of this monograph devoted to the concept of word-meaning.

ii. The Meaning of the Word in a Sentence

Bhartṛhari's discussion on *mukhya* (primary), *gauṇa* (secondary) and *nāntarīyakārtha* (close to primary meaning), is concerned not only

with his explanation of the meaning of a word in a sentence, but also of sentential-meaning. A word, used in a sentence, conveys a meaning that varies according to various allegiances and intentions of the users. The various meanings of a word are categorized as *mukhyārtha* (fixed or primary meaning), *gauṇārtha* (intended-meaning) and *nāntarīyakārtha* (non-intended but close to the primary meaning).

The assumption of intended meaning is rooted in the freedom of the human mind in using words. A word has a given or fixed meaning and on account of some similarity, the fixed meaning, if imposed on other meaning and if the user intends to convey that meaning by the use of same word; is called intended or secondary-meaning (*gauṇārtha*) of the word. The intention of the user in using a word may be to convey a meaning either similar to or quite opposed to or even reversed to the fixed meaning of the word and the hearer knows them by implication (*upapādana*) made on the basis of primary-meaning.⁸⁸

Before coming to the discussion on the subject proper, it is necessary to clarify, the problem concerning meaning. The problem is: how can plurality of meaning of a word be explained if 'a fixed word denotes a fixed meaning' is taken in view. If all meanings are meanings of a word then the question arises—what is the basis of meanings other than the fixed meaning conveyed by the word? It seems apparently contradictory to accept many meanings of the word, if eternity of word-meaning relation is taken into account. The assumption of many meanings of a word may cause the problem of an irregular relation (*sambandha-vyabhicāra*) between a word and meaning, and, hence, it may go against the basic position of *Vaiyākaraṇas* thesis of given relation. The problem of an epistemological justification of many meanings of a word may also not be ignored because of the fact that meaning, for Bhartṛhari, is what the word reveals, and the word do not reveal many meanings simultaneously.⁸⁹

Bhartṛhari has discussed the problem of many meanings of a word from the points of views of (1) *Śabda-ekatvavādins* (who consider the unity or sameness of a word used for different meanings), (2) *Śabda-nānātvavādins* (who consider the word as different if used for different meanings), and (3) *Vaiyākaraṇas* own holistic view that reconciles the above two. A brief account of the views is given as follows:

(i) *Śabda-ekatvavāda*

This theory accepts the unity or non-difference of the word in spite of its different uses for different meanings.⁹⁰ The word is not changed even if it is used for many meanings. The unity of word is original or primary and its separateness resulting from different uses is artificial or unreal.⁹¹ For example, the word 'cow', the expresser of cowness, does not differ from the word 'cow' when used for cowherd (*gaurbāhika*). The cowness by some similarity is imposed on cowherd and thus the word 'cow' secondarily denotes it.

(ii) *Śabdanānātvavāda*

In this theory, the word is different if it is used for different meanings. Unlike the former view, change of word used for different meanings, in this view, is original, and oneness or sameness is imaginary or unreal. As no verbal-cognition or communication is possible without the identical cognition revealed by a word, *nānātvavādins* also give place to unity of word used for different meanings, but, for them, unity is mere imagined and, hence, unreal.⁹² For example, the word cow used for cowness (meaning) is different from the word 'cow' used for 'cowherd'. As these words are same and alike, they are taken as the same by resemblance.

(iii) *Vaiyākaraṇa's View*

Vaiyākaraṇas attach importance to both of the above views for the explanation of meaning of a word acquired by grammatical analysis of an expression. '*Vārttikakāra* Kātyāyana has written the *Vārttika ekatvādakārasya siddham*'⁹³ in favour of unity of a word, if it is used for different meanings on the one hand and the *vārttika* '*ānyabhābyam tu kāla śabdavyavāyāt*'⁹⁴ in support of plurality of word on the other hand.

Bhartṛhari explains the grounds for accepting plurality of word and meaning from the point of views of '*śabda-ekatvavāda*' and '*śabdanānātvavāda*' as well. An account of his interpretation in the light of commentators is given as follows:

1. Explanation of the Problem of Plurality of Word and Meaning from the Outlook of *Śabda-ekativavāda*

According to this view, the same word, by *Śabdopacāra* and *arthopacāra*, conveys many meanings. The word does not change with the difference of several meanings it conveys.

(i) *Śabdopacāra*

The idea of primary and secondary meanings is based on distinction made on the basis of currency of the word. Both 'cowness' and 'cowherd' are meanings of the same word 'cow'. The difference between them is that the word 'cow' is popularly used for 'cow' and unpopularly for 'cowherd'. With the difference of popularity and unpopularity of the use of a word, the same word is taken as the conveyor of different meanings. The word does not, actually become many if it is treated differently on the basis of popularity and unpopularity of its uses.⁹⁵

(ii) *Arthopacāra*

The logic behind assuming *arthopacāra*, as the cause of many meanings of a word, is based on *Vaiyākaraṇas'* assumption 'any word can convey any meaning'. *Śabdopacāra* treats a word as different on the basis of its popular and unpopular transactions. Now, if *śabdopacāra* is accredited for many meanings, the fallacy of irregular relation between a word and its meanings may arise that cannot be solved if *arthopacāra* is not accepted. The *śabda* (word) and the *upacarita-śabda* convey *artha* (meaning) and the *upacārithārtha* respectively and hence, there is no occasion for the fallacy of irregular relation or for accepting a meaning without a word, and vice versa. In *śabdopacāra*, *śabda* is approached differently while in *arthopacāra*, meaning is approached differently. According to the commentator Puṇyarāja, *arthopacāra* is of two kinds:⁹⁶ (1) *Svarūpopacāra* and (2) *Vāhyārthopacāra*.

(i) *Svarūpopacāra*

According to those who consider the form of the word as the meaning

of the word, the cause of many meanings of a word is the attribution of the form (meaning) to some other form similar to the given form, and, thus, the meaning of the word is reversed or changed. The word 'cow' denotes its form 'cow' and, if otherwise, this given form is *attributed* to cowherd (*bāhika*) on account of similarity in voraciousness, dullness, carrying of loads, etc., or any one of them.⁹⁷ Thus, the word remains the same; only its treatment is different. The primary and the secondary of meanings are decided on the basis of the use of word for popular or unpopular form. If the word stands for the popular form, it denotes the primary meaning of the word and the secondary meanings is implied consequently on the basis of primary meaning.

(ii) *Vāhyārthopacāra*

The meaning of the word, according to this view, is that the word expresses and the word expresses universal. The word cow (*gauḥ*) expresses 'cowness' which is sometimes imposed on cowherd (*bāhika*) by resemblance. Cowness is the primary and cowherd (cowness imposed) is the secondary meaning of the word (cow).⁹⁸ In both of the cases, the meaning of the word 'cow' is the same (cowness). The difference between the two is that 'cowness' is expressed in the former while imposed in the latter. The word, in all of its uses, remains the same and only its meaning is treated differently.

2. Explanation of the Problem of Plurality of a Word and Meaning from the Point of View of *Śabda-nānātvavādins*

Śabda-nānātvavādins, unlike *śabda-ekatvavādins*, assume plurality of word if used for different meanings.⁹⁹ For example, the word 'Hari' in *Sanskrit*, is used for deities—*Viṣṇu*, *Śiva*, *Yama*, *Indra*, for human person like Bhartṛhari, for animals like lion, monkey, frog, etc., and for qualities like—green, greenish-yellow, reddish-brown, etc. The word 'hari' used for God 'viṣṇu' is different from the word 'hari' used for God 'Indra' and so on. In all uses the word serves as the expresser (*vācaka*) of independent meaning (*vācya*). The word cow is an independent expresser of cowness and again separate from the word 'cow' used for 'cowherd' (*bāhika*) that is considered by *nānātvavādins*

as another expresser of the expressed 'bāhīka'. For this view, the unity of the word, in its several uses, is imagined on account of resemblance and, hence, unreal.¹⁰⁰

In order to illustrate the significance of this theory, in explaining certain expressions of the *Vedas*, Bhartṛhari has given an instance of 'Sāmidheni hymns' of which the repeated hymns are considered to be original; they function independently from other *sāmidhenis* involved in a *sāmidheni* sacrifice.¹⁰¹ It may be asked, if the same hymn, in its repeated recitations, is taken to be different, can the repeated hymn be accepted an original (*vedic*) hymn? Clarifying the position of *nānātvavādins*, Bhartṛhari says that in each recitation, the hymn is a different word revealing different meaning. For example, the hymn of the deity sun (*saṁvitā*) apparently appears to be one but originally it is different, i.e. one is employed for sanctification, another for praying the deity sun, and still another is employed for *japa* (reciting in a contemplative manner).¹⁰² As the hymns are similar and alike, the unity among them resembles, but the hymn is a different expresser (*vācaka*), if used for a different expressed (*vācya*). On account of the popular and unpopular uses of the hymn, its primary and secondary meanings are distinguished.¹⁰³

3. EXPLANATION OF THE PLURALITY OF MEANING FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SENTENTIALISTS

Sententialists assume that a complete or unit meaning is expressed by a sentence, that is the indivisible unit of communication, and not by an isolated word. If a complete meaning is revealed simply by a letter or a word, in that case, it also serves as a sentence. For example, a single word, if implied with the verb 'to be' is sentence.¹⁰⁴ If addressing a singer someone asks: who is singing and the other replies 'A', the word 'A' stands for 'A is singing', and, hence, a complete sentence because a complete meaning is revealed by that single letter. Words are acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence, and the analyzed words, in grammar, are also treated as independent meaning conveying units. On the basis of beginninglessness of the use of words, their meanings are considered fixed. A fixed meaning of a word is that which it revealed directly in the mind after hearing the utterances. If the word, analysed from the sentence, is accepted as a meaningful unit, the meaning that it reveals (may be universal or

individual) is distinguished as the primary meaning of a word and others, known consequently by implication, are secondary.

After clarifying the distinction of primary and secondary meaning, Bhartṛhari discusses the grounds for determination of the intended or secondary-meaning (*gauṇārtha*) of a word in a sentence but before coming to an observation of those grounds, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the terms '*mukhya*' and '*gauṇa*'. The terms *mukhya* (primary) and *gauṇa* (secondary) are used significantly, by Bhartṛhari, in connection with *mukhya-sattā* (external being) and *gauṇa-sattā* (being figured in the mind of words) respectively. These words, in connection with the meanings of a word – *mukhyārtha* (primary or fixed meaning) and *gauṇārtha* (intended meaning) – are used respectively for the fixed meaning of a word and for the meaning known out of association of other words in a sentence. Secondary meaning is called so because it is subordinated (*gauṇa*) to the primary meaning. Mind is free to use the word for meanings similar to, opposed to, or even reversed to the primary meaning of the word. The intention of the user in using a word for meanings other than the primary holds the primary meaning of the word as base of the use of the word for other (subordinated) meanings. This fact is justified cognitively on the ground that hearer knows intended meaning only if he cognizes not only the expressed (*vācya*) but the intention of the user involved in the use of the words also. Words are not used arbitrarily; communication becomes impossible if the hearer does not know the intention conveyed by the word. The communicative nature of the word plays a role in using and cognizing the meaning of the word. We learn the uses of a word through the observation of its uses by elders, and this may be true for learning all sorts of uses – expressive and intended – though there is cognitive difference in the cognition of these different meanings of the word. The expressive meaning is known as revealed directly by the word and intended meaning is known afterwards by means of implication or by the imposition of primary meaning on the other meaning of the word. Now, it is clear that though a fixed word denotes a fixed meaning, yet human mind is free to use the words differently for different meanings, as per their different allegiances. The different meanings of a word emerging out of resemblance, imposition, implication, etc., are secondary, though these may occupy primary importance in a use. The expressive meaning is revealed directly without

any efforts, and, hence, primary in contrast with those known consequently by inference, etc.

Grounds for the Determination of Secondary/Intended Meanings (Gauṇārtha)

Bhartṛhari has discussed different grounds given by different theorists popular at his time for the determination of the primary and secondary meanings of a word. A brief account of his discussions on determinants of the secondary meanings is given as follows:

1. *Purpose, Situation-context and Proximity of Another Word (Arthaprakaraṇaśabdāntarasannidhāna)*

According to some, meaning is decided on the basis of factors like purpose, context of using a word and its association with meanings of other words of a sentence.¹⁰⁵ The cognition of the intention of the user in using the word and the satiation of the expectancy for a complete unitary meaning are accrued through these factors. For example, the meaning of the word 'cow' in the sentence '*gauḥ paṭhati*' (cow reads) is known by means of the purpose (of referring a dull and foolish cowherd = *bāhika*), situation context (reading) and the proximity of the word with another word (*paṭhati* = person who reads). In other words, the meaning 'cowherd' is not spontaneously revealed or expressed by the word 'cow' as it reveals cowness. Cowherd is known by the efforts made on the basis of the expressed of the word 'cow', and, hence, secondary. A primary meaning, in this view, is that which is expressed by the word directly without any logical effort or reasoning.¹⁰⁶

2. *Base and Based (Nimitta-nimitti)*

The fixed meaning of a word that serves as the base (*Nimitta*) of other meanings is primary, and, for the theorists, it is expressive meaning. The meaning which is understood on the basis of expressive meaning or which is based on it (*nimitti*) is secondary.¹⁰⁷ For example, the expressive meaning of the word 'cow' is cowness (for universalists) that is imposed on cowherd and, thus, it serves as the basis of the meaning 'a dull and stupid fellow (like cow)' that is secondary meaning (*nimitti*). Bhartṛhari observes this criterion for determining secondary

meaning as inadequate and unsteady, because the meaning of certain words like 'ārāta' and 'purā' cannot be determined on the basis of it. The words 'ārāta' and 'purā' are used in the primary sense for both of the meanings - 'far' and 'near' in time and it can't be said that the meaning 'far' is the base of 'near' and vice versa, and, therefore, there is no determination by differentiating them in terms of the base (*nimitta*) and the based (*nimitti*). On the basis of popularity and contextual derivation, also, sub-ordination of one of the meanings may not be decided, because both the meanings of these words are equally popular.¹⁰⁸

3. *More or Less of degree of the Properties* (*Nyūnādhikyabhāva*)

Those who accept external objects as the denotation of word consider the sense of more or less of the properties of the object indicated by the word as the basis of distinction between primary and secondary meanings. For example, the word 'cow' if used for 'cow' conveys more degree of the properties of the cow like dullness, voraciousness, carrying of loads, etc., and hence, is primary, and if the word 'cow' is used for 'bāhika' it denotes a lesser degree of those properties, and hence, is secondary. Bhartṛhari criticizes the criterion by making a remark that it is not reliable, because in some cases conveyance of less degree of properties is regarded as the popular meaning of the word and in some other uses conveyance of more degree of the properties is found to be unpopular.¹⁰⁹ It is difficult to decide the degree of properties also and the meaning of all words cannot be decided on the basis of degrees, because all words do not denote degree.

4. *Similarity (Sādṛśya)*

For some, the expressive meaning of a word is primary and the meaning emerged by imposition of primary on other meanings is secondary. For example, the denotation of the word 'cow' is cowness, and, hence, primary. On account of some similarity (in dullness, etc.), the meaning of the word 'cow', i.e. 'cowness' is imposed on 'cowherd', which is taken as the secondary meaning of the word 'cow'. A word, according to the theory, is considered pluri-vocal on account of imposition of primary meaning of it on other meanings by means of similarity and dissimilarity.¹¹⁰

5. *Inversion (Virodha)*

The meaning of a word, used in some sentences, is reversed (*arthaviparyaya*).¹¹¹ For example, the meaning of the word 'great' in the expression 'mercy is not expected from a great man like *Shylock*', is used in inversion (*viparyaya*) and is considered as a secondary meaning of the word 'great'. This inverted meaning is known by implication made on the basis of the reversion of primary meaning revealed by the word.

Puṇyarāja¹¹² has mentioned inversion by imposition and inversion by identification (*adhyavasāya*). According to him, inversion by identification of the meanings may be a ground for a change of meaning, but it may not be the ground for making primary and secondary distinction, because there is no occasion for making such distinction, if other or inverted meaning is identical to the primary meaning. Inversion by imposition (*adhyāropa*) depends upon similarity, as mentioned above (Determinant No. 4). *The distinction of primary and secondary is possible only if there is occasion for separateness of meanings in which one (primary meaning) is imposed on another (secondary) and this is possible only if there is inversion by imposition.*

6. *Form and Potency/Action (Rūpa-śakti)*

It is taken that the word denotes a fixed form (*rūpa*) and action (potency). For example,¹¹³ the word 'cow' denotes the form 'cow' possessing flesh, lap, and the action of carrying loads, etc. The words plough (*hala*), sword (*khaḍga*), and pestle used for clearing rice (*musala*) denote instruments having fixed forms and specific actions using them, but if they are applied for forms and actions different from those for which they are popular, then the meanings they convey are considered secondary.¹¹⁴ For example, the word '*khaḍga*' in the expression, *vanāta bṛhacchṛṅgaḥ khaḍgānīyatām*, bring a *khaḍga*, a wild animal having horns like sword from the forest, conveys a form and power different from that of the popular denotation (sword) of the word '*khaḍga*', and hence, it is the secondary meaning of the word '*khaḍga*'.

The words are used for a fixed form and potency, and if the word is used with the consideration of form (*rūpa*) only, as in the case of the use of the word 'cow' for cow made of clay or wood, its meaning is

decided to be secondary. Similarly, if the word is used with the consideration of power only (and not form) as in the use of the word 'khaḍga' for a wild animal, or even for a knife, the meaning of the word is decided to be secondary.¹¹⁵

Bhartṛhari has raised some technical problems based on grammatical formations of words, the primary and secondary meanings of which cannot be decided on the basis of the grounds discussed above. He, for clarifying the difficulties, takes the words *gauḥ* (cow), *yusmat* (you), *mahat* (great), which express their own meanings, but if the suffix 'cvi' is added to them, they express different meanings. The suffix 'cvi' conveys that it did not exist, but appears to exist now. For example, the word 'go abhavat' in the expression 'agauragauḥabhavat' (which was not cow, but has appeared as cow), the word 'mahat' in the expression 'mahadbhūtaḥ' (which was not great became great) and the word 'tvam' in the expression 'tvadbhavati' (that which was not yours has become yours) express their primary meanings. Now, if a word with (cvi) is different from the one without (cvi) and they express their own (primary) meanings, how can primary and secondary meanings be decided?¹¹⁶

Another difficulty is with the explanation of meanings of name-words conveying the named (*sañjñī*).¹¹⁷ For example, the word 'agnisoma' used in 'dvandva' (copulative compound) expresses the deity *Agnisoma* (*sañjñī*), which is the popular, and, hence, primary meaning of the word. But according to *Pāṇini Sūtra*, 'agneḥ stutstoma somāḥ',¹¹⁸ *ṣatva* (*ṣa*) is used in the compound if it stands for primary meaning.

Now, it may be asked, as the compound 'Agnisoma' is used in the primary sense, there should be the use of *ṣatva* '(*ṣa*)' to form *agnisoma*, but this is not so in the compound *agnisoma*. The next aspect of the problem is: if the word, expressive of the deity, is used for the human individual (*sañjñī*), it conveys the meaning secondarily, and in the case of secondary application of a word, *ṣatva* (*ṣa*) is not applied as per grammatical rule. Now, the question is: if the word 'agnisoma' is used for both the deity and the human individual, and if *ṣatva* (*ṣa*), in either of the uses, is not applied, how can the primary and secondary uses of the word be decided?

Bhartṛhari and his commentator, Puṇyārāja, solve the problem by saying that there are reasons for not applying *ṣatva* (*ṣa*) in either of

the uses of the word. According to *Jaimini Sūtra*, 'gauṇamukho-yoramukhye kārya sampratyayaḥ' that is, if a word is used for many meanings, 'śatva' is applied with the word used for primary meaning. But 'śatva' is not applied with the word, because the word 'agnisoma' is in its original form and 'śatva' according to rule is not applied, if the word is used for secondary meaning. Thus, it is clear that in the former it would not be applied, and in the latter it could not be.

Answering both the difficulties, Bhartṛhari says words, if used for popular meaning, convey primary meaning, and, if the primary meaning is imposed on other meanings, they convey secondary meaning. The case is different in regard with the meaning of name-words like *Deodatta*, the name of a person (*sañjñā*). The word '*Deodatta*' expresses the named and, therefore, conveys the primary meaning. But, if the word '*deo*' or '*datta*' are used for *Deodatta*, they convey the meaning secondarily, because '*Deodatta*' is not expressed by either of words separately. Bhartṛhari remarks¹¹⁹ that as the form of the word changes with the difference of causes (*nimitta*), there should be augment of '*suṭ*' by rule with the word *hariśchandra* (if used for the ancient sage), but *suṭ* (*ś*) is not applied with the word, if it is used for a human individual holding that name. In the latter sense, the form of the word should be *Harichandra*, but this is not the case.

Now, if the same form of word is applied for both the sage and the human individual, how can the primary and secondary of its uses be decided? Bhartṛhari's answer to the questions is: as per *Paṇini Sūtra*, '*praskaṇva hariśchandrā vṛṣī*',¹²⁰ there is augment of *suṭ*, in the word *hariśchandra* used popularly for the sage and the *suṭ* remains with the word, even if the word is used for the name of a human individual, which is not popular, and thus, is the secondary meaning of the word.¹²¹

Besides the grounds mentioned above, Bhartṛhari has mentioned the dull-witted people's criterion for deciding primary and secondary meanings of a word also. This criterion is based on the perception of actual state of affairs, different from their imaginary appearances. He has given a number of instances for clarifying the position. For example,¹²² the word 'water' is used for water that is touched and taken and not for the mirage that cannot be touched or taken. Again the peculiar quality of a rope is to tie, which cannot be performed by snake, the peculiar quality of which is to bite. Similarly, the peculiar quality of a mountain is its hugeness or largeness and if one confronts

it, one is likely to be hit. However, in a mountain showed on a map, these qualities are not observed. The peculiar quality of a rotating wheel is that it may be touched every time it revolves, but the same cannot be possible with reference to an imaginary wheel formed by a revolving torch or light. Again, the peculiar quality of a city is that it is surrounded by ditches, boundaries, etc., but the same cannot be perceived in the case of a celestial city. Finally, the peculiar quality of poison is to cause death if taken orally, but this is not true for the poison taken in a dream. On the basis of these examples, it can be said that the real or actual state of the objects, if conveyed by words, is taken as the primary and their use for imaginary appearance is secondary.

Non - intened meaning (Nāntarīyakārtha)

For *Nāntarīyakārtha*, the terms used by Bhartṛhari are 'anya' (meaning different from primary and secondary) and *avivakṣitārtha* (non-intended meaning known by closeness of the primary meaning). It is his commentator Puṇyarāja who uses the term *nāntarīyakārtha* for such a meaning known by the closeness or nearness of the primary meaning (VP, 2/298-314). Raghunāth Sharma has his full agreement with Puṇyarāja on the use of the word *nāntarīyakārtha* for *avivakṣitārtha* of Bhartṛhari.

Apart from the primary and the secondary meanings, Bhartṛhari has discussed a third category of meaning of the same word which is neither an expressed (*mukhyārtha*) nor the intended (*gauṇārtha*) but non-intended (*avivakṣitārtha*).¹²³ *It is a meaning inseparably connected with the primary meaning of the word (nāntarīyaka) and is known in a use where the expressive and the intended meanings of the word are not expected by the use of the word (iha yatpratipādanāya śabdāḥ prayujyante, tattasya prayojakam mukhyam tat pratipādanāvasare ca sanniddhānādyadanyat pratyāyayati tattasya nāntarīyaka mucyate.* Puṇyarāja (VP, 2/298).

It may be asked, if *nāntarīyakārthas* are non-intended, what is the need to admit them as the meaning of a word? In order to solve the problem one has to observe the trend that Bhartṛhari follows to explain the meaning of words. For him, all meanings are meanings of words and a word expresses all meanings (*sarvesarvārthavācakāḥ*). He does

not accept any other meaning-producing force, such as secondary force (*lakṣaṇa-śakti*) and tertiary or close to primary force (*vyañjanā-śakti*) and explains all kinds of meanings as meanings of the word. The word 'gauḥ' in its intended uses, like 'gauḥ paṭhati' (cow reads), conveys a foolish and dull person, and in its expressive uses like, *gauḥ carati* (cow grazes), it denotes 'cowness'. Other meanings, like gender, number, person, etc. that are closely connected with the primary meaning of the word 'cow' are also revealed by the same word, though, these meanings are left aside, as there is no expectancy for those meanings, in the use of the word. These non-intendeds, the non-expected meanings (*avivakṣitārtha*) of a word are the *nāntarīyakārthas* of the same word. Bhartṛhari has elucidated *nāntarīyakārthas* on the basis of two sorts of instances as stated below:

Instances in the favour of *nāntarīyakārtha*

i. Suggestive (*jñāpaka*)¹²⁴

Apart from the 'pot', which is expected, the lamp enlightens many other objects kept near the pot, viz. the ground on which it is kept, its colour, number, etc., similarly, the word expresses its fixed meaning and the number, gender, person, closely connected with the expressive meaning, are also known to the hearer by the same word, though, they may not be expected in a particular use of the word. The word is an expresser/illuminator and illuminates many meanings, of which that which is taken popularly as fixed is primary and those expected by imposition of that which is primary, are secondary (*gauṇa*), and yet others that are non-expected but known by their nearness to the primary meaning of the word are *nāntarīyakārthas*.

ii. Instrumental (*kāraka*)¹²⁵

As smoke (non-intended) is also produced when two pieces of wood are rubbed for kindling fire, similarly, the word primarily expresses its popular or fixed meaning and other meanings closely connected with it, viz. person, gender, number, etc., which are non-expected (*avivakṣita*) but are also known to the hearer by the word.

In Sanskrit, a word is used always with a suffix (*pratyaya*), and it is difficult to decide which part of the word conveys primary and which

conveys *nāntarīyakārtha*. Some theorists think that the root or stem expresses primary and the suffix conveys *nāntarīyakārthas*—number, gender, person, tense, etc. But, this view is not reasonable, as the primary meaning is never void of its number, etc., and the word with suffix is considered as a unit that conveys a unit meaning comprising number, etc.¹²⁶ *Nāntarīyakas*, being closely connected with the primary meaning expressed by the word, are also known and the word in that case, as Puṇyarāja observes, serves not as expresser but as the indicator (*prayojaka*) of them.

Grounds for the determination of tertiary/non-intended meanings (*Nāntarīyakārtha*)

Bhartṛhari has classified *nāntarīyakārtha* into four kinds and has decided them as meaning of the word accordingly:

(i) *Inversion of the primary and secondary meanings* (*Guṇapradhānatāviparyaya*)

In some uses, the primary and secondary meanings of a word are inverted, because the verb in those cases is used in the sense of *taddhita*, and as a result, the primary and the secondary meanings of them are not expected primarily, and, thus, the gender, number, person, tense, etc., are exchanged.

According to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, the meaning of the verb is considered as primary and the accessories – agent, etc. – are taken as secondary, but as there is no expectancy for primary and secondary meaning of the words '*ākṣika*' and '*dīvyati*' in the expression '*akṣaira dīvyati*', there is inversion of meaning of these words. In other words, the verb (*dīvyati*) in the expression '*akṣaira dīvyati*' is secondary and the agent (*ākṣika* – the person who plays with dice) is primary. As the agent is primary in the use and the verb is secondary, there is exchange of primary and secondary that results out of the non-expectancy of the primary and secondary meanings of the words '*ākṣika*' (agent) and *dīvyati* (verb). Thus, the meaning of a word that is not expected in a use is taken as *nāntarīyakārtha* known by the inversion of the sense of primary and secondary.¹²⁷

(ii) *Non-expectancy of certain part* (Padārthaikadeśāvivakṣā)

Just as a fish-eater, though he eats the flesh and throws away the scales and bones, does not bring a fish without its scales and bones, which are inseparably associated with it, similarly, a word expresses its primary meaning and other meanings like gender, number, person, time, etc., which are not expected in the use of the word, are known on account of their close proximity to the primary meaning.¹²⁸

(iii) *Non-expectancy of the complete meaning of the word* (Sakalapadārthāvivakṣā)

In some uses, expressive meaning of a word is not expected (avivakṣita). In such cases, the meaning associated with the primary meaning is taken as the meaning of the word. For example, the primary meaning of the word 'ardhahrasvam' (half of a short vowel) in the sūtra 'tasyādita udāttamardhahrasvam',¹²⁹ is not expected, and, so the non-stated meaning (long and prolonged vowel) apart from short vowel (mātrā), is also taken as the meaning of the word.

(iv) *Implication of the meaning closely connected with the primary meaning* (Upātta padārthā parityāgenaivānyārthopalakṣaṇa)

In some uses, the primary meaning of the word is not given up, even though other non-stated/non-intended meanings, inseparably connected with the primary meaning, are understood by implication made on the basis of primary meaning of the word. For example, the primary meaning of the word 'sun' in the expression 'gantavyam dṛśyatām sūryaḥ'¹³⁰ (see, the sun sets), is not given up but non-stated meaning 'time' (connected with sun), is understood by implication (upalakṣaṇa). Similarly, upaghātaka sāmānya (destroyers in general – cat, dog, etc.), is the nāntarīyakārtha known by implication made on the basis of the expressive meaning of the word 'crow' used in the expression 'kākebhyo rakṣyatām sarpisaḥ'¹³¹ (protect the curd from the crow). In some cases, many meanings-non-expected, non-intended but closely connected with the primary meaning of the word, are understood. For example,¹³² washing the plates, cleaning the pots, hands, etc., though non-stated by the word 'bhojanam' in the expression

'*bhojanamasypapādyatām*' (give food to him), are also understood, as they are accessories to, and, hence closely connected with the act of serving food.

It may be asked, if the meaning is what the words express non-differently in the mind, or if it is a being of awareness in nature, how can the primary – secondary distinctions of meanings be possible? The meaning of the word will always be in a primary status, as the meaning revealed in the mind of the hearer is that for which the word is naturally fit. Though meaning is a being, yet the distinction of meanings can be made on the basis of popularity and unpopularity, revealed and imposed status of them, and, the cognition of the intention involved in the uses of a word helps in deciding the meaning conveyed by the very use of the word. Words, when used, function as the limitor of the specific meaning, for the communication of which the speaker intends to use the word.

Concluding the whole discussion, it can rightly be remarked that Bhartṛhari's trend of observing the problem of plurality of meanings of words is based on *Vaiyākaraṇas*' assumption that 'all meanings are meanings of a word'. The *Vaiyākaraṇas*' thesis of 'a fixed (*niyata*) word denotes a fixed (*niyata*) meaning' on the one hand, and, that 'any word expresses any meaning' (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*) on the other hand, may seem to be dichotomous for those who are not well-versed with Bhartṛhari's trend of looking at meaning as communicative being. Indian rhetorics has a different approach to the problem. It explains the problem of many meanings by assuming three different powers, independent of each other, in a word. According to rhetoric, the literal-meaning is known by *abhidhā-śakti* (literal-power) of the word, and, if it is not intended in a use, the secondary power (*lakṣaṇā-śakti*) operates for secondary meaning, and, if both the meanings are not fit for the context, the third power *vyanjanā-śakti* (close to primary-power) functions for a suggestive-meaning. They accept even such a meaning that is not the meaning of the word used but known through purpose, etc., independently of the words used in the expression.

Bhartṛhari is allergic to the idea that there is a meaning without a word. There is no justification for accepting subordination of secondary and suggestive power to literal power of the word, if all the three powers (*abidhā*, etc.) of a word are independent of each

other. All meanings are meanings of the word and then if, their primary and secondary nature is taken to be decided on the basis of factors like similarity, etc., there is no logical necessity for accepting these powers in a word to interpret the problem of different meanings. If each of the powers of a word does not operate independently, then there is no need for accepting these powers, and it is useless to assume secondary and suggestive forces for interpreting the meanings other than the expressive meaning conveyed by the word. If these powers are accepted for interpreting different meanings conveyed by a word, a confusion regarding the operation of these forces may arise, because, then, it would be difficult to decide which force is at work in a particular use of the word. The decision of the force at work by inference is an unnecessary assumption, and, if accepted, it may lead to a painful consequence reducing verbal cognition to cognition by inference which is not acceptable to a philosopher like Bhartṛhari, for whom all cognition is intertwined with language, which itself is the power.

The problem of plurality of meanings arises only if the meaning of a word is identified as its expressive meaning. As the word is not the illuminator of its fixed or given denotation only but of others also the fact of many meanings of a word cannot be denied.

For Bhartṛhari, the word is a power itself, a light which is self-luminous and illuminates meanings out of which that *which is revealed directly is understood as popularly expressed or given meaning, and, others, cognized consequently by efforts made on the basis of the given meaning, are taken as implied meaning. Apart from the given meaning, the meaning known consequently by efforts is also divided into two: gauṇārtha (secondary) and nāntarīyakārtha (closely connected with the primary meaning).* For a philosopher like Bhartṛhari, for whom, cognition is cognition revealed non-differently by language, the difference between the latter two of the meanings is very clear. Primary meaning is expressed and hence basic while secondary is an intended meaning of the word. That is secondary because it is a meaning known by imposition of primary meaning of the word. *In cases primary and secondary meanings of a word are not intended in a use, the meaning inseparably connected with the primary meaning is taken as the nāntarīyakārtha of the word.*

It is clear, now, that Bhartṛhari feels no need to accept three separate kinds of forces independently of each other in order to explain the different meanings of a word. The word itself is a force, a power that expresses all sorts of meaning.

The word illuminates all of its meanings but as human mind does not grasp them all simultaneously, the meaning of the same word is known to be different (*mukhya*, *gauṇa* and *nāntarīyaka*) on account of the differences involved in their cognition. The given meaning of the word (*mukhyārtha*) is revealed directly in the mind by the word. Secondary meaning is known afterwards by implication made on the basis of the primary meaning, and, if both of them, primary and secondary meanings, are not expected in the use of the word, the meaning not expected but inseparably connected with or close to the primary meaning is known by consequent efforts. This analysis of meaning is based on how the words are used in ordinary communication and even a seer or a sage, who is *lakṣaīkacakṣuṣka*, cannot ignore these facts of communication.

The word is the *expresser* and the use of word functions as a limiter of a specific meaning and, that, on account of different intentions involved in the use, the word serves as the limiter of different meanings. *It is not intention that serves as the cause of meanings because only word is the cause of meanings. The intention involved in the use of word plays the role of specifying the meaning of a word in a use.* The freedom of human mind lies not in creating or producing meanings of a word, but in knowing them. One's mind is free to use the word for any of its meanings (*mukhya*, *gauṇa* or *nāntarīyaka*) as per his expectancy and the hearer cognizes that specific meaning by cognizing the expressive meaning and the intention of the speaker involved in the use.

One cannot understand Bhartṛhari's discussion on meanings of a word without knowing his trend of explaining different meanings of a word. Where there is a case of change of meaning of a word, Bhartṛhari does not admit it as a case of transfer of the meaning of word, but a case of imposition of the fixed meaning of the word on other meanings. The meaning is primary, if the word is used for popularly fixed and secondary if it is used for meanings other than the former or if the

former meaning of the word is imposed on other meanings by similarity etc.. If we do not confine ourselves to the popularly fixed meaning or expressive meaning of the word, the distinction of implied, intended, non-intended meanings will not be possible and then communication, which is based on these specific distinctions, will not be explained. It may be true for a *lakṣāikacakṣuṣka* (realizer of the word-principle) that one word (*sphoṭa*) illuminates all meanings to him. It may also be added that, as we (*lakṣaṇaika*) know the popularly fixed meaning of a word as revealed without any effort, *lakṣāikacakṣuṣka* knows all meanings as revealed by a word without any effort, i.e., by implication, etc. But that is of no use for explaining communication (*vyavahāra*),¹³³ for which the scheme of plurality of meaning of a word is real and cognitively justified.

Fifteen Determinants of Meaning of a Word in a Context

The Problem

While discussing Bhartṛhari's concept of primary, secondary and non-expected meanings of a word in a sentence it has been clarified that a word, for Bhartṛhari, is a force of awareness in nature and, hence, it can illuminate all meanings (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*) grossly identified and classified as primary, secondary and non-intended meaning. The primary meaning of a word is popularly fixed by convention. Communication by means of words has beginningless convention. The expressive or fixed-meaning is revealed by *sphoṭa* in the mind just after its manifestation by utterances/noises. This meaning is the expressive-meaning of the word. The expressive-meaning serves as the ground for the cognition of secondary/intended and non-intended meanings. If the expressive-meaning of a word, in a sentence, is not conveyed, its secondary/intended and non-expected meaning are decided on the basis of its expressive-meaning with the help of factors like similarity, etc., as we have discussed earlier under the topic '*mukhyārtha*, *gauṇārtha* and *nāntarīyakārtha*'. But, the problem of determination of the very specific meaning of the word still arises because of the fact that a word in a use can convey a number of intended (*gauṇārthas*) and non-expected (*nāntarīyakārthas*) meanings. To clarify more specifically, we can say that the fixed-meaning of a word is

revealed in the mind directly by the word. If the expressive-meaning is not conveyed, its intended-meaning is looked for by the imposition of primary meanings. If both of the expressive and intended-meanings are not conveyed to that use of the word in the sentence, non-intended meanings of the word are decided on the basis of its closeness or nearness with the primary-meaning of the word. The issue: what is that specific intended and non-intended/non-expected meaning for which the word is used, is left still unresolved. Determination of that very specific-meaning requires some factors concerning communication. It is remarkable to note here that those factors function for determination of those meanings on the basis of primary meaning and not of inference or memory.

The very specific meaning of the word, used in the sentence, cannot be decided only on the basis either of the form of the word or of the very general meaning or expressive-meaning of the word, because the form of the word may remain fixed in all its different uses. Even, in the use of the word in a sentence, the form remains the same and the same form conveys different meanings.

Though Bhartṛhari accepts intended, non-intended meanings of a word, he does not accept forces like *lakṣaṇā* (secondary force of a word) and *vyañjanā* (tertiary force of a word) as explanation of meanings different from the expressive-meaning of the word. The trend of his philosophy of language as communicative being explains different meanings of a word on the basis of fixed or primary meanings of the word. We have already clarified that intended meaning, for Bhartṛhari, is primary meaning imposed by similarity and other factors on other meaning. Non-intended meanings are known by the nearness to the primary meaning and the primary meaning itself is that revealed directly and non-differently by language (*sphoṭa*). Different determinants serve as factors helpful only in the implication of the specific intended or non-intended-meaning of the word in a use.

In *kārikās* 314 to 316, Bhartṛhari has mentioned different determinants for deciding the specific intended and intended meaning of a word in a sentence. An account of the different determinants in the light of commentaries may be given as follows:

1. Vākyāta (*The sentence of which the word is a part*)

The word and the meaning of the word are units acquired by the grammatical analysis of the indivisible sentence and of sentential-meaning and it is the cognition of the complete meaning of a sentence on the basis of which the meaning of a word, used in the sentence, is determined. Syntactically, a complete sentence, comprising words—nominative, verb, accessories, etc., is defined as a synthesis of qualified and qualifiers. Whether a word in a sentence stands in capacity of a qualifier or of a qualified is decided on the basis of the structure of the complete sentence. On the basis of the cognitive and syntactical ground of a complete sentence, the meaning of a word used in a sentence is determined. This is what Bhartṛhari, perhaps, wants to say by the use of term 'vākyāta'. In order to make the point clear, Puṇyārāja has given the example of the word, 'bhīṣma' used in the sentence. 'kaṭam karoti bhīṣmamudāramdarśanīyam'¹³⁴ (he makes an astounding and affable mat). The word 'bhīṣma' is popularly used for the invincible patron of the ancient empire *Hastināpur*, and a chief character of the epic *Mahābhārata*. The word 'bhīṣma' in the sentence, under example, is not used as a substantive but as an adjective that qualifies the object 'mat' (*kaṭam*) qualifying the action 'makes' (*karoti*). The sentence itself helps to decide the meaning of the word 'bhīṣma' as a quality of the mat being constructed. Similarly the word 'karma' is generally used for 'action' but in the *sūtra* 'karmanidvītyā',¹³⁵ it stands for accusation, which is decided by the *sūtra* itself.

2. Prakaraṇa (*Context*)

Context is not the meaning of a word used in a sentence and the meaning, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is always the meaning of a word. The word is a power, and it can be used differently in accordance with the expectancy of the speaker involved in the use of the word. For example, the word 'saindhava' in the sentence 'saindhavamānaya' (bring the *saindhava*) expresses those belonging to the *sindha* region, in general, and the 'horse' and 'sandhava-lavaṇa' (salt) as well, in particular. It is difficult to decide the specific meaning for which the word 'saindhava' in an expression is used. This cannot be decided. Only by the form of the word (*saindhava*) it cannot be decided. It is the context of the use of the word in the sentence that helps in deciding the specific meaning of the word 'saindhava': If the aforesaid sentence

is uttered by one at lunch, the hearer understands 'salt' by the word 'saindhava', but if it is spoken by one proceeding for a war, the hearer understands 'horse' as the intended meaning of the word. According to *Mīmāṃsakas*, the context helps the implication of the meaning for which the word is not spoken, but according to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, context is not a meaning-conveying unit. A meaning-conveying unit, for them, is always a word. It is not true to say that the meaning 'pidhehi' or 'udghātaya' (shut or open) is known by implication on the basis of the context of using the word 'dvāram', which alone is spoken. According to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, the meaning 'pidhehi' or 'udghātaya' is known by the word 'dvāram' in accordance with the context of winter or summer. In *Vyākaraṇa*, the meaning of the word 'karaṇa' in the *sūtra* 'kartṛkaraṇyostṛtīyā'¹³⁶ is a 'means' to 'an action' and if the word is used in the context of 'śabda vair kalahābhra kaṇva meghebhyaḥ karaṇe' the meaning of 'karaṇa' is action. Thus, whether the meaning of the word 'karaṇa' is 'means' or 'action' is decided on the basis of the context of its use. However, both of the meanings are the meanings of the word itself.

3. *Artha (The Meaning of another word of the sentence)*

The meaning of another word of the sentence sometimes helps in determining the meaning of a word. The word 'artha' is used for the meaning expressed by other words of the sentence and, hence, it should not, here, be taken for 'purpose'. In order to clarify Puṇyarāja¹³⁷ has given the example of the expressions 'añjalīnā juhōti' and 'añjalīnā sūryamupaṭiṣṭhate', in which the meaning of the word 'añjalīnā' is decided on the basis of the meaning of other words (*juhōti* and 'sūryamupaṭiṣṭhate' respectively) used in the sentence. It is the meaning of the word 'juhōti' (offer alms to fire = *tejas*), on the basis of which the word 'añjalīnā' in the expression 'añjalīnā juhōti' is understood as a particular sort of cup formed by folding hands and, in the expression 'añjalīnā sūryamupaṭiṣṭhate', it is known as another sort of cupped and folded hands.

4. *Aucitya (Propriety)*

A word may be used for many meanings, and, in a particular use, the fitness of its use in a sentential structure determines its meaning. An action is to be associated with a particular means fit for the

accomplishment of that action. Puṇyārāja¹³⁸ says that it is propriety on the basis of which the meaning 'praise' or otherwise by a sentence is decided. He gives the example of the verse '*yaśca nimbam paraśunām yaścainam madhusarpiṣā, yaścainam gandhamālyābhyām sarvasya kaṭureva ca.*'¹³⁹ It is the propriety of the means, that is an axe, honey and flower-garland, on the basis of which they are taken as associated with their respective actions, that is cutting, irrigating and offering. The meaning of the above verse is 'unaltered conduct of a mean person towards the wicked and the saint', and this condemnation is known by the propriety of the use of words, in that very syntactical structure.

5. *Deśa (Place)*

In some cases, 'place' also serves as a factor in the determination of the meaning of a word used in a sentence. For example, the meaning of the word '*Hari*' in the sentence '*Hariḥ dvārikāyām*' (*Hari* in *Dvārikā*) is known as Kṛṣṇa and not the other meanings, because of the place (*Dvārikā*), which is popularly known as the kingdom of Kṛṣṇa. In the sentence '*Hariḥ amarāvatyām*' (*Hari* in *Amarāvati*), the word *Hariḥ* means 'Indra', which is decided on the basis of the place (*Amarāvatyām*, the kingdom of Indra). The same word in the expression '*Hariḥ āraṇye*' (*Hari* in the forest) means a 'lion' that lives in the forest. Even when the particular place is not indicated in an expression, the indication by direction helps to locate the meaning. For example, in the expression '*Mathurāyāḥ prācīnādudīcīnāt nagarāt-gacchāmi*'¹⁴⁰, a particular place is not named, but the mention of the direction 'north-east from Mathurā' helps to determine the meaning of the word '*nagarāta*' as Pātaliputra (now Patnā), which is a popular place located north-east of Mathurā.

6. *Kāla (Time)*

The same word uttered at different times conveys different meanings, and the cognition of time facilitates knowledge of the specific meaning of the word uttered at a particular time. For example, the meaning of the word '*pataṅga*' in the expression '*dṛṣyatām pataṅgaḥ*', if uttered in day-time is known as referring to the 'sun', but if uttered during the night, the hearer cognizes a moth 'near the lamp'. Similarly, if it is a summer-day, the word '*dvāram*' means 'open the door', and if it is

winter, 'shut the door' is decided as the meaning of the single-word expression, 'dvāram'.

7. *Saṁsarga (Association)*

The meaning of a word is decided on the basis of its association with another word. For example, the word 'Rāma' is popularly used for the hero of the epic *Rāmāyana*, written by sage *Vālmīki*, but if it is associatedly used with *paraśu* = *Paraśurāma*, or with *lakṣmaṇa* = *Rāmalakṣmaṇau*, their meanings are decided as 'the son of *Jamadāgni* and *Rāma*, elder brother of *Lakṣmaṇa*' respectively. *Puṇyarāja* gives the example of the word 'dhenu', the meanings of which are decided differently with the association of other words. Generally, the word 'dhenu' means a cow that gives milk, but if it is associated with the words *sakiśorā* (*sakiśorādhenuḥ*), *savatsā* (*savatsādhenuḥ*) *savarkarā* (*savarkarādhenuḥ*), *sakarbhā* (*sakarbhādhenuḥ*), their meanings are decided respectively as a mare, cow, she-goat and she-camel that gives milk, on the basis of their association.

8. *Viprayoga (Dissociation)*

The issue of dissociation significantly arises only in the cases where association is observed previously, for example, the association of a calf with 'cow' is known by the word 'dhenuḥ' (*savatsādhenuḥ*). By the rule of dissociation, the word *dhenuḥ* in the expression 'avatsādhenuḥ' conveys the meaning a cow without its calf. Similarly, the meaning of the word 'dhenuḥ' in expressions like 'akiśorādhenuḥ', 'abarkarādhenuḥ', 'akarbhādhenuḥ', is decided respectively as mare, she goat, she camel without their kids, by the dissociation of different words popularly linked with the word *dhenu*. Again, if someone calls 'avarkarā dhenuḥ ānīyatām' (bring the she-goat without kid), the hearer takes it for bringing the 'she goat' without its kid.

9. *Sāhacarya (Resemblance)*

Resemblance means companionship. For example, the word *Rāma* is used in its companionship with *Lakṣmaṇa* (*Rāmalakṣmaṇau*), *Keśava* (*Rāmakeśavau*) and 'Paraśa' (*Paraśurām*) respectively, and it is its companionship with other words on the basis of which its meaning is decided as 'Rāma' the elder brother of *Lakṣmaṇa*, 'Balarāma' the elder

brother of *Kṛṣṇa* and *Paraśurāma* as one who holds the 'paraśu' (a special kind of weapon).

In usual communication, the meaning 'ox' is known by its resemblance to the word 'godvitīyam' (next one of the cow) when the sentence 'go dvitīyamānaya' is uttered. Thus, *sāhacarya* also serves as the deciding factor of the meaning of a word used in a sentence.

10. *Virodha* (Opposition)

Opposition, in some cases, serves as a factor in the determination of the meaning of a word in a sentence. On the basis of opposition, *Paraśurāma* (the son of *Jamadāgni* who killed *Sahasrābāhu*) is known by the word *Rāma* in the use '*Rāmārjuna*' and similarly if the word *Arjuna* is used along with the word *Karṇa* then *Arjuna*, the hero of the epic *Mahābhārata*, and not a tree, is known by opposition.

11. *Liṅga* (Indication by Another Expression)

The meaning of a word in an expression is determined on the basis of 'liṅga' also. *Puṇyarāja* elucidates¹⁴¹ that the meaning of the word 'aktāḥ' (drenched with) in the expression 'aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti' (he places soaked pebbles around the sacrificial place) as drenched with clarified butter is cognized on the basis of indication made in another expression 'tejo vai ghṛtam' (clarified butter is ablaze). Similarly, what animal should be sacrificed is not clear by the word 'paśum' in the expression 'paśumālabhet', and it is by indication by the other expression 'chāgsya haviṣo-vapayamadasaḥ' the meaning of the word 'paśum' is cognized as 'chāga' (a he-goat).

12. *Sabdāntara Sannidhāna* (Proximity of Another Word)

The meaning of a word is determined, in some cases, on the basis of syntactical proximity of it with another word. For example, the meaning of the word 'gauḥ' as a foolish or stupid-fellow is cognized by its proximity with the word 'paṭhati' (reads) in the expression 'gauḥ paṭhati'. *Puṇyarāja* has cited the examples of such expressions as '*Arjunaḥ kṛtāvīryaḥ*' and '*Rāmojamadāgnyaḥ*', in which the specific meanings of the word '*Arjuna*' and '*Rāma*' are determined by the

proximity of words *kārtavīryaḥ* and '*Jamadāgnyaḥ*' as *sahasrābāhu* and *Paraśurāma* respectively.

13. *Sāmarthya* (Capacity)

Śakti (power) is meant by the word '*sāmarthya*'. This power, for some, is to be found in the things outside and for others it is the power of words. A word is a power and it is added with a specific power when associated with other words. Implications of capacity (*sāmarthya*) are discussed in Chapter VII. The words '*anudarā*', by its capacity in the expression '*anudarā kanyā*', conveys a virgin having a slender waist. In *Vyākaraṇa*, the word *samāsa* (compound) is used for compound and for the *sūtra* (rule) of the compound as well, and it is the capacity of the word '*samāsa*' in *sūtra* '*prathamānirdiṣṭam samāsa upasarjanam*'¹⁴², on the basis of which the meaning 'rules of compound' is known by the word '*samāsa*' (compound).

14. *Vyakti* (Gender)

Puṇyarāja has taken the word '*vyakti*' for *liṅga* (gender) and has explained that the gender of the word used in a sentence also helps the determination of its meaning. For example, the meaning of the word '*ardham*' (half) in neuter gender (*ardhamanapuṃsakam-Pāṇini-2/2/273*) is determined as equal division (*sampravibhāga*), but when used in the masculine gender, as in the expression '*tam grāmasya ardham labhate*', its meaning on account of its gender (masculine) is cognized as a certain portion of the village (*grāmaika deśamātram*) but, if taken in neutral-gender, it means '*sampravibhāga*' (equal division of the village).

15. *Svara* (Accent)

The accent of the word involved in uttering also helps in the determining the meaning of the word. For example, we take the popular expression '*Indraśatruvardhasva*'. If the accent is there on the former word '*Indra*' it conveys the meaning *Indra*—the killer, but if the accent is there on the next word '*śatru*', it conveys the sense 'enemy of *Indra*'.

In addition to the factors mentioned above, Bhartṛhari has elucidated some other determinants of the meaning of a word in a use.

An account of some of them may be given as follows:

1. The word *prati*, *gati*, *upa*, *ati*, etc., are used as both *upasarga* (prefix) and *karmapravacanīya* (post-position), and a distinct cognition of them helps in determination of their meanings in respective uses. The distinction of 'na' and 'ṇa' also helps in determining the meaning of a word. For example, the words, '*pranāyaka*' and '*praṇāyaka*' may be confused, if the distinction of 'na' and 'ṇa' involved in the articulation of them is not followed properly. '*Pranāyaka*' means destitute of a leader or guide and '*praṇāyaka*' means 'chief leader, or commander'.¹⁴³

2. According to Bhartṛhari, there are many words that are used as both substantive and verb, and their difference is decided on the basis of factors like context, etc. For example, the word '*aśva*' as a substantive is used for 'horse' but as verb formed by √*śvi* in the past-tense by derivation '*ṭuośvigativṛdhayoḥ*'¹⁴⁴ means 'swelled or increased'.

In the Pāṇinian system of grammar, the word, from a semantic point of view, is observed from two different perspectives: (1) *Avyutpanna* (constant) and *Vyutpanna* (derivative). From the former perspective, the meaning of a word is taken as fixed. From the point of view of *avyutpannatā*, the expressive-meaning of a word is popularly taken as the fixed-meaning of the word and from the point of view of *vyutpannatā* (derivation), the same word is treated differently for different meaning. Derivative or interpretative meaning of a word is based on the freedom of human mind. Although the meaning of a word is fixed, yet human-mind is free to interpret and use the word according to different allegiances to different meanings. According to Bhartṛhari, the fixed meaning, cognitively, serves as the basis of the treatment of the word differently for different meaning. As these different meanings are known by implication made on the basis of fixed or primary meaning, the cognition of different meanings by the same word cannot be taken as a psychological phenomena. It has a cognitive ground. They are known on the basis of the cognition of the expressive-meaning of the word.

However, one thing can be said with certainty that Bhartṛhari's philosophy interprets the issue of different meanings of a word on the basis of primary or fixed meaning of the word revealed in the mind. There is no problem in determining the meaning of a word in a sentence,

if the word is used for its primary or expressive-meaning. The problem of the determination of the meaning of a word arises only if the expressive-meaning of a word is not conducive in that use. Secondary and non-intended meanings of the word are known by imposition of primary meaning and by closeness to the primary meaning of the word respectively. What specific meaning (*gauṇārtha* or *nāntarīyakārtha*) of a particular word, in a given use, should be taken, is decided on the basis of the factors as mentioned above.

An evaluation of the nature and functions performed by the aforementioned determinants, suggests that these factors comprise certain psychological, grammatical, syntactic and semantic grounds and are helpful in the determination of the contextual-meaning of a word in a language. Moreover, meaning, for Bhartṛhari, is always the meaning of a word and other factors are only instrumental in deciding the specific intended or non-intended meaning of the word in a sentence. Context is not a meaning-expressing unit, though it helps in the determination of contextual-meaning. Thus, it is apparent from the discussion made in earlier pages that Bhartṛhari's philosophy of contextual-meaning of a word should not be observed either from the angle of the *Naiyāyikas* or from the western view of contextual-meaning, which considers context in some cases as a meaning-conveying force.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Sanisarge, sansargavaśādvīṣeṣā vasthite padārthe ca vākyārthe'bhihitān vayah. Sansṛṣṭe kriyāyām cānvitābhīdhānam... Prayojane tvabhihitānvaya eva. Pratibhāyām tvaikarasaiva pratipattiriti na tatra kācid abhihitānvayānvitābhīdhāna carcā*, Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/1-2.
2. *Śabdasyanavibhāgo'sti kuto'rthasyabhaviṣyati. vibhāgaiḥ prakriyābhedamavidvān pratipadyate*, VP, 2/13.
3. *Pratyātmavṛtti siddhā*, VP, 2/144.
4. *Vyavahārāya manyante śāstrārtha prakriyā yataḥ*, VP, 2/232.
5. VP. 1/123.
6. *Sarvabhedānugūṇyam tu sāmānyamapare, viduḥ tadarthāntara sanisargādbhajate bhedarūpatām*, VP, 2/44.
7. *Tāñca pratibhā na kincit prānimātram vyavahāre 'tivartate. Yataḥ sarvo' pi*

praṇimātrasyetikartavyatārūpo vyavahāraḥ pratibhāmūlakaeva. Ambākartrī on VP, 2/146.

8. *Pūrvairarthairanugato yathārthātmā paraḥ paraḥ. Saṁsarga eva prakrāntastathā' nyesvarthavastuḥ. VP, 2/411. Clarifying the difference of anvitābhīdhāna and abhihitānvaya, Puṇyarāja writes: Tathātvabhihitānvayavādināḥ pūrvapūrvārthānugataḥ Saṁsargo vākyārthaḥ anvitābhīdhānavādinastūttarottara padārthāvagataḥ prathamatarameva saṁśṛṣṭeva. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/411.*
9. *Kevalena padenārtho yāvānevābhīdhīyate. vākyastham tāvato' rthasya tadāhurabhīdhāyakam. Sambandhe sati yattvanyadādhikyamupajāyate vākyārthameva tam prāhuranekapadaśāśryam. VP, 2/41-42.*
10. *Tataḥ samudāye padānām parasparānvaye padārthavaśādyadādhikyam Saṁsargaḥ....yadatrādhikyam vākyārthaḥ sa iti. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/42.*
11. *Tadyathā vīraḥ puruṣa iti vīratvapuruṣatvayorguṇa viśeṣajātivīśeṣayorekārtha samavāyapratipattipūrvakam sāmānādhikaranyam vākyārthaḥ. Edārthāpekṣayā' dhika upajāyamāno dṛśyate. Anekapada saṁśrayam anekapadaśītam anekapadanimittakam, padārtho pasthitidvārā' nekapadañāpyamiti yāvat. Anekapadañāpyatvā devatam padārthayoḥ Saṁsargarūpam vākyārthameva prāhurna tu padārthamiti. Ambākartrī on VP, 2/1-2, p. 9.*
12. *Kāryānumeyaḥ sambandhorūpam tasya na dṛśyate. asattva-bhūṭamatyantamatastam pratijānate, VP, 2/46.*
13. *Kim tarhi sarvabhedānuguṇasāmānyarūpo viśeṣāntarasannidhānā dviśeṣaviśrāntaḥ padārtha eva vākyārthaḥ iti. Kāryeṇa padārthā nām viśeṣaviśrānti lakṣaṇenānumīyata iti kāryānumeyaḥ. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/46.*
14. *VP, 2/113.*
15. *Ambākartrī on VP, 2/1-2, p. 11.*
16. *Na vākyārtha ākāṅkṣābhāsyāḥ kāryānumeyo vā... kintu padārthaḥ padābhīdheyāḥ vākyārthastu vākyasya prayojanamiti. Ambākartrī on VP, 2/1-2.*
17. *Na loke pratipattṛṇāmarthayogātprasiddhayaḥ. Tasmādalaukiko vākyādanyaḥ kaścinnavidyate, VP, 2/344.*
18. *According to abhihitānvayavādins, the word expresses universal and the expectancy for the completion of a specific meaning by which communication is accomplished is not satiated by universal. If a complete meaning is revealed even by a word or by a letter, it is the meaning of the sentence and not of the word isolately from the sentence.*

19. *Na hi saṁsargasya jñānarūpo vyāpāraḥ śāstreṇa padāntaḥ śabdāsanskāre kriyamāṇe nimittatvenāśrīyata iti nāsau padārthaḥ.* Ambākartrī on VP, 2/42.
20. *Abhidheyaḥ padasyārtho vākyasyārthaḥ proyojanam. Yasya tasya na sambandho vākyānāmupapadyate,* VP, 2/113.
21. *Aśabdo yadi vākyārthaḥ padārtho 'pi tathābhavet. Evam ca sati sambandhaḥ śabdasyārthe na hīyate,* VP, 2/16.
22. This may go in favour of *anvitābhidhanavādins* for whom sentential-meaning is the meaning of the word which conveys mutually connected word-meanings.
23. *Yathā 'syāvayavā varṇā vinā vācyena kenacit. Arthavantaḥ samuditā vākyamapyevamiśyate,* VP, 2/54.
24. *Śabdasya na vibhāgo'sti kuto'rthasya bhaviṣyati. Vibhāgaiḥ prakriyābhedamavidvān pratipadyate.* VP, 2/13. Also VP, 2/9-13.
25. *Sāmānyārthaṣṭirobhūto na viśeṣe' vatiṣhate upāttasya kutastyāgo nivṛttaḥ kvāvatiṣthatām,* VP, 2/15.
26. *Na hi tasya sambandhasya svarūpamavadhārayitum śakyam,* Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/46.
27. Communication even according to *padavādins* is accomplished by specific meaning, i.e. individual, and not by universal.
28. *Artha pratibhāsasadrśyām smṛtāveva śabdānāmupayogaḥ śabdasyārthena sahasudūrameva viprakarṣaḥ tataśca katham śabdo 'rtha mabhidadhītetyasatya eva śabdārthaḥ paryavasyati,* Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/417.
29. *Kāryānumeyaḥ sambandho rūpam tasya na dṛśyate,* VP, 2/46.
30. VP, 2/411.
31. *Sarvabhedānugūṇyam tu sāmānyamapare viduḥ. tadarthāntara saṁsargād bhajate. bhedarūpatām. Bhedānākāṅkṣatastasya yā pariplavamānatā. Avacchinatti sambandhastām viśeṣe niveśayan.* VP, 2/44-45.
32. Unlike *abhihitānvayavādins*, the theorists do not accept sentential-meaning as the relation (*sansarga*), but as the meaning of word which is fit for expressing mutually related meanings.
33. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/17.
34. *Yadyekenapadena sakalavākyārthasyā śeṣaviśeṣaṇakhacitasyāvagatiḥ tadottareṣām padānām niyamāyānuvādāya vocaraṇamsyāt.* Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/18. Also VP, 2/412.

35. *Ākhyātaśabde niyatam sādhanam yatra gamyate. Tadapyekam samāsārtham vākyamityabhidhīyate*, VP, 2/326.
36. *Kriyāvinā progeṇa na dṛṣṭā śabda coditā. prayogastvanunispādī śabdārtha iti gamyate*, VP, 2/124.
37. VP, 2/414.
38. *Sarvam sattvapadam śuddham yadi bhāvanibandhanam. saṁsarge ca vibhaktō'sya tasyārtho na pṛthagyadi. kriyāpradhānam ākhyātam namnām sattvapradhānatā catvāri padajātānisarvametadvirudhyate*, VP, 2/340-1.
39. VP, 2/425-6.
40. For a detailed discussion, please consult P.K. Mazumdar, *The Philosophy of Language*, 1977, pp. 36-75.
41. *Vyāparobhāvanā saivotpādanā saivacakriyā krñō'karmakatāpatter na hi yatno 'rthaḥ iṣyati. Vaiyākaraṇabhūsaṇa sāra, dhātvartha, kārīkā-5.*
42. *Vaiyākaraṇasyākhaṇḍa evaiko' navayavaḥ śabdaḥ sphoṭalakṣaṇo vākyam pratibhaiva vākyārthaḥ. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/1-2.*
43. K.A.S. Iyer, Bhartṛhari, 1956, pp. 86-87.
44. 'Some Remarks on Bhartṛhari's Concept of Pratibhā', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, edited by B.K. Matilal, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1990.
45. *Sākṣāta śabdena janitām bhāvanānugamena vā. Itikartavyatāyām tām nakaścīdativartate*, VP, 2/146.
46. *Svabhāvacaraṇābhyāsayogādṛṣṭopapaditām. Viśiṣṭopahitām ceti pratibhām, ṣaḍavidhām viduḥ*, VP, 2/152.
47. VP, 2/146.
48. *Śvabhāvena yathā kapiḥ*, Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/152.
49. *Tadyathā kā (ca) raṇenaivāvadhrta prakāśaviśeṣānām vaśiṣṭhādīnām*, ibid., 2/152.
50. *Nyāya Manjarī*, pp. 104-5.
51. *Idam taditi sānyeśāmanākhyeyā kathañcana. Pratyātmavṛttisiddhā sa kartrāpi na nirūpyate*, VP, 2/144.
52. Puṇyarāja observes that there is no utility or even any room for theories of abhihitānvaya and anvitābhidhāna in the theory accepting pratibhā as sentential-meaning, he writes, *pratibhāyam tvekarasaiva pratipattiriti na tatra kācidabhi-hitānvayānyitābhidhāna carcā*. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/1. He is right in the context of those who can understand the indivisible directly, without any analytical remedy, but theories of anvitābhidhāna and

- abhihitānvaya* are useful for learners and children in understanding the *pratibhā* (meaning), and that is the reason different forms of the *padavādins*, theory have been discussed by Bhartṛhari in *Vākyapadīya*.
53. *Anarthakānām sanghātaḥ sārthako 'narthakastathā'. varṇānām padamarthena-yuktam nāvayavāḥ pade*, VP, 2/205.
 54. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/206.
 55. *Parasparasambandhavigamenānarthaka iti sambandhād vyapetaḥ*, *ibid.*, 2/206.
 56. *Sārthakā narthakau bhede sambandam nādhigacchataḥ. Adhigacchata ityeke kutīrādinidarśanāt*, VP, 2/207.
 57. *Arthavadbhyo viśiṣṭārthaḥ sanghāta upajāyate. Nopajāyata ityeke samāśasvārthikādiṣu*. VP, 2/208.
 58. *Yutaḥ siddho'rtho yeṣām te tathāvidhāḥ yathā śamīvrkṣo dādīmivrkṣa ityādayaḥ*, Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/209.
 59. *Ibid.*, VP, 2/209.
 60. VP, 2/116 and Puṇyarāja's commentary on it.
 61. *Samudāyāvayavayorbhinnārthatve ca vṛttiṣu. Yugapad bhedasaṁsargo viruddhāvanuṣaṅginau* VP, 2/218.
 62. *Prajñusanjñ vādyavayavairna cāstiyarthāvadadhāraṇam. Tasmātsaṅghāta evaiko viśiṣṭārthanibandhanam*, VP, 2/220.
 63. VP, 2/221.
 64. *Ibid.*, 2/222.
 65. Puṇyarāja on, VP, 2/223.
 66. VP, 2/224 and Puṇyarāja on it.
 67. *Nanu vastubhūtaḥ śāstraprakriyāḥ, kimitināśritā ityāḥ śāstrārtha prakriyāḥ kevalamabudhānām vyutpādanāya*. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/232. Also VP, 2/23 and 'śāstreṣu prakriyābhedaividyaivopavar ṇyate. Anāgamavikalpā tu svayamvidyopavartate, VP, 2/233.
 68. *Mahābhāṣya*, 2/2/6.
 69. *Vrkṣo nāstīti vākyam ca viśiṣṭābhāvalakṣaṇam. Nārthena buddhau sambandho nivṛtteravatiṣṭhate*, VP, 2/241.
 70. *Aśābdavācyā sā buddhīrnavarteta sthitā katham*, VP, 2/242.
 71. VP, 2/243.
 72. VP, 2/244.

73. VP, 2/245.
74. *Bahubrīhipadārthasya tyāgaḥ sarvasya darsītaḥ*, VP, 2/228.
75. Ibid., 2/233.
76. VP, 2/229-232 and Puṇyarāja commentary on them.
77. VP, 2/233.
78. *Anibaddham nimitteṣu nirupākhyam phalam yathā. Tathā vidyāpyanākhyeyā śāstropāyeva lakṣyate*, VP, 2/234.
79. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/234.
80. Quoted by Puṇyarāja in his commentary on VP, 2/246.
81. Quoted by Puṇyarāja in his commentary on VP, 2/247.
82. Ambākartrī commentary of Raghu Nāth Sharmā on VP, 2/239.
83. Ibid., VP, 2/239.
84. *Sphoṭa lakṣaṇasya vibhāgo nāsti...pratibhārūpasyārthasya kuto bhaviṣyati Vibhāgaiḥ prakriyābhedaṃ hi bhedagrahaṇam hi tasyārthātmanaḥ śabdātmanascābhinnasya pratipattidvāram. Pada pratipattipūrvikā hi sāmānyaviśeṣāvagrahaṇopāyā... ..kuśalastu pratipattā sarvameva bhedambhedānatikrameṇa paśyati*, Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/13.

It is apparent from Puṇyarāja's commentary on VP, 2/13,14 that he indicates knowledge itself by the term *pratibhā* and thus he is right in saying that there is no possibility of any application of universal or individual in knowledge itself. This is what is established by Bhartṛhari in VP, 2/144 and by Bhartṛhari and Helārāja in the *jāṭisamuddeśaḥ* also. If *pratibhā* as ontic reality is taken in view even then there is no possibility of cognition of a reality which is not revealed by language. Different from these two positions mentioned earlier if *pratibhā* as meaning is taken in view it is no more than a being the nature of which is determined by Bhartṛhari in *jāṭi samuddeśaḥ* as universal; more specifically as distinct universal serving as a cause of particular activities.

85. *Nityaḥ śabdo. nityo'rtho nityaḥ sambandha ityeṣā śāstravyavasthā. Vṛtti* on VP, 1/123.
86. *Yataḥ sarvapārśadamidam hi vyākaraṇam śāstram*. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/250. Also '*tathaiva loke vidyānāmeṣā vidyā parāyaṇam*, VP, 1/15.
87. *Svā jātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvairvābhidhīyate. Tato'rthajātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā*, VP, 3/1/6.
88. *Yadvā sambandhavyutpattikāle gaurayamarthaityarthajātyā śabda śabdajāteratyantabhedātsāmānadhikarāṇyānyathānupapattyā*.

- abhedādhyāropaḥ kalpyate*, Helārāja on VP, 3/1/6.
89. *Yugapada sarvārthaprakāśanam na karoti*, Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/251.
 90. *Gotvānuṣango bāhīke nimittātkaiścidiṣyate. Arthamātram viparyastam śabdaḥ svārthe vyavasthitaḥ*, VP, 2/255.
 91. *Tathā svarūpam śabdānām sarvārtheṣvanuṣajyate. Arthamātram viparyastam svarūpetu sthitiḥ sthīrā*, VP, 2/256.
 92. *Ekatvam tusvarūpatvācchabdayorgaṇamukhyayoḥ. Prāhuratyantabhedo pi bhedaṁgā nudarśinaḥ*, VP, 2/257.
 93. *Vārttika on aṣṭādhyāyī*, 1/2/3.
 94. *Ibid.*, 1/2/11.
 95. *Tatraikaśabdadarśaneśabdopacāraḥ prasiddhyaprasiddhinimittikaḥ*. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/250.
 96. *Tatraiva cārthopacāro dvidhā-svarūpārthatvena vāhyārthatvena ca*, *ibid.*, 2/250.
 97. *Gośabdasyagotvajātiye bāhīkādaḥ ca prayujyamānasya śabdasvarūpamevārthaḥ pravṛttinimittamityeko' rthopacāraḥ*, Ambākarī on VP, 2/251.
 98. *Aparastu-ekasyaiva gośabdasyagotvajātiye bāhīkādaḥ ca prayujyamānasya śabdasvarūpatvātbāhyambhinnaḥ gotvamevamāropitamāṇā ropitamvārthaḥ pravṛttinimitti*, Ambākarī on VP, 2/251.
 99. VP, 2/257.
 100. *Sārūpyāttvekatvavyavahārastatra boddhavyaḥ*. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/261.
 101. *Sāmidhenyāntaram caivamāvṛttāvanuṣajyate. Mantrāśca viniyogena labhante bhedaṁūhavat* VP, 2/258. *Samidhā* is a stick to be offered in sacrificial fire along with the hymns called 'sāmidhenī mantra'. Sāmidhenī mantras in different śākhās are thirteen or eleven in number and are applied as seventeen or fifteen independent sāmidhenīs (each of the hymns) one to one with seventeen or fifteen sticks respectively by repeating the first and the last hymns for three times each.
 102. *Anyāḥsanskārasāvitṛ karmanyanyā prayujyate. Anyā japaprabandheṣu sātvekaiva pratiyate*, VP, 2/261.
 103. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/263.
 104. *Vākyam tadapi manyante yatpadam carita kriyam*, VP, 2/326.
 105. VP, 2/264 and Puṇyarāja's commentary on it.
 106. VP, 2/265.

107. *Svārthe pravartamānyasya yasyāṛtham yo 'valambate. Nimittam tatra mukhyam syādnimittī gauṇaiṣyate, VP, 2/267.*
108. *Aayorubhayatrādimukhyārthatvamiṣyata - Gauṇamukhyabhāvo na prayojayatīti boddhavyam, Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/268.*
109. *Naivādhikatvamdharmāṇāmyunatā vā prayojikā. Ādhikyamapi manyante prasiddheryunatā kvacit, VP, 2/272.*
110. *Sambandhīsadrṣāddharmāttam gauṇamapare vidhuḥ, ibid., 2/273.*
111. *Viparyāsādivāṛthasya yatrārthāntaratāmiva. manyante sa gavadiṣṭu gauṇa ityucyate kvacit, VP, 2/274.*
112. *Viparyāsaścādhyavasāyena bhavati adhyāropeṇaca. tasmādadhyavasitatadadbhāvanimittaprayukto nāsti gauṇamukhya vyavahāra' iti. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/274.*
113. *VP, 2/275.*
114. *Ibid., 2/276-7*
115. *Ambākartṛi on VP, 2/275.*
116. *VP, 2/279 and Puṇyarāja on it.*
117. *Agnisomādayaḥ śabdā yesvarūpanibhandhanāḥ sañjñibhiḥ samprayujyante 'prasiddhesteṣu gauṇatā, VP, 2/281.*
118. *Aṣṭādhyāyī 8/3/82.*
119. *VP, 2/283.*
120. *Aṣṭādhyāyī, 6/1/153.*
121. *Ṛsyādaḥ prāptasanskāro yaḥ śabdo'nyena yujyate. Tatrānātrangaḥ sanskāro bāhye 'rthe na nivartate, VP, 2/284.*
122. *VP, 2/286-95.*
123. *Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/301.*
124. *Yathādīpa' iti jñāpakadrṣṭāntopadarśanam ghatādiṣu jñāteṣu viṣayeṣuyathā jñāpakodīpo yenārthena ghatādiḥ jñāpanalakṣaṇena tataḥ prayojakādanyatprakāśam nāntarīyakam yathā karoti, Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/298.*
125. *Nirmanthanam yathā'raṇyoragnyarthamupapāditam. dhumamapyana-bhipretam janayatyekasāadhanam, VP, 2/300.*
126. *Tathā śabdo 'pyatyantasambandhāliṅgasamkhyāpratipādakaḥ, tatra na kevalā prakṛtiḥ prayoktavyā na ca kevalaḥ pratyaya iti pravivektum parihartum na śakyate, Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/302.*

127. *Ākhyātam taddhitārthasya yatkinsidupadarsākam. Guṇapradhānabhāvasya tatra dṛṣṭo viparyayaḥ*, VP, 2/306.
128. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/302.
129. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1/2/32.
130. VP, 2/310.
131. VP, 2/312.
132. VP, 2/313.
133. *Yaccopaghātajam jñānam yacca jñānamalaukikam-Na tābhyām vyavahāro'sti śābdā lokanibandhanāḥ*, VP, 2/297.
134. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/314.
135. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2/3/2.
136. Ibid., 2/3/18.
137. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/314.
138. Ibid., VP, 2/314.
139. Quoted by Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/314, from *Aucityavicāracarcā*.
140. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/314.
141. Ibid., VP, 2/314.
142. *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 1/2/43.
143. *Ṇatvanatvābhyāmyathā praṇāyakaityatropasargāśrayaṇatvasadbhāve praṇayanakriyākartuḥ pratītiḥ, ṇatvābhāve tu pragatā nāyakā asmād deśādasau praṇāyakodeśa iti*. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/315-16.
144. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/318.

CHAPTER-V

THE CONCEPT OF WORD (*PADA*)

According to the interpretation '*padyate gamyate anena*', a *pada* is called so because it expresses word-meaning. While defining the word (*pada*) Bhaṭṭhari has given utmost importance to its cognition by language in communication and has philosophized that language and meaning are beings or units of cognition and communication. He interprets that language is not confined only to the acts of uttering and hearing, which are mere instruments in the manifestation of meaning-revealing unit (*sphoṭa*). The *sphoṭa* reveals cognition, which, is a complete unit, that is a sentence (*vākya-sphoṭa*). Manifested through utterances or symbols, it reveals itself, and its meaning is revealed non-differently by it in the mind. The meaning, revealed non-differently by it, is also inner, indivisible flash (*pratibhā* = *vākyaṛtha*). These indivisible flashes are divided through grammatical analysis into words (*padas*) and their meanings (*padārtha*). The units acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence are also indivisible (*pada-sphoṭa*). A *pada-sphoṭa*, by grammatical analysis, is also analyzed into further components-roots/stem, prefixes, suffixes, etc. The reason behind accepting the *pada*, acquired by grammatical analysis of a sentence, as indivisible, is that words, as units, are the expressers of their meanings (*padārtha*), without any awareness of their components, that is, letters. Word-meaning is not a synthesis of the meanings of component letters because discrete individual letters, for grammarians, are not expressers. It is not the components of a word i.e. letters, individually or collectively, that convey word-meaning, but the word is a meaningful unit or an expresser of word-meaning (*padārtha*). We are not always conscious of the alphabets or of components of words when we use them for communicating meaning; rather, we use them as meaning-revealing units. They are known not as a putting-together of letters, but as an indivisible unit of awareness revealed in the mind. Now, it is obvious from the analysis made above that a word, for grammarians, is an indivisible unit (*pada-sphoṭa*) acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence (*vākya-sphoṭa*). The analysis of an indivisible sentence is made on the basis of the meaning it reveals. Thus, a unit (word-*sphoṭa*) acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence (*vākya-sphoṭa*) is taken

by analysis as the expresser of word-meaning. As communication is accomplished not by a word (*pada*), but by a sentence conveying sentential-meaning, it is the sentence that is the real unit of communication. Those who are not well-versed in communication (as we find in the cases of beginners and children) cannot grasp the indivisible sentence and sentential-meaning, as such, that are grasped to them only by analysis into components, that is words, and their meanings. The indivisible, then, is explained to them as a synthetical unit of words and their meaning acquired so. Thus, from the point of view of grammar (practical purposes) a *pada* acquired by grammatical analysis is also taken as the real unit of language or the expresser (*pada-sphoṭa*) of independent word-meaning which is also taken in grammar, as independent meaning of the word.¹

We have mentioned earlier that a word, for Bhartṛhari, is a concept. Discussing the nature of the concept of word he philosophizes that all words are universals. Identical cognition of a word in its several utterances and instances cannot be explained properly, if it is not accepted as a universal. It is cognitively justified to say that the word 'book' uttered once is cognized identical with the same word uttered at different times in a variety of tones of different persons. The word is a generality, on account of which all words are known and identified so. Perhaps, this is the reason Bhartṛhari defines word as universality = *svājāti* (word-ness), which is gradually manifested by verbal utterances (letters). As a word (*pada-sphoṭa*) is revealed when it is manifested gradually in sequence and is manifested completely after hearing the last syllable, it is universal. All words are concepts/universals and the word tokens that bring out their manifestation are particulars or individuals. Words, being concepts, are expressers of their expressed while utterances being instrumental in their manifestation are mere momentary tools. The identical conception of a word by frequent and different instances is revealed by indivisible word (*sphoṭa*) and, it, as the cause of identical cognition, is universal. According to Bhartṛhari's philosophy,² the utterances p, o, t, manifests a word(ness) = *sphoṭa* in the mind, first, on account of which word-ness (*śabdatva*) and the universality of the particular word (*pot-word-ness*=*ghaṭaśabdatva*) or the identity of the word (*svājāti*) is cognized and, then, the meaning-universal (potness) is revealed non-differently by the *pada-sphoṭa*. Thus, the concept (*svājāti*) of the word and the meaning universal (*arthajāti*) revealed non-differently by it, are

cognized as revealed by the *sphoṭa* (inner-language), and that is why identical cognition by the word is revealed.

Russell in *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* has philosophized that a word is universal. The word 'dog' is universal just as dog is universal.³ Unlike Russell's the universal (word), for Bhartṛhari, is not a class of similar bodily movements of tongue, throat and larynx. Utterances or verbal-noises/tokens are mere tools in the manifestation of the word, which is universal. The universal-word, for Bhartṛhari, is indivisibly given as a meaning revealing unit, i.e. *pada-sphoṭa*, and hence is foundational, while utterances/verbal-noises are momentary tools that help manifestation of it. A word, for Russell, is universal, as it is an abstraction from a number of similar noises/marks while it, for Bhartṛhari, is a being of awareness in character. It reveals itself and its meaning is revealed by it non-differently. A word is a word because it expresses itself first and then its meaning is revealed by it non-differently. If it were taken as something abstracted then it would cease to be a unit of awareness. Even an abstracted entity requires to be revealed by it in order to be known so. There is no question of its being an expresser itself if it, for any purpose, is taken as abstraction. If the meaning, the word expresses, is also taken as abstracted from external-things or objects then it would not be the meaning that is directly revealed in the mind by words. It is not proper to take the objects revealed by *sphoṭa* as abstracted. Contrary to it, the word, for a language philosopher like Bhartṛhari, is the being foundational in character. It is a revealing force, it reveals itself and its meanings as well. He is, of the view that a philosopher should study the words and their meaning, as they are cognized or revealed in the mind in communication. The objects of cognition, for him, are the being that figure in the mind by word, and, thus, the word for such a philosopher is a cognitive-being. Else, nothing will be acceptable as foundational in the absence of the cognition revealed by language. Moreover, if we undertake the study of the language with a view to understanding the nature of cognition revealed by it in the mind only then it becomes both philosophical and cognitively justified.

Naiyāyikas define a word (*pada*), basically from the syntactical point of view, as a get-together of letters in a sequence (*varṇa samūho padam*).⁴ Objecting to their definition of word as a get-together of discrete letters, Bhartṛhari elucidates it as a unit. The unit (*pada*)

derived by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence is also indivisible. The unity of a word is not derived by the get-together of discrete letters, but is given. Bhartṛhari adds as the theorists do not accept discrete letters as meaning-conveying units, the expectancy for associating discrete meaningless letters will not take place and the act of associating them without expectancy is irrational. Expectancy for associating inevitably implies expectancy for a meaning; otherwise, no expectancy will take place in the absence of an incentive, which cannot be caused by meaningless letters. As the letters are not expressers, how can the expectancy for associating them in a unity (word) be explained? What will be the ground for associating letters in a particular sequence? If sequence is accepted as the expresser of meaning, then units like letters, words, sentence, all except the sequence, cannot be accepted as units of communication. Sequence, being the mode of time, is associated with time and not with cognition. If a word is taken as the association of letters, for example the word 'pot' as association of letters p, o, t, it may be asked 'are the letters p, o, t, associated with expectancy or without expectancy?' If by expectancy, then letters have to be accepted as meaningful units; else, there would be no ground for an expectancy of associating them. The meaning of pot is obviously not a collection of the meanings of letters, p, o, t, and, thus, the idea of a word as an association of discrete letters is untenable. On the other hand, the association of letters without expectancy cannot be accrued and, ultimately, the word as an indivisible unit, independently of components, has to be accepted as the expressers of word-meaning.

If we accept a word as a get-together of meaningless letters, the possibility of the word-meaning, on the basis of the same logic, cannot be explained, because, a group of meaningless components can, logically, not be meaningful. Not only that, if the association is accepted as the association of meaningful units, i.e. if letters are accepted as meaning conveying units then the association of meaningful letters either in a succeeding order or in reverse order should make no difference (so far the meaning of the association is concerned). For example, the association of p, o, t, as 'pot' and that as 'top' should then convey the same unit, but this is not so because both of them are different expressers of different meanings. The question of determination of the form of association also arises.

The Concept of Word (Pada)

It may, here, be said, conclusively, that a word, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is an indivisible, meaning-revealing unit (*pada-sphoṭa*) acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence.⁵ As a sentence, in his philosophy of sentence-holism, is only explained as a synthesis of different words through grammatical analysis, similarly, the word is also explained as a construction of components, i.e. root/stem, suffixes, etc.

Keeping syntactical points in view, Pāṇini defines word (*pada*) as '*suptiṃantam padam*'.⁶ *Sup*-suffixes are applied to units conveying accomplished character (*siddha*), and *tiṃ*-suffixes are applied to those conveying non-accomplished character (*sādhya*). Thus, according to the definition, *subantas* (units having case-endings and conveying accomplished character) and *tiṃantas* (units having verb-endings and conveying non-accomplished character) are characterized as words. The same character of a word is accepted by *Naiyāyikas*. *Nyāya Sūtra* 2-2-58 defines it as '*te vibhaktyantaḥ padam*'.⁷ It means the word is a unit that has a case-ending. Explaining the *sūtra*, Vātsyāyana, the commentator of *Nyāya Sūtra*, comments that nominal words (*nāmikī*) and verbs (*ākhyātakī*) are word because they are *Vibhaktyantaḥ* (associated with case/verb endings—(*Dvayī nāmikī ākhyātakī ca*)).⁸

From the discussion made in the earlier pages it can be inferred that all words, acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence, are chiefly divided in two categories i.e. *nāma* (nominal word) and *ākhyāta* (verb), but, if this is so, why *Vaiyākaraṇas* have enumerated prepositions (*upasargas*), particles (*nipātas*) and postpositions (*Karmapravacanīyas*) also as kinds of independent words (*padas*)? If they are also words independently of substantives (*nāma*) and verb (*ākhyātas*), how can they be explained as word (*pada*), if '*suptiṃantam padam*' is the definition of *pada*? As the application of case/verb endings is not seen with them, they should not be termed as *pada* but it is quite true that they are also used in expressions and that they are also termed, by *Vaiyākaraṇas*, as *pada*. There are some units that are either bare *prakṛti* (crude form of the nominal word) or bare suffix (*pratyaya*) without a *prakṛti* or *dhātu* (crude form of the verb/nominal word) but are used for communicating meaning. There are also such words (*padas*) as having single letter. Now, if we rely upon *Mahābhāṣyakāra* Patañjali's statement '*na kevalā prakṛtiḥ prayoktavyā na kevalāḥ pratyayaca*' (The crude form of the nominal word and bare suffixes, void of *prakṛti* or *dhātu*, are not worth the use), we confront

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an apparent paradox. In order to solve the paradox, we would have to put forth a three-fold interpretation from the side of *Vaiyākaraṇas*, an account of which is given as follows:

1. It is a *Vaiyākaraṇika* principle that separately neither the crude form of the word, i.e. root/stem, nor bare suffixes (word-endings/case terminations) are worth the use, and that the word is a unity of the root and the suffix (*pratyaya*). This basic principle of grammarians cannot be overlooked while interpreting even the units having a meaning only in a syntactical structure. In case of word as a single letter or as crude form of the word or even as suffixes, *Vaiyākaraṇas* interpret them as a unity of the two. However, they accept one of two components, derived by grammatical analysis of the unit, as retained by grammatical operation. Retention of any of the components of a unit does not mean non-existence of the component in that unit and the unit, after dropping off the component, is taken by them as a complete word expressive of a unit meaning (*padārtha*).
2. In the system of grammar, any meaningful unit, derived by the grammatical analysis of sentence, is a word. It hardly matters whether the unit is a single letter, bare root (*prakṛti*) or suffix, because the unit may be interpreted in the system of grammar as a unity of the crude form and the suffix. On the basis of meaning, the sentence is analyzed into meaningful units (*pada*) and may be synthesized again for making the sentential-meaning understandable to laymen and children. For this view, a word is called so because it is a step (*pada*) towards understanding the indivisible sentence and sentential-meaning.
3. In some cases, the *prakṛti* or bare suffixes by beginningless and uncontradicted traditional use (*avyabhicāra rūḍi*) are popularly assumed as non-derived word (*avyutpanna-pada*). For example the word 'Ramaḥ', in Sanskrit is taken as the original form of the word and then case-endings are applied to it. Again, the word 'Rāmaḥ' if taken to be derived by the root/(*dhātu*) *Rāmaḥ* = *ram kriṇāyām* + (suffix) *ghañ*, it conveys the same meaning. In both of the situations the word *Rāmaḥ* is taken as a word expressive of an accomplished character.

Keeping the views mentioned above, in mind, any unit acquired by grammatical analysis of a sentence and taken as an expresser of a

The Concept of Word (Pada)

word-meaning is called, by *Vaiyākaraṇas*, a word (*pada*). If the meaningful unit is only a root (*dhātu*) or a suffix (*pratyaya*), *Vaiyākaraṇas* accept them as a word that can also be interpreted in terms of a unity of root and suffix. In case of disappearance of any of the components, *Vaiyākaraṇas* either recommend its retention by grammatical operation, or elucidate them as indeclinables having no regular derivation (*avyutpanna*).

Here, it needs mention that separate meanings of stems/roots and suffixes have also been taught in the system of grammar. We discuss this in detail in Chapter VII, entitled 'The Concept of Grammatical Analysis (*apoddhāra*)'. Here, suffice it to say that suffixes in the tradition of grammar are taken as expressers (*vācaka*) in some cases and suggestive (*dyotaka*) in some other cases. *Vaiyākaraṇas* take universal (*jāti*)/or individual (*vyakti*) as the very general meaning of roots/stems. Gender, number, means, in general, are taken as the meaning of nominal-suffixes (*sup*) and means, number, person, time and mood are taken as the general meaning of verbal-endings ('*tip*' *pratyaya*). The idea of separate meaning of suffixes provides a solution to the problem that only meaningful units can be synthesized. Suffixes (nominal or verbal) follow stems or roots (*dhātu*) and on the basis of meaning they follow them respectively, otherwise, the expectancy for synthesizing them in a unity, or for their association and dissociation, may not significantly arise.

In Bhartṛhari's *holistic philosophy*, a sentence is actually an inner, indivisible unit (*sphoṭa*) and the meaning it reveals non-differently in the mind is also an indivisible flash (*pratibhā*). Words (*padas*) acquired by grammatical analysis of sentence are also taken as indivisible units conveying indivisible word-meaning (*padārtha*). Meaning is awareness, and, as such, a unit whole. There are no parts in meaning in-itself and it is artificially analyzed into different components so as to make the indivisible understandable to laymen and children. In grammar, the analysis is made by keeping the syntactical form in view and through the analysis and synthesis of the parts acquired by analysis the indivisible is explained for the understanding of beginners.

Now, it is clear that while defining a word (*pada*) cognitively or syntactically, *Vaiyākaraṇas* have kept the meaning, that is the object of cognition, or the unit of communication in view and, thus, for them,

a meaningful unit (may be a single letter or a group of letters—without the consideration of its long or short in size and shape in writing or in speaking) acquired by grammatical analysis of a sentence is a word (*pada*). A word acquired so is a meaningful unit, an universal to be manifested by signs, symbols and other tokens like verbal utterances, noises/written marks, etc. and which by grammar is explained as a synthesis of parts, i.e. root/stem and suffix.

KINDS OF WORDS DERIVED BY GRAMMATICAL ANALYSIS OF A SENTENCE

As we have mentioned in earlier pages, a sentence, for the sake of explanation, is taken by some as a synthesis of words, chiefly categorized as means (*sādhana*), accessories (*kāraka*) and verb (*kriyā*), out of which means expresses an accomplished character while verb expresses a non-accomplished character. Words (*padas*) other than those three, as they function for modifying them, are not different from them and are included in these three heads. According to some others, prepositions (*upasarga*) and particles (*nipāta*), as they perform function different from nominal words and verbs, are also separate words (*pada*) and, thus, they classify the words acquired by grammatical analysis of a sentence into four groups, i.e. nominal (*nāma*), verb (*ākhyāta*), prefix (*upasarga*) and particle (*nipāta*). According to still some others, post-positions (*karmapravacanīyas*) are also *independent* words. Thus, they accept five kinds of words. Bhartṛhari in the second book of his *Vākyapadīya* has discussed the nature and function of five sorts of words acquired by the grammatical analysis of a sentence.

A brief account of his discussion on the nature and function of different kinds of words (pada)

1. *Nāma* (nominal-word): The verb, occupies a central position in the Vaiyākaraṇas' scheme of explanation of an indivisible sentence through analysis. Nominal-words, as they qualify verb or as they are subordinated to verb, are called by the term '*nāma*' (*namanti ākhyātam prati*). In the scheme of analysis, a nominal-word is explained as a unity of the crude form of the word (*prakṛti*) and of the case-terminations (*pratyaya=sup-vibhakti*), and the meaning of a nominal-word is taken

as conveyed by both the radical/crude form and the suffix. For example, the component 'go' of the nominal word 'gauḥ' is the radical form (*prakṛti*) and 'aḥ' is the suffix (*subanta-pratyaya*). The general meaning of the radical form is taken as universal/individual while gender, number, time and action are taken as the general meaning of suffixes (*sup-vibhakti*). The radical form of the word is designated by *Vaiyākaraṇas* as the crude form of a substantive (*prātipadika*). In order to clarify the concept of a substantive, it is necessary to explain the concept of the crude form of the substantive.

According to the derivation '*padam padam pratipadam*', a *prātipadika* is the crude form of all nominal words. A noun, in its uninflected state, a crude form of a substantive word conveying an accomplished character, or an essential part of all forms of a word conveying an accomplished character before receiving case terminations, is called '*prakṛti*'.

The interpretation '*prātipadikam ahat pratipadam*', the word *prātipadika* is formed by the word '*pratipadam*' added with the suffix '*thak*' of *taddhita* that is changed for the suffix '*ik*'. Nominal words (*subanta pada*) are formed only if there is a *prātipadika*, and only then case terminations follow them. According to *Pāṇini Sūtra*, *nyāpprātipadikāt*⁹ case-terminations follow the unit if it is a *prātipadika* or if it has '*ni*', '*ap*' suffix-endings. Subantapadas (nominal-words) are formed by adding case-terminations to the radical form. A unit is called a *prātipadika*, if it has the capability to be one. For example, the unit '*Rama*' is a *prātipadika*, because adding the case endings *sup* suffixes (*aḥ*, *au*, *āḥ*, etc.) to it yields subantapadas like *Rāmaḥ*, *Rāmau*, and *Rāmāḥ* respectively.

In order to define the term *prātipadika*, Pāṇini has taught the aphorism '*arthavadadhāturapratyayaḥ prātipadikam*'.¹⁰ As per the *sūtra*, a meaningful unit, which is neither a verb nor a suffix, is called *prātipadika*. This definition of word (*pada*) emphasizes the meaningfulness of the unit and excludes roots, suffixes and suffix-ending. It admits that although verbs, suffixes, etc. are meaningful units, yet they are not designated as a *prātipadika*. According to this definition, meaningful units that have no regular derivations (*avyutpanna śabda*), and others if they are neither verbs nor suffixes/suffix-endings, are characterized as *prātipadika*.

Only on the basis of the *sūtra* 'arthavadadhāturapratyayaḥ' many units formed by verb-roots by adding *kṛt* and *taddhita* suffixes, and compounds (*samāsa*), may not be designated as *prātipadika*. In order to characterize them as *prātipadika*, Pāṇini has given another *sūtra* 'kṛttaddhitasamāsāśca'.¹¹ According to this *sūtra*, units formed by adding *kṛt* and *taddhit* suffixes to verb-roots, and compounds, are also designated *prātipadika*. It is only because they are taken as *prātipadika* that case-terminations are added to them. The unit *Rāma* derived by root *ram* + *ghañ* (*taddhita* suffix) is designated as *prātipadika* only as per the latter *sūtra*. Similar is the case with 'śaiva', which is as formed *śiva* + *aṃ* (a *taddhita* suffix). Indeclinables (*avyaya*), like *ucaiḥ*, *nicaiḥ*, are nominated *prātipadika* by the former *sūtra*, and, when they are taken as *prātipadika*, they are suffixed with case-terminations (*sup-vibhakti*). *Sup-vibhakti* follows units such as *nyanta*, *ayanta*, which are *prātipadika* according to Pāṇini *Sūtra* 'nyāp prātipadikāt'.¹² If 'ap' or 'sup' fall with indeclinables (*avyaya*), they are dropped,¹³ and even after being dropped they are considered units having case-terminations (*vibhaktyanta*), which is the reason why *avyayas* (indeclinables) are designated as *prātipadikas* to which case-terminations are added, by the *sūtra* 'suptiñantam padam'.

So far as compounds (*samāsa*) are concerned, as no suffixes are added as ending components, they may be characterized as *prātipadika*, as per the *sūtra* 'arthavada', but as the precedent component of a compound is a word (*pratyayāntapada*) and the consequent component is a case-ending (*vibhaktyānta*), they, separately, cannot be defined as *prātipadika*. For example, the word 'rājapuruṣa' is a compound made of the components *rājñyaḥ* and *puruṣaḥ*. The component *rājñyaḥ* is a word (*pratyayānta*) because it is formed by adding the case-ending *ñas* (as) to the word *rājan*. Similarly, as the latter component 'puruṣaḥ' is the unit 'puruṣ' plus the *sup-vibhakti* (case-ending), it is a *vibhaktyanta*. Thus, separately both *rājan* and *puruṣaḥ*, being words (*pada*), cannot be defined as *prātipadika*. The compound 'rājapuruṣa' is not *pratyayanta*, because *sup* (*vibhakti-pratyaya*) of the word *rājñyaḥ* is dropped by the *sūtra* 'supodhātuprātipadikayoḥ'.¹⁴ As the compound (*rājapuruṣa*) is not a *pratyayanta*, therefore, it can be defined as *prātipadika* by the *sūtra* 'arthavada'. Now, it may be asked what is the need of the *sūtra* 'kṛt taddhita samāsāśca' for defining a compound as *prātipadika*. According to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, there may be associations of units that are not *pratyayanta*, but only on that ground they cannot be

taken as *prātipadika*. For example, a sentence (*Rāmaḥ gṛham gacchati*) is not *pratyayanta*, and, thus, this association may also be defined as *prātipadika* following the *sūtra* 'arthavad'. Pāṇini formulates the *sūtra* 'kṛttaddhitasamāsāśca'¹⁵ in order to exclude other associations of words, like sentences, etc., from being termed *prātipadikās* and nominates only compounds.

From the point of view of meaning, a nominal word (*pada*) is grammatically analyzed into *prakṛti* (radical form of the substantive word) and *sup*-suffixes. There are several views on the meaning of a *prātipadika*. For some it is universal, for some other individual and for still some others universal and individual both. Apart from universal and individual *Vaiyākaraṇas* take gender, number and means also as the meaning of a *prātipadika* (*pañcakam prātipadikārthaḥ*).

Grammarians define the meaning of the radical form of a substantive as '*niyatopasthitikaḥ prātipadikārthaḥ*', according to which the meaning that directly and inevitably figures in the mind in an accomplished form, after hearing a nominal word, is *prātipadikārtha*. In the sense of *prātipadikārtha*, nominative case-termination is taught in the *Pāṇini Sūtra* '*prātipadikārtha liṅga vacanamātreprathamā*'.¹⁶ Later, *Vaiyākaraṇas* like Bhaṭṭoji Dīxita and others have discussed *prātipadikārtha* in detail. Bhartṛhari, while elucidating on the separate meaning of *prātipadika* and case-termination (*pratyaya*) of a nominal word in the scheme of grammatical analysis, has discussed three chief views¹⁷:

1. The radical form of a substantive (*prātipadika* or *prakṛti*) is the expresser and the *vibhakti* (case-termination) is suggestive (*dyotaka*), as it suggests the meaning expressed by the former.
2. Suffixes are also expressers, and they express the same meaning that is expressed by the radical form of the substantive.
3. Both the radical form and suffixes (*vibhakti*) unitedly are the expressive of the word-meaning (*padārtha*). For this view, the combination of the two as a unity functions as expresser of the meaning.

Prātipadika, for Bhartṛhari, is an expresser (*vācaka*) and the meaning it expresses is an expressed (*vācya*). Suffixes (*vibhakti*) follow *prātipadikas* for the same meaning as expressed by them. The meaning

non-differently revealed by the radical form of the substantive is called *prātipadikārtha*. Five meanings, namely universal, individual, gender, number and means, are figured in the mind by a *prātipadika*.

Pāṇini has taught that the nominative case follows if a unit is used for *prātipadikārtha* (*prātipadikārtha liṅga vacana parimāṇa mātṛe prathamā*).¹⁸ Now, if universal/individual, gender, number and means (*prātipadikārtha*) are conveyed by a *prātipadika* itself, what is the need of the aphoristic rule (*sūtra*) for delimiting the meanings like gender, number and quantity as a *prātipadika*?

Vaiyākaraṇas take it as true to say that gender, number, etc. in general are expressed by *prātipadika*, but as number, etc. in general are conveyed by a *prātipadika* (for example it may express the gender and number of only those units which are not taught in all numbers and genders), the specific number and gender of the units, which are used in all the numbers and genders, are not understood by a *prātipadika*. For example, the word 'taṭi' is used in all genders (*taṭah, taṭī, taṭam*) and only on the basis of the *prātipadikārtham* the specific gender, etc. are not known, even though gender, etc. in general are understood by it. Therefore, it is justified to accept that in the sense of the specific number, gender and quality that the *sūtra* '*prātipadikārtha liṅga vacanaparimāṇa mātṛe prathamā*' is taught.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in *Nyāya Mañjari*¹⁹ has criticized the *Vaiyākaraṇas*' definition of *prātipadika*. According to him, the aphoristic rule '*arthavadadhāturapratyayaḥ*' alone can define compounds as *prātipadika* on the one hand and exclude roots and suffixes on the other hand. Therefore, the rule '*kṛttaddhita samāsāśca*' is unnecessary. As a reply to Jayanta's argument it can be said from the side of *Vaiyākaraṇas* that the rule '*kṛttaddhita samāsāśca*' is taught for a specific purpose of defining an association of which the antecedent component is a word, i.e. compound, as *prātipadika*. As there is no question of a substantive word being an antecedent component of a root or suffix, the rule '*kṛttaddhita samāsāśca*' is not taught for the purpose of excluding verbs and suffixes as *prātipadika* and that for the exclusion of them the rule '*arthavad*' is inevitably significant.

2. **Ākhatāta (Verb):** Yāska in the statement '*catvāri padajātāni nāmākhyātopasarganipātaśca*',²⁰ has considered verb (*ākhyāta*) as a separate kind of word (*pada*). The word '*ākhyāta*' is derived by

khyā + a (prefix)+ *kṭ* (suffixes) and stands for *tiñ* (verb) and for words with verb-endings (*tiñanta*). In the system of *Vyākaraṇa*, verb-endings (*tiñanta*) are applied in the place of *lakāras* (a technical term used by Pāṇini for tenses and moods of verbs. In order to teach the meaning of *lakāra*, Pāṇini has given the rule '*laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarma kebhyaḥ*'.²¹ It means in some cases *lakāra* occurs in the sense of nominative or agent (*kartā*), and in some other cases in the sense of accusative (*karma*). With intransitive verbs, in some cases, it is used in the sense of agent and in other cases in the sense (meaning) of a being that has an unaccomplished character (*bhāva*), and so is the case with the meanings of verb-endings used in place of *lṛ* for *lakāras*. As tense and mood are the meanings of *lakāra*, they are also taken as the meaning of verb-endings (*tiñ*) used in place of *lakāra*, because they are used in all tenses and moods – *ātmanepada*, for which speaker is the object of the action, and *parasmaipada*, for which the object of the action is different from the speaker, as we find in uses like *paṭhati*, *pacati*, etc. As dual and plural number are also conveyed by *tiñ* (verb-endings), number is also taken as its meaning. Thus, *kartā* (agent), *karma* (accusation), *saṃkhyā* (number), *kāla* (tense) and *upagraha* (aspect) are taken as the meanings of a *tiñ*.²² For example, the word '*pacati*' in the expression *Rāmaḥ taṇḍulam pacati* (Rāma cooks rice) conveys the action (*vyāpāra*) of cooking, present-tense, first person, singular number, agent of the cooking and *parasmaipada*, out of which the result (*phala*) of the action (cooking) denoted by the root '*pac*' (cook) comes to the agent himself. In the system of *Vyākaraṇa*, the meaning of the verb, i.e. action, is taken as the primary meaning of an expression, and other meanings, such as number, tense, agent, accessory, person, aspect (*upagraha*), are taken as *nāntarīyakārthas* (meaning close to the primary meaning). Action, from the point of meaning of the verb analyzed into root and verb-endings, is taken as the meaning of root, and number, time, agent, accessory, person and aspect are taken as meanings of the verb-ending (*tiñ*).

Central word of a sentence: Is it nominal word (*Nāma*) or Verb (*Ākhyāta*)?

Different Indian thinkers have given different opinion on the issue of the central word in a sentence. According to *Naiyāyikas*, the word in nominative case, expressive of agent (*kartā*), is the central word of a

sentence. For them, effort or doing is the meaning of *lakāras* and is a quality of the agent to be conveyed by the nominal word. They interpret the meaning of the sentence 'Rāmaḥ odanam pacati' (Rāma cooks rice) as 'odanakartṛka pākānukūla kṛtimāṇa Rāmaḥ' (the doer of the act leading to the cooking of rice is Rāma). Thus, the meaning of the word in the nominative case (*prathamānta*) in a sentence is primary, and other words only qualify the meaning expressed by it. *Mīmāṃsakas* give utmost importance to incentive to an action (*bhāvanā*) as the meaning of a sentence and, therefore, take meaning of the verb as the central or primary meaning of a sentence. They interpret the sentence 'Rāmaḥ odanam pacati' as 'Rāmaḥ samavet odanapākānukūla bhāvanākṛtiḥ' (acting for the action leading to cooking rice by Rāma).

According to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, the general meaning of the root (*dhātu*) is action (*vyāpāra*) and its result (*phala*) as well. The substratum of the action is the agent, and the substratum of its result is the object. Keeping this in view, *Vaiyākaraṇa* Bhūsaṇakāra writes '*phala Vyāpārayoḥ dhātur āśryetu tiṅ smṛtā*',²³ the meaning of the verb is taken as primary and that of others as secondary. For example, the verb 'pacati' in the expression 'Rāmaḥ tanḍulam pacati' is the primary word, and its meaning is the central meaning of the sentence, thus, they interpret the sentence as 'Rāma kartṛka odanakarmaka pākānukūlaḥ vyāpāraḥ' (the process or action leading to cooking rice by Rāma). In a scheme of analysis on the basis of meaning, they observe that action is the central meaning of an expression and the meaning of other words qualify it. *Vyāpāra* and *bhāvanā* are almost similar in meaning, though there is a slight difference between them. The action performed is called *vyāpāra*, and the incentive for an action is called *bhāvanā*. As both the words are used for action, they are taken synonymously.

3. *Preposition (Upasaraga)*: *Pra*, *parā*, *ap*, *sam*, etc. are defined as prepositions (*upasarga*) in Pāṇini's aphorism '*upasargāḥkriyā yoge*'.²⁴ Actually, the root (*dhātu*) and prepositions of a verb are not separate, and, originally, both of them form the unity which, for the sake of explaining is analyzed by grammar into separate units or components of a verb.²⁵ For example, if we take a root like '*prabhu*', and then by imagination we prefix *aṭ* (*a*) to it, the unit so formed will not be worth any use. Some roots (*dhātus*), in the system of *Vyākaraṇa*, are taught together with prepositions. For example, the word *saṃgrāma*

(of *curādī* group) is analyzed into the root *grām* and preposition *sam*, but the verb '*saṃgrāma*' as a unity is actually not made up of an association of the preposition *sam* and root *grām*.²⁶

The word '*upasarga*' is derived by *srja* + *upa* (preposition) and, thus, it stands for that unit which when connected with root/verb produces a different meaning, different from the meaning of the root/verb. For example, the verb '*bhavati*' means 'exists', but when '*pra*' is prefixed to it, the word *prabhavati* is formed, which means 'becomes sovereign' or capable of. '*Stha*' means to stay, but when '*prati*' is prefixed to it, it conveys a different meaning, which is to move or to start with. '*Upasargas*' are prefixed to roots or verbs, and the uses are formed afterwards by adding verb-ending suffixes (*tipādī*).

Bhartṛhari, has discussed two main views on the position of roots and prepositions in the formation of the usage:

1. The preposition of a verb is already prefixed to its root, and the usage (verb) is formed later, by adding verb endings (*tipādī*).
2. The usage (verb) is formed first and prepositions are prefixed to the verb later.

According to the first view,²⁷ the role of the root and the preposition is internal. They are related internally as a unity, and, the usage (verb) is formed by adding a verb-ending to the unity of root and preposition. For example, *pra* (preposition) of the verb '*prabhavati*' is given with the root '*bhava*', and by adding '*tip*' (verb-ending) in first person, singular number, present tense and *parasmaipada*, the word '*prabhavati*' is formed. On the basis of accepting preposition as prefixed to the root, it appears that the root '*bhū*' in the sense of being (*sattā*) is intransitive, and the case-ending (*pratyaya*) is applied as with intransitive roots. Different to it, there is no intransitive use of the root '*bhū*' in the sentence '*caitreṇa ānandaḥ anubhūyate*'. If '*bhu*' is used with the preposition '*anu*' ('to experience'), only then does '*ānanda*' (bliss) become the object (*viśaya*) of the verb '*anubhūyate*'. The verb-ending (*pratyaya*) in such cases is applied to the root, if it is transitive.

According to the second view, the general meaning of a root is specified when added to the preposition. For example, the general meaning of the root '*pac*' of the verb '*pacati*' is 'to cook', but if the preposition '*pra*' is added, the word '*prapacati*' is formed, which means

'cooks exclusively'. After the formation of the verb, the prepositions are fixed with it as a precedent component to specify the meaning of the verb. The qualification of an action may be conveyed only if the verb is existent first. Thus, for this view, a preposition may be prefixed to the verb to qualify its meaning, only if the verb already exists. Thus, this theory takes it to be justified to accept the addition of prepositions after the formation of verb (*tipādi* = verb - endings associated with the root). If there is only the root 'bhū' and the verb 'bhavati' is not still formed, is there any justification in saying that a preposition be applied to the verb to qualify the meaning expressed by it? The theorists of the former view may say that the verb-endings (*tipādi*) are used with the verb when the verb is already existent. In other words, the root united with the preposition is existent before the application of the verb-ending. Refuting this position, the theorists of the latter view observe that taking the action to be accomplished by the verb as an idea, the preposition may be prefixed in mind. For example, the verb 'vaya' (*kni*t) in the expression 'asya sūtrasya sārīvaya' (kni t the sārī with this thread) is used with the consideration of the idea of a sārī yet to be produced. Similarly, taking the action to be accomplished in the mind, a preposition is prefixed first to the verb in the mind, and, then, the verb-ending is added to the unit (which is the unity of the preposition and the verb).²⁸ For example, cottonseeds are dyed with lac juice before being sown. The action of dying helps the proper germination of the seed and causes brightness of lac in products. Similarly, if the root is associated with the preposition first, its general meaning is changed to a qualified meaning, and the suffixes are attached to express the qualified meaning of the unit. Though root and preposition are separate units, yet they are united in the mind and the unit expresses a distinct meaning. The unit may be separated by grammatical analysis into root and preposition, which are observed as separate words conveying separate meanings.

The differences in the same action are conveyed when a verb denoting that action is prefixed with prepositions like *pra*, *parā*, etc. For example the difference of *pacati* (cooks) and *prapacati* (cooks exclusively) is expressed by the presence of the preposition 'pra'. If we do not accept that roots and prepositions are associated in the mind before the verbs come into use, then not only can the problem of 'at' not be explained, but also the uses of intransitives as transitives will not be possible. Thus, the theorists, of the first view seem right in

accepting that the root and the preposition are associated first in the mind, and then the verb is formed by adding the suffix.

In connection to the meaning of prepositions, Bhartṛhari has raised the question: are they expressive (*vācaka*) or suggestive (*dyotaka*) of the meaning expressed by the verb? He is of the opinion that if the meaning of a root together with the preposition is the same (as what is expressed by the root) the preposition will only be a suggester of the meaning expressed by the root, and if the meaning of the root is not the same, then the preposition will function as the expresser of that meaning. For example, the preposition 'pra' of the word 'prapacati' is suggestive of the meaning expressed by the verb 'pacati', but the same preposition if added with root 'sthā' of the verb 'tiṣṭhati', i.e. *pratiṣṭati* (expressive of motionlessness) expresses the meaning.²⁹

Bhartṛhari, on the issue of the meaning of prepositions elucidates that they, in some cases, are expressive, in other cases suggestive, and, in still other cases, are cooperative (*sahakāri*).³⁰ Explaining the functions of preposition as mentioned above Bhartṛhari adds that they are suggestive in cases where the meaning is conveyed by the root itself.³¹ In the philosophy of grammar, a root has been accepted as the conveyor of a number of meanings, i.e. plurivocal. For example, if we take the root 'sthā' as the conveyor of many meanings, then *pra*, etc. prepositions will be only suggestive of the meanings conveyed by the root itself. Prepositions like *a*, *pra*, *saṃ*, etc. added with the verb root 'hr', as in cases of words like *āharaṇa*, *prahāra*, *saṃhāra*, etc. suggest the homonymy of the root.³² Some other thinkers, by taking the prepositions as expresser, explain it as an independent conveyor of a separate meaning of its own, i.e. killing, hurting, destroying, etc. respectively.

Some prepositions like *adhi*, *pari*, etc. have no meaning independent of the meaning of the root to which they are applied. Their meaning is known only when they are used together with the root. Thus, these prepositions categorically are neither expressive nor suggestive, but accommodating of the meaning expressed by the verb and, hence, co-operative.

Conclusively, it can be said that Bhartṛhari supports the view that the root prefixed with preposition in the mind is a unit independent of the root, and it is for explanation that the verb is taken as the synthesis

(root + prepositions) fixed as the antecedent component of the verb (verb + *tipādi* + verb-endings). Even in such explanation, the prepositions are taken as added to the root prior to its use formed by adding-verb-endings. Prepositions function as the qualifier of the action (meaning) expressed by a root, and, thus, they are suggesters. However, in cases they are taken as expresser, their expressiveness is not observed independently of the verb.

4. *NIPĀTA* (Particle): A *nipāta*, according to the interpretation '*nipatante iti nipātaḥ*' is that which comes down indeclinably as a word (*pada*). Usually, words are explained as a synthesis of *prakṛti* (the crude form) and *pratyaya* (word-ending suffixes = *sup* and *tip*), but there are some indeclinable words which have no regular derivation and which have come down in usage as of an imperishable nature and particles (*nipātas*) are included among them.

Pāṇini, in order to designate *nipāta*, has taught the rule '*cādayo'sattve*',³³ which means a *nipāta* is the name given to non-substantives like *ca*, *vā*, *yaḥ*, etc. For example '*ca*' in the expression '*Rāmalakṣmaṇaśca*' is a particle. Again, he in the *sūtra* '*svarādi nipātamavyayam*',³⁴ has designated particle as indeclinable (*avyaya*). On account of its being indeclinable, case-terminations are dropped in their uses, on account of which case-terminations of those forms in all their uses remain unaltered.

In his *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari has discussed some problems regarding the nature and functions of particles. A brief exposition of his discussions is as follows:

1. Copulative assemblage (*dvandva-samāhāra*) is understood as the meaning of the particle '*ca*', in some cases, which is a copulative conjunction. For example, copulative assemblage is apprehended in the sense of the particle '*ca*' in the expression '*ahantvam ca*'.
2. Some particles function as suggestive (*dyotaka*), for example the '*ca*' in the expression '*vṛkṣcasyapalākṣaśca*'. The aggregate of *vṛkṣa* (tree) and *palāśa* (a kind of tree) is implicated (*upalakṣita*) by the word *vṛkṣa* itself and the same is indicated by the particle '*ca*'. '*Ca*' does not express any extra meaning over and above the meaning expressed by the word *vṛkṣa*. It is only suggestive to the aggregate expressed by the words (nominal or verb).

The Concept of Word (Pada)

Some particles express a meaning separate from the meaning of the words with which they are used. Some particles express the meaning together with the words with which they are used. Still some other particles do not express separate meaning; they indicate the same meaning expressed by the word with which they are conjoint.

According to Bhartṛhari, a particle like 'ca' may have a separate meaning, but is not used independently. It may now be asked: if particles are words (*pada*) and a word is a conveyor of an independent meaning, why are particles, like other words (substantives and verbs), not used independently to communicate meaning. Answering the problem Bhartṛhari elucidates that 'ca' is a word, but is not used separately for meaning. On the pattern of the metaphor of suffixes, he says suffixes, though expressive in some cases, are not used alone but with the radical form. Similarly, particles, though expressive in some cases, are not used singly. As a suffix is used together with the crude form, a particle is also used together with a substantive to which it is joined.³⁵

It may again be asked: if the genitive case (*ṣaṣṭī*) is applied with the word used to convey aggregate (*samuccayaḥ*), and if aggregate is the meaning of the particle 'ca', then it must be applied in the genitive case. As no case-termination is applied to a particle, it would not be a word capable of use, and as it is not used in the genitive case, it may not be accepted as a conveyor of aggregate in particular. Bhartṛhari, in order to answer the aforesaid problem, expounds that aggregate is not the direct meaning of the particle 'ca'. It is not expressive of a substance. On account of its being non-substantive (*adravyavācī*), the substance will not be connected with it, if aggregate is taken as its meaning. Therefore, he denies the application of the genitive case to the particle 'ca'. Even if we take aggregate as the meaning of 'ca', the application of the genitive case is not possible, because it does not discriminate between substance (*dravya*) and non-substance (*adravya*), or substance and action, or accomplished and non-accomplished characters.

Accessories (*kāraka*) express an accomplished character (*dravyabhāva*) and the verb expresses a non-accomplished character (*asattvabhūta/adravyabhāva*) and in the sense of non-accomplished character (*asattvabhūta*), case-terminations (*sup*, etc.) are not applied, and so is the case with particles.³⁶

Even the verb in the sense of conveying a finished-character (*sattvabhūta*) denotes substance (*dravya*), for example, the word *pāka* (cooked-meal) and, therefore, case-termination (*sup*) is applied with it. But, in case it expresses a non-accomplished character, verb-endings (*tiñ*) are applied, for example 'ti' (*tiñ*) in the word 'pacati'. On account of being non-substantive, particles are considered indeclinable and case-terminations are dropped.³⁷

3. The nature of particles does not alter with the change of their place in an expression. For example the particle 'ca' in the expressions 'Rāmaḥ ca kṛṣṇaḥ' or 'Rāmaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ ca' is placed at different places, but that does not change its nature or meaning. Even in the case of plurivocal words, particles function as indicators of the meanings, and with the differences in the meanings expressed by the word, the suggestive function of particles does not change.

In brief, particles are not qualifiers of anything. They have no qualificandum (*viśeṣya*). They are not used independently as a separate word and that case-termination conveying number and gender are also not applied to them.

Viewing the difference between prepositions and particles, Bhartṛhari elucidates that prepositions are only suggesters (*dyotaka*) of the specific meaning of the verb, while particles function as suggesters of meaning of both finished and non-finished characters (*kriyā*).

5. *Karampravacanīya (Post-Position)*: Apart from substantives, verbs, prepositions and particles, Pāṇini has designated post-positions (*karmpravacanīyas*) as a kind of word (*pada*) acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence. He has taught *sūtras* to designate some prepositions,³⁸ like *prati*, *pra*, *anu*, *pari*, etc., as post-positions that indicate the specific relation between an accessory and the verb, caused by some previous action.

Relation between an accessory and a verb caused by some action is accomplished by case-relations (*kāraka*). There are six *kāra*kas that depict relations called case-relations (*kāraka-sambandha*). In addition to case-relations, there are relations in general expressed by the genitive case, which includes not only all case relations when they are not meant as such, but also those that are results (*phala*) of previous relations,

caused by some past-action, between action and accessory and the use of words *anu*, etc. express them.

According to Bhartṛhari, there are two possibilities for a verb to cause the relation between an action and an accessory.

1. The verb may be mentioned in the expression and 2. It may be dropped or removed.

In order to clarify the former stand, Puṇyārāja³⁹ has given the example of the expression 'Rājapuruṣa', which expresses the relation established earlier between the master and the servant. The relation of a master to his servant is a result of the previous services rendered by the king, such as maintenance, abduction, purchase, suppliance, etc., on the basis of which a previous relation of āśryāśrayī (donor and recipient) is caused between them. Though this previous relation (āśryāśrayī) caused by the action of maintenance, etc., is not mentioned in the expression 'Rājapuruṣa', it is expressed by the use of post-positions. In order to clarify the latter possibility, Puṇyārāja has given the example of the expression 'mātuḥ smarati' (he remembers [the service rendered to him by] his mother).⁴⁰ In this expression, the verb expresses the action related with his mother and it is not removed but mentioned in the expression. The cause-caused (*nimittanimittibhāva*) relation is obviously known by the expression, but apart from this relation there is another casual relation of son and mother/father (*janyajanakabhāva*), which is known by implication as the result (*phala*) of the former relation of cause-caused mentioned by the verb remembers (*smarati*).

These examples are not directly concerned with the explanation of post-positions (*karmapravacanīya*). They only show how there are specific previous relations apart from case-relations caused by some action that are not mentioned in those expressions, but are known by implication. The examples also show that the verb that denotes action caused by a previous relation may or not be present in the expression. There are specific relations apart from case-relations that are not only not known as case-relation, but cannot be explained on the basis of the genitive case or relation either. In the examples given above, it has been shown that specific relations caused by some action rendered previously are not known by the expression, but by implication based on the relation is expressed by the *karmapravacanīyas*.

However, there are expressions in which *kāra*kas, as such, are not meant, but by which these specific relations caused previously by some action are specifically expressed. Such an expression is not possible if post-positions (*karmapravacanīya*) are not taken as separate words, because otherwise the relation caused by the action denoted by the verb will either be a case-relation or a relation in general. But, the specific relation based on services rendered previously, is different from a case-relation and relation in-general and, cannot be explained on their basis. Post-positions are words that indicate the relation established previously between an accessory and the action. For example,⁴¹ the word 'anu' in the expression 'japamanupravarṣati' is a post-position that indicates the previous relation between the accessory (*japam*) and the verb (*varṣati*). The word 'japam' (recitation) in the expression is a tool of the action rained (*pravarṣati*), and according to *Pāṇini Sūtra* 'kartṛkarmyostṛtīyā',⁴² the instrumental-case (*ṭṛtīyā-vibhakti*) should be applied to the word 'jap', but the accusative-case is applied instead. The application of accusative-case with the instrumental cannot be explained properly if the word 'anu' as a post-position is not accepted as an independent word. According to *Pāṇini Sūtra* the accusative-case is applied in the presence of a post-position in order to indicate the relation previously caused between the accessory and the action, which is why the instrumental-case, is dropped and is replaced by the accusative case, which conveys the specific relation indicated by the post-position 'anu'. The word 'anu' delimits the specific relation of the cause (*japam*) and effect (*varṣati*) and, thus, the expression conveys the meaning, 'it is due to recitation (*japa*) that it rained'. It is noteworthy to say here that the causal relation between 'japam' and 'varṣati' is not mentioned in the expression and that it is the post-position 'anu' that expresses that specific-relation (cause-caused).

Puṇyarāja has given another example of the expression 'vṛkṣam prati vidyotate vidyuta' (the lightning flashes at the tree). The verb 'vidyotate' is present in the expression and expresses the action of flashing. Where and in what direction is it flashing is not mentioned in the expression. The flashing is aimed at the tree, but the relation of the aiming (*lakṣaka*) and the aimed (*lakṣya*) caused by flashing between it and the tree is not mentioned in the expression. It is the post-position 'prati' that denotes that specific relation. The use of the accusative case instead of the instrumental case with the word 'vṛkṣam' illustrates that instrumental case, as such, is not meant there and the specific

relation (*lakṣya-lakṣaka-bhāva*) between tree and flashing caused by the action 'lightning' (*vidyotate*) is delimited by the word 'prati' which is a post-position.

A post-position does not express an action (the action of 'aiming' in the case of the expression under discussion). Such an action does not come to the mind from the sentence. Nor does it directly express the relation because the accusative case suffix after 'vṛkṣa' does it; it does not bring any other action to the mind. All that it does is that it specifies the relation, namely *lakṣyalakṣakabhāva*,⁴³ i.e., the previously caused relation between the accessory and the action. If the verb expressive of the previous relation is not heard, i.e. if the verb is removed from the expression, the doubt arises as to whether or not the previous relation is caused by some action. The post-position indicates that the specific relation is caused by some previous action (*karma*), which is not mentioned in an expression.⁴⁴

Bhartṛhari's discussion on the function of post-positions, in brief, is as follows:

1. It indicates the previous specific relation which is shown neither by instrumental case nor by relations in general (*śeṣa*), and that is why an instrumental case with the accessory is not applied if there is a use of a post-position in the expression. The justification of the use of the accusative case cannot be given if post-position is not accepted as a separate word. Only by taking it as a separate word (*pada*) that the use of the accusative-case in place of the instrumental or the genitive case can be justified.
2. If prefixes like 'su' 'ati' associated with the verb are designated as post-positions then their designation as preposition (*upasarga*) and motion (*gati*) is negated. For example, 'su' in the expression 'susincati' is a post-position. Had it been a preposition, the 's' of the verb 'sincati' should have been changed to 'ṣ' but 's' of 'su' is not changed, because 'su' as an independent word (*karmapravacanīya*) is applied with the verb 'sincati'. If a word is once designated as a post-position, it cannot be designated as preposition or motion (*gati*) simultaneously.
3. The instrumental-case must be used with an accessory (*hetu*), but in conciliation of a post-position, the accusative case is applied with it. That is the reason the word 'japam' in the accusative is

applied for the instrumental case 'japam'. The post-position 'anu' characterizes the relation and removes the instrumental case, which is not meant to be there, and then the accusative-case is applied to it.

Bhartṛhari is of the view that the post-position does not project the verb which is not heard in an expression.⁴⁵ Projection is possible only between a verb and an accessory, i.e. a verb may be projected by an accessory and vice versa, as we find in the cases of *praviśa-pindī*. If we accept the projection of a verb (not heard in the expression), then in that case there must be a case-relation (*kāraka-vibhakti*) and, then, the *sūtra* 'karmapravacanīya yukte dvitīyā',⁴⁶ will be useless. Not only that, but there is no possibility of projection of the verb in expressions like *japam anupravarṣati*.

It is very difficult to decide categorically whether post-position is an expresser (*vācaka*) or suggester (*dyotaka*). No unanimous decision may be given, because in some cases it suggests the meaning expressed by the verb, in some cases, it conveys the specific action, and in still some other cases it functions to delimit or specify the specific relation (caused previously by some action) between action and accessory. However, it can be said that post-positions in some cases suggest the specific meaning conveyed by the verb. If it is not an expresser, it cannot be an independent word. Not only that, but there is no difficulty in accepting it as a word, even if it is accepted as suggester because of the specific function of suggesting the past-relation caused previously by some action.

Showing the difference between a preposition and a post-position, Puṇyarāja has said that prepositions qualify only the present action expressed by the verb, while post-positions specify the previous relation caused by the action between it and the accessory, when they are not meant as such and, thus, it modifies the past-action.⁴⁷

Concluding the discussions on post-position, Bhartṛhari says⁴⁸ that it is neither a suggester (*dyotaka*) of action nor an expressor of relation. Had it been a suggester of action, a causal relation (*dvitīyā*) would then naturally have followed and then there would have been no need for the *sūtra*. As the previous relation, without the application of the general relation (*śaṣṭī*), is known by the accusative case itself, it cannot be accepted as the expressor of relation either. It does not imply

a verb unheard, as we have already discussed. It only specifies the relation (between action and accessory) caused by past-action, i.e. it may be a proposition, particle or adverb when they are not connected. It specifies the sort of the relation between the action and verbs and governs a noun.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It can be said that Bhartṛhari considers a word from the point of view of expressiveness of meaning and takes it as an indivisible unit (*pada-sphoṭa*) acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence (*vākya-sphoṭa*). As there are no parts in a meaning (*vācya*), there is no question of parts in the expresser that expresses them non-differently. A word, as an indivisible unit, is used for meaning. While using a word as an expresser to convey an expressed, we are not always conscious of it as a one-to-one association of discrete letters. Thus, to accept a word as an association of letters is not justified from the point of view of its expressiveness or that of cognition of meaning by it. Though Bhartṛhari accepts a word as an indivisible unit, yet he, as a grammarian philosopher, gives due importance to the syntactical explanation of it as a syntactical formation by root/stem and suffixes. A word, like a sentence, is taken as an indivisible unit and the unity of it is given, which is grammatically analyzed into root/stem and suffixes to make it understandable to beginners and children. However, he, in no case, endorses the word as a one-to-one get-together of discrete meaningless letters. It is not sound to accept a word as association of letters that are not expressive by themselves. The theory of word as association of letters goes against the fact of communication of meaning by a unit used without the consideration of its components. The letters in themselves are not expressive and, in cases they are used for meaning, Bhartṛhari does not accept them as discrete letters but as a single-letter expression that manifests the complete *sphoṭa* by which complete meaning is cognized.

Explaining different kinds of words acquired by grammatical analysis of a sentence, Bhartṛhari discusses the nature and function of five kinds of it on the ground that they are important in syntactically explaining an indivisible sentence. On the basis of accomplishment of communication, he lays importance to nominal words and verbs and

elucidates that other words only qualify them. Prepositions and post-positions qualify verbs while particles qualify, in some cases, the meaning conveyed by a substantive, and in some other cases the meaning expressed by the verb. Discussing the issue of the expressiveness and suggestiveness of words, Bhartṛhari has elucidated that prepositions, particles and post-positions generally indicate the meaning expressed by the verb/nominal word. They are not used independently of the verb/nominal word and, in cases, they are used as independent units, they are taken as expressive of a word-meaning i.e. a word. *A word is word as it, in an analytic scheme, is expressive of its meaning independently of other words.* As preposition, particles and post-positions are not used independently of the verb/nominal word, how can they be called a word?

In the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, a word without prepositions, etc. is an independent unit and the word, with them, is different from the former, because it expresses a separate or different meaning. It is right to say that from the point of view of meaning, substantives and verbs are taken as expressive and prepositions, etc. are accepted as suggesters of the meaning expressed by them. However, apart from the function of suggesting the meaning expressed by substantives/verbs, prepositions, etc. are also, in some cases, used as expressers and when they are used as expressers, it is necessary to accept them as independent words. The specific function to be performed by them in a sentence cannot be explained (only on the basis of substantive and verbs), if they are not accepted as independent words. This is the reason Pāṇini has designated them as words (*padas*) independently of substantives and verbs. For the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, all words are concepts. They are manifested by verbal-noises and utterances, and when they are manifested they reveal themselves and their meanings, which are universals and that is why identical conception of them in all their instances and occurrences is revealed. These concepts are given as indivisible units. They cannot be accepted as associations from verbal-noises, because they are revealing units. Bhartṛhari takes those units as units of awareness of themselves and of their meanings and, hence, as awareness they are foundationally real beings.

No philosophy of communication can ignore the expressiveness of words. They express themselves (*grāhaka*) and the meaning (*grāhya*) also. Thus, words may be interpreted as indivisible expressers of their

expresseds, which, in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, are revealed by *pada-sphoṭa*. Even words that have meaning only in a syntactical structure are expressers, on the basis of which they are applied in all their occurrences and identical cognition is caused by them. It is only for explanation that they are analyzed into root/stem and suffixes and understood as a synthesis of the components acquired by grammatical analysis. Ultimately, they are taken by grammarians as units acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Vākyapadīya*, 2/10-12 and *Puṇyarāja* on it.
2. *Jāṭisamuddeśaḥ*, VP, 3/1/9-12 and HR commentery on them.
3. Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 24.
4. *Nyāya Sūtra*, 1/1/1, p. 4.
5. VP, 2/13.
6. *Pāṇini Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 1/4/14.
7. *Nyāya Sūtra*, 2/2/58.
8. *Bhāṣya on Nyāya Sūtra*, 2/2/58.
9. *Pāṇini*, 4/1/1.
10. *Ibid.*, 1/2/45.
11. *Ibid.*, 1/2/46.
12. *Ibid.*, 4/1/1.
13. *Avayayādāpsupaḥ*, *ibid.*, 2/4/82.
14. *Ibid*, 2/4/71.
15. *Ibid*, 1/2/46.
16. *Pāṇini*, 2/3/46.
17. *Vācika dyotikāvā syurdvitvādīnām vibhaktyaḥ*, *syādvā saṃkhyāvato* 'rthasya samudāyo 'bhidhāyakaḥ, VP, 2/164.
18. *Pāṇini*, 2/3/46.
19. *Nyāya Mañjarī*, vol. 2, *Sābdārtha Prakaraṇa*.
20. *Nirukta*, 13/9, also 'catvārī pada jātāni nāmākhyātopasarga nipātaśca, *Mahābhāṣya*, p. 3, vol. 1, Kilhorn edition.

21. Pāṇini, 3/4/69.
22. *Bhāva-pradhānam ākhyātam*, Nirukta, 1/1.
23. *Vyākaraṇabhūṣaṇsāra*, Kārikā-2.
24. Pāṇini, 1/4/59.
25. *Aḍādinām vyavasthārtham prthaktvena prakalpanam, dhātūpasargayoḥ, śāstredhātureva tu tādr śaḥ*. VP, 2/180.
26. Ibid., 2/181.
27. *Kāryāṇāmatarangatvamevam dhātūpasargayoḥ. Sādhanaīhyāti Sambandham tathābhūtaiva sā kriyā*. VP, 2/182.
28. Ibid., 2/85-86.
29. Ibid., 2/189 and Puṇyarāja commentary on it.
30. *Sa vācako viśeṣāṇām sambhavād dyotako 'pi vā. śaktyādhānāya dhātorvā sahakārī prayujyate*. VP, 2/188.
31. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/189.
32. *Upsargenadhātūrarthobalādayaḥ pratīyaie Prahāraskarasamhāra Vihāraparihāravat*.
33. Pāṇini, 1/4/57.
34. Ibid., 1/1/37.
35. VP, 2/194.
36. Ibid., 2/195.
37. Ibid., Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/195.
38. *Pāṇini has designated anu, upa, ap, pari, ari, prati, adhi, abhi, su, ati, api, these eleven as Karma-pravacanīya*.
39. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/197.
40. Ibid., 2/197 and Puṇyarāja's commentary on it.
41. Puṇyarāja has illustrated the issue with the analysis of the expression 'Śākalyasya sanhitāmanuprāvarṣati' Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/203.
42. Pāṇini, 2/3/18.
43. Bhartṛhari. K.A.S. Iyer, p. 236.
44. *Karmaproktavantaḥ kriyā kṛtam viśeṣa sambandam dyotayantīti karma-pravacanīyā ucyante*. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/199. Helārāja on *Sādhana samuddeśaḥ* 3/3/1.
45. *Yena kriyāpadākṣepaḥ sa kārakavibhaktibhiḥ. Yuujyate viriyathā tasya likhāvanupasargatā*. VP, 2/200.
46. Pāṇini, 2/3/8.
47. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/201
48. Ibid., 2/204.

CHAPTER-VI

THE CONCEPT OF WORD-MEANING (PADĀRTHA)

THE MEANING OF MEANING

'Object of cognition is the object figured in the mind by language (*śabda*).¹ As knowledge illuminates itself and the object (*jñeya*), language illuminates both itself as expresser (*vācaka*) and the meaning, the expressed (*vācya*)² as well.' It is quite obvious from this statement of Bhartṛhari that the problem of meaning is deeply concerned with the knowledge revealed by language.³ It is the basic premise on the basis of which he expounds meaning as that which is revealed non-differently by language in the mind. Bhartṛhari has used the word '*śabda*' for any unit, i.e. sentence (*vākya*), word (*pada*) or letter (*varṇa*), if communication is performed by it, or a complete meaning is conveyed. The unit that reveals itself as expresser and the meaning as expressed in the mind is called '*śabda*'. The unit is 'sentence', as it reveals a flash satiating further expectancy involved in the completion of cognition of a unit meaning. Meaning, for Bhartṛhari, is *pratibhā*, a clear, distinct awareness. For practical purposes, the complete indivisible sentence is analyzed through grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*) into different units (*padas*), which, by grammar, are also taken as indivisible and meaning conveying units. The flash revealed by a sentence and that by a word are different in the sense that the former reveals a complete sense while the expectancy for the completion of meaning is not satiated in the case of the latter, if taken independently of the former. However, if even a word or a letter reveals a complete unit, the unit is a sentence (*sphoṭa*). For the limited purpose of the present discussion, we centralize our study to an analysis of Bhartṛhari's observation on the meaning of meanings of words acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence.

Bhartṛhari strongly urges philosophers to be aware of the limits of their reflections to what he calls '*upacāra-sattā*' that is the being as it figures in the mind by expressions'.⁴ That which figures in the mind by language is a being, a being that is not an outcome of abstraction, but revealed by language, independently of metaphysical things.

Upacāra-sattā, as such, is a self-restrained world of directly revealed ideas or thought-objects that are of the nature of awareness. Awareness sustains all beings, but there is nothing that sustains it. He identifies it as the world of communication. For Bhartṛhari, a language philosopher, language is a cognitive-being and the meaning (*artha*) is what is revealed non-differently by it in the mind. These beings are intelligible or philosophical, and hence foundational.⁵ Philosophy, therefore, is concerned with the investigation into the world of these beings (*upacāra sattā*). It consists of investigations into reflections on the cognition of objects as are revealed by language in ordinary usage. Only this way of reflecting on problems, he thinks, would provide clarity, and, ultimately, wisdom.⁶

Here, it needs mention that Bhartṛhari has not rejected or denied the existence of external things, rather, he accepts not only the existence of external things, but of transcendentals also. He wants to stress that transcendental Beings are not within the reach of language. Language does not touch the external things and he, rather, tries to establish on the ground of cognition that only ideas or beings that are revealed by language in the mind are objects of cognition. Saroja Bhate in her paper entitled 'Bhartṛhari on Language and Reality' has beautifully discussed how Reality in Bhartṛhari's philosophy is untouched by language. So far as external Beings are concerned, they, as the ontic substratum of cognition revealed in the mind by language, are inferred.

The cognition revealed by language is always veridical cognition. Even the meaning revealed by the word 'non-veridical' is veridical, otherwise, how could it be known as 'non-veridical'. Cognitively, the statement 'sentence meaning is non-veridical' inevitably implies a veridical cognition of it.

Meaning is always the meaning of language. A child is taught meanings of words of the same language – token or those of other languages, and he takes to it as a matter of course and learns meanings of words without ever asking 'what is the meaning of the meanings?' He consults dictionaries or other sources (*śaktigraha*) to know the meaning of the word 'meaning'. But the question is: does it have the same sense when a philosopher takes the meaning of meanings as a problem for philosophical investigation? It is obviously not the case. A philosopher's concern with meaning is a very serious and difficult

affair. His endeavour involves neither the determination of what is the meaning of this or that word (he is rather concerned with the meaning of the word 'meaning' itself) nor the exploration of meaning of words. He does not perform the functions of dictionaries either, which are at best engaged in translation and demonstration. Neither are philosophers concerned with the study of meaning of the same word in different use-contexts, which is the onus of the linguists, nor even with the study of the rules of language, with which grammarians occupy themselves. A philosopher's task is distinguished from that of others in the sense that he is solely concerned with the exposition of the cognition of meaning, as it is revealed by words in the mind. It is fairly known to all by now that verification, pictorial representation of experienced facts or utility are criteria for determining the meaningfulness of words/propositions; and they are not concerned directly with philosophical investigation into the cognition of meaning by words.

Keeping our limits in view, we do not want to go into any detailed discussion on the issue of a philosopher's task, but before concentrating on the subject proper, it is desirable to clarify the question: why should the meaning of meanings be selected as the subject-matter of philosophical investigation? Before coming to an answer to the question, it, we think, is better, to point out the problems, in brief, for the solution of which philosophers legitimately choose this issue for investigation. Different thinkers, having different allegiances (*vāsanās*) based on different systems of faith, interpret meaning differently, which prevents us from having a true understanding of meaning. Some take meaning for ultimate reality, while others for external things. Some take it to be individual forms, properties, etc., while others universals. Some take it as the form of the word, while others view it as imaginary or a mere fiction, and so on. Often, meaning is erroneously identified with the different modes of its use, like indication, cause, effect, intention, explanation, purpose, implication, significance, use, etc. Very often, the denotative or expressive meaning of a word and its suggested/indicated or implied meaning are not distinguished. This causes confusion in the way its meaning is determined, and results in conflict. A philosophical investigation, free from all sorts of allegiances, overcomes all ambiguities in the uses of words, by explaining the cognition revealed in the mind by words and provides a philosophical understanding of the concept of meaning.

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Keeping our limits in view, we do not want to go into any detailed discussion on the issue of a philosopher's task, but before concentrating on the subject proper, it is desirable to clarify the question: why should the meaning of meanings be selected as the subject-matter of philosophical investigation? Before coming to an answer to the question, it, we think, is better, to point out the problems, in brief, for the solution of which philosophers legitimately choose this issue for investigation. Different thinkers, having different allegiances (*vāsanās*) based on different systems of faith, interpret meaning differently, which prevents us from having a true understanding of meaning. Some take meaning for ultimate reality, while others for external things. Some take it to be individual forms, properties, etc., while others universals. Some take it as the form of the word, while others view it as imaginary or a mere fiction, and so on. Often, meaning is erroneously identified with the different modes of its use, like indication, cause, effect, intention, explanation, purpose, implication, significance, use, etc. Very often, the denotative or expressive meaning of a word and its suggested/indicated or implied meaning are not distinguished. This causes confusion in the way its meaning is determined, and results in conflict. A philosophical investigation, free from all sorts of allegiances, overcomes all ambiguities in the uses of words, by explaining the cognition revealed in the mind by words and provides a philosophical understanding of the concept of meaning.

II

Bhartṛhari has minutely discussed many acute and subtle problems regarding meaning and has answered them in the spirit of a true philosopher of language who does not go beyond the limit of philosophical beings. Before he opens his discussion on the meaning of a word, he, in order to determine the meaning of meanings of words (very general meaning of the word commonly applicable to all units of meaning on the basis of which a uniform explanation of them can be given) has included verses 119 to 142 in the second part of his *Vākayapadīya* which, as Puṇyarāja classifies, consist of twelve different theories of meaning of meaning given by different thinkers popularly known at his time. As the views in these verses are only referred to and are not discussed in detail, it is very difficult to give a detailed exposition of them. The twelve theories are as follow:

THEORY 1

Words denote unqualified existence⁷ of the nature of generality, free from all specific determinations – particular forms or sensory images (*ākāraviśeṣaparāmarśasūnyamātramsāmānyam*). Words like *apūrva* (unseen potency of an act, which is the cause of future happiness or misery), *devatā* (divinity) and *svarga* (heaven) do not denote any particular form of sensory image, though they express their meanings.⁸ It may be said that some words like cow, dog, etc., denote forms or shapes of the objects perceived by eyes, on account of which their meanings are distinguished, but according to this theory the external form (uniquely real) does not come within the range of words as we find in the case of words like *apūrva*, etc. The particular form or image of the uniquely real associated with the denotation of words would not be confused as denotation. Concluding this view, Bhartṛhari remarks that forms, sensory images are not denotations of the word itself and that they are considered as denotation by other means like habit (*abhyāsa*), perception (*darśana*) and practice (*prayoga*).⁹

Now, coming to an examination of this view, if we confine ourselves to this theory of meaning, many words denoting forms, qualities, etc. may not be explained. If the word denotes abstract ideas free from all unique qualifications, the problem of distinguishing the idea expressed by a particular word from that of others arises and in

that case, the meaning of that word may be confused with that of others. Not only that, it is epistemologically not justified, as human mind does not cognize pure abstraction without being revealed in the mind by a word. The meaning without content cannot be cognized and explained as meaning. As the purpose of using words is to communicate some specific denotation, this theory fails to explain the purpose of communication. Thus, it may be concluded that an indeterminate meaning cannot be identified with or distinguished by the use of words, and, in fact, the purpose of communication is defeated if the theory is taken into practice.

THEORY 2

The followers of this theory make a distinction between the expressive or denotative meaning, and the meaning implied by or known consequentially (*anuniṣpādi*). A meaning known consequentially is that which is implied by the denotative meaning and is known after the cognition of denotative meaning.¹⁰ Denotative meaning, according to this theory, is universal and as it inheres or subsists in particulars, they are also cognized by implication as the substratum of denotative meaning (universal).¹¹ The words denote the universal, but individuals, being the substratum of universals, are implicated from the cognition of the universal expressed by word in the mind. In this view, the cognition of universal serves as the cause of implication of individuals and, hence, both the denoted and consequent meanings are the meanings of words. The denoted meaning of the word cow, to them, is cowness and the particular forms, etc., of the cow are consequently known by implication. Similarly, the denoted meaning of the word 'yajeta' is an action, but as an action cannot be performed without an agent and object, the 'actor' and 'material' are also known as consequential (*anuniṣpādita*) or implied meaning of the word 'yajeta'.

Coming to an examination of this view, G.N. Sastri (1959) remarks 'there is no sense in saying that specific attributes and individual characters are the meaning of the words though they can not actually enter into the content of denotation'.¹² In our opinion, the way Sastri presents this theory as non-sensical is not justified because of the fact that the theory distinguishes meaning as denotative and implied and mentions that both of them are contents of a word. For example, the word 'pot' denotes 'potness' (*pot-universal*) and the particular 'pot' is

also known, consequently, by implication as the substratum of 'potness inhering in it. Individualists may take an opposite stand, and may say that the individual is the denotation of words and that implies the universal. It can also be asked if individual is not included in the denotation proper, and even if it is taken as meaning, will it not be a meaning without a word (*vācaka*)? Logically, it is not justified to accept a meaning (*vācya*) without a word (*vācaka*). Conclusively, it can be said that both of the meaning, denotative and implied, are the content of the word, but the implied meanings are not those revealed directly. They are implied by the denotative meaning of the word and are known consequentially by implication as the ontological substratum of the denotative meaning. If this is the case, it can easily be said that the above theory has a sound base to explain universal as the denotation of a word. As *Vaiyākaraṇas* accept 'universals in universal', the universal stands as the meaning of implied meanings also.

THEORY 3

According to this theory, both the universal and the individual are denotative meanings of a word, though, a distinction of primary and secondary meanings is made.¹³ In order to clarify the point, we may take an example of the word '*pidhehi*' (close), that primarily denotes an action, and by closeness to the former (*nāntarīyakayā*) it denotes an object (door). But when the word 'door' is uttered, it primarily denotes object (accessory) and the action (close) is known only by implication.¹⁴ Both the meanings, in this view, come within the range of denotation of the word. Likewise, the word '*pot*' denotes '*potness*' as well as '*pot-individual*' and, when the word '*pot*' is used directly to denote 'potness', the universal becomes its primary meaning and vice versa.

Now, it can be asked, how can a word, e.g. dog, denote both dog universal and individual-dog at the same time? As two denotations are not simultaneously revealed by a word, how can the idea of two denotations of a single word (*vācaka*) be justified cognitively? The cognition of two denotations of different nature implies two expressers. The two will be different meanings of two different words and, thus, it will go against their interest. Another alternative, that one denotation is implied by another, also goes against the spirit of this theory. It, even may invite the same objections as lodged against Theory 2 also.

The theory of two denotations of different nature of a word is, logically, inconsistent, because, in the theory 'one expresser denotes two expressed', one out of the two will be an ultra vires and, hence, without an independent expresser. To accept one without an expresser amounts to the fallacy of meaning without a word on the basis of which 'meaning as meaning revealed non-differently by word' cannot be explained. A grammatical difficulty in assuming both of them as meaning of a word is that if a word is taken to denote two expresseds, the word should always be used in plural number, but this is not conducive, because words are used in all the numbers (singular, dual and plural). If it is said that it is by alternation and option that words sometimes express the universal and sometimes the individual, accumulation and option should be admitted in number also, and that may cause unsolvable difficulties in the way of the expression by the words.

THEORY 4

For the followers of this theory, the denotation of a word is an aggregate of universal, form and individual (*jātyākṛtivyakti samudāyaḥ*).¹⁵ Gautama, the ancient *Naiyāyika*, has been the follower of this view. Some *Neo-Naiyāyikas* interpret the individual qualified by the universal and form (*jātyākṛtiviśiṣṭavyakti*) as the denotation of words. As opposed to the third view, the followers of this theory do not admit distinction of primary and secondary denotations. There is neither accumulation nor option in the meaning denoted by words (*avikalpa samucayaḥ*). For example,¹⁶ the word 'forest' denotes neither different trees constituting the forest, nor as one added to another. Rather, it denotes the aggregate without a reference to plurality, collectively or severally. Similarly, the word '*brāhmaṇa*' does not, collectively or individually, denote qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* such as austerity, birth and learning. All the qualities are understood as a whole belonging to '*brāhmaṇa*'.

Theory 4, we feel, avoids the difficulties raised and mentioned earlier, to an extent, but lands itself in logical problems. It will be difficult to explain words not denoting any form such as '*apūrva*' and also those denoting universals, for example the word 'generality'. The word 'particular' is not used to denote universal and vice versa. How can the words, not denoting aggregate, be explained if aggregate is the meaning of all words? Bhartṛhari observes a cognitive difficulty in

accepting aggregate as the denotation of words. He says that for cognition of an aggregate, difference is fundamental and on the basis of that, identical cognition by words cannot be explained. For example, the word 'forest', in the case of aggregate, as the denotation of words, may denote the aggregate of different trees like, cypress, chestnut and other kinds of trees, but not the identity of them. Similarly, the word 'brāhmaṇa' may denote the aggregate of qualities like austerity, birth and learning, and not the identity of them as *brāhmaṇa*, and thus, this theory fails to explain the distinct identical cognition by words.

THEORY 5

The theorists of this view hold that the denotation of a word is an unreal relationship between individual and universal.¹⁷ Relation is not seen apart from the relata in which the properties subsist and, hence, is unreal. This unreal relationship is the meaning of words. According to *Bauddhas*, the real is a momentary flux or instants (*svalakṣaṇa*) that are untouched by the use of words, and what is expressed by words is false relationship of individual and universal. For example, the word 'pot' denotes the relation of an individual 'pot' to 'potness'. They do not accept eternal and independent relation like inherence (*samavāya*), as held by *Vaiśeṣikas*.

This theory is, thus, based on a defective definition of meaning and confuses relation for meaning. If relation (whether external, conventional or fictional) is to be accepted as meaning, it has to be an expressed (*vācya*) of an expresser (*vācaka*). Relation cannot be indicated apart from its relata, and hence, there is a chance of misunderstanding a relation as a relata. How can a relation be a relata? An expressed is that which an expresser expresses. How can an utterly dependent relation be an independent relata? Moreover, relation is not an expressed of an expresser, but the fitness of the latter, by virtue of which it expresses the meaning, the expressed.

THEORY 6

This theory assumes that words denote reality through unreal adjuncts.¹⁸ According to this theory, both the individual and the universal are unreal adjuncts through which words denote reality. *Mahābhāṣyapradīpakāra* Kaiyaṭa observes that words denote the

ultimate word-principle (*śabda-brahman*) through the various adjuncts, e.g. universals, forms and particularities. For the adherents of this theory, word and meaning both are eternal. Bhartṛhari, in his chapters on universal and substance, has referred to this view for the explanation of Being (*sattā*) as the meaning of words.

Contrary to Theory 5, this theory believes that the meaning of a word is not a fictitious relation, but the ultimate reality. The theory that 'words denote ultimate reality through unreal adjuncts' has more a teleological significance than logical. It interprets the subordination of both the individual and the universals to the absolute reality. Logically, such a stand causes critical problems. The theorists themselves accept that the words do not denote reality directly and the adjuncts - universals, forms and individuals - are not denotation of words themselves but are tools or means through which reality is denoted. Thus, the theory swings between the transcendental and empirical, but embraces none because an indirect denotation is not a meaning of a word at all and the direct denotation of the word is not the meaning proper as the theorists themselves accept. Meaning is the unit revealed directly by the word. Even if indirect meaning of a word is accepted, the question of direct meaning of word remains unsolved. If unreal adjuncts are accepted as the meaning of words, it goes against their basic assumption and in that event, it has to face the difficulties raised against Theory 5. If a transcendental reality (ultimate) is accepted as the meaning, it cannot be justified communicatively, as words do not communicate reality, but meaning, and both of them cannot be accepted as the meaning, because they are not cognized simultaneously by the word. A two-level meaning is not justified because meaning does not necessarily involve a two-level denotation - transcendental and empirical, real and unreal. As the theorists themselves accept that words do not touch reality directly, it is contradictory to accept reality as the meaning of words and words as a pointer to reality at the same time. The problem of denotation is least concerned with reality, which is a subject-matter of religion and of other modes of objective reflection. In Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language, meaning of a word is an expressed. By expressed he means the very general meaning directly revealed by words, which serves as the basis of implication or inference of other meanings.

THEORY 7

This theory holds that the form of a word is its meaning (*yoyam śabdaḥ soyamarthaḥ*). The form of the word, identified as meaning, is called 'abhijalpa' and is the denotation of the word.¹⁹ The *sūtras* of Pāṇini's rules of grammar and language do not express any specific form or sensory images except the word's own form. If it is asked which one is of primary importance – the word or the form? The answer is, for grammatical purposes both are important – some times the word and some times the form, whereas, in the world of communication, the form is certainly more important than the word.²⁰ The meaning of the word 'pot', is the form that it reveals. Hence, the relative importance of one over the other is dependent upon unerring custom (*avyabhicāra rūḍhi*) or the continuity of their use.²¹

This view is based on the grammarians' assumption of word as the expresser and the expressed (*grāhya-grāhaka*). However, it has its area of expertise in the sense that what the word expresses, according to this view, is not a referable object, but the word's own form. However, this theory fails to notice that the purpose of using words is not confined to the form of the words only. Words do not express only their forms, but the meaning contents as well. So, mere forms of the words cannot be equated with denotation, though there is no harm in accepting that form is also denoted by words as are used in grammar and mathematics. Naturally, certain words denoting specific contents will not be explained on the basis of this theory. If we observe Bhartṛhari's view that 'words denote their own form and meaning as well', we will find that meaning is not the form of the word but that which is expressed by the form. It is, thus, clear that the present view misinterprets the form of a word (word-universal) as its meaning (meaning-universal) and, thus, fails to interpret the essential character of a word as the expresser and the expressed.

THEORY 8

According to the followers of this view, external-objects are powerless (*aśakteḥ*) and cannot reveal cognition. Words are the power that expresses meanings, which are understood as the words express them. The meaning is what the words reveal and what is revealed by words is the expressed of words. The expressed of the word is an idea that figures in the mind non-differently by words. It is universal.²²

This theory is more comprehensive in its range. In this view, words, independent of sentence, are expressers, and the meanings they express are universals (*ideas*). Words denote universals, and other meanings on which they are imposed are known through resemblance or by implication. The universal is the expressed meaning of words, and others, i.e. individual, etc., are implied by the denotative meaning and are dependent on it. They are known, consequentially, by the factors like cognition of intention of the user, context, etc.

THEORY 9

This theory is opposed to the eight just discussed, as it does not accept external-objects as powerless, but rather it views them as all-potent (*sarva śakti*). Things are potent enough to be manifested through words as universal, particular, form, action, accessory, result, etc. Words for this theory, are only the means or tools in making the potency of things known in accordance with the expectancy of the speaker, who uses words to communicate the quality, form, etc. of the potency.²³ For example, the meaning of the word '*pot*' is the power agreeable to the potency of '*pot*'. The word '*pot*' (*ghaṭa*) denotes the power as the association of atoms of soil adorned with water. Thus, for the followers of this view, the meaning of the word is the potency of things and one cognizes the fixed potency of the thing by a fixed word.

Now, it is obvious that denotation, in this theory, is the potency agreeable to the thing. This view does not accept the word as the expresser and the expressed, but a medium, a tool, through which the potency of objects is indicated. Cognitively, it is not the potency of things, but words that reveal meaning. If things are taken as the meaning of words, many words, like non-existence, non-potency, hare's horn, etc., corresponding to no external-existents and also those conveying such meaning as yet to be produced and destroyed, cannot be explained. Many words having a meaning in a syntactical context, like if, either, wheter, or, etc., will be without a meaning and will cease to be words. As external things have fixed forms, they cannot move between the changing positions of being and non-being at the same time. The meaning – being and non-being – figures in the mind only by words, and, hence, there is no cognitive ground for accepting external things as the denotation of words, because words, for Bhartṛhari are not merely tools but both the expresser and the expressed (*grāhaka-grāhya*).

THEORY 10

For this theory, meaning is neither an external-object/being nor merely intelligible idea/being (*Buddhistha*). It is the idea (universal) revealed by the word in the mind of the hearer, which, when taken as external object, is understood as the meaning of the word.²⁴ In other words, the hypostatization of idea as things external is the denotation of the word.

An explanation of the theory given by Puṇyārāja seems very close to that of *Yogācāra*-idealism, according to which the meaning of a word is a mental idea wrongly understood as an external object. Nāgeśa, the author of *Vyākaraṇa-Maṇjuṣa*, has viewed this theory as Bhartṛhari's own. Contrary to Puṇyārāja's opinion, Śāntarakṣita, the author of *Tattva-Sangraha* and his commentator Kamalaśīla, have taken the theory as something quite distinct from the theory of *Yogācāra*-idealism. Although both Bhartṛhari and *Yogācāra* take meaning as an idea, their views are different. *Yogācāra* rejects external-objects and holds that ideas are wrongly taken as external objects, while Bhartṛhari does not feel any need to reject external things, rather, he accepts them as the substratum (*samānādhikaraṇa*) known by implication of the idea that figures in the mind through words. Thus, for him, the idea, which is universal, is the denotation of words. While for *Yogācāra*, the idea hypostatized as an external object, is the denotation of words. In *Yogācāra*, words and ideas are two discrete entities, while for Bhartṛhari they are identical. Theory 10 is agreeable to him and to *Yogācāra* as well in so far as it assumes idea as the denotation of words, but when it comes regarding to idea personified as external thing, it differs from Bhartṛhari and goes in favour of *Yogācāra*. As opposed to *Yogācāra*, Bhartṛhari explains identical-cognition by words not by means of personification, but by accepting words as expresser, and meaning as an idea or thought-object expressed non-differently by them.

THEORY 11

According to this theory, some words denote individuals qualified by forms, and some other words denote mere understanding void of all determinations like form, colour, etc. (*samvinmātram*) and, hence, the denotation of words is not uniformed.²⁵ For example, the word 'apūrva' denotes an indeterminate idea, while the words dog, pot, etc. denote individuals that have concrete shape and colour. Theories 1 and 11

are similar in assuming a non-qualified idea as the denotation of a word, but theory 11, unlike the assessment of it by K.A.S. Iyer (1966), is not just a repetition of theory 1.²⁶ Theory 11 differs from theory 1, in so far as it does not admit only abstract idea as the denotation of word. It assumes that some words such as *apūrva*, *devatā*, etc., express non-qualified idea, while some other words, like dog, pot, etc., involve particularities – forms, qualities, etc. This theory does not produce a unanimous criterion of denotation and, hence, confusion in determination of the denotation of a word is always possible. This theory also poses the same problems that are raised against theory 1. Conclusively, it can be said that an indeterminate denotation cannot be identified or distinguished on the basis of cognition revealed by words, but it is not the case with words, as they distinctly and determinately express their own meanings.

THEORY 12

For the exponents of this view, meaning of a word is not fixed but variable, and the determination of the meaning of a word depends on the use-context. In other words, the use-context of a word must be taken into consideration in determining the meaning of a word. The speaker may utter a word with a particular intention, but the hearer may understand its meaning differently, if he has a different impression of the use of that word. On account of allegiance to different cultural backgrounds, the meaning of a word differs from person to person. The same person trained in a particular system of faith, may take the meaning of a word differently if he changes his allegiance to another system of faith.²⁷ For example, the meaning of the word 'pot' for those trained in the *Sāṃkhya* school of philosophy, is the aggregate of three *guṇas* (*guṇa samudāyaḥ*), while for those trained in the *Jaina* and *Bauddha* systems of philosophy, it is a particular kind of association of atoms (*paramāṇu saṃghāta*). *Saṃkarites* take *Brahman* as an indeterminate, while *Rāmānujaites* take it as a determinate-reality (*saguṇa-brahman*).

The advocates of the theory maintain that the same word conveys different meanings to different persons in different use-contexts. Explaining the changing meanings of a word in different use-context, *Bhartṛhari* says that the sentence and the indivisible sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*) are given in the mind of the user. It is an indivisible idea,

a clear and distinct flash having no accumulation or option in it. The science of grammar introduces the device of grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*), through which the indivisible sentence and sentential-meaning are understood as that constituted by part-words and their meanings. The interpretation of indivisible sentential-meaning through the artificial process of association of word-meanings acquired by analysis made by different persons trained in different systems of faith, varies according to their impressions and intentions involved. Therefore, in order to determine the meaning of a word, one must know the use-context. For example, the word 'śavati' is used in the sense of 'going' in the Kamboja region of India, but in other parts of India, it is used for 'to change into a corpse'. In the sentence 'you are great', the meaning of the word 'great' could be ungratefulness, if used for a thankless person; and greatness if used for a person of character. These examples, taken at random, show that a word is used for many meanings, and it becomes difficult to observe a unanimous theory of the meaning of word-meaning. Theory 12 emphasizes this matter of fact. The other aspect of the theory is that meaning of a word is its use in a use-context, i.e. in order to determine the meaning of a word, we have to observe its use-context. No theory of meaning can ignore the fact that word is used for many meanings in different use-context or even in different expressions. Viewing this matter of fact, Bhartṛhari remarks that the nature of meaning of meanings (*artha-tattva*) cannot be determined absolutely. In order to determine it, one has to pay attention to the use of words that is founded on the time-honoured experience of the user.²⁸ Scholars should not change them or translate them arbitrarily, because that may obscure communication and may cause confusion.²⁹

'What does it mean to say that meaning cannot be determined' is a question the solution of which is of vital importance for arriving at a clear conception of meaning. Something is considered indeterminate, if it is beyond the grasp of the mind, or if it is free from all specific determinations – property, quality, etc. Is meaning such a thing? Indian philosophers in two ways give the answer to this question: 1. Understanding of meaning as a metaphysical reality: empirical or transcendental; and 2. Cognitive understanding of meaning as a being revealed by words. In the former case, the reality, though beyond the grasp of the mind and speech, is described in language, because language is the only tool at our disposal through which even such

indescribables can be communicated. Bhartṛhari is of the opinion that in such descriptions, words function not as expressers, but as pointers and the reality in-itself remains 'indeterminate', as the words do not touch it. Those having no genuine insight about the nature of reality fail to describe it, and being based on false or superficial notions, it is not free from errors. The transcendental experiences of those having insights into reality cannot be perceived by means of cognitive understanding of language, and, hence, are incommunicable to ordinary mortals.

In the latter case, words are used for communicating meaning that is cognized as the words express them. Though word, meaning and the relation between the two are given, communication becomes possible only if speakers and hearers are acquainted with the uses of words. If we limit ourselves to the use of a word in a use-context that varies (in keeping with different impressions and intentions involved in its use), we are bound to accept the conclusion that the meaning of a word is not determined. However, if meaning is taken as a metaphysical-reality, it follows that it is untouched by words and, thus, the same conclusion is derived. Perhaps, viewing this aspect of the explanation of meaning G.N. Sastri determines Bhartṛhari's view of meaning of meanings as fiction. He writes 'in his system, however, the import of a word is fiction, in as much as he believes in the reality of sentence, and also of its meaning, as an indivisible unit. Hence, word and meaning have no objective value to him than that of an instrument enabling us to visualize and reach the ultimate goal'.³⁰ The remark made by Sastri is based on an obvious mistake. The grammatical analysis of indivisible sentential-meaning into word-meaning is quite useful, but it does not imply that meaning revealed by the words in the mind is just a fiction. What is implied is that the process of understanding meaning through analysis is just a means to an end, never an end in itself.³¹ Now, meaning for Bhartṛhari, is a being revealed by words; it is a cognitive unit. The fact of the cognition of meaning by words admits meaning as veridical cognition and not as fiction. If we do not accept the verity of meaning cognized by words as a being figured in the mind, even the word 'fiction' will lose its meaning. Cognitively, 'meaning is fiction' needs a veridical cognition of it, otherwise, a counter statement would arise as to how could it be known as fiction.³² Certainly, problems like identical-cognition of meaning by a word in its several instances and occurrences, its recognition and

memory cannot be explained if meaning is taken as fiction. If what is real on the plane of cognition is passed off as ontic real, the whole phenomenon will remain unexplained and confusion would follow. However, if one, keeping the character of the word in view, defines meaning as that which is revealed non-differently by the word, one would have no logical problem in accepting the verity of cognition by words. Certainly, it is logically untenable to identify an object of knowledge as fiction. How can an object or a being of awareness in character be called fiction? In that case, it will be difficult to distinguish between cognition and fiction, and, what is more, no knowledge will be sound.

In order to critically assess any observation on a concept (presently, Bhartṛhari's observations on the meaning of meaning), fundamental factors, like the problem involved in the explanation, the method or approach, the aim, and the consistency of the evaluated facts with the constitution of a system of thought, must be taken into consideration.

Bhartṛhari, as we have already seen, maintains throughout his discussion that the meaning a sentence revealed non-differently in the mind is also an indivisible – an indivisible, complete meaning satiating further expectancy for the revelation of a complete unit. From these remarks, it cannot be inferred that Bhartṛhari has not given due importance to words (*pada*) and their meanings. It is grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*) on the basis of which an indivisible sentence is taken artificially divided into components (words) and these indivisible components are further divided into their roots or stems and suffixes, prefixes, post-positions, particles, etc. Similarly, sentential-meaning is also divided into different word-meanings (*padārthas*). This piecemeal system (may be imaginary) is accepted for the fulfilment of a certain purpose. Though words and their meanings are basically means in understanding an indivisible whole, yet in ordinary usage they are also considered as real units. Bhartṛhari's approach is specialized in that through analysis, a cognitive-ground is reached, on the basis of which identical cognition by words can be explained uniformly, which perhaps is the reason why he admits universals as meaning of meanings. Bhartṛhari's aim, in explaining the world of communication, is to explain a clear and true understanding of meaning, as it is revealed by words, in their various uses, by taking the language as expresser and the meaning as expressed by nature.

I shall conclude here Bhartṛhari's views on the meaning of meaning. *Jāti-Samuddesaḥ*, the first chapter of the third part of *Vākyapadīya*, provides the cognitive grounds and logical justifications in support of his preferred theory. I am presenting a concise account of that chapter based on the *Prakāśa* commentary of Helārāja, and the *Ambākarī* of Raghu Natha Sharma.

Import of Words: Universal or Individual? (A Discussion)

Sanskrit grammarians have made significant contributions to the discussion on the generality of words and meanings. Discussion of *Vaiyākaraṇas* on this issue are chiefly divided into two groups. According to the first major group, led by Ācārya Vājapyāyana, the meaning of the meaning of words is universal. The other, led by Ācārya Vyāḍi, holds that individual (*vyākti*) is the very general meaning of words. Moreover, in both the views, meaning (*jāti* or *vyakti*) is taken as eternal (*nitya*).

Observing the merits of both the views, Paṇīni and his commentator Patañjali have valued both for the explanation of forms of words. Bhartṛhari, in the third part of his *Vākyapadīya*, has fully analyzed and interpreted the arguments of both the views separately under the chapters '*Dravya Samuddeśaḥ*' (substance as the import of words) and '*Jāti-Samuddeśaḥ*' (universal as the import of words).

(A) UNIVERSAL AS IMPORT OF WORDS (PADĀRTHA)

It is clear that Bhartṛhari's insight regarding the concern of philosophical reflections sports in the court of cognition by language only. As words are used for all their occurrences and instances (past, present and future), they are their common designations, but more than that they are as much cognitive beings as they are expressed or revealed beings. The being it reveals comprises itself and its meaning, which are essentially universal, and that is why identical conception/cognition is accomplished across different instances or occurrences.

It is, cognitively justified to say that the word 'book' uttered once is cognized as identical with the word 'book' uttered at different times

or by different users. The recognition of the same word and its memory are not possible, if there is not some cognitive base to them. This base is generality or universal, on account of which all words are known distinctly. Similar is the case with their meanings. First, I propose to discuss Bhartṛhari's views on the universality of words.

The generality of words is *svājāti* (the universality of words or word-ness, and that of the particular word-universal, that is 'pot-word-ness' etc.), which is revealed when manifested gradually by hearing of verbal utterance/noises. When it is revealed, it reveals meaning in the mind. All words, for this view are universal.³³ A universal (word), in this explanation, is that which is manifested by syllables uttered and heard. Bhartṛhari, as we have indicated earlier, introduces³⁴ a new concept of gradual manifestation of the universal (*sphoṭa*). As *sphoṭa* is manifested gradually in the sequence of utterances and reveals itself completely after the hearing of the last syllable, it is universal. Contrary to the *Vaiśeṣika* view, grammarians have assumed 'universal in universal'. In word-universal, for them, are the particular word-universals and meaning-universal. The utterances p, o, t, manifest wordness first and reveals itself as a word different from other meaningless sounds, etc., and, then, the pot word-universal on account of which the word 'pot' is distinguished from that of other words. The cognition of the wordness and particular word-universal (*svājāti*) is a figuring of the complete apprehension of word (*sphoṭa*) that non-differently reveals meaning universal in general and 'potness' (pot-meaning-universal) in particular. As wordness, pot-word-universal, meaning universal and potness all of them are revealed by the wordness (*sphoṭa*), they are cognized non-differently by the word 'pot'.³⁵

It may be asked, if the word 'pot' reveals 'pot-word-ness', how can it be said to reveal 'word-ness', which is additional. Bhartṛhari's answer³⁶ to this question is that as the 'universal inheres in the universals', word-ness inheres in all of them, and, the word, when uttered, manifests the universal, which reveals itself and those universals as well. The pot-word-universal reveals word-ness (*śabdatva*) and then potness (*ghaṭatva*) as well. The cognition of the *svājāti* is the cognition of word-ness inhering in the pot-word-universal, meaning universal and potness as well. The articulated verbal utterances 'pot', when heard, manifest the 'word-ness limited by pot-wordness' directly and reveals the rest non-differently. As universal is the unity inhering in many, it

can be taken to inhere in many universals, directly and indirectly. For example, the word '*rakta*' (red) denotes a quality produced from *lākṣā*, which is also called *rakta* and the clothes coloured in it are also called by the same word '*rakta*'. The word '*rakta*' denotes 'redness' that inheres in all the 'red' designata. Similarly, the word-universal is the universal of pot-word-universal, meaning universal and the potness, which is why identical conception is revealed by the word 'pot'.³⁷

Bhartṛhari has explained the above point also from the Advaitic theory of superimposition (*adhyāsa*). According to this view, the pot-word-universal is imposed on the word-universal, meaning universal and potness, and, hence, identical cognition is revealed.³⁸ It is clear from the above argument that Bhartṛhari assumes 'universals in universal', which is a significant contribution to Indian philosophy by a grammarian philosopher, on the basis of which he explains expressions like '*imā jātayā*' (these universals) '*śabda jātiyān*' (word-universals), etc.³⁹ *Vaiśeṣikas* do not accept 'universals in universal' for, they fear, it may lead to infinite regress. The detailed account of Bhartṛhari's view on this point will be given in due course of the discussion. Presently, suffice it to say that on the basis of their assumption 'universal in universals', *Vaiyākaraṇas* have succeeded not only in explaining expressions like 'these universals', etc., but also in elucidating the non-difference of word and meaning. The word universal reveals itself and the meaning universal is revealed non-differently by it in the mind and, thus, the meaning-universal is not different from the word-universal. The *sphoṭa* is both the expresser and the expressed. Bhartṛhari does not take word-ness and meaning-universal as synonymous. The same principle from the point of view of the expresser is language, and from that of the expressed is meaning. He simply assumes that word-ness reveals itself and that it reveals the meaning-universal non-differently, on account of which identical cognition by it is accomplished. Identical cognition by word cannot be explained, if meaning universal is taken independently of the word-universal. How can a word express that which does not subsist in it? Words express themselves and the meanings also and, therefore, it is concluded that the word-universal (*sphoṭa*), which is the foundational being in the philosophy of *Vaiyākaraṇas*, subsists in particular word-universals and meaning-universals as well. As identical cognition of them is accomplished in communication, the fear of infinite regress does not arise, even if 'universal in universals' are admitted.

'The word reveals itself, and its meaning is revealed non-differently by it', is the ground on the basis of which Bhartṛhari has accepted both the word and the meaning as objects of cognition and has explained the word as 'universal'. For him, meaning is also 'universal'. Before a detailed discussion on the problem of universal as the meaning of words, it is imperative to show how Bhartṛhari explains universal as the meaning of all words. In his view, nouns (*nāmas*), verbs (*ākhyātas*), prepositions (*upasargas*), particles (*nipātas*) and post-positions (*karmapravacanīyas*) are five kinds of words obtained by the grammatical analysis of a sentence, and that all of them denote 'universal'.

Bhartṛhari, like *Mahābhāṣyakāra* Patañjali, is always conscious of showing that philosophy of language is not concerned with the nature of things as they really are, but with meanings as they are conveyed by words.⁴⁰ All substantives (*nāmapadas*) denote universals. Even the proper names as they are applied and are applicable to many individuals, denote universal. The universals denoted by a proper name like Deodatta is explained by him, on the basis of the cognition of Deodatta as Deodatta through all his changing stages of childhood, youth and old age.⁴¹ Even the very general meaning of the words conveying qualities such as red, white, fat, beautiful, etc. are universals. These words are commonly used for all their occurrences and instances and identical cognition is revealed by each of the uses.⁴² The cause of identical cognition of them is the universal. The word *śyām* (dark) is used for a quality, but when it is compounded with the noun '*ghana*' (cloud) it denotes substantive universal as Pāṇini⁴³ shows by the *sūtra* '*upamānāni sāmānyavacanaiḥ*'. This *sūtra* explains how an adjective is taken as a general name if compounded (as we see in the expression '*ghanaśyāma*'). The word 'universal', according to him, is called so because it denotes universal. Thus, Bhartṛhari shows that all substantives (*nāmapadas*) convey universal.⁴⁴ This is true of verbs (*ākhyātas*) as well. For example, the verb 'to cook' (*pacati*), as it is used for a number of occurrences and instances of cooking rice, meat, molasses, etc., denotes a universal. Even in a single case of cooking-rice, a number of acts like washing the cooking-pot, setting the fire, keeping the pot on the fire and many others are involved. The word '*pacati*' denotes the universal of all the actions that occur in cooking.

The cause of this identical cognition is the universal that inheres in all the particular actions falling under the act of cooking and the word denotes that.⁴⁵ As prepositions express a peculiarity in action which is universal and 'karmapravacanīyas' (post-positions) function as qualifiers of past-actions (universals), their meanings are also understood as universal. As particles (*nipātas*) express a peculiarity of substantives (*bhāvas*), they too denote universals. Bhartṛhari shows that every word expresses a universal that serves as the cause of identical cognition in the various instances and occurrences of an individual and, therefore, universals are admitted as the very general meaning of all words.

Bhartṛhari and his commentator Helārāja, are very much aware of the fact that *Vyākaraṇa* has a deep concern with the interpretation of expressions. No theory of language and meaning, they believe, may be well received if it does not explain the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions. Bhartṛhari has referred to a number of Vedic expressions for the purpose of explanation. The prescribed material should perform the prescribed Vedic act, otherwise, it would be a violation of the Vedic injunction. Now, if the meaning of words is universal, how can the Vedic-acts be performed, if the prescribed material is not available? If it is said that it may be performed with a substitute, how can substitution be explained if universals are the import of words? As the universal of substituting material will be different from the universal of the material prescribed, the performance of a Vedic act by the substitute will be a violation of the commanded prescription. Accepting universal as the import of words, Bhartṛhari, on the basis of a thorough scrutiny of the meaning of individual words, the purport of the expression and the context, has observed that substitution, without a violation of the Vedic prescription, can be explained. K.A.S. Iyer, following Helārāja's interpretation, has explained it with the example of the expression '*khadirebaddhnāti*' (The sacrificial-animal should be tied up to a post made of *khadira*).⁴⁶ (Catechu wood). An account of three-fold explanation of the expression '*khadirebaddhnāti*' follows thus:

1. If the meaning of the expression '*khadirebaddhnāti*' is taken as 'tying the animal to a post', then the action conveyed by the expression is not directly related to *khadira*, but to the act of tying

(*baddhnāti*), which cannot be accomplished by the mere being of *khadira*. Any post that has the capacity to tie the animal strongly can perform the act. Thus, the capacity (of holding strongly) serves as the universality of posts and it inheres in the *khadira* post as well. Taking the capacity of post into consideration, '*khadira*' may be substituted by some other post that has the capacity to serve as a strong post for the act of tying the animal.

2. On the basis of the purport of the expression '*khadirebaddhnāti*' also, Bhartṛhari explains the meaning of the expression as universal. For grammarians, a verb denoting action is the most important and central word in a sentence. According to this view, *baddhnāti* is the central meaning of the expression. The word '*khadira*' expresses an accessory to the action 'tying the animal'. If *khadira* is not available; the post of any wood (with which the tying animal strongly can be performed) can be substituted. Thus, he explains the meaning of the word, '*baddhnāti*' as universal of actions involved in the act of tying the animal so as to check its free movement, with a substitute of the post made of *khadira*.
3. The context of the use of the expression '*khadirebaddhnāti*' is of primary significance, for its relevance is in the tying of the animal and includes other activities, such as checking its free movement and enabling sacrifice, only secondarily. The *khadira* post is fit to serve the function, but if *khadira* is not available, it can be substituted by some other post having the fitness, otherwise, there may be a case of violation of the Vedic injunction. The 'fitness of the post' serves as the universal here, hence, any post useful may substitute *khadira* for the purpose. In case of individual as the import of words, such substitution would not be possible, which may lead to violation in the absence of the prescribed material.

If words denote 'universal', and each word conveys more than one meaning, it may be asked, how can a word reveal many meanings without losing its universality? It will be inconsistent and faulty, from the holistic outlook, to accept that one word-universal denotes many meaning universals. As this assumption goes against the theory that 'a fixed word denotes a fixed meaning' or 'the meaning of a word is fixed', it may go against the fact of communication (*vyavahāraviruddha*), in which a word is used

for many meanings. Solving this dichotomy, Bhartṛhari observes that the word 'cow' denotes cowness 'gotva', which is the primary or fixed meaning of the word 'cow', and because of resemblance (*sādrśya*) based on some similarity, it is also used for cowherd (*gaurabāhika*).⁴⁷ According to his holistic point of view 'cowness' is imposed on cowherd, etc., with some similarity in dullness, meekness and stupidity. Thus, Bhartṛhari accepts that a word may be used for different meanings, but its denotative or expressed meaning, as distinct from other intended meanings, is fixed. On the basis of accepting the expressed one as the popular meaning and the different meanings on which it is imposed, Bhartṛhari explains the universality of meaning without violating his own theory of non-difference of word and meaning.

Bhartṛhari in '*Jāti-Samuddeśaḥ*', is chiefly interested in showing that the meaning of all words is universal and whether this universal is a common designation, or a generic form, or a common and essential property, does not matter. He has ably faced the *Vaiśeṣika* arguments against universal as meaning,⁴⁸ has minutely analyzed them and then given his own verdict. As the clarification on these objections sheds sufficient light on his conception of universal as the import of words, it seems necessary to discuss it first.

1. According to the *Vaiśeṣika* definition of universal, plurality of substrata (particulars) is required for the inherence of universal. They say, as there is no plurality in unitary, all-pervasive substrata, such as the Advaitin's *brahman*, sky, soul, time, direction, etc., which for them are many names for one, those words cannot be taken to denote a universal. Bhartṛhari's solution to this problem is based on two theories founded by his predecessors for the explanation of universal as the import of words. These are, the theory of universal as an ontic being (*sattā jātivāda*) and the theory of limitedness (*upādhivāda*). Both these theories are the topics for an independent study. Our involvement, here, with these two is confined only to the explanation of words conveying unitary substrata.
2. *Sattā jātivāda*,⁴⁹ like Plato's theory of ideas, believes in a hierarchy of universals with the universal of *śabda-brahman* as the supreme reality (*mahāsattā-mahājāti*). All words are common units and convey universals. Inherence of universals in the great universal

(*mahājāti*) are explained by Bhartṛhari as the powers of manifestations of the all-pervading and abiding principle of all those pervaded by that principle. Thus, his attitude in explaining the subordination of pervaded universals to the great universal is more teleological than logical. All words ultimately convey the great universal, but on the plane of cognition they express the universal that is the direct denotation of words.⁵⁰

Explaining words like space, time and direction, he has adopted the theory of limitedness, according to which space, time and direction are taken to be varied through the properties of the objects with which they are communicated as conjoined, and on the basis of which they are treated as the common substratum of all instances of them.⁵¹ For example, 'space' is one, but treated as many on the basis of the adjunct pot, room, heart, etc. with which it is taken to be conjoined, as we find in the uses '*ghaṭākāśa*' (the space of the pot), '*hṛdayākāśa*' (the space of heart), etc. The space, as a common substratum of *ghaṭākāśa*, *hṛdayākāśa*, etc., is universal, which, when revealed by the word 'space', causes identical cognition of space (*ākāśa*).

Similar is the case with time and direction. Time, with its conventional divisions into past, present, future, etc., based on its associatedness with different individuals, is taken as different. The common element of all the divisions of time is the universal (time-ness) that serves for their identical conception as time.⁵² Like time, space, in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, is one and whole but treated differently as east, west, etc., when communicated on the basis of its conjunction with the different points of the sun.⁵³ The common jargon for divisions of space is universal space-ness and the word, 'space' denotes that on account of which identical cognition by the word space is cognized.

Bhartṛhari, unlike *Vaiśeṣikas*, believes that external existences are not necessary for the explanation of the inherence of universal, and that, even on the basis of cognitive, logical, artificial or imposed difference, universals can be explained as a common substratum of differences. The word space (*ākāśa*) denotes 'space' (ness) while the word '*ghaṭākāśa*' conveys space (ness) secondarily. Now, if these words express universal, how can the primary and secondary meanings of the words like space, etc. be distinguished? Bhartṛhari is quite clear on the point that communication of such unitary

wholes as space, etc. is possible only if they are treated through relations of inherence and conjunction.⁵⁴ If inherence is observed in the use of the word, the meaning of the word is distinguished as primary, while in the case of conjunction, the word secondarily conveys universal. For example, it is by inherence that the word space in the expression 'the space is one' is taken to mean 'spaceness' primarily while it in the expression *ghaṭākāśa* expresses its conjunction with the adjunct pot (space limited by pot), and, hence, secondarily conveys 'spaceness'.⁵⁵

The '*Vaiśeṣikas*' argument against the *Vaiyākaraṇas*' thesis 'all words denote universals' is that synonymous words do not denote universal. On the basis of a minute observation of the use of words in communication, Bhartṛhari has clarified that all words have their specific uses. As for synonymous words, they are actually different words used for conveying their specific meanings.⁵⁶ In taking them as synonymous this minute aspect is overlooking.⁵⁷ The point will be elaborated in Chapter VIII under the topic 'relation between language and meaning'.

3. *Vaiśeṣikas* may argue that if all words denote universals, and universals are ubiquitous, there may be cases of confusing universals (*jāti-sāṅkara*), and thus the universal cannot be accepted as the denotation of words. For Bhartṛhari, the problem of confusing universals is baseless in the context of universals as the expresseds of expressions. As no substrata (individuals) manifest all universals, and as they manifest their specific universals, there is no possibility of confusing universals, even though they are ubiquitous. The universals are distinguished by individuals through which they are manifested.⁵⁸ The word 'pot' reveals 'potness' inhering in all individual pots and it is 'potness' that is distinctly known by the word pot. Even in case of inherence of universals in universal, such confusion does not arise, as all universals are distinctly known as revealed beings.
4. *Vaiśeṣikas* may ask: if universality is regarded as universal inhering in many universals, another universality will be required to pervade the former with the latter, and similarly a third, fourth and so on ad infinitum. Bhartṛhari's solution to this problem is based on his explanation of cognition by words. As we have discussed earlier, 'universality inheres in universals' and as identical cognition of 'universals in universal' is revealed by the words, there is no fear of ad infinitum.⁵⁹

5. If words denote universals, what does the word 'individual' denote? It seems apparently contradictory to say that the word 'individual' denotes universal. In order to get a solution of the problem, we have to examine Bhartṛhari's explanation of the word 'individual'.⁶⁰ The word 'individual' (*vyakti*), as Bhartṛhari says, stands for substratum (*avayavī*) of many constituents (*avayavas*) like existence, action, quality, independence, inherence, etc. The word 'individual' 'reveals the identity of the constituents as substantive (*avayavī*).⁶¹ No epistemological justification of the cognition of individual (*avayavī*) can be given, if it as the universal of its constituents is not admitted. The word 'individual' (*avayavī* or *vyakti*) is a common expresser of all the particularities or constituents of an individual, and thus cognition of individual as substantive of particularities cannot be explained, if universal is not admitted.

The individualists may say that individuals are self-distinguished (*svatovyāvṛtta*) categories, and that, it is the individual that is the inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of the universal, and hence there is no need to accept universals for the explanation of the cognition of individual, the substratum because the individual itself is the cause of unitary cognition. Bhartṛhari has tested the position of individualists on the ground of common use of words. He argues, if the *Vaiśeṣika* view 'components inheres in individual' is taken for granted, there should be such expressions like '*śṛṅge gauḥ*' (the cow is in horns) and '*śākhāyāmvṛkṣaḥ*' (the tree is in the branches), but such expressions are not used, rather the expressions like '*gavi śṛṅgam*' (horns in the cow) and '*vṛkṣe śākhā*' (branches in the tree) are the correct forms of uses in communication.⁶²

Vaiśeṣikas also accept that it is not parts but the whole (*avayavī*) that serves as the substrata of parts and that substrata, according to Bhartṛharians is universal which the word expresses. What individualists call 'individual' cannot be explained as substrata of its components without admitting universals.

Bhartṛhari, explaining particularity, says that particularities are called so as they exclude one another. This exclusion is the common and essential character of all the particulars or particularities and, therefore, universal.⁶³

6. *Vaiśeṣikas*' objection is how can non-existence (*abhāva*) in which nothing can inhere, be the substratum of a universal? For Bhartṛhari, non-existence or negation as a counterpart (*pratiyogī*) of different kinds of existences (*bhāvas*) is taken as different negations, namely *prāgbhāva* (antecedent non-existence), *pradhvansābhāva* (subsequent non-existence), *anyonyābhāva* (mutual non-existence) and *atyantābhāva* (absolute non-existence). It is universal which inheres in all kinds of negations and hence, universal is also the denotation of the word.⁶⁴
7. Against *Vaiyākaraṇas*' assumption that 'universals are that which inhere in particulars', it can be asked: what does inhere in inherence? Any positive reply to this question will amount to an endless process. Bhartṛhari, for interpretation, takes the word 'inherence' as a common unit of inseparable relations and that it reveals identical cognition of all the occurrences and instances of inherence, and thus, he shows that, the word 'inherence' denotes universal-inherence.

Accepting universals as eternal, Bhartṛhari proceeds to examine the question: what is the use of admitting universals as eternal? He is of the view that there is nothing that is born, and yet that does not manifest its universal since its birth.⁶⁵ All births are distinguished by their universals. Universal, as eternal, is admitted for the explanation of the possibility of incentive to its manifestation in effects newly born. The function of universal, according to Bhartṛhari, is to prompt the causes for manifestation in effects, and thus, it implies that the universal exists prior to the effects newly born. As an accessory to the cause, it is instrumental to the manifestation of effect, and thus, it implies that the universal exists prior to the effects newly born. As an accessory to the cause, it is instrumental to the manifestation of itself in the effect. It may be asked as to how can universal be said the motivator of causes of an effect, if it is not there in causes? Answering this question, Helārāja says that universals are ubiquitous. They subsist in causes in an unmanifested form and prompt the causes as an accessory towards the production of effects, which subsequently manifest them.⁶⁶ According to *Satkāryavāda* of Bhartṛhari, effects are there (in an unmanifested form) in their causes in the form of universal and they effect (manifest) their universality when they are brought into being by their causes.

Such expressions as, '*ghaṭam karoti*' (he is making a pot) cannot be explained if universals as eternal are not admitted as the import of

words. If meaning is taken to be an individual, how can a 'pot', which is not yet produced, be the object of an act of making? As pot, in the expression '*ghaṭam karoti*' is used for that which is non-existent, it cannot be taken as the object (*karma*) of the action (*karoti*), but it is indeed used as an object of the action, which, according to Bhartṛhari, cannot be explained if the universal as the meaning of the word 'pot' is not taken into account.⁶⁷ The word 'pot' denotes the object as the instrument of the act of making in the form of a universal, which is an accessory to the production of the effect (pot to be produced). When the effect is produced, it manifests it (the universal) subsequently. The pot, as universal (potness) that precedes the particular 'pot' to be produced, serves as an instrument in the act of making the individual 'pot' and is the object of the act of making.⁶⁸ If universal is not accepted prior to the effect, as eternally subsisting (as the cause) in the form of unmanifested effect, many questions like what serves as an accessory to an action and what prompts the cause for producing effects, will not be explained. *Not only that, it may* also go against their honoured theory of *satkārya*.

Bhartṛhari⁶⁹ observes that universal, in Vedic injunctions also serves as a means (*sādhana*). For example, '*brāhmaṇam na hanyāt*' (a brahmaṇa must not be killed) is a Vedic prohibition in which the word '*brāhmaṇa*' is used in singular number. According to Bhartṛhari, the singular number is not significant in this expression. As the word '*sarva*' (all) is used in the form of a collective sense (*śeṣa*), the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for the class of *brāhmaṇa* (*brāhmaṇatva*), off-springs of *Brahmā*. Similarly, present tense is also not significant, because an injunction or prohibition is a precept taught for all times. The expression would not be taken to accomplish its meaning with its application to only an individual, because that will go against the spirit of Vedic expression. Thus, it is clear that the universal (*brāhmaṇatva*) in the expression '*brāhmaṇam na hanyāt*', serves as the accusative to the action '*na hanyāt*' (non-killing). The same is the case with other injunctions and prohibitions.

The most general account of the universal that emerges from the discussions in the earlier pages is that it inheres in a substratum and is never observed without a substratum that manifests it, and that universals are eternal. Now, the problem arises: does the destruction

of the substrata (individual) at doom not imply the destruction of universals? If everything is destroyed in a deluge, how can universals be accepted as eternal? A two-fold solution to this problem can be given on behalf of Bhartṛhari. The first is based on the beginninglessness of communication, on account of which he observes that there could be not stage in the world of communication in which universals do not exist.⁷⁰ In the word of communication, a stage of complete absence of substrata is not logically possible, rather, the logical possibility of the substrata cannot be denied. For example, all pots may be destroyed but potness is ever lasting. In the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, destruction, like permission, is a power, and the two are the powers of the time power of the word-principle (*śabda-brahman*) which is eternal.⁷¹ Second, Bhartṛhari speculates deluge as a stage of merger of individuals and universals in the great universal (*mahājāti*). Even in designating the Absolute as *mahāsāmānya*, the logical possibility of unmanifested presence of merged universals in the great universal is taken into account, otherwise, nothing could be said trans-communicatively.⁷²

Bhartṛhari's discussion on the problem, 'why should universal be admitted as the cause of identical cognition' is of much philosophical significance, because a number of Indian and western thinkers think that identical cognition may be interpreted on the basis of other factors like cognition of similarity, natural power of the individuals and group. For example, some conceptualists and realists reject universal as the import of words on the ground that identical or unitary cognition is accomplished by similarity (*sādrśya*) of individuals and, therefore, the cause of identical cognition is not different from the individuals. *Vaiśeṣikas* are of the opinion that there is natural power (*śakti*) in individuals, and that identical cognition is caused by that power. A group of individualists do not feel the need to admit universal in addition to the cognition of group (*samūha*), which, for them, is the cause of unitary cognition.

Bhartṛhari has minutely analyzed cognition of group, similarity or resemblance and natural power possessed by individuals, and has distinguished the cause of identical cognition from those of the others.⁷³ An account of his discussions on this issue is given as follows:

1. The cognition of group is the cognition of aggregate without an accumulation or option (*avikalpasamuccayaḥ*).⁷⁴ For example, the word 'forest' does not denote the cognition of different trees

constituting the forest, nor as one tree added to another, but it expresses the whole without a reference to plurality. Bhartṛhari remarks 'in the cognition of group differences are basic, and on this basis, identical cognition by words may not be explained.'⁷⁵ For example, in case of group, the word 'forest' should reveal the aggregate of different trees and not the identity of the trees. Similarly the word '*Brāhmaṇa*' should denote the aggregate of qualities like austerity, birth and learning and not the identity of *Brāhmaṇas*. Even the cognition of group as group or the identical cognition by the word 'group' cannot be explained, if it is taken as the denotation of words. The explanation of identical cognition by the word 'group' admits universals as the denotation of the word by which it is distinctly known.

2. Cognition of resemblance (*śādrśya*) is different from that of group (*samūha*) and of identity.⁷⁵ The followers of the resemblance theory may say that there are countless pot-individuals and all are different. No two particular pots are exactly the same and alike, but they all are similar to one another in being pots, and because of this similarity, we call all of them by the word 'pot'. What makes all of them known as pots is not for the reason that the same universal inheres in all of them, but because of their basic similarity. In such explanations Bhartṛhari does not seek any ground for distinguishing universality from similarity. He thinks that if similarity serves as the cause of identical cognition, it is not different from universal. Helārāja remarks that similar things are countless in number and that all are not known simultaneously by the word and, hence, similarity cannot be the denotation of words.⁷⁶ He opines that that which is given can only be the denotation of beginningless words. In his philosophy, universals are eternal while individuals are transient. Therefore, he concludes that eternal universals are the denotations of eternal words. On this basis, he shows that similarity is a common idea of which there are countless instances that share it as they share in universality and, thus, similarity, in such an interpretation, is not different from universal.

Bhartṛhari observes that differences figure in the cognition of similarity, but unlike the cognition of group, similarity is the cognition of identity-cum-difference. Two things are cognized as similar when they are first cognized as two different objects and then found to share certain

common features. The cognition of similarity is the cognition of two beings similar, but it cannot be the cognition of their identity. To be similar is not the same as to be identical and the cause of identical cognition is different from the cause of being similar. Anything cannot be called the cause of anything. All actions and, hence, cognition is caused by specific causes. Bhartṛhari clarifies the point with the example of a man with a *stick* (*dandī*).⁷⁷ The desire to hold the stick may be the cause of his being desirous of the stick, but the cause of designating someone as '*dandī*' is 'the holding of the stick by him'. Similarly, the cause of the cognition of similarity is the cognition that two or more than two things are similar, but the cause of their identical cognition is their universality.

It is not just to say that identical cognition emerges from the cognition of similarity. Helārāja has clarified it by saying that cognition of similarity, as the general properties of individuals (for example the general properties like dewlap, tail, hump, hoof and horn, etc. of a cow), may be taken as the cause of the similarity of those properties only but the identical cognition as 'cow' (*gauḥ*) is not known by the cognition of the similarity of the parts. Universal must be admitted as the cause of identical cognition of similars also.⁷⁸

It may be argued by *Vaiśeṣikas* that natural power possessed by individuals (*sāmarthya*) is the cause of identical cognition, and that there is no need for admitting universal for the explanation of identical cognition. If the accomplishment of action (cognition) is not accepted even in the presence of power possessed by individuals, it will amount to infinite regress, to avoid which the power of the universal must, ultimately, be accepted as the cause of identical cognition. For Bhartṛhari, capability (*sāmarthya*) is nature (*svabhāva*). He argues that the mere presence of *sāmarthya* (being of power) is not sufficient for the purpose of cognition, as it needs to be cognized as power and the cognition of power as power is not a mere fact of being power, but the identical cognition of power as power, which is caused by the universal. Just as, merely by having a desire, someone is not 'known' as a person with desire. The cognition of a person having desire is inferred by the activities that the desire propels him to do.⁷⁹

Bhartṛhari takes capability (*sāmarthya*) also as universal, because of the fact that theorists hold that identical cognition is accomplished

by capability (*sāmarthya*),⁸⁰ and, he concludes that power (*sāmarthya*), similarity (*sādrśya*) and group (*saṃūha*), only if they function as causes of identical cognition, are not different from universals.⁸¹

3. A critical problem against the universal as the import of words, is raised by *Bauddhas* who hold that universals are not perceived, and to accept them as the cause of identical cognition is ignorance. There is nothing identical or similar in momentary discrete instants and, hence, universal as the cause of identical cognition is imaginary. Contrary to the *Buddha* view, Bhartṛhari asserts that words reveal identical cognition, which is understood as the cognition of difference due to ignorance. The cognition of the meaning of words is based on the observation of its use in communication, and not on the nature of things (*svalakṣaṇa*) apart from the cognition by words. The identity of the knowledge produced by senses (*prakhyā*) and that by verbal usage (*upākhyā*) cannot be explained without admitting universals.⁸² Even saying that identical cognition is illusory needs a veridical cognition of it, and universal as the base of the veridical cognition is admitted.⁸³

Defending universal as the import of words, Helārāja observes that universals are not inferred, but perceived. They are perceived as the ontological basis (*ālambanapratiyaya*) of identical cognitions. He argues if we do not accept universals, they cannot be treated even as imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*). He counter retorts, 'what is wrong in accepting universals as perceptible, if *Bauddhas* accept blue (*nīla*) as perceptible?' The universal reserves the same claim as blue (*nīla*) to which *Bauddhas* ascribe perceptibility. As there is no justification for discriminating the perceptual cognition of 'blue' and that of the universal, universal must be admitted as a perceived entity.⁸⁴

Bhartṛhari argues that in verbal-expressions, universal is denoted separately from individuals.⁸⁵ For example, although 'perception' in the expression *jale mukham paśyet* (perceive face in water) is not the perception of the face but of its reflection. The denotation of the expression is face (*mukham*), and not water (mediums). Similarly, universals are denoted independently of the individuals manifesting them.

If universals are independently denoted by words, it may be asked how can universals be accepted as that exemplified by individuals? Bhartṛhari's answer⁸⁶ to this question is that universals, though

independent, may be exemplified by individuals. He clarifies the issue by giving the example of sense organs. Senses are not apprehended by themselves, but are distinguished on account of the differences of sense perceptions or effects they produce. Similarly, individuals, though not denoted by words, may be taken to exemplify universals. However, he is very clear on the point that though in sense-cognition individual and universals both are apprehended as congealed into each other, the words reveal only universals, and individuals are known by implication (*upapādita*) made on the basis of universals revealed by words.⁸⁷ Both of them cannot be known simultaneously, as no simultaneous cognition is possible.

It may be argued that if all knowledge is knowledge through words, and words denote universals, then knowledge as the generality of different units of cognition is also universal. If knowledge is universal, then it will be an object, and, hence, it will cease to be knowledge. Bhartṛhari counteracts the question by maintaining that knowledge is not an object but an awareness, in that knowledge or in another knowledge.⁸⁸ It is not justified to say that cognition is the object of cognition. There is a difference between cognition and its object. The cognition 'this is a pot' is different from the cognition 'I know the "pot"'. He remarks, '*anuvyavasāya*' of *Naiyāyikas*, which is mistakenly taken as cognition of cognition, is, in fact, cognition of the objects like pot, etc., and not of the cognition of cognition.⁸⁹ Nor is cognition an object in recognition, or even memory. Not only in cognition but in recognition and memory also, the object of cognition is not the cognition but the object figuring in that cognition.

The word *jñāna* (knowledge), as it is used for the cognition of objects, denotes the universal, but *jñāna* itself is not an object of anything. The knowledge is knowledge of some object, but it is not an object itself. It is contradictory in nature to say that cognition is an object or another in a cognition, and such a stance may lead to infinite regress too.⁹⁰ As a light does not need to be enlightened by another light, knowledge is not the object or another in that knowledge.⁹¹ Knowledge is awareness, of the object and the self-awareness as well. It is foundational, while universals are objects of knowledge, and, hence, object to or relational to the knowledge. The identity of cognition by language is explained on the basis of universals inhering in objects.

To sum up, we can say that Bhartṛhari, like realists, accepts that universals are the cause of identical cognition by words and that they are not only inferred but perceived entities. He rejects realists on the ground that meaning is not an external thing to be referred to, but it is that which figures by language in the mind of the hearer. If meaning, as external thing, is accepted, words like non-existence (*abhāva*), hare's horns, and many others expressing past and future meanings (whose references are not to be found as externally existents) will be without meaning, and, hence, useless. Not only that, but many words having a meaning in a syntactical context like suffixes, prefixes, post-positions and particles, will not be words, if meaning is taken as external things.

Bhartṛhari is close to conceptualists in assuming that there is a cause of identical cognition, but he differs from conceptualists on the ground that universality, and not similarity, is the cause of identical cognition. For him, similarity is also universal if it is taken as the cause of identical cognition.

In explaining universal as the import of word, Bhartṛhari has not rejected individual as the import of word. He has only shown that neither of the meanings is cognized simultaneously. The universal is the fixed denotation or very general meaning of the words and individuals are known by implication as the substratum of it. As movement (*gati*) is manifested by the things moving, universal is manifested by individuals. As the meaning of the word 'movement' is not the medium like those of things moving (may be shade or light), similarly, denotation of the word is not individual. Universal is revealed by the word and individuals are known by implication made on the basis of universal.

The most significant contribution of Bhartṛhari to the history of philosophy in general is that he has fully analyzed the problem of universal as the import of word and has successfully explained that all words denote universal. His contribution to Indian Philosophy, in particular, lies in the fact that more than fifteen hundred years ago, he gave a sound exposition of the thesis 'universal in universals' and has observed its implications in the use of certain expressions the explanation of which cannot be possible otherwise. His approach towards the explanation of universal as the import or words is not confined to what Bertrand Russell calls object-word. Rather, he explains

that words (the object words and also those considered to be of merely syntactical significance, like prepositions, particles, post-positions, etc.) denote universals. In explaining universals as the import of words, he is very much careful in elucidating that though words express universal, knowledge itself is not the object of another in a knowledge, and, hence, not universal. The cognition of universal as an object of awareness is relational to that knowledge, but knowledge itself is awareness, and, hence, foundational.

Universal is what the words express. As it serves as the ground for other meanings known consequently by implication or by imposition of it, it is the generality or universality inhering in all the meanings of words. For example, the meaning (expressive) of the word 'cow' is 'cow-ness' but on account of similarity or resemblance of some or any of the particularities of the 'cow' like dullness, meekness, voraciousness or carrying of load, the word 'cow' is used for a cowherd or stupid fellow (*bāhīka*) also. The 'cowherd' is the meaning of the word 'cow'. It is not the expressive but the secondary meaning, as it is known as that on which the expressive meaning is imposed. To take 'cowherd' as the expressive meaning of the word 'cow' is fallacious—a fallacy of assuming the resembling part as the expressive whole (*avyāpti*).

If universal, as the meaning of meanings of a word, is not accepted, secondary (*gauṇa*) and suggestive (*nāntarīyaka*) significations of words will be put in question. Synonyms and polysemes will not be explained genuinely because they, as Bhartṛhari thinks, are dependent on the expressive meaning, that is the universal, inhering in all of them. If secondary and suggestive meanings of a word are also taken as universals, it hardly makes a difference to Bhartṛhari's position because he believes in the concept of 'universals in universal'. The primary meaning serves as the cause of those that are known consequently, after the cognition of primary meaning of the word, by imposition or by implication. They are not known simultaneously, but consequentially, because no simultaneous cognition, as Bhartṛhari thinks, is possible. In this regard, it can be said well that no alternative theories of meaning discussed in earlier pages, can properly answer the problem of different meanings of a word on the one hand, and that of the identical conception revealed by the word in its different occurrences and instances, on the other. To accept something other than universal, i.e. external things, reality,

fiction, context, abstraction, relation, etc. as the meaning of meanings is, cognitively; not justified, because they are not accepted as those revealed by words but as those known consequently by implication or imposition made on the basis of universal revealed by words. In cases of consequential cognition of them (many meaning), it seems logically justified to accept universal as the basis of them. It is the universal on account of which identical conception of meanings of a word in its different utterances, occurrences and instances, is revealed and cognized as the meaning of the same word. It is only on the basis of the universal as the meaning that the fact that the object of cognition revealed by a word also figures in recognition and memory can be explained. It is on the basis of universal that recognition and memory are distinguished from the meaning expressed and is known as the memory of the cognition revealed previously by the word. Otherwise, all verbal knowledge will fall into the category of fiction and, hence, be devoid of the revealed character, which is not acceptable to Bhartṛhari for whom cognition as revealed by words is always veridical and not fictional. The words reveal meaning which being universal, is consequently recognized and recollected and serves as the ground of the cognition of different meanings of a word. How can the fact that the word 'meaning' is used for all meanings of all words on the one hand and the concept of meaning is interpreted differently by different persons having different allegiances on the other hand, be taken properly as the meaning of the same word without admitting the universal inhering in all those instances and occurrences? In fact, there is levity (*laghutā*) in assuming that convention of words is with universals, or a class of particulars, and that is the reason a word is used for its meaning at all times (present, past and future) and causes identical cognition. Thus, Bhartṛhari's theory of meaning explains not only the cognition of any meaning by words, but also removes the confusion of convention (*samayavyabhicāra*) also.

From the point of view of very general meaning, *Vaiyākaraṇas* classify all words into two categories: (1) those conveying a finished character and (2) those conveying an unfinished character. All words, except verbs, express meanings that have a finished character, while the verb expresses the meaning of a non-finished character. Meaning conveyed by words may be of accomplished or of non-accomplished character, but their identity, as meaning cannot be denied. The cognition of all meanings as meaning revealed non-differently by words justifies

Vaiyākaraṇas' position of universal as the meaning of the meanings or as the very general meaning of words.

To sum up, we can say that it is on the basis of the universal as the very general meaning of words/language that identical cognition by words is accomplished. The universal is the only object of cognition, and the universal of words and their meanings are non-different because the latter is infused with and is revealed by the former. If the theory of universal is taken in view, individuals are known by inference or by implication as the ontic substratum of the former, which is revealed by words in the mind. Individuals in-themselves are incommunicable and incognizable, as they are Beings not expressed by language to which our cognition is confined. Perception, and inference, etc based on perception are merely tools in the manifestation of word (*sphoṭa*), which when manifested reveals its own nature by which its meaning is revealed non-differently. Even a clear and specified meaning conveyed by a *sphoṭa* (sentence) is of the nature of universal, which is why Identical cognition is revealed by it in all its occurrences and instances.

(B) SUBSTANCE AS IMPORT OF WORDS (PADĀRTHA)

The time-honoured discussion on the problem of substance as a metaphysical entity, as empiricists conclude, tends either towards scepticism, or towards the decomposition of substance into properties, and modern readers show little interest in spending their time on such an empirically unsolvable or cognitively ungrounded issue. Observing philosophically, substance, whether in the empirical world or transcendental, necessarily demands a cognitive ground in order to be known and to be expressed. Is there any cognitive ground or justification for accepting a thing-in-itself or external-thing, beyond the grasp of the mind, as the meaning of a word? For a philosopher who takes philosophy as a system of interpreting cognition as revealed by language, philosophical reflections are concerned with the explanation of meaning as presented by language in ordinary communication, which is accomplished not only by analyzing, but by explaining the meaning as revealed or expressed by the language. For a Bhartṛharian, no theory of meaning can be proper if it is not grounded on a communicative or cognitive base.

For some analytic philosophers, the issue of substance, as a thing-in-itself, is not a legitimate problem of philosophical investigation. For them, the problem is actually verbal and it is metaphysicians who confuse it to be factual. Is it not true to say that all problems of philosophy, and, hence, the problem of 'substance is a fact' is verbal for a philosopher for whom the language and its meaning are intelligible beings? A philosopher, whose aim is to explain the world of communication (*vyavahāra*, i.e. the world of language and meanings), takes all the issues for investigation on the basis of cognition as it is expressed by language. The interpretation of communication or cognition by language is the sole philosophical concern for such a philosopher, and he does not consider a substance independently of what and how the language reveals it.⁹²

Substance stands as logically and philosophically legitimate problem if it is discussed as language presents it. The founder of the theory 'all words denote substance' is an ancient Indian grammarian named Vyāḍi.⁹³ *Acārya* Pāṇini⁹⁴ and his commentator Patañjali⁹⁵ have honoured this theory for the explanation of the meanings of words. Bhartṛhari, in his third part of *Vākyapadīya*, has included two chapters entitled '*Dravya Samuddeśaḥ*'⁹⁶ and '*Bhūyodravya Samuddeśaḥ*'⁹⁷ respectively for looking into Vyāḍi's view of meaning. His interpretation in these chapters is dedicated to substance as the very general meaning of all words. Bhartṛhari's significance as a metaphysician, as a grammarian and, finally, as a philosopher for whom *language and meanings* are only beings, can well be observed in his treatment of the problem. The commentaries of Helārāja and Raghunath Sharma are of much help. Without them it is difficult to understand the verses full of grammatical and philosophical subtleties. Here, we are utilizing the *excellence* of commentaries to the best of our *ability to discuss* the problem of substance as the very general meaning of words.

Bhartṛhari's account of the discussion on substance may be classified into two categories: (1) Substance as the transcendental absolute untouched by words (*pāramārthika dravya*) and (2) Substance as it is presented by expressions or substance as expressed (*sāṃvyavahārika dravya*). A brief account of these two is given below:

1. Substance as Transcendental Absolute (*Pārmāthika Dravya*)

No category of speech is applicable to the unconditioned transcendental substance. It can be said neither to exist nor to non-exist, neither one nor many, neither unity (*sansṛṣṭa*), because there is nothing except it, nor diversity (*vibhakta*), because it is non-dual, neither changing nor non-changing, neither nor, nor nothing. Such things are untouched by words, and, hence, non-communicables.⁹⁸

How can such a transcendental unconditioned be accepted as the meaning of a word? It is the peculiarity of human mind that it thinks determinately even of those beyond the grasp of it. As all thinking is thinking in language, the unconditioned is thought of as conditioned by language and is communicated accordingly as of this or that form, one, many, unity, diversity, changing, unchanging, etc.⁹⁹

Bhartṛhari has mentioned two sorts of conditioning factors of the unconditioned: (1) *Mūrtivivarta* (space) and (2) *Kriyavivarta* (time) and elucidates that space and time serve as individualizes of the unconditioned substance.¹⁰⁰ The same substance from the point of view of movements is sequence (action) in time and from the point of view of extension as bodies moving in space. As no sequence is possible without a thing, and as a thing is always a thing in a space, the two are co-related continuum conditioners through which the unconditioned is known as determinate.

Bhartṛhari, in the first two verses (*kārikās*) of *Bhūyo dravya Samuddeśaḥ* (comprising of total three verses), has discussed the significance of grammatical-analysis (*apoddhāra*) in order to show how indivisible sentence and sentential-meaning are made understandable through the artificial divisions of them into parts. The indivisible whole is made understandable by analytic device as a synthesis of parts (sentence = words-substantive, verb, etc. + suffix + prefixes + particles + post-positions), and, so is sentential-meaning as the meaning of those parts. He concludes that indivisible becomes the object of explanation only if it is divided artificially, otherwise, no expression of the indivisible is possible.¹⁰¹

The world of communication is the sole concern of philosophy, and communicable being (words and meanings) are only intelligible

beings to which reflection of a philosopher of language like Bhartṛhari is confined. The words do not express external things and the senses do not reveal meanings. The meaning (*vācya*) is revealed by the word and is non-different from the word it reveals. Words reveal the expressed (*vācya*) and not things, or external-objects that are extra-language, extra-cognitive entities.

The meaning is not even an outcome of an abstraction (*amūrtikaraṇa*) from external-objects. It is a revealed/expressed being, the being presented or revealed in the mind by words independently of external things.

As a metaphysician, he does not deny, rather accepts, that sometimes language serves as indication/marks; it indicates things/entities. There are things corresponding to words. But, as a language philosopher, he reflects on the cognition as it is revealed by language in the mind. For such a reflection the real language (*spṛṣṭa*) is a ubiquitously given indivisible being that reveals itself and its meaning in the mind. It is awareness – of itself and of its meaning – and, hence, the language and the meaning, it reveals, are the only beings of a philosophical concern. External objects are taken by habit as the external basis or substratum (*vāhyalāmbana*) of the intelligible beings. Meaning, as such, is not a thing assumed by habit. It is a being revealed by language in the mind, and, thus, there is no philosophical need and sense in assuming external-things, which are non-communicables and are ungraspable by language.

Those who accept external-substance as meaning of words conceive substance as the substratum of qualities. For some, the substance is the sum total of qualities, while for others it is something more than the qualities. Logically, theorists belonging to the former view are unable to defend themselves if the question of the decomposition of substance to qualities, which are only perceived, is put before them, and, those belonging to the latter view fail to produce any cognitive-ground for a substance beyond and above the qualities known. Is there any ground to perceive gold above and beyond the qualities or free from all its qualities? The assumption of substance as that 'which is defined through its qualities but indescribable in-itself amounts to scepticism, and, no uniform theory of substance as the import of words may be founded on the basis of the aforementioned metaphysical view of substance.

Those who accept that words denote the form directly and the substance indirectly,¹⁰² confuse the term denotation. For Bhartṛhari, a denotation (*vācya*) is that which is revealed in the mind non-differently by words. As two denotations are not cognized simultaneously, there is no cognitive ground to accept denotation as a thing independently of what is perceived as revealed, or as those perceived. And, if the consequential cognition of them is accepted, then there is no justification for accepting indirectly supposed substance as the denotation which is cognized directly as expressed by the word¹⁰³ and which serves as the basis of implication or assumption of the former as the substratum of the latter.

A denotation is an expressed, which is directly revealed in the mind by words. There is no space in the mind to house external things. It can be said that external things are there, and it is these things that figure in the mind when words are uttered, otherwise, one cannot find any justification of the problem as to why do we not understand 'house' when we hear the word 'cow'?¹⁰⁴ It can also be added that the uniformity of external-objects perceived and the ideas figured in the mind by words, necessarily demand the existence of external things as the meaning of words. Helārāja refutes¹⁰⁵ their arguments by putting the dialectic-whether they (external-things and their ideas) are similar (*sādṛśya*) to limited extent or to the full-extent? In the former case, the cognition will be like the cognition of an object (pot, etc.). But for Bhartṛhari, knowledge is not an object in knowledge. In case of assuming it as an object in cognition, it will lose its foundational character. In the latter case, knowledge will cease to be knowledge. It will, then, be a matter like external-things, and, thus, the logic of the sameness of a psychological and a physical or external will amount to utter obscurity. In perceptual experiences, it may be accepted that external-things are perceived by senses, but there is no justification for external things if we confine only to the cognition expressed or revealed by the words in the mind. The experiences perception, inference, etc. serve as means in the manifestation of *sphoṭa* and the meaning is revealed by *sphoṭa* itself. If we deny the foundationality of the cognition revealed in the mind by language, there will be no base for the acceptance of external things.

The view that ideas hypostatized as external objects is the meaning of words, is also confusive. Words do not reveal external objects

(whether hypostatized or otherwise). The cognition by words is the awareness of meaning revealed by words without having any recourse to external objects. How can words—negation, unreal, non-existent, hairs-horns, etc., be explained if external things are taken as the expressed or denotation of words? The meaning is known as revealed in the mind by words and it is needless to admit it as personified. In the beginning of the Chapter I, we have seen how Bhartṛhari shows impossibility of expressions regarding being, non-being, etc. if external beings are taken as the meaning of language.

It is apparent from the observation made in the earlier pages that if substance is taken as the meaning of words, it must be a being (*buddhistha*), thought-object, or idea figured by words in the mind. It is not a mental construction or any kind of abstraction, but a being revealed in the mind by words.¹⁰⁶

Some metaphysicians accept that words are indicators of things-in-themselves. They are signs or symbols of external objects and indicate that of which they are symbols. For some, the word functions as a denoter of a sense (meaning) and as a pointer to a referent (thing-in-itself). The referring capacity of a word cannot be denied, but it also cannot be denied that with the change of sense the referent is also changed. As word and its meaning are revealed truths,¹⁰⁷ and as the word does not reveal any thing ontic in nature, how can an external entity be accepted as the meaning which is non-different from the word? Is it not that they are assumed by implication or supposed by habit? If it is yes, how can that which is not revealed by words but supposed otherwise be accepted as expressed (*vācya*) of an expresser? Now, it is clear that the view of language as committed to ontology is significant for ontologists, but for philosophers it misleads philosophical reflection from reaching the right conclusion.

2. Expressional Substance (*Sāṃvayavahārika Dravya*)

Bhartṛhari has interpreted the expressible substance from two perspectives. A brief account of these perspectives is given as follows:

First Perspective

As a grammarian philosopher Bhartṛhari aims at explaining meaning as presented in the mind by words. According to him, some words,

i.e. pronouns like *idam* (it), *tat* (that) and *sarva* all function as indicatives to substance in general (*vastumātra abhidhāyinaḥ*) while some other pronouns like 'anya' (others), *anyatara* (another) are expressive of specified substance (*viśiṣṭavastu vācakaḥ*). In brief, by the term non qualified or substance in general (*śuddha dravya*) we mean sheer substance which is not determinated. Different to it, by the term qualified substance (*viśiṣṭa dravya*) we mean substance determined by quality. Apart from the meaning of qualified substance as mentioned above, Bhartṛhari has used the term for that which figures by language in the mind as something distinguished from others. Discussion, herein, is primarily concerned with the latter view that according to Bhartṛhari is expressional substance (*sāmavyavahārika dravya*). The issue of qualified substance as the import of words will be discussed later in this section. Presently, we propose to discuss the former perspective according to which a substance is that for the indication of which pronouns like *idam*, *tat* and *sarva* are used.¹⁰⁸ These pronouns are used as pointers to all sorts of things in the world without distinction of their properties, particular names, genders, etc. Pronouns are used in place of nouns, which have particular names, gender, etc. But, when pronouns *idam*, *tat* or *sarva* are used in place of nouns, the specific name, gender and other distinctions are neither expressed nor expected and, thus, all that is referred to by those pronouns (*idam*, *tat* or *sarva*) is taken as 'substance' in general.¹⁰⁹

Though pronouns are used in place of nouns, their uses are different. Nouns express their own particular meanings, while pronouns like 'this' or 'that' indicate substance is general. A noun cannot be used for substance in general or for substance without its determinants, that is qualities, etc. For example, the word 'dog' is not used for all substances pen, book, etc. except its own meaning. Unlike nouns, pronouns are used as indicative to all sorts of substances (things – this or that). A thing may be called by different names (i.e., *ātmā*, *dravya*, *svabhāva*, *śarīra*, etc.), and by each name their specific meanings are known or expressed. But, pure substance, void of names and genders, cannot be indicated by them. A pronoun is used to indicate the substance for which a number of nouns may be used, and, perhaps, this is the reason Bhartṛhari defines substance in general (*śuddha dravya*) as that which is referred to by pronouns *idam*, *tat*.

Clarifying the position of pronouns in marking substance, Bhartṛhari gives the analogy of the house of Deodatta¹¹⁰ indicated through the crow (mark) sitting on its roof, which is ascertained by the hearer through the crow indicated by the word, even if it flies away later. Similarly, the substance is marked by pronouns like this, that and all, which are separated after performing the task or indicating the substance. The pronouns function as marks or as pointers (*upalakṣaṇa*), but they should not be confused with adjectives or properties. The difference between a mark and property is that the former is separated from what it points, while the latter is inseparably associated with it. In case of properties, as they are inseparably associated with the substance, unqualified substance or substance void of forms cannot be referred. The former may point to the unqualified (substance in general) while the latter being predicate implies the substance as its substratum (*samānādhikaraṇa*).¹¹¹ Conclusively, pronouns, according to grammarians, function in two ways to indicate the substance: 'this', 'that' and 'all' indicate sheer substance void of all determination. Out of them 'this' indicates visible beings of present time and that of 'that' for indicating being invisible, presently, but is inferred.

Second Perspective

According to second perspective a substance is that which is expected as that to be distinguished by others (*bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ*).¹¹² For this view, the qualified substance (*viśiṣṭavastu*) is the expressed (*vācya*) or the word.

The words present substance as that which is qualified or distinguished by an expression. The difference between what qualifies and what is qualified is known by the use of words, and, anything, even qualities, etc., can also be presented by words as that to be distinguished by others and, then, they are also substance. Helārāja by explaining all words, grouped into five categories, i.e., *nāma* (nominatives), *ākhyāta* (verb), *upasarga* (prefixes), *nipāta* (particles) and *karmapravacanīya* (post-positions), shows how they, when presented as substantive, express an accomplished character or state (*siddhavasthā*) designated as individual (*vyakti*) or particular (*viśeṣa*) or substance (*dravya*). For example, the word 'nīla' (blue) in the use 'nīlokāśaḥ' (blue sky) expresses a quality (colour), but the same word in the use 'sky-blue' expresses the 'blue' as distinguished by the sky,

and, hence, substance. The word 'batting' in the use 'He is batting' expresses an action but the same word in the expression 'His batting is excellent' expresses substance as it denotes an accomplished character (*siddhāvasthā*) qualified by the predicate 'excellent'. If the definition of substance as '*adhikāraṇamdravya*' (that which words present as substratum of the meanings of other words of the expression) is taken for consideration, substance will be the meaning of all words standing as substratum (*adhikāraṇa*). For example, the word 'liberation' (*mokṣa*) as it serves as a substratum, in the expression '*mokṣe icchāsti*' (there is craving for liberation), is substance because it stands as the substratum (*adhikāraṇa*) of the desire (*icchā*). For *Vaiyākaraṇas*, this definition of substance (*dravya*) may also be explained because of the definition *bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ*. Helārāja says, as an action is the central meaning of an expression and as they take other words of the expression, as accessories that qualify verb, substance is taken as the meaning of verbs. Substance is considered as the import of suffixes, prepositions and postpositions, as they function as suggestive to the meaning of the words with which they are used. For individualists like *Vaiśeṣikas*, universal is a quality and not substance, but universal, as Helārāja says, if presented by words as something qualified, expresses substance.

In brief, it can be said that the views of substance, as presented by Bhartṛhari and his commentators, present substance as that which is referred to by pronouns 'this' or 'that', etc. and is known as that which is presented as qualified or distinguished in an expression. These two definitions of common sense view of substance, given by Bhartṛhari, are not separate but complementary, as they together characterize the common sense view of substance.

Mīmāṃsakas, to whom universal is the very general meaning of all words, reject the individualists' theory of substance as the meaning of words by saying that, as discrete individuals are innumerable, it is difficult to decide the individual particularly observed by the convention (*samaya*). If convention of the word 'pot' is there with pot A, and if pot B or C is cognized by the word 'pot' it will cause an irregularity of convention (*samayavyabhicāra*), and, hence, a deviation (*vyabhicāra*) from what is observed by convention. It is not sound to say that the word serves as a limiter to all its instances (individuals), and, thus, the charge of a deviation from its meaning does not arise because this may go against the *Vaiyākaraṇas*' honoured theory of 'word expresses all meanings' (*sarvārtha vācakāḥ*).

Individualists, in order to get rid of the charge, say that the specific form, qualifying substance as specific (*viśeṣa*), distinguishes the meaning of a word from that of the others. For example, the individual 'pot' associated with a certain form is distinguished from the individual 'sun' or 'tree' associated with different forms. Putting up the individualists' position, Bhartṛhari says, just as the perceiving power of the eyes is limited, if one perceives through a tube, the substance, when communicated by words, is cognized as qualified by the qualities – form, colour, etc., and, thus, 'the substance qualified by a particular form is the meaning of the word.'¹¹³

The three-fold logic on which Bhartṛhari's explanation of the individualist theory of substance, as the very general meaning of the words is based, is given as follows:

1. **Logic of Grammar or Use:** In ordinary practice, some words in the ontological mode of use are used as marks of things. That which is referred to by pronouns, such as 'this', 'that', 'all', is pure or non-qualified substance and that which is presented by words as something having an accomplished character distinguished or qualified as such in an expression, is a qualified substance.
2. **The Eternity of Meaning:** In the philosophy of grammar, the word, the meaning that it reveals and the relations between the two *are eternal in the* sense of given. The form or universal according to individualists is an adjunct of substance, and, adjuncts are transitory or destroyable. Gold may be crafted into a number of forms, like ring, bracelet, bangle, earrings, etc., which are destroyed if, melted, but the gold does not. Forms and substance both are known by the word but forms are transitory while substance is eternal, and, hence, it, and not the forms, is the very general meaning of the word.¹¹⁴ Universals in this view are qualities that inhere in the substance.
3. **Incentive to Action:** Words, when heard, cause incentives in the mind of the hearer to an action (*pravṛtti*) or otherwise (*nivṛtti*), and, *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti* is seen in relation to the substance and not the form.¹¹⁵ One is prompted for bringing an individual 'pot' with which carrying of water may be performed when 'bring the pot' is uttered. It is the *brāhmaṇa* who is called by the expression 'call

the *brāhman*' (*brāhmaṇam preṣaya*). The acts of bringing or sending cannot be performed with universal, but with substance. In the expressions under example, 'pot' and 'brāhman' are presented as qualified by 'ānaya' and 'preṣaya' and hence, are substance.

It may be asked, does the word express the form or the substance, without the form or the substance qualified by the form or substance and form both? For universalities, the word expresses form, and the individual as an ontic substratum of the form is implicated. For realists, like *Vaiśeṣikas*, the word expresses the individual qualified by the form. The grammarians' account of individualists' positions is similar to that of realists. For them, the word denotes the form and it denotes the substance indirectly (through the form). The denotation is not limited to form, but it goes up to the substance. For universalists, form or universal is the primary meaning of the word, and substance is secondary, while, for individualists, the form, being the adjunct of substance, is secondary and the substance is the primary meaning of words. In individualist's account, substance is cognized as the primary meaning of the word and, as forms are inherent in them, they are also known by implication.

Vaiyākaraṇas give due importance to both the views for interpreting meaning. Some unitaries like *ākāśa* (sky) sun, moon, etc., can better be explained on the basis of individual as the meaning of words, while some others like 'these universals' (*imā jātīyān*), 'word universal' (*śabda-jāti*), etc., though they may be explained on the basis of individual as the import of words, can better be explained on the basis of universal as the meaning of words. What *Bhartṛhari* wants to show is that if universals are taken as primary meaning of words, individuals are secondary and vice versa. Finally, words can be used in a sentence so as to mean substance or universal, as per the expectancy of the speaker involved in the use of words.

The use of words as per expectancy or will of the speaker is not possible if substance is taken as an external thing. The change of status as per expectancy or will is not possible in the context of external things, which are not beings figured by words (*vikalpagocara*). A *vikalpagocara* is a being figured in mind by words, independently of external things. Cognitively, it is a meaning, the inner being qualified

or to be distinguished by the other that is known in accordance with the use of the word, but in daily practices, particular utterances (sounds) by proxy are taken to stand for particular things.

Bhartṛhari has made a three-tier approach towards explaining substance as the meaning of words. As a metaphysician, he interprets substance as the ultimate reality expressed in all the qualified forms and words. As a grammarian, he expounds the definition of substance as that which is presented as qualified by the others and which can be referred to by pronouns. As a philosopher of language, he bases his reflections on cognitive grounds and accepts meaning as that revealed by words in the mind of the audience. Cognitively, as he shows in *Jāti Samuddeśaḥ*, a word reveals a universal, and other meanings, like substance or individual (*vyakti*), are known consequentially by implication (*upalakṣaṇa*). The substance is implicated as the ontic substratum (*samānādhikaraṇa*) of universal. Both individualists and universalists agree on the point that universals are expressed directly by words. The universalists, as meaning for them is what is revealed non-differently by words, take universals as the very general meaning of words but the individualists view substance, as substratum of the universal and take it as the general meaning of words. It may be observed that in Bhartṛhari's explanation of substance as the very general meaning of words, wordism (*padavāda*) of the individualists, according to which a discrete word, independently of sentence, is a meaning-conveying unit, comes to sententialism (*vākyavāda*), because, something can be presented as qualified or as distinguished by other words only by a unit of a sentential form.

It can be said that Bhartṛhari's expositions of substance as the very general meaning of words stands significant only if a word is taken as a part of a sentence or as a sentence. But, words independent of sentence cannot be explained on the basis of it, because, in that case, the expectancy of being qualified or distinguished by qualifiers will not be accomplished. Individualist's assumption that 'the import of a word, acquired by grammatical analysis of a sentence, is substance' implies that the words are expressive of qualified meaning. It can be said against their view that a meaning is taken as qualified only if there is a qualifier, and this is possible only in the case of a sentence. On the basis of the analogy of gold and its various ornaments, individualists may say that substance in general is the very general

meaning of words, and forms are known consequently as they subsist in it, but this assumption again implies that non-qualified substance (gold), void of all forms, is not different from universal. This is the meeting point of Bhartṛhari's discussion in the three chapters entitled *Jāti-Samuddeśaḥ*, *Dravya Samuddeśaḥ* and *Bhūyodravya Samuddeśaḥ*. The all-comprehensive Being is the all-comprehensive universal (*Mahāsattā* is *Mahājāti*).

So far as the meaning of isolated words is concerned, universalists are right in assuming universal as the very general meaning of all words. For them, word is universal and the meaning it reveals non-differently is also universal. That is why, identical cognition, in all its occurrences and instances, is accomplished by them. Identical cognition or concept is not possible if universal is not admitted. Both the universalists and individualists accept that the expressive or primary meaning serves as the basis of cognition of other meanings of the word in its different uses, which according to universalists cannot be explained without admitting universals as the very general meaning of words. Individualists try to explain the problem of identical cognition on the basis of similarity. For them, identical cognition is imposed, while for universalists it is basic. The individualist theory provides no answer to the question why should one accept a being (unit) directly revealed by the word as imaginary. The logic of eternity of substance may be attractive, but cognitively it is unfounded. The logic of grammar or use of words in daily practice is accepted, but it needs to be examined philosophically on the ground of cognition as revealed by the words. If words are accepted as indicative, then their foundational character as expressive of themselves and their meaning may not be possible.

For a grammarian philosopher, the cognition of substance is an issue of proper philosophical investigation. As being (inner) can be presented by words so as to be distinguished or to be differentiated, it seems right to accept substance as the very general meaning of all words. Expression regarding being or non-being cannot be possible if substance as external being is taken as the meaning. Substance, in general, cannot be expressed as different from universality. In other words, the idea of substance, in general, is universal which even the word 'substance' expresses. The utterance of language-tokens (*spṛṣṭātmaka śabda*) is taken as the indicator of substance (qualified), but the real language (*spṛṣṭa*) is the revealer of universal. What we

can conclusively derive from the aforementioned discussion is that universal is the import of words (if words, derived from grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence, are taken as an indivisible meaning-revealing unit) and substance is known by implication as the substratum of universal.

As we have already seen in the earlier pages, in some cases only the uttering of words is understood as the meaning, as in the case of *mantras* (numinous words uttered in a contemplative manner); in some other cases, it is the form of the words, as in the cases of words like *apūrva*, *devatā*, *svarga* and *sūtras* of Pāṇini, and, in still some other cases the word (*sphoṭa*) itself and the meaning non-differently revealed by it are understood as the meaning of the word. However, in no case a referent outside is taken as the meaning of a word. Words are not eternally related with things outside, but with meanings non-differently revealed by them.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Are words marks of things? Much has been said on the problem, and, here, I am not going to suggest anything new, but clarify the reason for thinking of words as marks. When we teach meaning of some word, say 'cat' to a child, the most easy and sure-shot method is to show him a picture of a cat. It can be said that a child learns all principal words by visualizing corresponding referents. These are prescribed for teaching a beginner, but philosophical investigation is different. A philosopher of language who aims at interpreting cognition by words, takes meaning as what a word reveals or what is cognized by a word. There is a difference between learning pattern analysis and philosophical analysis, and my contention is that those who accept words as mere referring-tools, confuse not only the differences between the functioning of the senses and that of words, but also the differences between the object of perceptual cognition and that of the cognition revealed by words, and the very instrumental character of perception and the foundational character of cognition as well. Showing the differences between the functioning of senses and that of words, Bhartṛhari writes 'the senses need not be cognized before perceiving objects. They do so when they come into contact with objects by their mere existence. Words, on the other hand, do not reveal objects

(meaning) by their mere existence. They have to be cognized themselves first, before they reveal meaning'.¹¹⁶ Language is both the revealer and the revealed.¹¹⁷ Manifested by sense data, it reveals itself, and then the meaning is revealed non-differently in the mind. External things may be accepted as the object of perception or as an inevitable basis of sense data, but there is no question of sense data as the meaning of a word, which is cognized as revealed in the mind non-differently by the word without any commitment to external objects. The hearing of verbal-noises (wrongly taken as real words) is not the expresser of knowledge (*jñāna*). It is a mere tool that helps revelation of a given word (*sphoṭa*), by which the meaning is revealed. The sense data of something, acquired by the same or other persons at different times, varies, but the meaning revealed by a word is fixed or given and that is why identical cognition by them is accomplished. Sense data acquired by senses are not meaning, but tools for manifesting *sphoṭa*, from which meaning is revealed non-differently.

Where there is a change of meaning of the word, Bhartṛhari does not endorse a case of transfer of meaning, but a case of imposition of the expressive meaning. In brief, we can say that sense perception necessarily requires an external object as a prerequisite of sense data, but this is not applicable to cognition by words in which perception of noises and utterances are considered tools for the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*, which out of itself reveals meaning and thus is not an outcome of sensing contents.

My involvement here in showing the differences of perception by senses and cognition by words is to clarify how cognition by words when considered on the pattern of cognition by senses misleads one to the conclusion that words are marks of some or other kind of referents—empirical or transcendental. As a child learns the uses of verbal utterances by taking them to stand by proxy for things, he, in his daily practice, is not only driven to things (through utterances-*dhvani*) by habit (*abhyāsa*), practice (*prayoga*) and perception (*darśana*), but identifies them with things also. He considers words as confined to the verbal-noises and, thus, he does not mind the foundationality of the inner meaning revealing language. The word as *sphoṭa* is awareness and the meaning revealed non-differently by it is also awareness (*pratibhā*). The meaning as *pratibhā* cannot be explained

if the word as *sphoṭa* is not accepted. The two are non-different, and hence identical conception or cognition by words is accomplished. Only by taking the word as *sphoṭa* that its foundational character as a meaning-revealing unit or expressive by nature may be explained properly.

Thus, *sphoṭa*, in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, is a meaning-revealing unit. Verbal or articulate utterances are marks which on the one hand are tools in the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, and on the other hand are taken as marks of things. These differences must be kept in mind, so as to avoid many difficult problems of philosophy of language. Verbal utterances as marks are taken as substitute of things, i.e., they stand by proxy for the things meant; they occupy a position like that of labels of commodities, while *sphoṭa*, as awareness of itself and of meaning, is an expressed being. It is doubtless to say that while discussing universal as the meaning revealed by word (*sphoṭa*), Bhartṛhari is quite clear about the substance that according to him is known consequentially by implication made on the basis of universals as substratum. It is remarkable to note that Bhartṛhari's account of substance as the import of words is different from others in the sense that he investigates not into the substance – empirical or transcendental – but into the meaning as is cognized or figured in the *mind by words*. For him the pronouns 'this', 'that', 'all', are indicative of *pure substance* without forms (gold void of all forms) and *anya*, *anyatara* (other, another) present qualified substance expected as distinguished from others. Qualified substance can be explained as the import of a word in the *presence* of its qualifiers and that is possible only in the *case of compounds* and sentences. The substantives express substance qualified by adjectives, verbs, etc.

Bhartṛhari's definition of qualified substance steers clear of the danger of decomposition of substance, in spite of the fact that the definition presents it as that which is qualified or subordinated.¹¹⁸ If words are taken as independent expressers of meaning, it will not be justified, epistemologically, to accept substance as the import of words. What is cognized by the discrete word 'pot' is not the individual pot (a qualified substance) but 'potness' and, thus, a universal (potness) is revealed by the word 'pot'. It is justified on the plane of cognition to accept universal as the very general meaning of words and substance as that cognized, consequently, as the substratum of universals. It is

also justified to accept that a universal is substance, if it is presented by language as that to be qualified. However, this is possible only if sentence, and not words independent of it, is accepted as the expresser.

MEANING OF SOME CONCEPTS

In the third part of *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari has discussed fourteen different concepts in fourteen chapters called *Samuddeśas*. The concepts are: (1) universal (*jāti*), (2) individual or substance (*dravya*), (3) more on substance (*bhūyo dravya*), (4) relation (*sambandha*), (5) accessories (*sādhana*), (6) action (*kriyā*), (7) quality (*guṇa*), (8) number (*saṃkhyā*), (9) time (*kāla*), (10) direction (*dik*), (11) person (*puruṣa*), (12) gender (*liṅga*), (13) mood (*upagraha*) and, (14) complex formations (*vṛtti*). His discussions in these chapters sheds light on the determination of meaning as known popularly in communication. He has put across different popular theories on a concept, has analyzed them and shown how far those theories are helpful in making the concept clearly understandable. I am presenting a brief account of these concepts in the light of commentaries on them.¹¹⁹

As we have already seen, Bhartṛhari's scheme of analysis and interpretation of the meaning of a word used in an expression is based on the view that the universal is the general meaning of words, and the individual is known by imposition of the universal, which is revealed in the mind by words as its ontic substratum. While discussing the separate meanings of root/stem/suffix acquired by grammatical analysis of a word (*pada*), he has also discussed the view that universals and individuals (as the ontic substratum of universal, in some cases) are the import of roots/stems. Analyzing the meaning of nominal suffixes or case-terminations, he decides means, action, individual, time, number and gender in general as their meanings. And, thus, the meaning conveyed by a nominal word as a unity of the stem and the suffix are decided as universal, individual, means, action, time, number and gender.

Similarly, the meaning conveyed by a verb (as a unity of root and verbal-endings) are decided, by analysis, as universal, action, time, means number, person and mood (*upagraha*), in general.

It is clear by now that the concepts under discussion are important for the determination of meanings to be known by a word acquired by

the scheme of analysis. This section of Bhartṛhari's reflections is, philosophically, important because of the fact that he has tried to clarify and decide their meanings by analysis, as they are used or are known as revealed in communication. In the scheme of analysis, he has tried to show that metaphysicians' understanding of these concepts, if analyzed, culminate in the conceptions popular in communication.

The brief survey presented below concentrates on a clear exposition of the meanings of these concepts:

1. **Universal (jāti):** A detailed account of Bhartṛhari's discussions on universal as the very general meaning of the words and other issues associated with it, has already been discussed in the previous pages and, hence, it is needless to repeat them here.
- 2 & 3. **Individual or Substance:** There are two versions of substance as the meaning of words. The first takes Vyāḍi's theory of substance as the very general meaning of words and the second discusses how language serves as the pointer to or indicator of reality (entities – physical, psychological or metaphysical). Bhartṛhari's original contribution in this chapter is that he has established a theory that views substance as it is expressed by language in the mind (*sāṃvyaṭvahārika dravya*). A precise exposition of Bhartṛhari's discussion on substance/individual as the import of word has been given earlier in this chapter.
4. **Relation (Sambandha):** Bhartṛhari makes a difference between relation and convention, or the relation by convention. The former is the natural fitness of the expresser (language) to express the meaning, and language is naturally fit to express all meanings, that is primary (*mukhya*), secondary (*gauṇa*) and close to primary (*nāntarīyaka*) and those meanings are specified thus, as per convention. Convention, for Bhartṛhari restrains the natural relation only, and the meanings are expressed by word/language which is naturally fit to express them.

Chapter VIII of the present work includes the concept of relation between language and meaning as discussed by Bhartṛhari and his commentators, in *Sambandha Samuddesaḥ*, the third chapter of the third part of *Vākyapadīya*.

5. **Sādhana (Means):** Means and verb in the scheme of analysis are taken to convey the complete meaning of an expression.

Action cannot be accomplished without means, and the means is called so because some action is accomplished by it. It is defined as the power inherent (*samavāya*) in the loci (*āśaya*) and that brings about the action expressed in the sentence. This power, with relation to the action accomplished, is designated as *kāraka*. *Kāra*kas are enumerated as nominative, accusative, instrumental, dative, ablative, genitive, locative and vocative and the case-terminations applied with the words express the respective *kāra*kas.

According to the metaphysical point of view of *śabdādvaita*, consciousness is the only foundational reality which through its diverse powers/actions is treated differently as *sādhana* (means), *sādhya* (being of a non-accomplished character), *siddha* (being of an accomplished character) and, that which are expressed by language. According to cognitive point of view, of *śabdādvaita*, different meanings of a word are known distinctively as expressed by language, as per their expectancy.

6. ***Kriyā (Action)*:** Action is the meaning conveyed by the verb. We have already discussed in previous pages, that *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Vaiyākaraṇas* take action as the central meaning of an expression. The meanings of other words of an expression only qualify the meaning (action) conveyed by the verb.

Defining action, Bhartṛhari writes, being, whether of a finished (*siddha*) or an unfinished (*sādhya*) character, if expressed by words as that to be accomplished, is designated as action (*kriyā*). The word action is used not only for a main action, but also for a sub-action that falls under the main action, and, thus, the word 'action' denotes a universal. The mind collects many sub-actions performed in a sequence for the accomplishment of the main action. The action is associated in sequences and, hence, the distinction of present, past and future, as per the expectancy of the speaker, expressed by words used in the respective tenses.

Bhartṛhari has accepted six modifications of becoming, (*bhāvavikāras*) namely birth, existence, change, growth, decrease and decay as a constant process, and for all practical purposes, they, on the basis of prior and later sequences, are classified into different modifications. Even the use of the word 'exists' will not be possible if

existence, a prior stage of growth and later to the first stage of 'birth', is not taken into consideration.

Words express the distinction between the two stages of being - finished or static and unfinished or dynamic. This distinction of finished and unfinished characters of beings can well be understood on the basis of the functions of permission and prevention of the time power. The permitted is later on prevented and vice versa, which, from the point of the view of the two stages of being, are considered as the dynamic and static forms, and words are used to express them as per the expectancy of the speaker. However, an action is known, as it figures by expressions, as a being of an unaccomplished character, and the divisions of past, present and future are relative to the changing sequences.

7. **Guṇa (Quality):** Apart from the universal, individual and other meanings a word expresses superiority or inferiority in degree or excellence of a substance, on the basis of which a substance is known as different from another. A quality, according to Bhartṛhari, is found in a substance. Sometimes a quality is separated from the substance and replaced by another quality. It is different from a universal, which is never changed and separated from the substance. It is quality on the basis of which universals and individuals are differentiated. However the word 'quality' denotes universal on the basis of which identical conception by the word 'quality' is accomplished in its different occurrences and instances.
8. **Saṃkhyā (Number):** Number is conveyed by the nominal suffixes and by the verbal endings as well. It is there in all beings of accomplished and of non-accomplished character, on the basis of which they are differentiated from each other.

Numbers from 1 to 10 are used as the designation of the beings numbered and from ten onwards are used as the designation of the beings numbered and as numerals as well. Two, three, etc., are interpreted as the numbers made by association of numbers as $1 + 1 = 2$, $1 + 1 + 1 = 3$ or $2 + 1 = 3$ but Bhartṛhari considers 2, 3, etc. as independent numbers because two is cognized independently of $1+1$, which is only an analytical device to understand the indivisible number 2, and similar is the case with other numbers.

Number is indivisible, and the prior and the later digits in the scheme of analysis are based on its artificial divisions for parctical purposes. The ideas of 2 is prior to 3 and later to one, 2 is bigger than one and smaller than 3 and likewise are conventionally fixed. The idea of one as the last from infinity and first from the starting digit, in the sequence of numbers, can consistently be explained and the idea of innumerable numbers can logically be justified, only if the indivisible number is taken as artificially divided from infinite indivisible to one.

Number is an important concept in Bhartṛhari's philosophy. It is number on the basis of which all beings of finished and unfinished character are differentiatedly known by words. Words convey the denotation distinctly known by the number of the being denoted. It is one of the major individualizers on the basis of which things are separated and are separately known.

9. *Kāla (Time)*: Bhartṛhari has elucidated time from two points of view. According to the first, the cognitive point of view, it is the sequence involved in an action and is expressed by the suffix 'tin' added to the root. According to the second point of view of time as ontic being (power), it is the dynamic force, an independent power of the language principle that brings all the changes without a change in itself. It is the creative power that brings about the constant process of changes by its different powers, namely prevention, permission, decomposition, present, past and future, and again these powers of time power bring all the changes without a change in their very nature.

Time as ontic Being is indivisible and is defined as power (*śakti*), because it is the cause of the change processes of birth, existence, growth, decrease, decay, etc.; as self (*ātman*), because it is the basis of the accomplishment of cognition of the sequences and divisions and, as deity (*devatā*), because it functions as the thread-holder of the world process that permits the prevented and prevents the permitted.

Time is known as sequence when presented by words and as Being when inferred as the ontic substratum of the sequences known by words.

10. *Dik (Direction)*: Direction is the power that serves as the basis of such cognition and expressions as 'this is before that', 'far', 'near',

'upward', 'downward', etc. Though in itself, the power is one, on the basis of *avadhi* (marking point or adjuncts) it is taken as different. It is convention on the basis of which ten directions are popularly known in communication. The word *dik* is a universal on the basis of which identical cognition by the word is accomplished and which serves as the basis of cognition of different directions as well. The existence of direction is inferred on the basis of uses like 'this', 'that', 'far', 'near', etc. and also as the cause of different directions. However, it is directly known as revealed by words or by language.

Time and space, in Bhartṛhari philosophy, are two different aspects of the same power and they are inseparable. Generally, it is understood that a man stands in a space and thinks at a time, but this stand is not correct. A man stands in a particular space and in a particular time, and he thinks in a particular time and cognizes his thinking as separate (at a distance) from the objects he thinks. No action is possible without space and time and all action is an action at a time and in a space. Action is a series of sequences and the sequence of moments is generally taken as time and the sequence of distances is known as space. Thus, Bhartṛhari shows that no knowledge by language is possible without individualizers like time and space, and it is only by these powers that language serves as individualizer or limiter of itself and its meaning. Not only that, language expresses time and space as well.

11. **Puruṣa (Person):** Person is also conveyed by verbal endings (*tiñ*), by which it is known that the particular action is performed whether by the speaker himself or by others. The action performed by conscious or unconscious being is also known by them. In Sanskrit, first person suffixes express that the action is performed by the speaker, second person suffixes express that some conscious agent other than the speaker performs it and third person suffixes indicate that some unconscious agent performs the action. Third person suffixes do not express consciousness in the agent even when the verb is such as *budha*, *jñā* or *cit*, which stand for acts of awareness or consciousness. These verbs themselves express consciousness, but a conscious agent is not conveyed by the verbal endings in these cases.
12. **Linga (Gender):** In the grammarian tradition of analysis, gender is also taken as expressed by suffixes of nominatives. For example,

masculine gender by the suffix (*sup* = *aḥ*) of the nominal word 'bālakah' is known.

Bhartṛhari in '*Linga Samuddesaḥ*' has mentioned at least seven different views popular at his time regarding the determination of gender. These are: (1) It is the relation of a thing with sex-signs such as breast, hair, etc. (2) It is sex-signs themselves characterized by relation. (3) It is the universal manifested by sex-signs. (4). It is the three conditions of the three *guṇas* or *qualities*, namely *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. (5) It is the three *guṇas* themselves in these conditions. (6) It is the meaning attributed to objects by language. (7) It is the attributes of the words themselves.

Bhartṛhari has mentioned seven specified ways in which gender is conveyed by words as associated with words as alternatives or as restrictions.

1. Some words are masculine or neuter, such as *śaṅkhaḥ*, *padmaḥ* and *saṅkham*, *padmam*, respectively.
2. Some are feminine or neuter, such as *bhāgadheyī*, *bheṣajī* and *bhāgadheyam*, *bheṣajam*, respectively.
3. Some are masculine or feminine, such as *isuḥ*, *aśaniḥ*.
4. Some are used in all the three genders, such as *taṭaḥ*, *taṭī* and *taṭam*.
5. Some are masculine only, such as *vṛkṣaḥ*, *prakāśaḥ*.
6. Some are feminine only, such as *khaṭvā*, *strī*.
7. Some are neuter only, such as *dadhi*, *vanam*.

Conclusively, he is of the opinion that there is no ultimate rule for deciding gender and, hence, it is decided on the basis of the use of a word in a sentence.

13. **Upagaraha (Mood):** Mood is also taken as one of the meanings conveyed by a verb. It is expressed by *ātmanepada* or *parasmaipada* suffixes. It is *ātmanepada*, if the result of the action comes to the agent and *parasmaipada*, if the result of the action does not go to the agent but to some other. Just as the sight of stars stands for a particular point of time in the same way, by the intention of the fruit of the action, a difference in action is implied.

To sum up, we can say that it is on the basis of the universal as the very general meaning of words/language that identical cognition by words is accomplished. The universal is the only object of cognition, and the universal of words and their meanings are non-different, because the latter is infused with and is revealed by the former. If the theory of universal is taken in view, individuals are known by inference or by implication as the ontic substratum of the former, which is revealed by words in the mind. Individuals in-themselves are incommunicable and incognizable, as they are Beings not expressed by language to which our cognition is confined. Perception, and inference, etc based on perception are merely tools in the manifestation of word (*sphoṭa*), which when manifested reveals its own nature by which its meaning is revealed non-differently. Even a clear and specified meaning conveyed by at *sphoṭa* (sentence) is of the nature of universal which is why identical cognition is revealed by it in all its occurrences and instances.

14. *Vṛttiyān (Complex Formations)*: The concept proposed here for discussion is distinguished from those discussed in the previous pages and is marked as a specific form in the Sanskrit language that facilitates the expression of complex ideas through compounds or phrases (*samastapada*), for the expression of which several sentences are required in other languages. Such complex ideas or qualified meaning can easily be expressed in Sanskrit by a single linguistic formation (*vṛtti*). For example, both the father and the mother are expressed by the *vṛtti* 'pitarau' formed by the rule of retaining the one and dropping the other word (*ekaśeṣa*). A single compound 'pītāmbara' expresses the meaning 'the hero of the epic *Mahābhārata*, who is popularly known as the one who wears golden cloth, or Kṛṣṇa'. In cases of *kṛta-vṛtti* (primary-derivatives), nominal bases are derived from roots and so case-terminations follow. For example the nominal base 'dohanī' (that pot into which we milk) is derived from the root *duḥ* (to milk) by adding the *kṛt*-suffix. In some other cases, as in the case of *taddhita* formations, some other nominal bases are derived from some nominal base and express a specified meaning. For example, the nominal word 'Vaiyākaraṇa', as per the interpretation *vyākaraṇa adhīte veda vā* means 'he who knows or learns grammar', and if added with the *taddhiti*-suffix 'an' in the interpretation 'tad adhīte

tadveda', it conveys a different meaning (he who learns and knows grammar). In some cases, as in the case of denominative roots, in which many roots in several senses are derived from a single original root, the derived roots function as formations since they signify the meaning different from the meaning of the original root. V.S. Rao seems right in observing that 'the system of compounding words and that of forming the desiderative, frequentative, denominative roots, etc. (*sanādyantādhātu*) has greatly contributed to the expressional faculty of the language, and lengthy ideas can be rushed into a single word or phrase whereas in such case in many other languages, recourse has to be taken to several complex sentences whose construction again becomes a bug-bear. It is this linguistic facility that greatly subscribed to the succinct and terse aphoristic writing even with reference to the most responsible walks of life'.¹²⁰

Definition of Vṛtti

Words have an independent capacity to express their independent meaning, i.e. universal. They are endowed with the capacity to be mutually expected if associated with other words in a sentence and with the distinct capacity, when they come into use as a complex formation, they express a particular of qualified meaning different from the meaning of the original word. Viewing this function of linguistic formations, *Vaiyākaraṇas* define *vṛtti* as '*parārthābhīdhānam*'.¹²¹ In such cases, the principal meaning is expressed by secondary words. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his *Laghu-Maṇjuṣā* has taken the term '*parārthābhīdhānam*' for the expression of principal meaning and has defined *vṛtti* as '*parārthasya pradhānārthasya apradhānapadai yatra svārthā viśeṣatvena grahaṇam sā vṛtti*'.¹²² It means, a *vṛtti* is the expression of the principal meaning as the main substantive signified by subsidiary words. In case of a compound, which, as we have seen, is also a *vṛtti*, different meanings of the words are integrated for a single unitary meaning. *Vaiyākaraṇas* call this integration of meaning *sāmarthya pṛthagartham padānām ekārthībhāvaḥ sāmartyam ucyate*.¹²³ Pāṇini, in the *sūtra*, '*samarthahpada vidhiḥ*'¹²⁴ has indicated *vṛtti* as that in which a group of words, having different meanings, are endowed with a power on the basis of which they function as a single unit for expressing an integration of meaning (*ekārthī bhāva*).¹²⁵ For example, the word *rājñyaḥ* in the genitive case and the word '*puruṣaḥ*' in the nominative case are combined as

'*rājapuruṣa*' and the compound '*rājapuruṣa*', as a single unit, expresses the meaning 'servant of the king' which is the meaning of neither of the words separately, nor the association of meanings of those words, but a different meaning in which there is a integration of the meanings of the component words. It is an additional power of the word (*ekārthībhāva*) by which it functions for the meaning of a compound (*samāsa-vṛtti*). The sentence which explains the integration of meaning, or the meaning of *vṛtti* is called *vigrahavākya*. For example, '*vānateya*' is a *taddhita-vṛtti*, which is explained by the sentence 'the son of *Vinatā*' (the mother of *Garuḍa*), i.e. *Garuḍa* and, hence, the sentence is designated as a *Vigrahavākya*, a sentence expressing integration of word meanings.¹²⁶

Vṛttikāra,¹²⁷ has enumerated five kinds of *Vṛttiyān*, namely (1) *Kṛt-vṛtti* (primary derivatives), (2) *Taddhita-vṛtti* (secondary derivatives), (3) *Ekaśeṣa-vṛtti* (retention of one), (4) *Sanādyanta-dhātu* (denominative roots) and, (5) *Samāsa-vṛtti* (compounds).

1. **Primary Derivatives (*Kṛta-vṛtti*):** Some nominal bases expressive of an accomplished character (*siddhārtha*) are derived from roots – original (*śuddha*) and derived (*saṅkīrṇa*). They are expressive of non-accomplished character (*sādhārtha*). For example, the nominal word '*pāka*' expressive of a finished character (cooked) is derived from the root '*pac*', expressive of an unfinished-character, by adding to it the *kṛt* suffix '*ghañ*'.
2. **Secondary Derivatives (*Taddhita-vṛtti*):** Some nominal bases expressive of finished character are derived from some other nominal bases expressive of a separate finished character. For example, the nominal word '*Vinatā*' (the name of the mother of *Garuḍa*, a character in Hindu mythology), if added with the suffix *taddhita*, forms another nominative word '*vānateya*', which conveys the meaning 'the son of *vinatā*', i.e. *Garuḍa* himself, which is different from the meaning of the nominal word *Vinatā*, the mother of *Garuḍa*.
3. **Retention of One (*Ekaśeṣa-vṛtti*):** Some complex forms are derived by dropping off other words and by retaining one. For example, the complex form '*Rāmāḥ*' is retained and others '*Rāmau Rāmāḥ*' are dropped and the retained complex form expresses even the meanings of the words dropped. Similarly, the word *pitarau* by *ekaśeṣa* expresses the meaning 'the father and the mother'.

4. **Denominative Roots (*Sanādyanta-dhātu*)**: There are some forms in which several roots in different senses are derived from some original root conveying a meaning different from the meanings of the roots derived from it. For example, the root *cikīrṣa*, as per *Pāṇini Sūtra*, '*sanādyantā dhātvaḥ*'¹²⁸ is derived from the root 'kṛ', by adding the suffix 'sañ' (in the sense of desire), and forms like *cikīrṣati*, *cikīrṣataḥ* are formed by adding verb-endings (*tip-suffixes*). The roots derived so express a meaning different from the meaning of the root from which they are derived.
5. **Compounds (*Samāsa-vṛtti*)**: In case of a compound, two or more words are compounded (*samaṣṭīkṛta*) and are treated as a single unit expressive of a qualified unitary meaning (*viśiṣṭaikārtha*).

There is integration of the meanings of components in a compound. On the basis of the power of integration (*ekārthībhāva*), the compounds are distinguished from the sentence, that is treated as an association of words having mutually dependent meaning (*vyapekṣā*). According to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, the power of the word in a sentence is called *vyapekṣā* (mutually depended) while that of the word in a compound is known as *ekārthībhāva* (power of integration). *Naiyāyikas*, contrary to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, are of the opinion that the words in a compound are not endowed with the power of integration of meaning (*ekārthībhāva*) but with *vyapekṣā* (mutual expectancy). They interpret the meaning of a component (*padārtha*) as derived by *lakṣaṇā* (implication), made on the basis of association of meanings of components mutually expected, but not as expressed by the compound as a whole unit. It is true that both *Vaiyākaraṇas* and *Naiyāyikas* accept *vṛtti* as *parārthābhīdhānam*, but they differ, at large, in explaining the conveyance of meaning by a *vṛtti* (*samāsa*). In this regard, *Vaiyākaraṇas* are *ekārthābhāvavādī*, while *Naiyāyikas* are *vyapekṣāvādī*. On the basis of viewing the power of compounding as *ekārthībhāva* and *vyapekṣā*, *vṛttis* are explained chiefly, in the following two ways:

Jahatsvārthāvṛtti and Ajahatsvārthāvṛtti

While discussing the concept of *ekārthībhāva* and *vyapekṣā-bhāva*, we have seen that both *Vaiyākaraṇas* and *Naiyāyikas* accept unity of meaning as the signification of the words compounded. We have also

seen that they differ on the nature of the association of components. The association, according to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is the unification of components as a single unit conveying an integration of meaning (*ekārthībhāva*) while it, for *Naiyāyikas*, is the connection of components having a mutually expected meaning to be known by implication. On the basis of these differences, *vṛttis* are also explained as of two kinds:¹²⁹ *jahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ* and *ajahatsvārthā vṛtti*.

Naiyāyikas, being *vyapekṣā-vādī*, support the former, while *Vaiyākaraṇas*, being *ekārthībhāvavādī*, support the latter. A brief account of the dialogue between the two views, as presented by Bhartṛhari and commented by Helārāja, may be given as follows:

1. *Jahatsvārthā Vṛttiḥ*: Just as an architect gives up his own work for some royal work, similarly, in case of such formations, component words of a compound give up their separate meanings and, thus, the compound is treated as a separate form denoting a specified single unitary meaning. For example, the word *rājan* and the word *puruṣaḥ* in the compound '*rājapuruṣaḥ*' abandon their separate meanings, and the compound as a unit (whole) expresses the meaning 'the servant of the king' which is different from the meanings of the components. Such integration of meaning (*ekārthībhāva*) is possible only if the compound is treated as a form separate from its components (*jahatipadāni svārthamyasyam vṛttau sajahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ*). This view is supported by Bhartṛhari, on account of which he treats complex formations (*vṛttis*) as units different from words and sentences.
2. *Ajahatsvārthā Vṛttiḥ*: For this view, the component words in a compound do not give up their meanings, and they, by mutual expectancy (*vyapekṣā*), serve for the implication of the meaning of the compound. For example, the components *rājan* and *puruṣaḥ* do not give up their meanings when compounded as *rājapuruṣa*, and the meanings of the components *rājan* and *puruṣaḥ*, by mutual expectancy, act on the implication (*lakṣaṇā*) of the meaning of the compound.

Difference between Complex Formation and Sentence

Some potency of the word is fixed when it is used in a sentence while some other potency of the word is seen in cases where more than one

word are united as a single unit, on account of which the sentence and the formations are differentiated.¹³⁰

The differences are as follows:

1. In a sentence, different words are expressive of their separate meanings, but in a complex formation (*vṛtti*) different words having different meanings are integrated and that integration functions for the signification of a single unitary meaning (*ekārthībhāva*).
2. In a sentence (*vigraha vākya*), case-terminations are not abandoned, but they are given up in compounds, as we find in the *vṛtti* 'rājapuruṣaḥ'. Cases of exception are also found, as in case of the word 'goṣucaraḥ' (cock).
3. In case of a sentence, some words may be inserted, for example, the word 'ṛddhasya' in between the words *rājñyaḥ* and *puruṣaḥ* may be inserted to form the sentence (*rājñyaḥ ṛddhasya puruṣaḥ*), but in case of a compound *rājapuruṣaḥ* no word can be inserted in between them. Adjectives, in between the components of a compound, cannot be placed while they may be placed with the sentence as in 'ṛddhasya rājñyaḥ puruṣaḥ'.
4. The sequence of words in a sentence may be changed, as *puruṣaḥ rājñyaḥ* but the sequence of a components of a compound (*rājapuruṣaḥ*) cannot be changed. If it is changed, it will be a different word altogether.
5. Number (singular, dual, plural) is known in the case of a sentence, for example, the sentences *rājñyaḥ puruṣaḥ*, *rājñya puruṣaḥ* and *rājāñām puruṣaḥ*. But, except in some cases, the number is not known by the compound.
6. Gender is clearly apprehended by a sentence, but in case of compound, the specific gender is not clearly apprehended. For example, the compound 'mṛgamāmsam' expresses the flesh of both the he and the she-deer. Not only compounds, but also sentences, in some exceptional cases, do not express gender. For example, the sentence 'chāgasya māmśam' does not indicate the gender of the goat.

7. The particle 'ca' is applied in a sentence for expressing aggregation but the particle is not applied in between the components of a compound as they, by nature, express the integration.

So far as the clarity of cognition of meaning is concerned, sometimes sentences are observed as more appropriate than compounds. For example, the sentence '*brāhmaṇasya kambalaḥ tiṣṭhati*' is clearer than the compound *brāhmaṇakambalaḥ*, which may be taken both as name of a brahmin or as the blanket of a brahmin. However, at other times, compounds function for meaning more clearly than sentences, for example, the compound '*ardhapaśuḥ devadattasya*' is more clear than the sentence '*arddham paśoḥ devadattasya*'.

In the paragraphs mentioned above, we have seen that a particular or qualified meaning, according to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is known by a complex form. As such, it can be asked: If the meaning of a complex formation is a qualified meaning, there must be a qualifier-qualified relation within the meaning of the complex formation? If there is a relation, such a relation, in fact presupposes a difference between the qualifier and the qualified, and not the integration, but *Vaiyākaraṇas* assume integration of meaning by a complex formation. This leads to a paradoxical situation of interpretation of the meaning of a complex formation as a qualifier-qualified, which implies difference, on the one hand and of the single unitary meaning of complex forms in which there is integration of meaning, on the other. Bhartṛhari in his *Vṛtti Samuddeśaḥ*, the largest of all the chapters in *Vākyapadīya*, has also raised many other connected questions with regard to the problem raised above, Bhartṛhari has discussed chiefly two points of views for looking at complex formations. A very brief account of those points of views is given as follows:

1. ***Samānādhikaraṇa Vṛttiḥ***: According to this point of view, the components (words) of a compound have a common substratum as their signification and the qualified meaning is known unitedly. For example, a common substratum is signified by both of the components *mahān* (great) and *deva* (deity) of the compound *mahādeva* (that which is *mahān* is *deva* also). And, thus, the compound, according to a *Pāṇini Sūtra* '*tatpuruṣaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇaḥ karmadhārayaḥ*'¹³¹ is designated as *karmadhāraya*. It may be asked: do the two components cause

cognition of relation, qualifier and qualified, simultaneously or consequentially in a sequence? There is no question of simultaneous cognition, as Bhartṛhari does not endorse it. Between the qualifier and the qualified, if the qualifier, in sequence, is taken to be known first, and the qualified later, it will not be a logically justified position. It is not logical to accept that the qualifier is cognized first and then it disappears, and the qualified is singly cognized as the meaning of the complex-formation. As the qualifier does not exist at the time the qualified is known, and as the qualified remains unknown at the time the qualifier is known, and the simultaneous cognition of both of them is not acceptable, the relation of qualifier-qualified cannot be possible if the integration of meaning is taken as the signification of a complex formation. The cognition of the relation of qualifier-qualified cannot be accepted as a product of memory, because, then, cognition by a complex formation will be a memory cognition that implies a previous experience. But, in the case of cognition of qualifier-qualified, the qualified is taken by *Vaiyākaraṇas* as unknown (*anirjñāta*) at the time of the cognition of the qualifier, which is known (*jñāta*). Not only that, but *Vaiyākaraṇas* accept the meaning as that which is expressed by the complex formation itself and not as a memory or implication.

In order to solve the problem of the qualifier-qualified relation, in the view of *samānādhikaraṇavādins*, Bhartṛhari elucidates that from the viewpoint of cognition by formations, qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) stands secondary and the qualified (*viśeṣya*) is principal (*mūkhyā*). A qualifier is the distinguisher (*bhedaka*), and a qualified is that which has to be distinguished by the qualifier (*bhedya*).¹³² *Bhedya* is unknown, and *bhedaka* is known. According to him, that which is to be expressed is unknown and the unknown is primary, for the cognition of which a qualifier functions as instrument. The qualifier, being mere instrumental in causing the cognition of the qualified, helps the expression of a single unitary cognition, i.e. the cognition of a qualified linguistic formation. For example, in the complex form '*kṛṣṇatīlāḥ, tīlāḥ*' (sesame-seed) is unknown, which is known by the qualifier '*kṛṣṇaḥ*' (black) in the interpretation '*kṛṣṇa ca asau tīlāḥ*' that sesame-seed (*tīlāḥ*) is black.¹³³

2. ***Vyadhikaraṇa Vṛttiḥ***: The term '*Vyadhikaraṇa*' means a state of being in different positions of case-relation or subsisting in different

substrata as in *vyadhikaraṇabahubrīhi*, which means, 'in a *bahubrīhi*-compound, the first member of which does not have a common substratum or which stands in a different case-relation to the second in the dissolution of the compound'. There is *Vyadhikaraṇa vṛtti* in the compound '*Rājapuruṣaḥ*', because not the same but different substrata are cognized by the components '*rājan*' and '*puruṣaḥ*'. In case of '*rājapuruṣaḥ*', the word '*rājan*' stands in a different case-relation to the second, in the dissolution of compound. Genitive case is used with the word '*rājan*' used as a qualifier (*guṇa*), since it elucidates not only the qualified, but its own meaning (*svārtha*) also and hence, the first case-termination is not applied with it. The word '*puruṣaḥ*' stands only for its fixed meaning and, hence, there is application of first case-termination. The word '*rājan*' is a qualifier and the word '*puruṣaḥ*' is qualified, but their qualifier-qualified relation is only verbal (*śabdataḥ*) because the relation of own and owned (*svasvāmin*) is conveyed by the genitive case, on the basis of which the qualifier-qualified relation is established. In such a situation, the genitive case is applied with the word which functions as instrumental in the relation as *rājñyaḥ-rājan* and the first case-termination with the word '*puruṣaḥ*' is applied as it is instrumented. As neither of the words signifies the same substratum, it can be asked: how can they stand in a qualifier-qualified relation? If the relation is fashioned by mind, it would not be real but imaginary on the basis of which the qualifier-qualified relation between objects (externals) cannot possibly be established.

Elucidating the role of mind in making the indivisible cognition understandable, Bhartṛhari says that it is the mind on account of which indivisible or unified is divided and a divided in unified. It is the mind on the basis of which a single son is treated in communication as elder or younger, that is treated differently (*vyapadeśekasmin*).¹³⁴ For example 'a' in the derivation 'a'+ *bhyām* is a single letter and is not a word-ending (*padānta*), but it is reduplicated as mind takes it as *adanta* (word having an 'a' ending) and then the compound '*ābhyām*' is formed.

Explaining different kinds of compounds, Bhartṛhari accepts the primacy of the components. For example, in case of *dvandva* (conjunctive-compound) in which there is desire for simultaneous

expression by a group of words, both of the components are considered as primary. It is the desire to express the *dhava* (butea tree) and *khadira* (catechu tree) simulataneously that the *dvandva*-compound is formed (*dhavakhadirau*). Similarly, in the case of *ekaśeṣa*, uses like *dhavauchindhi* takes place. In case of a *bahubrīhi* (possessive-compound), which expresses a meaning that is a meaning of neither of the components, and none of the components are taken as primary, the meaning of the compound is known by implication made on the basis of the meaning of the component words. In cases of *tatpuruṣa*, *karmadhāraya* and *dvigu* compounds the latter component is taken as primary while in *dvandva* the former and the latter both are taken as primary. In case of *avyayībhāva samāsa* (adverbial-compound) the former component is taken as primary for the conveyance of meaning. The notion of primacy of the former or the latter, of both or of none of the components of a compound, for Bhartṛhari, is meant only for the sake of explanation of the integration of the meaning of a compound that, in fact, is taken in the system of grammar, as a single unit. A compound is a single unit and the meaning revealed in the mind by them is also indivisible. Taking cognition as an indivisible unit, the problem of simultaneous or consequential cognition does not arise, and thus components are significant only for the sake of explanation of the indivisible cognition revealed by a complex formation.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Tathā hi buddhyā nirūpitava stuviṣayāḥ śabdāḥ. Helārāja (hereafter, *HR*) on *VP*, 3/8/1 and 3/3/39, edited by R. N. Sharma, S.S. University, Varanasi.
2. Ātmarūpam yathā jñāne jñeya rūpam cadṛśyate, *Artharūpam tathā śabde Svarūpam ca prakāśate*, *VP*, 1/50.
3. *Ibid.*, 1/123.
4. Following B.K. Matilal, *Perception*, 1986, p. 396, many scholars of *VP* have taken *upacāra-sattā* as metaphorical existence. Ashok Aklujkar seems right in taking it for secondary being. Actually, the being revealed in the mind by languages is termed by Bhartṛhari as *upacāra-sattā*. It, in contrast with the primary being, is called secondary being.
5. *Iha vyākaraṇe na vastvārthaḥ apitu 'śabdārtho'rthaḥ*, *HR* on *Kriyā samuddeśaḥ*, *kārikā-2*.
6. *Prajñāvivekam labhate bhinnairāgamadarśanaiḥ*, *VP*, 2/484.

7. *Astyarthaḥ sarvaśabdānāmiti pratyāyyalakṣaṇam*, Ibid., 2/119.
8. *Apūrva devatāsvargaiḥ samamāhurgavādiṣu*, Ibid., 2/119.
9. Ibid., 2/120.
10. *Jāteḥpratyāyake śabdeyā vyaktiranuṣaṅgiṇī, natad vyaktigatāna bhedaṇ jātiśabdo'valambate*, Ibid., 2/122.
11. *Jāti śabdā jāti mātram pratyāyayantivyaktistu tatrānuṣaṅgiṇī*, Ibid., Puṇyarāja commentary of 2/122.
12. G.N. Sastri, *Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, p. 163.
13. VP, 2/125.
14. Ibid., 2/125 and Puṇyarāja's commentary on it.
15. *Samudāyo'abhidheyo vā'pyavikalpa samuccayaḥ*, Ibid., 2/126, p. 209.
16. *Ambākartrī on VP*, 2/126.
17. *Asatyō vā' pi saṃsargaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścidiṣyate*, VP, 2/126.
18. *Astyopādhiyatsatyamtadvā śabdanibandhanam*. Ibid., 2/127.
19. *Śabdovāpyabhijalpatvamāgatoyātivācyatām, soyamityabhisambandhā drūpamekīkṛtam yadā. śabdāsyārthena tam śabdamabhijalpam pracakṣate*. VP, 2/127-128.
20. In ordinary usage the word 'agnim' in the sentence 'agnimānaya' denotes the form of the fire but in the sūtra 'strībhyo dhañk', Pāṇini 4/1/120, the word 'strībhyo' indicates the word expressing women.
21. VP, 2/129.
22. Ibid., 2/131.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. *Ākāravantaḥ samvedyā vyakta smṛti nibandhanāḥ, yete pratyavabhāsanta samvinmātram tvato'nyathā*, Ibid., 2/133.
26. Bhartṛhari, K.A.S. Ayer, p. 232.
27. *Ekasminnapi dṛśye 'rthe darśanam bhidyate pṛthak, kālāntareṇa caiko' pi tam paśyatyanyathā punaḥ*. Ibid., 2/136.
28. *Asamākhyeyatattvānāmarthānām laukikaiairyathā, Vyavahāre Samākhyānamtat prājño na vikalpayet*. Ibid., 2/142.
29. Ibid., Ambākartrī on, 2/142.

30. *Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, G.N. Śāstri, p. 171.
31. VP, 2/136-137.
32. Puṇyarājā on VP, 2/143.
33. *Svājātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarverevābhidhīyate. tato arthajātiḥ peṣu tadadhyāropa kalpanā.* Ibid., 3/1/6.
34. VP, 1/75-120.
35. VP, 3/1/9-12.
36. Ibid., 3/1/10-11 and HR Commentary on them.
37. *Arthabhedenahi bhinnasya nityasya śabdasyābhinnābhīdhanapratyaya-heturjātiravaśyābhyupagantavyā.* Ibid., 3/1/7-8; VP, 3/1/9-12.
38. Ibid., 3/1/6.
39. Ibid., Helārāja's commentary on VP, 1/1/9, pp. 37-38.
40. *HR on Sambandha-Samuddeśaḥ*, 3/3/39.
41. *Ditthaḍavittadevadattādīpāda rūpaiḥ samjñā śabdaiśca, Jātirvā, Jātivat svāśrayasya bhedakogūṇa kriyārūpaḥbālyakaumārādyavasthābhede—apyabhinnapratyayanīmītabhūtaḥ prativyakti niyataḥ sansthānadirūpo viśeṣo vāpi Jātivat.* Ambākartī commentary on VP, 3/1/12, p. 42.
42. *Guṇa śabdānāmapi śuklādīnām Guṇa jātirvācyā,* Helārāja on VP, 3/1/2.
43. Pāṇini 2/1/55.
44. HR commentary on VP, 3/1/12.
45. HR commentary on VP, 3/1/2.
46. VP, 3/1/3-5 and HR commentary on it.
47. Ibid., HR commentary on 3/1/3.
48. *Vyākterabhedastulyatvam sankaro'thānavasthitiḥ rūpa hānira sambandoḥjātibādhaka sangrahaḥ Nyāya-kiraṇāvalī Udayanācārya-Jātibādhaka Prakaraṇa*, p. 161.
49. VP, 3/1/34-44.
50. *Asatyopādhi yat satyam tadvā-śabda nibandhanam.* VP, 2/127.
51. Ibid., 3/3/15-16.
52. *Idamākāśam, idamākāśam'pratideśam ityabhinnābhīdhanā pratyayānuvṛtti lakṣaṇamākāśā sāmānyamākāśa śabdagocarō' sti.* HR commentary on 3/1/15, p. 49.
53. *Evam merum praḍakṣiṇamāvartamānsya savituḥ lokapālagṛhītairdeśa*

viśeṣairye sanyogāḥ tadupādhinā sūryeṇa diśaḥ sanyoge sati-bhede' bhinnamdik sāmānyam dik śabda vācyam parikalpayam. Ibid., 3/1/15, p. 49.

54. VP, 3/1/17-18
55. HR on VP, 3/1/17-18.
56. Bhartṛhari's *Philosophy of Relation Between Word and Meaning*, D.N. Tiwari, JICPR, Vol, XI, Number 2, pp. 50-51, 1994.
57. Ibid.
58. HR commentary on VP, 3/1/12.
59. Ibid., 3/1/10, pp. 38-39.
60. *Yopi viśeṣaḥ sanjñā śabdānām vācyah pratīti niyataḥ so 'pi Jātivat prasiddha jātyā tulyam. Ibid., 3/1/12, p. 43.*
61. Ibid., 3/1/11-12.
62. Ibid., 3/1/11.
63. VP, 3/1/14.
64. *Tathā cābhāveṣvapi sāmānyābhyupagame bhāvatvāpatterabha-
vanātmakadharmā sāmānyādanvayī pratyaya viśayateti saiva tatrāpi Jātiḥ.*
HR commentary on VP, 3/1/14.
65. VP, 3/1/25.
66. VP, 3/1/26 and HR commentary on it.
67. Ibid., HR commentary on 3/1/27.
68. VP, 3/1/27.
69. Ibid., 3/1/28.
70. Ibid., HR commentary on 3/1/42.
71. *Kāla-Samuddeśaḥ* VP, pt. III/ Chapter 9.
72. *Naikatvam nāpi nānātvam na sattvam na canāstitā. Ātmatattveṣu,
bhāvanāma sanṣṛteṣu vidyate. VP, 3/1/21.*
73. Ibid., 3/1/92.
74. Ibid., 3/1/97.
75. *Samūhāvagrahe hi Samūhināmanā vṛttāsaivabuddhiḥ sāmānyam grhṇāti.*
Ibid., HR commentary on 3/1/98.
76. Ibid., 3/1/98.
77. Ibid., 3/1/93.

78. Ibid., 3/1/98.
79. Ibid., 3/1/94.
80. Ibid., 3/1/95.
81. Ibid., 3/1/98.
82. Ibid., 3/1/100.
83. *Tasya tatsāmānyam na cakṣhurādivadadhipati-pratyayarūpam kāraṇam, apitvālabhāna pratyayarūpam.* Ibid., HR commentary on 3/1/95.
84. *Yena nīlam pratyakṣam sāmānyamīdṛśamevāpratyakṣamiti.* Ibid., 3/1/95.
85. Ibid., 3/1/29.
86. Ibid., 3/1/26.
87. *Ārthastu Jāti dravyayorguṇapradhānabhāvaḥ...Samarthyāt pratītam dravyam.* HR commentary on VP, 3/1/2.
88. Ibid., 3/1/104.
89. Ibid., 3/1/105 and HR commentary on it, p. 187.
90. *Jñeyasthameva Sāmānyam Jñānānāmupakāraṇam. Najātu Jñeyavajjñānam parārūpeṇa rūpyate.* Ibid., 3/1/103.
91. Ibid., 3/1/104.
92. *Śabdārtpho' rthaḥ, na vastvarthaḥ ityasaṅkṛdaktam.* Commentary of Helārāja on *Vākyapadīyam* 3 vol. II, chapter 8, kārikā 2p. 417, edited by B.P. Tripathi with commentary 'Ambākartrī' of Raghunath Sharma, S.S. University, Varanasi, 1979. Also *Yadyapi bahirvastūni na santi' tathāpi śabdaistathā pratyāyyante.* HR on VP, 3/1/11.
93. *Dravyābhīdhanam Vyādi. Pāṇini sūtra 1/2/64 vārttika 46.*
94. For explaining substance as the import of words Pāṇini has written *the sūtra sarūpāṇām eka śeṣe ekavibhaktau.* Pāṇini-1/2/64.
95. *Mahābhāṣya, 1/1.*
96. *Vākyapadīya 3/Dravya Samuddeshaḥ* consisting of total 18 Kārikās edited by B.P. Tripathi, S.S. University, Varanasi, Part-3, 1974.
97. *Ibid., 3/Bhūyo Dravya Samuddeshaḥ* (consisting of total 3 Kārikās part 3/vol. 2, Chapter 4).
98. *VP, 3/2/12* and HR commentary on it.
99. Ibid., 3/2/13.
100. Ibid., 3/2/8.

101. VP, 2/13, 238 and Puṇyarāja's commentary on them.
102. *Asatyopādhi yatsatvam tadvā śabdānibandhanam*. VP, 2/127, edited by B.P. Tripathi, S.S. University, Varanasi, 1980.
103. Puṇyarāja's commentary on VP, 2/127.
104. Helārāja on VP, 3/3/29.
105. *Ekadeśena sārūpye sarvam syāt sarvavedanam. Sarvātmanā tu sārūpye Jñānamajñānatāmvrājeta*. Helārāja on VP, 3/2/9.
106. A precise account of the theory is presented in the paper entitled 'Cognition, Being and Possibility of Expression: A Bhartṛharian Approach', published in *JICPR*, Vol.XIV, No.1, pp. 65-73, 1996.
107. VP, 1/55 edited by B.P. Tripathi, S.S. University, Varanasi, 1976.
108. *Vastūpalakṣaṇam yatra sarvanāmaprayujyate*, VP, 3/4/3 and Helārāja's commentary on it.
109. *Vastumātrābhīdhayinaḥ kecid yathā sarvādayaḥ viśiṣṭavastu vācakas' cānye yathānyatarādayaḥ*. Helārāja on VP, 3/4/3.
110. VP, 3/2/3.
111. Helārāja commentary on VP, 3/2/3.
112. *Dravya mityucyat so'rtho bhedyatven vivakṣitaḥ*. VP, 3/4/3.
113. Helārāja's commentary on VP, 3/4/3.
114. Ibid., 3/2/15.
115. *Jāterdohābhāve vyaktidvārakaḥ Kriyaasambandho gaurduhyatāmiti*. HR on VP, 3/4/3.
116. VP, 1/56-57.
117. Ibid., 1/55.
118. In this view, even the meaning of deconstruction is also a substance if presented by language as qualified as we find in the expression 'deconstruction is a Derridian method for elimination of metaphysics'.
119. A detailed account of analysis of concepts contained in book III of VP, is to be presented separately.
120. The Philosophy of a Sentence and its Parts, p.244.
121. *Mahābhāṣya* on *Pāṇini* 2/1/1.
122. *Laghu Mañjuṣā, Vṛtti Prakaraṇa*.
123. *Mahābhāṣya* 2/1/1.

124. Pāṇini 2/1/11.
125. *Mahābhāṣya* on 2/1/1.
126. Vṛttiyartha avavodhakam vākyam vighrahaḥ.
127. Kṛttaddhita samāsaikaśeṣa sanādyantadhātu rūpaḥ pancavṛtityaḥ.
128. Pāṇini 3/1/32.
129. VP, 3/ Vṛtti Samuddeśaḥ, kārikā 44-53.
130. Ibid., 36-39.
131. Pāṇini 1/2/42.
132. VP, 3/ Vṛtti Samuddeśaḥ 6 and HR commentary on it.
133. Ibid., 27.
134. Ibid., 15.

CHAPTER-VII

CONCEPT OF GRAMMATICAL ANALYSIS (*APODDHĀRA*)

ADVANTAGE OF GRAMMATICAL ANALYSIS

We have seen that *Vaiyākaraṇas* explain language on the basis of cognition by it in usual communication. Communication is accomplished by sentence, which is an indivisible, and hence, the primary unit of communication. The function of philosophy of grammar lies in explaining indivisible cognition revealed by indivisible sentence through artificial divisions of it. The importance of such explanations lies in helping beginners to understand the indivisible through its visible parts, which otherwise, cannot be understandable to them. The method of grammatically dividing the indivisible into different components or parts is called '*apoddhāra*' (grammatical analysis). For practical purposes, the units acquired by grammatical analysis, i.e. words and their meaning, are also accepted by grammarian philosophy as real units. Accepting words and their meanings, acquired by grammatical analysis, as real, *Vaiyākaraṇas* give importance not only to grammar and to the studies (*śāstra*), but also to other systems of thought that take words as real meaningful units. Viewing these functions of grammar, Patañjali rightly observes the system of grammar and language as *sarvam pārśadam* (the school of all systems of knowledge). Grammatical analysis is just as important for beginners and children who can understand the indivisible only piecemeal, as it is to for the wise or for philosophers who, otherwise, cannot explain the indivisible cognition to these beginners.¹

Bhartṛhari has discussed grammatical analysis chiefly in connection with the explanation of the cognition of meaning acquired through the analysis of an indivisible whole, perhaps, with the understanding that the parts are implied in it. Otherwise, the explanation of the indivisible whole without parts is not possible. Thus, analysis is involved in determining the cognition of parts as elements of a complex whole on the one hand and the cognition of the complex whole through the parts on the other hand. His commentators have discussed the concept of grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*) chiefly in the context of

meaning (*apoddhāra-padārtha*). The discussion on grammatical analysis will not throw sufficient light on the problem, if it is not discussed as the grammatical analysis of sentence, word, as well as their meanings.

Bhartṛhari has mentioned two sorts of word-meanings (*padārtha*):²

1. *Sthitalakṣaṇa Padārtha*

Sentential-meaning and some word-meanings are fixed in character. They are not acquired by grammatical analysis; they are fixed and their explanation by analysis does not change their character, which as such cannot be understood in terms of that acquired by the get-together of the meanings of roots/stems and suffixes. The *Vṛṣabha* commentary says, '*sthitalakṣaṇāḥ padārthāḥ vākyārthāśca matabhedena Prakṛti pratyayārthaḥ yathopāyatayā padārthe tirodhīyante natupadārthaḥ. Tayā padārthā upāyatayā vākyārthyapratipatau tirodhīyante, tat vākyārthaḥ*'.³ According to these lines, only sentential-meaning is fixed, because its character is not changeable. It is always an indivisible, clear and distinct flash (*pratibhā*). The cognition by association of word-meanings is sublated after the revelation of the cognition of the indivisible sentential-meaning. Divisions like meaning of words, root/stem, suffixes, etc. are artificial analysis of the indivisible sentential-meaning, which in itself is indivisible.

According to another interpretation, the word-meaning in itself is also fixed, because the separate meanings of the root/stem and suffixes disappear when the word-meaning is cognized. For example 'potness' is the fixed meaning cognized by the word pot (*ghaṭaḥ*) as a whole. The meaning of the stem '*ghaṭ*' and the meaning of the suffix *sup = aḥ* disappear after causing the cognition 'potness'. The meaning is neither different from the pot-universal nor a meaning other than the meaning of the word 'pot'. Even in this sense, word-meaning is taken to be of a fixed character. Bhartṛhari takes sentential-meaning only as fixed (*sthitalakṣaṇa*), because its nature does not change with the different analytic derivations. However, he does not deny the fixed meanings of such words that reveal a complete sentential-meaning. For example, the meaning 'Deities make it rain' of the word '*varṣati*' is fixed.

2. Apoddhārapadārthā

According to this view, word-meaning is not fixed in character. It is known through the process of dividing and deriving the word differently into different roots/stems and suffixes. Vṛṣabha⁴ has defined the term *apoddhāra padārtha* through four different derivations:

1. According to the derivation '*apoddhriyante ityapoddhārāḥ padārthaśceti*', the term *apoddhāra padārtha* means the cognition of word-meaning acquired by grammatical analysis of it or the word-meaning known by deriving the word differently into different parts. The term *apoddhāra* means division, and the meaning known through the different artificial divisions of a word-meaning is called *apoddhāra padārtha*. Thus, the word-meaning known through the grammatically-analyzed parts of it, i.e. known as an association of meanings of roots/stems and suffixes, is called *apoddhāra padārtha*.
2. According to the second derivation, '*apoddhṛtānām vāpadānām arthāḥ*', the meaning of the words or units acquired by grammatical analysis of a sentential unit, i.e. word-meaning, is called '*apoddhāra padārtha*'.
3. According to the third derivation, '*apoddhāreṇa parikalpitānām vā'rthāḥ*', the meaning known by grammatical analysis, or the meaning acquired by the device of distributive settlement (*parikalpanā*) of the sentential-meaning, is known as *apoddhāra padārtha*.
4. According to the derivation '*apoddhārasambandhino. vā padārthāḥ*', the meaning of the parts acquired by grammatical analysis of a whole is called *apoddhāra padārtha*. In grammar (*Vyākaraṇa*), the meanings of the root/stem and suffixes and the word-meanings are called *apoddhāra padārtha*.

Apoddhāra padārtha in all the four derivations mentioned above is concerned with the meaning of words acquired by grammatical analysis of indivisible sentential-meanings. The word-meaning, if conveyed by the word as a whole, is called *sthitlakṣṇa padārtha* but if the word-meaning is derived on the basis of the grammatically-analyzed parts i.e. on the basis of the meanings of root/stem and suffixes, etc. then the meaning is called *apoddhāra padārtha*. *Apoddhāra padārtha* is

concerned with the explanation of meaning of a word through the theories or rules of grammar (*śāstra*), and that is the reason a sentence-holist like Bhartṛhari, accepts it as an artificial remedy for helping beginners to understand the indivisible whole.

TWO WAYS OF GRAMMATICAL ANALYSIS

Grammatical analysis, as commentators observe, is performed in two ways:⁵

1. Grammatical Analysis of Word-meanings from the Sentential-meaning

According to this perspective, complete sentential-meaning, like 'it is a tree' (*ṛkṣaḥ asti*), 'it is a book' (*pustakam asti*) are known even when isolated words like *ṛkṣaḥ* or *pustakam* are spoken. On the basis of a unit cognition by single words, it is accepted that the word-meanings are acquired by the grammatical analysis of the sentential-meaning ('*ṛkṣaḥ asti*', '*pustakam asti*' respectively). *Vaiyākaraṇas* are of the firm opinion that even in speaking single words, meanings like *jāyate* (born), *asti* (exists), etc., are implied, on the basis of which the complete meaning is known, and in knowing the meaning, we grammatically analyze their meanings from the complete sentential-meaning (*ṛkṣaḥ asti*, etc.).

2. Grammatical Analysis of a Word-meaning (*Padārtha*) From some other word-meaning

The interpretation of the meaning of a word through analysis, as the meaning of its preceding part (*pūrva padārtha*), subsequent part (*uttara-padārtha*) and other parts of it, is a means to help one understand the word-meanings as a whole unit. The meaning acquired by analysis as *pratyayārtha* (the meaning of suffixes or *sup*) and *prātipadikārtha* (the meaning of the crude form/base) from the *nāmārtha* (meaning of the nominal word), or the analysis of the meanings of the root and verb-endings from the meaning of a verb (*ākhyātārtha*), are known as *apoddhāra padārtha*. The meaning of the stem (*prakṛtyārtha*) in particular, is analyzed into the meanings like universal, particular, gender, number and accessory (*kāraka*), and the meaning of the root

(*dhātvārtha*) is analyzed into action, means, time (tense), number, person and mood.

The process of grammatical analysis is accepted equally by word-theorists (*padavādins*) as instrumental in explaining word-meaning through a piecemeal scheme. To both word- and sentence-theorists, analysis of word and word-meaning has been accepted as an easy way to understand the indivisible through parts. In the process, the grammatical analysis of a word (*pada*) sometimes serves as the base of the analysis of the word-meaning and vice versa. As a word-meaning is the meaning of a word, the grammatical analysis of a word, and that of the word-meaning, are equally accepted.

Similarly, a sentence is grammatically divided into words, viz. substantive (*nāma*), verb (*ākhyāta*), particles (*nipāta*) and post-positions (*karmapravacanīya*), and the sentential-meaning into their respective meanings. Nominal words (*subantapadas* or *nāma*) are divided into stem (*prakṛti* or *prātipadika*) and suffix (*pratyaya*), and the meanings of *subantapadas* into *prātipadikārtha* (the meaning of the crude form) and *pratyayārtha* (the meaning of the suffixes = *sup*). Similarly, a verb is divided into roots (*dhātu*) and suffixes (*pratyaya* or *tiñanta*) and the meaning of the verb is divided into meaning of root (*dhātvārtha*) and verb-ending suffixes (*pratyayārtha*). Roots are also divided into original roots and derived roots (roots made of nominal bases), and their meanings are derived accordingly. The suffixes are divided into *taddhita* and *kṛdanta* and the *kṛdanta*-suffixes are again divided into *tiñanta* and *ayanta*-suffixes and then their separate meanings are derived accordingly. All the meanings of the units acquired by grammatical analysis of a sentential-meaning are called '*apoddhāra padārtha*', and the units conveying them are called '*apoddhṛta-śabda*'.

Different to the method of grammatical analysis mentioned above, some grammarians think that word-meanings should be analyzed into their components within the framework of the sentential-meaning. They are of the opinion that grammatical analysis of a word independently of a sentence may cause confusion regarding the exact meaning of the word. The meaning of the word differs in different uses, and that is the reason they emphasize the analysis of words and their meanings within the framework of the sentence and its meaning.

Technique of Grammatical Analysis

In order to clarify the methods of grammatical analysis of both words and their meanings, let us take an example of the sentence, 'deodatta viṣṇudattaśca gr̥ham svāgacchataḥ'. It is necessary to note here, that the analysis of the sentence into parts is equally applicable to the analysis of the sentential-meaning (into the meanings of the parts) because, in the system of grammar, meaning is taken as non-different from language. With this consideration, the grammatical analysis of the sentence under example may be given as follows, in the light of the second view discussed earlier:

Dyu (*krīṇāyām*) + ta (singular number, instrumental case) + *ḍuday* + kt + su = Deodattaḥ + Viṣṇu + *ṇu* + *ḍuday* + kt = su = Viṣṇudattaḥ + ca (particle) + gr̥h + ka + am = gr̥ham = su + an + gam + sap + tat (tas) = svāgacchataḥ. The meanings of the analyzed units are synthesized for the meaning of the sentence analyzed.

The first view, which accepts grammatical analysis of a word and its meaning (*padārtha*), may analyze the sentence under example as follows:

The words *Deodattaḥ*, *Viṣṇudattaḥ* and *gr̥ham* are substantives (*subantapadas*), 'ca' is a particle. *Anu* is a preposition (*upasarga*), *gacchataḥ* is a verb and 'su' is a post-position. Substantives are analyzed into stem and suffixes and, thus, the words *Deodattaḥ*, *Viṣṇudattaḥ* are analyzed as *Deodatta* (stem/*prakṛti*)+*sup* (*aḥ*) suffix (nominative case-termination). The stem (*prakṛti*) is substantive (*prātipadika*) and universal, individual, gender, number and accessory (*kāraka*) in general, are taken as its meanings (*prātipadikārtha*). In the example given above, the word *Deodattaḥ* and *Viṣṇudattaḥ* are used as substantives (*dravyavācī*) and the individuals *Deodatta*, the *Viṣṇudatta* respectively are known by them. *Deodatta*, individual, masculine gender, singular number and agent (*kartā*) of the action (*gacchataḥ*) are known by the word 'Deodatta' and similar is the case with the word 'Viṣṇudattaḥ'. The word 'gr̥ham' is expressive of the universal, accusative-case (*karmakāraka*), *gr̥hatva* (home-ness), neuter gender and singular number are understood as the meanings of the word *gr̥ham* (home). *Prātipadika* in the words *Deodattaḥ* *Viṣṇudattaḥ* should be taken only as instantial, and it may be observed for meanings like universal, quality of substance. As the meanings of *prātipadikas*

are derived by grammatical analysis, they are called *apoddhāra padārtha*. The meanings of the suffixes that follow *prātipadikas* are taken to be the same as expressed by the *prātipadika*. If suffixes are taken as expressors (*vācaka*), then specific number, gender and case are taken as the meanings expressed by them, and the universal and the individual are taken as the meanings expressed by the *prātipadika*. Pāṇini has defined suffixes only in the two senses mentioned above.

The word 'gacchataḥ' is a verb and is analyzed into $\sqrt{\text{gam}}$ + suffix (*tas*). The meaning of the $\sqrt{\text{gam}}$ is analyzed as action and the result of the action (*vyāpāra* and *phala*) as well. Roots are also analyzed into original (*śuddha*) and derived (*saṅkīrṇa*). The root 'gam' is original, and it can be analyzed no more. A derived root is that which is formed by adding suffixes like *san* and *kyañ* with nominal words (*nāma*), e.g. the verb 'kalahāyate'. The meaning of the verb by grammatical analysis in all the cases is decided as action and result. The meaning of the 'gam' in the sentence under example is the action leading to the arrival of one at another place, and the meaning of the suffix 'ataḥ, (aḥ)' falling with the $\sqrt{\text{gam}}$ is decided as the agent (*kartā*), present-tense, dual-number, first person and *parasmaipada* (the object of which is other than the speaker himself). Specific meanings of suffixes like *kṛta*, *ṇmul*, etc., falling with roots, have also been taught in the system of grammar. Non-finished character (*bhava*) is taken as the meaning of *tin* suffixes and some *kṛt* suffixes. For example, the suffix in the sentence 'Rāmeṇa sayyate' is used for *bhava*. The suffix 'ghaṇ' with the word *pāka* is used in the sense of finished character. The meanings of suffixes (*pratyayārtha*) and of roots (*dhātvartha*) are called '*apoddhāra padārtha*'.

The word 'a' used before the verb 'gacchataḥ' is a preposition (*upasarga*) on the meaning of which there is controversy. It is accepted as expressive by some and as suggestive by others, which has been discussed in detail in Chapter V, and it needs no repetition. No matter what may be the meaning of prepositions – expressive or suggestive – it is *apoddhāra padārtha* and in the sentence under example it indicates the meaning (act of their coming = *āgamana*) expressed by the verb 'gacchataḥ'. The word 'ca' is a particle, and association (*samuccaya*) is taken as its general meaning. In the example given above, it indicates the association of *Deodattaḥ* and *Viṣṇudattaḥ*. The meaning of 'ca',

an association, is an 'apoddhāra padārtha'. Similarly, the meanings 'option' etc. of *nipātas* like *vā' iti*, *ca*, are also taken as those acquired by grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra padārtha*).

The word 'su' applied as the preceding word of the verb 'āgacchataḥ' is a post-position. According to *Pāṇini Sūtra*, 'su pūjāyām', *su* is designated as a post-position, if it is used with the verb in the sense of praise or worship. 'Su' in the sentence under example is used in the sense of good wish towards the act of arrival (*āgamana*). The meaning (happily) of the 'su' which is a post-position, is the meaning acquired by grammatical analysis.

Meaning of Root/stem (Prakṛti) and Suffixes (Pratyaya)

According to both the sententialist and the word-theorist, a unit formed with the addition of suffixes (*pratyaya*) with stem/root (*prakṛti*) is called a word (*pada*) and the meaning of the word, by analysis, is taken as the meaning of both the components jointly, i.e. of the *prakṛti* and the *pratyaya*. For example, the meaning of the nominal word 'Rāmaḥ' is explained as the meaning of the stem (*prakṛti* = *Rāma*) and of the suffix (*su* = *aḥ*). The meaning of the verb 'pacati' is interpreted by grammatical analysis as the meaning of the root (*pac*) and of the suffix (*tiṇ* = *tī*). A word in Sanskrit grammar is taken as a cultured unit (*Samśkārarūpa*), and, this cultivation is accomplished through the application of suffixes. For example, 'Rāma' is not a word in Sanskrit, and can accomplish the form of word only if added with the suffix (*sup*, i.e. 'aḥ', etc.) and that is the reason, nominal words are called *subantapadas* (words having case-termination suffixes). It may be asked: if meanings - universal/individual, number, gender, etc. - are conveyed only by the stem (*prakṛti* or *prātipadika*), what is the need for applying suffixes with them? Not only that, but the question regarding the utility of adding suffixes with them also arises if the suffixes are accepted as the expresser of the same meaning which is expressed by the *prātipadika*. In order to solve the problem mentioned above, it seems necessary to discuss the nature and function of suffixes acquired by grammatical analysis of a word.

Three theories on the Meaning of Suffixes

Regarding the nature of suffixes (*pratyayas*), Bhartṛhari has discussed three possible views⁶ familiar at his time:

1. According to the first view, suffixes are suggestive and indicate the same meaning that is expressed by the stem (*prakṛti*). This view accepts the stem as expressive (*vācaka*) and suffixes as suggestive (*dyotaka*).
2. According to the second view, suffixes are also expressive. They express the same meaning that is expressed by stems roots.
3. According to the third view, both stems and suffixes together as a unity are expressive of the meaning. For example the meaning of *Rāma* (*padārtha*) is expressed by the word *Rāmaḥ*, the unity of *Rāma* (*prakṛti*) and 'aḥ' (*sup* - suffix).

It is important in this regard to note that meaning, according to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is eternally related with the word and in the process of determination of it through its analysis and derivations into separated stems and suffixes, the power of the analyzed parts are taken into notice and on the basis of agreement (*anvaya*) and disagreement (*vyatireka*), its meaning is decided in a particular use. Showing the importance of the device of agreement-disagreement, the commentators clarify that the methods help not only in deciding the meaning of the word through analyzed parts, but also in checking meanings of other words so that the meaning of that word may not be confused for the meaning of other words. For example, the meaning of the word 'bhūti' is not decided by the device of agreement-disagreement of stems and suffixes because the use of the suffix (*sap*) is not observed in that use, while the meaning of the word 'bhavati', through agreement-disagreement of the meaning of its stem and suffix, is decided because of the suffix 'sap' which is observed in the use (*bhū + laṭ + sap + tip = bhavati*).

The meaning of the suffix 'nuṭ' is not known or decided separately in the use 'Rāmāṇām', because in many cases the meaning of the word is known even without the presence of 'nuṭ'. There is no separate meaning of 'nuṭ' in the word 'bhavatām', in which it functions only as co-ordinator and the meaning of it (*nuṭ*) is decided by the meaning conveyed by the word. Conclusively, it can be said that in the determination of the meaning of a word, the meanings of the stem and the suffix are taken as important elements, but it is not a fixed rule regarding 'nuṭ' and 'sap'. In other words, the meaning of a word through its stem and suffix are determined as per a rule but it may be

otherwise in regard with 'nuṭ' and 'sap'.⁷ In some cases, the stem and suffix of a word have their separate meanings acquired by the grammatical analysis of the meaning of the word, but, on the one hand, their separate meanings are not taken into consideration for meaning, and on the other, the meaning of the word is not known by other indicative forces like *lakṣaṇā*, etc. In such cases, the meaning is understood only by the word as a whole (*samudāya*).⁸ But, if the separate meanings of the stem and the root are taken into consideration, both of them are taken as related by expectancy for the completion of the meaning.⁹ In other words, if there is the presence of both the stem and the suffix, then the meaning of the word is taken as related with the meaning of both of them; but if the word is only a stem or a suffix, then the meaning is taken as related either to the former or to the latter. In case the stem and the suffix are not present together, the meaning is considered as the meaning of the whole (*samudāya*), because of the absence of the opportunity for consideration of the meaning through the meanings of stems and suffixes separately. For example, the word 'adhunā' is only a suffix. The stem has been dropped off, and thus, its meaning cannot be decided through the process of analyzing it into stem and suffix. The word 'adhunā'¹⁰ cannot be divided into parts any more and, therefore, it (*pratyaya*) alone, as a whole unit, is taken as a word expressive of the meaning. On the basis of the discussion, it can be said that:

1. Stem alone, in some cases, as in the case of 'dadhi', is expressive of the meaning.¹¹
2. In some cases, suffix alone expresses the word-meaning as in the case of 'adhunā', which is a suffix devoid of a stem. In the case of 'vyatise' the root is dropped and the suffix alone conveys the meaning.¹²
3. In the presence of both the stem and the suffix, the meaning is conveyed by both of them. They are associated together by expectancy as an aggregate, and, then, the aggregate conveys the unit meaning. It shows that *Vaiyākaraṇas* do not feel any need for accepting other forces, like secondary force (*lakṣaṇā*), etc., in order to explain the meaning of a word through analysis. According to them, secondary force, is applied only in the sense of purport (*prayojana*), or in the sense for which convention prevails over precept. In case, the meaning is not decided by the

device of agreement and disagreement of stem and suffixes, as in the cases of *kup*, *sup*, *yup*, etc., the unit as a whole (*sanghāta*) is taken as expressive of meaning. The meaning of words like *kup*, etc., is not conveyed by the letters *ka*, *yu*, etc., and these words, as a whole, are taken as expressive of their meanings.¹³

Vaiyākaraṇas have their own theory regarding the derivation of words through analysis. A word, according to them, is a polyseme and certain meanings of it is decided on the basis of some factors (*nimitta*). In the case of a polyseme, the particular meaning in a particular use of the word is decided on the basis of factors like context, etc., as discussed in Chapter IV.

Bhartṛhari asserts that there are some factors (*nimitta*) for deriving the word in each of its meanings.¹⁴ The word '*Vaira*', *Vaśiṣṭha*, *girīśa*, *ekāgārika*, etc. are derived differently for different meanings: (1) The word '*vair*' formed by the stem *vīra* + suffix 'añ' of *taddhita* in the sense of accusative (*karma*). The 'i' of '*vīra*' is changed for 'ai' = *vairum* that conveys heroic actions (*vīra karma vairam*). (2) The word *vair* formed by the stem *vīra* + suffix 'añ' in the sense of *bhāva* (becoming) means 'the attitude of a hero' (*vīreṣubhāvam*). Out of these meanings, which one is conducive to a use of the word '*vair*' is decided by factors like context, etc. Similarly, the word '*vaśiṣṭha*' as per the interpretation, '*vaśiṣṭhena dr̥ṣṭam proktam vā*' is taken for what is visualized and spoken by sage *vaśiṣṭha*; and as per the interpretation '*vaśiṣṭhaśabdoasmin vartat*' it stands for the words spoken by *vaśiṣṭha*. The word '*girīśa*', as per the interpretation '*girau śete*', stands for one who sleeps in the mountain, but according to the interpretation '*girau ḍaśchandasi*',¹⁵ it means 'splitting the mountain'. These few examples show that the same word can convey different meanings, on the basis of different interpretations.

Giving his opinion on the significance of grammatical analysis in interpreting the same words for different meanings, Bhartṛhari presents the analogy¹⁶ of different paths for arriving at the same goal. One is free to follow any of the paths to reach that goal. The goal does not change with the change of path. From the point of view of the goal, no path is opposite to another. They all are equally important and useful. Similarly, the words '*go*' (cow), etc., are explained for ignorants differently, as this or that shape, size and colour, which are instrumental in the understanding of the meaning. For Bhartṛhari, the cognition of

sentential-meaning is basic and others word word-meaning, stem, suffixes and their meanings, etc; acquired by grammatical analysis, are only instrumental in explaining or for making the indivisible sentential-meaning understandable.

Explaining the issue of different meanings by a word, Bhartṛhari gives two operating conditions. (1) The partial understanding of the object to be denoted. For example, an object like '*kiṃśukaḥ*' is described differently by persons who see it in different conditions and forms as a tree of cotton and as *kiṃśukaḥ* (Is it a parrot?).¹⁷ (2) The word '*gauḥ*' (cow) is interpreted differently through different derivations. For example,¹⁸ some take it to be derived from *girate* (to swallow), others from *garj* = *garjati* (to roar), some others from *gam* (go, move) and still some others from *gavati* (void by stool); some derive it from *gad* (to speak articulately) and from *gauḥ* (cow), etc. In each of the derivations, the word '*gauḥ*' is used for different meanings. Now, it is clear that in such a situation, the meaning, for which the word is used in a particular case, is decided on the basis of some factors (*avadhī*).

Describing another matter of fact, Bhartṛhari says¹⁹ that some take the word '*gauḥ*' as an indeclinable unit (not formed by root and suffix, which, as a unit, is beginninglessly used as fixed), while according to others it is derived from *gam* + suffix '*nāṣ*'—the '*n*' of which is nominated as '*am*' and is dropped to form the word '*gauḥ*'. Now the question is: if words in ordinary communication are not used in their derivative forms and are used as whole without the sense of their derivative forms, what is the need for explaining the meaning of the words through their different derivations? Solving the problem, Bhartṛhari elucidates²⁰ that it is as an easy means for making the indivisible meaning understandable through the meanings of root/stem, suffixes, etc. acquired by grammatical analysis.

In order to make the word and its meaning easily understandable, the general and particular rules of grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) are taught. Bhartṛhari is of the view that the word used in a particular or in a defined sense is different from it if used in its general sense and vice versa. The word conveying a particular cannot be identical to the word conveying a general meaning, rather, it is a different word altogether. He opines that the form (of the word) conveying a fixed meaning by

derivation may be the same, but the two cannot be misunderstood as identical, because a word having a conventionally fixed form is separate from a word formed by stem/root and suffixes (*pratyaya*). The differences between them are cognized with the difference in their conveyance of the meaning. For example,²¹ the roots 'yaj' and 'ij' are different from each other and are taught differently for different meanings. The verb 'yajati' is formed by adding suffix *tip* (ti) to 'yaj'. According to some, 'ij' is not a separate root, because it is formed by the *yaj*, the 'ya' of the *yaj* if added with suffix 't' is changed (*samprasāraṇa*) for 'e' and, thus, the word 'ij' is formed. If 'e' is not changed, the root 'yaj' remains in its original state. But, as Bhartṛhari elucidates, both of them, 'yaj' and 'ij', are separate roots fixed for different meanings. Their difference is known by their separate uses. Words are treated differently due to identity and difference. For example, if there is a single unit even then different stems and suffixes of it may be derived through grammatical analysis. The roots 'yaj' and 'ij' have the same meaning, the expressor of which is taken by some as to be formed by 'yaj' and by some others by 'ij'. Similarly, the words 'Vidūra' and *Bālavāya* like *jītvā*²² are not different and, thus, it causes no difference (*virodha*) even when they are taken as different words.

Grammatical analysis is based on imagination of human mind and that is why there are differences regarding the analysis or *Rāmaḥ* as *Rāma* (*prakṛti*) + *su* (suffix). The verb 'bhavati' is analyzed as *bhū* + suffix (ti) but *Mahābhāṣyakāra* Patañjali himself has analyzed it as *bhū+a+ti*. However, the differences in derivation by the method of analysis do not matter so far as their significance in making the whole understandable through parts is concerned.

Conceptual and Grammatical Analysis

While discussing grammatical analysis in the previous pages, we have seen that it is a method of separating or dividing a whole (*anvayī*) into parts (*anvaya*), an indivisible into divisions, identity or unity into diversities, so as to make the former understandable through the latter (simple parts). The process of grammatical analysis cannot be identified with analysis, because analysis, we think, is a more comprehensive act.

What is analysis? It is very difficult to define analysis in categorical words or sentences as it is taken differently by different thinkers. Scientists take analysis as a process of breaking down of physical objects into their components. They think that this way they can acquire the all-round cognition of the structure of a thing. Religion, theology, metaphysics and others, taking philosophy as the objective mode of reflection, adopt it as a process for taking out the consistent implications of their views of reality. Philosophers generally take it as a process for clarification of a concept par excellence. It is a method of investigation through analysis (division), explanation and evaluation of different views in a way to determine the concept as it is revealed in ordinary communication. It adopts grammatical analysis as a primary step to the whole process or analysis, on the basis of which the expressions are divided into simple units (parts) and the meanings of the parts are determined as elements of the whole. It includes the determination of discrepancies between the speculative and the ordinary uses of an expression on the one hand, and between the meaning of a word in a particular expression and the meaning of a word as an independent unit on the other hand. As a whole, it can be said that analysis, for a philosopher of language, is a critique of language or thought for which language-tokens serve only as tools. It is noteworthy here that language, with regard to Bhartṛhari, should not be confused as identical with verbal-noise, utterances or marks. If it will be taken as verbal-utterances or noises, then, it will be inevitable to accept that the laws of language are different from the laws of thought. Not only that, but the clarification of thoughts by analysis of language may not be realized concretely. The analysis of verbal-noises isolated from thoughts, cannot be accepted as a philosophical activity. Though verbal utterances are also taken as language (in the sense of language as a tool for manifesting the language as thought), yet language, for Bhartṛhari, is a thought object. Language and thought are intertwined and hence, non-different. Thoughts are revealed by language and language reveals thoughts non-differently in the mind. Before revealing the meaning (which is thought-object) the language, manifested by verbal utterances, reveals itself (which is also a thought-object).²³ Thus, on the basis of the principle that 'language (*sphoṭa*) and thought are intertwined,'²⁴ Bhartṛhari thinks that the clarification of meaning by the analysis of language may well be explained only if language and meaning as thought objects are taken as non-different. It is true to say that the laws

of verbal utterances and the laws of thought are different, but if language as an intelligible being or *sphoṭa* is taken into consideration, there is no room for such a difference between language and thought. *Sphoṭa* as language is awareness (*idea*), and the meaning it reveals non-differently in the mind is also awareness (*idea = pratibhā*). As meaning, for Bhartṛhari, is non-different from the language, the laws of language and that of thought are also non-different. If we accept language as the only reality, which reveals meaning non-differently in the mind, and if the meaning like language is also taken as an idea or thought-object, then it seems cognitively and logically justified to accept the non-difference of laws of language and that of thought. Otherwise, analysis will not fulfil its purpose of accomplishing clarity regarding the concept as figured in the mind by language. But this does not mean that analysis, in philosophy, is an end in itself. It is always an inquiry subordinated to the ascertainment of cognition revealed in the mind by language in communication. It is a means for understanding a concept through the determination of its essential constituents.

Analysis, for Bhartṛhari, is a philosophical activity that helps in understanding a whole, indivisible concept through the rendering of it as a constitute of parts. Such rendering cannot be confused with one, similar to early Wittgenstein's view, according to which the ordinary language is confusive and, hence, in order to get clarity it needs to be rendered in a ideal-language. Philosophical problems are not similar to the problems of logic and natural sciences, in which assertions need to be translated in an artificial language for removing confusions and for achieving clarity. Philosophy of language, in its true spirit, does not consider the language of communication as ambiguous, rather, it, like later Wittgenstein, considers the language of our use a most appropriate so far as the clarification of thought is concerned. Bhartṛhari as a language philosopher aims at explaining cognition as revealed in ordinary communication, so as to get the popular view (*lokasiddhārtha*), on which communication is based. No view is sound if it is not based on communication or if it overlooks the value of ordinary use as the ground of clarity of concepts. Clarity, here, means the cognition of the popular meaning (*loka-siddhārtha*) as accomplished in communication. Language, according to Bhartṛhari, if driven away from the usually accepted use of it, causes confusion, and, ultimately, in order to get rid of them one has to base oneself on the popular use.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The function of philosophy of language, according to Bhartṛhari, is not to establish a system. To favour a system by arguments and reasoning or to reject it is not the proper field of philosophy (*nedam ekasya sahāyabhūtam*).²⁵ The function of philosophy is not confined to logical justification or a logically consistent explanation. It deals with the clear exposition of the concepts or cognition, as revealed in usual communication. It relies upon the cognitive bases rather than the logical bases. It is called *Vyākaraṇa*, because it explains the cognition revealed in communication, through the use of analytic devices. It is analysis through which indivisible cognition is divided, and the discriminative knowledge of the concept free from religious, allegiances, confusions, etc., is accomplished through the process. All concepts are indivisible. Even the concept of divisibility is indivisible in its character, and the indivisible without its analysis cannot be interpreted. As analysis is based on mental division of a concept, grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*) is essentially implied in it. If analysis is taken as an explanation of a concept as communicated, grammatical analysis is an essential step to it, because, if it is otherwise, the division of an indivisible concept is impossible and, hence, no explanation of an indivisible may take place.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānām bālānāmaplāpanāḥ. Asatye vartamani sthitvā tataḥ satyam samīhate. VP, 2/238.*
2. *Apoddhāra padārthā ye ye cārthāḥ sthitalakṣaṇā. Vākyapadiya, 1/24.*
3. *Vṛṣabha commentary on VP, 1/24.*
4. *Ibid., 1/24.*
5. *Ibid., 1/24.*
6. *Vācīkā dyotikā vā syurdvītvādīnām vibhaktyah. Syādvā sankhyāvato 'rthasya samudāyo' bhidhāyakaḥ. VP, 2/164.*
7. *Yatra cāvvyabhicāreṇa tayoḥ śākyam prakalpanam. Niyamastatra na tvevam niyamo nuṣābādiṣu. Ibid., 2/167.*
8. *Na kevalā prakṛtiḥ prayoktavyā na ca kevalaḥ pratyayaḥ. Mahābhāṣya on Aṣṭādhyāyī 3/1/94.*
9. *Ibid., 2/168.*

10. *Adhunādīnām cāpakṣīṇarūpānām ṇa rūpānām va kaścīdarthaḥ prakalpitaḥ*, Puṇyarāja, VP, 2/167.
11. Puṇyarāja on VP, 2/167.
12. *Evam kevalasya pratyayasya prayogaḥ, vyatise iti*. Ambākartrī on VP, 2/168.
13. *Na kūpasūpayūp ānāmanvayo 'rthasya dṛśyate Ato 'rthāntaravācitvam sanghātasyaiva gamyate*. Ibid., 2/169.
14. Ibid., 2/170 and Puṇyarāja's commentary on it.
15. *Vārttika on Aṣṭādhyāyī 3/2/15*.
16. VP, 2/172.
17. VP, 2/173.
18. VP, 2/174.
19. Puṇyarāja's commentary on VP, 2/174.
20. VP, 2/176 and Puṇyarāja's commentary on it.
21. VP, 2/178 and Puṇyarāja's commentary on it.
22. In ancient India, merchants use to address Vārāṇasī by the name 'Jitvarī' and in this sense Vārāṇasī is not different from 'jitvarī' but their purpose of addressing Vārāṇasī as 'jitvarī' was confined to a specific cultural sense, and, hence, these words may be taken as different also. Puṇyarāja's commentary on VP, 2/123.
23. *Na So'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ Śabdānugamādṛte. Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāṣate*. VP, 1/123.
24. *Artharūpam tathā śabde svarūpaṃca prakāśate*. VP, 1/123.
25. *Mahābhāṣya tīkā 1/11/12*.

CHAPTER-VIII

RELATION BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND MEANING

No cognition, communication and hence, philosophization is possible without acknowledging the relation between language and its meaning. As the purpose of communication is to communicate meaning, we primarily take notice only of the meaning, while the cognition of the real form of the language (*sphoṭa*) and its relation with the meaning are left out as secondary.

‘Knowledge is knowledge intertwined with language’,¹ is what Bhartṛhari elucidate with great conviction. Although relation is not known independently of the knowledge of an object, the solution of the problem of relation involves other philosophical issues in such a way that makes the whole outlook of a philosopher different. The relation between language and its meaning is the central problem of the philosophy of language.

The purpose, in the present discussion, is confined to a critical survey of the cognitive and logical analysis of the problem of relation made by Bhartṛhari under the chapter ‘*Sambandha Samuddeśaḥ*’, the Chapter III of the third part of ‘*Vākyapadīya*’.

By the term ‘cognitive analysis’, we mean an investigation, through analysis, into the meaning on the basis of the cognition revealed by language in the mind. By the term ‘logical analysis’ we mean the analysis of the meanings of the statements concerning relation, and, as such, it includes Bhartṛhari’s paradox of the *Vaiśeṣika*’s acceptance of inherence (*samavāya*) as relation.

Bhartṛhari’s treatment in the chapter ‘*Sambandha Samuddeśaḥ*’ comprises the analyses of the views of other Indian philosophical systems, namely Buddhism, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Mīmāṃsā*, *Sāṃkhya* and *Vedānta*, popular at his time. In order to clarify the cognitive and communicative bases of the problem of relation, which is of much philosophical relevance, he has analyzed those views and has given his own verdict based on cognition as it is revealed by language.

The logical analysis of a concept necessarily requires the mention of the cognitive-situation in which it is cognized. For Bhartṛhari, knowledge is knowledge of an object (*jñeya*), though knowledge itself is not an object.² As language is expresser and it expresses the objects non-differently, the objects of knowledge by language are both the *sphoṭa* and its meaning (*pratibhā*) revealed non-differently by it. Language cannot reveal meaning, if meaning is not related with it or if it is not fit to reveal it by nature. Thus, the cognition of meaning, inevitable by language, implies the relation between the two as a pre-requisite of cognition, but relation is not the object of cognition expressed by language, because knowledge is not relational but foundational. It is the awareness of the objects/beings revealed by language in the mind and is the awareness itself.

Relation is Neither an External nor an Internal Object

In a philosophy that accepts language as the only reality and which assumes meaning as that the language expresses (*vācya*), relation is neither a meaning nor a word and over and above them, the question of accepting it as a thing – external or internal – does not arise. Linguistic philosophers of the west, while analyzing the epistemological basis of cognition, have confronted the problem of relation. In a linguistic philosophy based on the empiricism of the western type, it is equally a trifling to accept relation as external or internal, because in both the cases, it must be a fact to be experienced or perceived. If it is a fact, it must be a discrete fact and, hence, different from the prepositional fact and experienced fact (meaning-element) and then, it will not function as relation; rather, it ceases to be a relation. This problem, in some way or the other, haunts the sense-data philosophers and positivists as well.

Bertrand Russell has elucidated 'we do not sense relations, but we are acquainted with them'. 'Mind directly knows relations', is what Russell, unlike an empiricist, means by acquaintance with relation.

In the Russell's theory of external relations, acquaintance with relation as direct perception hardly adds anything new to the explanation of the nature of relation (which, for him, is an object and, hence, a relata) because in that case the problem of mutual dependency of the

two independents, mind and object, remains unsolved. As mind arises out of object, it is mind, which may depend upon the object, and, hence, the problem of relation of one-sided-dependence arises in Russell's view of acquaintance with relation. Relation cannot be an object, because then it will cease to be relation. The only reason for this, I think, is Russell's infatuation with meaning as an external object. If he would have concentrated on meaning as an idea or thought-object conveyed by words, he would have more consistently philosophized the problem of relation as a philosopher of language, who cannot ignore the fact that the meaning, as an expressed of an expresser, is naturally related with language. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, is more like a language philosopher in assuming the meaning element as an idea pictured by the word. Though his endeavour to understand the word as the totality of discrete facts finds no proper ground to solve the problem of relation, which for him, is neither an experience of fact (picture) nor the prepositional fact nor a fact-itself. I shall not go into a detailed analysis of their outlook, and would like to concentrate on Bhartṛhari's discussions on relation. For Bhartṛhari, meaning is what the language expresses and what it expresses is an idea or thought-object.³ Cognitively, external things, apart from the thought-object, do not serve for the cognition by language.⁴ To understand language does not mean simply a hearing of utterances but a clear idea revealed by it with all its specialities, i.e. the *sphoṭa* which, when manifested by utterances, reveals its own nature (*svājāti*) and the *pratibhā* (meaning), which it reveals non-differently. As we are accustomed to the use of language, we do not take notice of the fact that before knowing the meaning, we know the *sphoṭa*.

Bhartṛhari is of the view that *sphoṭa* is manifested (*vyāṅgya*) by utterances, and meaning (*vācya*) is revealed by the *sphoṭa* itself. No knowledge is possible without the revelation of *sphoṭa* and the language-tokens or grabs, gestures, etc. serve only as a means to the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, which when manifested reveals its own nature first from which meaning is revealed non-differently.

'Language (*sphoṭa* = *śabda*) reveals itself and its meaning as well', is the ground on the basis of which Bhartṛhari has elucidated language as having the two powers of expressing and being expressed, or conveying and being the conveyed (*grāhaka-grāhya*).⁵ Bhartṛhari uses the term '*sphoṭa*' for the former and the term *pratibhā* for the latter.

Clarifying the differences between cognition by language and by perception, Bhartṛhari writes 'the senses need not be cognized before they reveal the object; they do so by their mere existence when they come into contact with the objects. Language, on the other hand, does not reveal objects by its mere-existence. It has to be cognized before it reveals objects'. By the word 'object' we mean 'the meaning' revealed non-differently in the mind by language. This is the reason,. Bhartṛhari characterizes language as *grāhaka-grāhya*. As knowledge is expressive by nature and expresses objects, similarly, if language does not express itself first, how can its meaning be revealed later by it?⁶

Relation, Bhartṛhari says, is there between the expresser (*grāhaka*) and the expressed (*grāhya*). Language (*grāhaka*) in his philosophy is eternal (given). We do not create language or words; we only make use of them. It is also taken for granted that the meaning (*grāhya*) that it expresses is also eternal. 'Meaning is always the expressed of an expresser (*vācaka*), on the basis of which it is concluded that relation between the eternal (language and its meaning) is also eternal (*siddha*).⁷ The eternal relation (*siddha-sambandha*), according to Bhartṛhari is the natural fitness (*yogyatā*) of the language to express meaning and is made known to us through convention (*samaya*). Convention is understood as the observation of the use of language by elders (*vṛddha vyavahārāt*).⁸ The question: how does language, a sentence or a word, come into use? cannot be answered without assuming its relation with its meaning. Relation is not produced by human convention. It is not just to say that the convention makers fixed a relation between the language and meaning first, and then they used the former for its meaning. That is the reason, Helārāja,⁹ conceives it as '*apauruṣeya*', which is known to us by the observation of the uses by elders. If, we, for a certain case, have no observation of the uses of language, we know only the *sphoṭa* revealed in the mind but not its meaning. Contrary to it, if we are acquainted with the use, we know the *sphoṭa* and its meaning as well. This does not mean that language (*śabda*) is void of meaning (*artha*), or that it is only the use that provides meaning to it. For Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* is in-born in a child born in a linguistic society and is revealed when manifested by the utterances or written signs used by the society in which he is born. The observation of the mode and reference of uttering signs by elders is instrumental in the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, by which the specific meaning (i.e. popular

or unpopular meaning) is cognized. Language, for Bhartṛhari, is the expresser of a number of meanings (*sarvārtha'vācakāḥ*) and the observation of its use by elders helps to know the specific meaning for which the word is fixed by convention.

Discussion on the Controversy Over Language as Power and Powers in Language

Potency (*śakti*) is the capacity or the cause that produces effects. The capability to manifest or to express is termed *śakti* (potency). The presence of *śakti* is known by the effects it produces.

What do we mean by the term '*śakti*' of a *śabda*? In the Indian tradition, there is controversy regarding the conveyance of meaning by language, and theorists root that conception in the conception of the nature of *śabda*. Indian Rhetoric, *Naiyāyikas* and *Mīmāṃsakas* accept a word (*pada*) as a meaningful unit made of association of letters and accordingly define a sentence as an outcome of association of those words, while *Vaiyākaraṇas* propound a theory in which a sentence is the original unit of awareness in nature and words derived by artificial division (*apoddhāra*) of the former is also taken as the meaningful unit for all grammatical purposes. They accept words as well as sentences as units of potency (*śakti*). This controversy gives rise to the problem as to whether *śakti* lies originally with a word or with a sentence.

There are remotely three theories in this regard—'expression precedes construction' (*abhihitānvayavāda*), 'construction precedes expression' (*anvitābhīdhānavāda*) and the theory of indivisibility of the *Vaiyākaraṇas* (*akhaṇḍavākyavākyārthavāda*). To be very precise, *śakti*, according to *abhihitānvayavāda*, is in words that express word-meaning. Word-meaning for Kumārila *Mīmāṃsakas* is universal, and sentential-meaning, which is individual, for them, is an outcome of the association of those word-meanings; for *Prābhākaras*, words by their power convey universal and individual both; while, for *Naiyāyikas*, individuals qualified by universals are expressed by the *śakti* of words. Sentential-meaning, in view of *Kumārilas* and *Naiyāyikas* is known by association (*saṃsargamaryādā*) and, hence, by imagination (*lakṣyārtha*). For *Prābhākaras*, the word has *śakti* not only for denoting

word-meanings, but they, by the same *śakti*, express sentential-meaning also and thus sentential-meaning is an expressed one (*vācyārtha*).

For *Vaiyākaraṇas*, the words/sentences are forces of awareness by nature. They are expressive powers (*śakti*); they express complete meanings. Not only that, but if a complete meaning is revealed even by hearing a word or a letter, they also serve as an indivisible sentence and not as a discrete word or a letter (*vākyam tadapi manyante yatpadam carita kriyam*) (VP, 2/326).

It is very difficult, rather impossible, to interpret cognition by a word or by a sentence, without determining the nature of *śakti* of a word or sentence. As the indivisible sentence, in the tradition of *Vyākaraṇa*, reveals indivisible sentential-meaning, or *pratibhā*, there is no doubt about meaning by a sentence, and, hence, there is no question of polysemeness of sentence as a unit of awareness in nature. The question of polysemeness arises due to our different allegiances involved in the interpretation of that very *pratibhā* and the analysis of the meaning as revealed and as alleged helps in knowing them determinately.

The question of polysemeness of meaning is of inevitable importance in the context of understanding sentential-meaning, through the analysis of word-meanings. A word expresses a universal, and several *individuals* sharing some or the other form relating to that universal may often be imposed on that universal, which may cause the problem of polysemeness.

To explain the different meanings by the same word, *Mīmāṃsaḥas* and *Vedāntins* accept only *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*, while Indian rhetoric like *Mammāṭa*, *Visvanātha*, accept three different powers including *Vyañjanā śakti* in the word, as responsible for respective meanings.

Bhartṛhari, in his *Vākyapadīya*, has analyzed that words, by their *śakti*, express universal (primary meaning) and the individuals are known by imposition of the primary meaning on other meanings known as secondary meanings (*gauṇārtha*). Apart from the primary and secondary meanings, there are other meanings that are known by the word. Those meanings are known by the nearness or proximity with the primary meaning of the word (*nāntarīyakārtha*). Thus, Bhartṛhari

has felt no need for accepting three different *śaktis* in the word like *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā* to explain different meanings known by a word. He does not accept any need for accepting even *lakṣaṇā* as an independent potency of the word.

The *śakti* of a word is termed as *vṛtti* because it is that which gives rise to verbal cognition. *Vṛtti* is defined as relation (*sambandha*), as it is due to it that the cognition of meaning by a word is accomplished. For old *Naiyāyikas*, the natural *śakti* of a word to denote a primary meaning is the will of God (*idam padam amum artham bodhayatu iti iśvarasaṅketaḥ - Siddhānta Mukṭāvalī*) and does not lie in *adhunika saṅketa*, such as proper names (*adhunike tu saṅketīte na śakti - bhāṣāpariccheda*). For Neo-*Naiyāyikas*, it is the mere will (*icchamātram śaktiḥ iti-Siddhānta Mukṭāvalī*). For them, even proper names have *śakti* (*adhunike saṅketīte 'pi sā śaktiḥ iti navyāḥ' - Siddhānta Mukṭāvalī*). In short, according to *Mīmāṃsakas*, the *śakti* is eternal in the sense of beginninglessness (*anādī*). *Naiyāyikas*, as Jagadīsa, the author of *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, writes, the *abidhā* or *śakti*, is established by God and, hence, permanent, and when it is established by the will of moderners, it is *paribhāṣā* or *adhunika* and, hence, not eternal but conventional.

According to *Vaiyākaraṇas* in general and Bharṭṛhari in particular, *śakti* is the *yogyatā* (natural fitness) of the word. It is notable in the context that Bharṭṛhari defines *śakti* or relation as that which is utterly dependent on substance, quality, etc. It can be neither a *vācaka* nor a *vācya*. If it is a *vācaka*, it will be an expression, and if it is a *vācya*, it will be an expressed of an expression, and in both the cases there will not be an utterly dependent relation but a *relata*. How can a relation be a *relata*? If relation is taken as a *relata* it will be relation no more.

A *śakti* is never seen independently of a *śaktimāna*. In case of word or sentence, the *śakti*, as the *yogyatā* of the word, is never existent independently of the word and it is with that *yogyatā* that a *vācaka* non-differently reveals its *vācya*. A *vācya* is eternally related with its *vācaka* due to the *yogyatā* of the latter and can never be found independently of it. The word *yogyatā* is used for the *śakti* of the word only by its *yogyatā*, and it is the *yogyatā* of the word *sambandha* (relation) that *yogyatā* is called relation and there is no other definition of it (*sambandha śabde sambandho yogyatām prati yogyatā*, 'Sambandha Samuddesāḥ', 31).

Criticizing the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view of *saṃyoga* and *samavāya* as the *śakti* of the word, Bhartṛhari says that *saṃyoga* is a transient relation and is found only in cases of qualities, but it is not a relation where there is no application of it, like in cases where *samavāya* is applied. *Samavāya* is a *relata* and is found only in the cases of the whole and the parts of substance. It cannot be a relation. *Samavāya*, even if it is defined as *avācya*, cannot be a relation but a *relata* to be signified by the word 'avācya'. Bhartṛhari remarks that *saṃyoga*, or even *samavāya*, is called relation only secondarily, and that too by the *yogyatā* of these words (*śaktināmapi sā śaktirguṇānāmapyasau guṇaḥ, sambandha samuddeśaḥ*, *karika-4*).

Taking *yogyatā* as the eternal *śakti*, or relation of a word with its meaning, Bhartṛhari says that the *yogyatā* of a word is there with all meanings (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*), and it is limited to a fixed meaning by the observation of the use of the word by elders. The observation of the use by elders (*āptavyavahāra, samaya* or *saṅketa*) delimits the *yogyatā* of a word to a fixed meaning, on account of which a fixed meaning is known by a fixed word. This *yogyatā śakti* is explained by theorists as *vācaka-vācya* and *kāraṇa-kārya* (cause-effect) *sambandha*, as per the need to explain the relation in a particular way.

To sum up the discussion, we can say that Vedic statements and commandments cannot be interpreted as having secondary and tertiary forces, as there will be the cases of accepting secondary and tertiary meanings of them, in which case there is a risk of violation of Vedic commandments. It is, perhaps, the reason that *Vaiyākaraṇas* accept the word/sentence as an expressive force by which all sorts of meanings are expressed and it is the primary meaning of the word that serves as the substratum of secondary and tertiary meanings. They do not feel any need of accepting forces like *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā*, as they think that the meaning of commandments cannot be taken figuratively. It is not genuine to accept meanings separated from the word, because such meaning will be meaning by inference, as we find being held by *Naiyāyikas*. There, the problem of the authority of the commandments arises. From the point of view of authority of Vedic commandments, the *Mīmāṃsaka* view of sentential-meaning as *lakṣyārtha* is also inconsistent, as it is meaning by association, which is over and above the meaning of the words. However, Indian rhetoric have shown interest in bringing out the magical meanings, where the meaning leaves the

word aside. Those meanings may be of some interest for those who like magical meanings, but may not be justified from the point of view of interpreting Vedic commandments.

Convention (Saṅketa/Samaya/Vṛddha vyavahāra that is Observation of the use by elders)

Difference between Naiyāyikaś and Vaiyākaraṇaś views on the Concept of Saṅketa (Convention) and Vṛddhavyavahāra (Use of the Words by Elders)

Convention, for Vaiyākaraṇaś, has a two-fold significance in the cognition of meaning by a word:

1. It specifies 'yogyatā-sambandha' only for specified meanings of a word.
2. The 'yogyatā-sambandha' of language with all its meanings is given, and the observation of the uses by elders of the community or communities enables the agent to know only those meanings based on communication.

Any word can convey any meaning. All or any meaning of a word does not perform communication, but a specified meaning does, and hence, the fitness of the word needs to be restrained to a particular meaning, popularly fixed in communication. It is convention that functions as the *niyāmaka* (restrainer) of the 'yogyatā-sambandha' of language. It restrains fitness, on account of which a fixed unit (expresser) is taken to express a fixed meaning (expressed).

Bhartṛhari has used *samaya* and *vṛddha-vyavahāra* for the same meaning. *Naiyāyikaś* accept *saṅket* and *vṛddha-vyavahāra* as different. They do not accept a relation like *yogyatā* between the word and the meaning. *Saṅketa*, for them, is given by God's will and *vṛddha-vyavahāra* is the means through which it is understood by us. *Saṅketa* is inferred first when the word is used, and then by the inferred force, the meaning of the word is known.¹¹

Unlike *Naiyāyikaś*, *saṅketa* and *vṛddha-vyavahāra* are not different for *Vaiyākaraṇaś*. They are two terms for the same power. According to the Vṛṣabha commentary, *samaya* or *saṅketa* is the

observation of the use of the language by elders (*vṛddha-vyavahāra darsāna*). Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa has also accepted *saṅketa* and *vṛddha-vyavahāra* as synonymous (*samayo vṛddha-vyavahāra darsanam*).

Āptopadeśaḥ (*saṅketa*) and *vṛddha-vyavahāra*, are also different for *Naiyāyikas*, but not so far *Vaiyākaraṇas*. *Naiyāyikas*' notion of the relation fixed by God's will (*iśvarkṛta saṅketa*) is also a type of *vṛddha-vyavahāra* for *Vaiyākaraṇas*.¹³ All forms of *saṅketa* – *Iśvarakṛta*, *yādṛcchā*, *vṛddha-vyavahāra*, etc., are taken by *Vaiyākaraṇas* as limiting factors (*prakāśaka*) and restrainers (*niyāmaka*) of the eternally given (*apauruṣeya*) natural fitness between language and its meaning.

It is with utterances that the speaker conveys both the *sphoṭa* and the meaning. At the time of uttering, there is a non-difference between language and its meaning. Only when we consider a word as expresser of what is expressed, the problem of relation as identity or as difference is confronted obviously, as we find in expressions, such as 'soyam' (it is that) and 'asyedam' (it belongs to this).¹⁴ The former expression is based on identity, while the latter on difference. As the language is both the expresser and the expressed, there is non-difference between the two. Identity, in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, can better be understood as being of an actual form of potency non-different from its potential form, which, by virtue of posing a potential different from its actual, is interpreted as a cause-and-effect relation.¹⁵ The term 'cause-and-effect relation' indicates that the meaning is something different from language. In identity, difference is subordinated, while in difference identity is subordinated. Both of these relations are relatively understood in the uses, though *Vaiyākaraṇas* seem to take identity as more original.

Are the words 'identity' and 'difference' not independent expressers of their meanings? If the answer is positive, they cannot be accepted as relation, because relation is not the expressed (meaning) of the expresser (*vācaka*). If the answer is negative, the question arises as to why? In order to solve this question, we have to observe Bhartṛhari's definition of relation.

Bhartṛhari defines relation¹⁶ as eternally dependent (*nitya-paratantra*). It is not an expressed of an expresser. The epistemological

justification of relation as eternally dependent is that it is seen always with a relata (*sambandhī*), but not known as a relata. As relation is not a word but the fitness of a word to express meaning, it does not convey an independent meaning and thus, Bhartṛhari says, its form cannot be indicated. How can an eternally dependent relation be indicated apart from the relata? On account of relation something is called relata and there is no relation without relata.¹⁷ A relata may be a substance, quality, action, universal, particular, negation, etc., which are independent meanings (*padārthas*), while relation is not a meaning (*padārtha*). Relation is not a property because a property is connoted in the relata. It is not an attribute that modifies a relata. It is not a predicate, though it is involved in the predication by an adjective of a relata (substantive). It is with the given relation that the words 'identity', 'difference', 'causality', 'protected-protector', 'mother-son', 'wife-husband', etc. convey their meanings of relatedness of relata in general and the mode of relation in particular. Thus, these are also not relation but the expressers of their own meanings, while relation is neither a conveyor nor a conveyed.¹⁸

Viewing relata as inseparably associated (*ayuttasiddha*) and separably (*yuttasiddha*) associated, *Vaiśeṣikas* admit two sorts of relation-inherence ('*saṃavāya*') and conjunctions (*saṃyoga*) in which the former is eternal (*nitya*) and the latter is transient (*anīya*). Bhartṛhari's objection is that the words 'inherence and conjunction' in the *Vaiśeṣika* system convey their own meaning i.e. substance (*padārtha*) and quality (*guṇa*). *Vaiśeṣikas* themselves admit the former as a substance and the latter as a quality and, hence, relata. The relatedness of relata – inseparably or separably, is predication of relata, while relation is neither a relata nor their relatedness (*saṃavāya* and *saṃyoga*).¹⁹

Bhartṛhari's Paradox of Relation as Inherence (*Samavāya*)

Bhartṛhari's paradox of relation as inherence (*saṃavāya*) is chiefly based on his observation of two defects in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* explanation of meaning of words on the basis of '*saṃavāya*':

1. *Ativyāptidoṣa and its solution*

If one accepts '*saṃavāya*' as relation, the word will signify even those meanings of which it is not a signifier. In case of '*saṃavāya*' as the

relation between word and meaning, the word 'sky' (*ākāśa*) being inherent in *ākāśa* (space) will be taken as a signifier of '*ākāśa*' and the signified (*ākāśa*), being all pervasive, will inhere in all. In such a situation '*ākāśa*' will be signified not only by the word '*ākāśa*' but by other words – pot, thread, etc, also – as it inheres in all of them, but then communication will be impossible. If the word '*śabda*' (word) by inherence as relation is taken as signifier (*abhidhāyaka*) of '*śabdatva*' (universality of words) could it not signify quality (*guṇatva*) and existence (*sattā*) in which there is inherence of *śabda*? As there is inherence of '*śabdatva*' in '*śabda*', similarly there is inherence of it in *guṇatva* and *sattā* also and then the word *śabda* will be a signifier of not only *śabdatva* but of *guṇatva* and *sattā* as well. In order to solve the problem of *ativyāptidoṣa*, Bhartṛhari gives the analogy of *Vaiśeṣikas*' concept of soul. The soul being pervasive pervades all substances (*dravyas*), yet its relation as own-owned (*sva-svāmibhāva*) is not observed with all of them, but only with fixed bodies of which the unseen impression of the pervading soul (*adṛṣṭa*) is a cause (*prayojaka*). The soul being pervasive (*vibhū*) is related, in general, with all substances, but its *svasvāmibhāva-sambandha* is accepted only with those bodies of which the '*adṛṣṭa*' of the soul is a cause. *Adṛṣṭa* functions as a determining factor (*vyavasthāpaka*) of the relation of cause and caused between the particular soul and particular body.²⁰ Similarly, '*ākāśa*' inheres in all, but it is '*adṛṣṭa*', defined as the impression caused by the observation of constant use of words, on account of which a fixed word signifies a fixed meaning, i.e. the words pot, etc., signify their own meanings, even though '*ākāśa*' is inherent (in general) in them. Commenting on the reference under consideration, Helārāja remarks, 'if the restraining of relation by *adṛṣṭa* is taken into consideration, and if *adṛṣṭa* is defined as an impression (*saṃskāra*) caused by the observation of the constant use of the word, then the relation between the word and meaning will not be different from *yogyatā-sambandha*, and then observation of the use of the word will not be different from convention (*saṅket*).

2. *Avyāptidoṣa* and its two fold solution by Bhartṛhari

Bhartṛhari has given a two-fold solution to the problem of '*avyāptidoṣa*' in accepting inherence as relation between word and its meaning:

(i) *By Assuming a Self-dependent Association as Relation Between Inherence (Samavāya) and its Meaning*

If the meaning of the word 'samavāya' is nonsignifiable (*avācya*), cognition by the word 'samavāya' is not possible. The meaning inherence is revealed in the mind by the use of the word 'samavāya' and so, its signified (*artha*) cannot be denied. 'Samavāya', according to *Vaiśeṣikas* is indetermined and unconditioned. It cannot be expressed by an expresser (word) being the relation between the two. If *Vaiśeṣikas* take it as ontologically real, even then it cannot be expressed, because words do not touch ontic reals. If it is said that cognition is accomplished by the word 'samavāya', then it can be said that its meaning (inherence) signified by the signifier 'samavāya' is not an ontological entity but something fashioned on the basis of the signifier ('samavāya'). In signifying 'samavāyārtha', signification of the word 'samavāya', if a relation like 'svāśraya-saṃyoga' i.e., self-dependent association of 'samavāya' with its signification (*artha*) is accepted, then there will be no objection,²¹ but this is not conducive to communication as meaning is known even by the word 'samavāya'. Nonetheless, 'samavāya', by *Vaiśeṣikas*, is taken as a technical word for denoting a specific relation, but in ordinary communication, it is also applied for other meanings, such as substratum, society, community, etc.

(ii) *By Taking Inherence (Samavāya) as unnameable (avācya)*

Ontologically, *samavāya*, according to *Vaiśeṣikas*, is *avācya* (unnameable), because it is not a relata. We have already seen that *samavāya*, according to *Vaiśeṣikas*, is unconditioned (*nirupādhika*) and, hence, beyond the grasp of words; it is not a signified of a signifier and, hence, unspeakable by nature.²² It cannot be indicated as 'this or that', because of its being a non-relata. If *samavāya* by its nature is unnameable (*avācya*), it is useless to seek *avyāptidoṣa* in *samavāya*. The above solution for the *avyāptidoṣa* of *samavāya*, on the basis of assuming its ontological un-nameability, as Helārāja points out, has been objected by *Naiyāyikas* on the ground that 'samavāya' stands as signified of the signifier *avācya* (non-signified), though this signifiability of the word 'avācya' (non-signifiable) may be of a non-

denotable nature (*avācya-rūpa*). 'Samavāya is *avācya*' is a self-contradictory statement. It is contradictory to say that *samavāya* is the *avācya* of the word *avācya*, because then non-signifiability of *samavāya* by the word '*avācya*' should not be cognized. Reversely, the hearer cognizes meaning that the speaker intends to communicate by the word '*avācya*', and then '*samavāya*' as the signified (*vācya*) of the signifier '*avācya*' has to be accepted. If '*samavāya*' is taken as the signified (*vācya*) of the signifier '*avācya*' (non-signifiable) the contradiction is obvious.²³

As negation of a mere quality (*dharma*) independently of the substratum (*dharmī*) is not possible, similarly '*samavāya*', if taken as non-signifiable even then the signifiability (*vācya*tā) of '*samavāya*' as non-signifiable (*avācya*), is not negated and, thus, the contradiction remains unsolved.²⁴

Vaiśeṣikas' solution of '*samavāya*' as relation between word and meaning, as Helārāja comments, is causistry (*vākchalam*, as the term used by *Naiyāyikas*) and the aim of this discussion of the paradox of '*samavāya*' as relation between word and meaning is to show the defects of '*samavāya*' if taken as a relation between word and meaning. It is important to note here that Bhartṛhari has explored the theme of the paradox of relation²⁵ as '*samavāya*' by analysing instances derived from doubtful cognition, veridical cognition and statement of falsity:

(i) Doubtful Cognition (*Samśaya Jñāna*)

A doubtful cognition does not doubt itself, but its objects. It is not an object of doubt, because it cannot be the subject and the object, that is independent and dependent, at the same time. A doubtful cognition will lose its character, if doubted at the same time. Similarly, the word '*avācya*' (non-signifiable) excluding itself negates the signifiability of the word '*samavāya*'.²⁶

(ii) Veridical Cognition (*Nirṇaya Jñāna*)

Veridical cognition is not an object (*viśaya*) of another in a cognition. A signifier (*vācaka*) cannot be a signified (*vācya*) at the same time. Similarly, the word '*avācya*', used for signifying the non-signifiability of '*samavāya*', cannot negate its signifiability (*vācya*tā) at the same

time, and as there is no other signifier to negate that signifiability, the signifier 'avācya' (non-signifiability) does signify the signified intended to be signified by that. The cognition revealed by the word 'avācya' will not be at the same time 'avācya', but veridical.²⁷

(iii) Speaking A Lie (Mithyā Vākya)

The signifier (vākya) 'sarvam mithyā bravīmi' (all that I speak is lie) itself is not intended by the speaker to be signified. As a rule, a signifier at the same time cannot be a signified. If the signifier 'sarvam mithyā bravīmi' itself is taken as its signified, then it will not fulfil its purpose of signifying the expressions expressed by the speaker. If I express expressions A₁, A₂, A₃,... and then in order to signify them as false I make the expression 'all that I speak is lie', the latter expression does not signify to itself as lie (Zero = 0) but to the expressions told by me previously, i.e. A₁, A₂, A₃ multiplied by 0 = 0 (zero). If the expression 'all that I speak is lie' is taken to signify itself, it will not only be meaningless, but will not fulfil its purpose of nullifying the expressions made previously. Not only that, it, like the expressions A₁, A₂, A₃, will also be an expression A₄ signifying itself, but this is not intended to be signified by the expression. According to Bhartṛhari, even the expression 'I am a liar' signifies the falsity not of itself, but of its signified.²⁸ Similar is the case with expressions signifying the non-signifiability (avācyatā) of 'samavāya'. The word 'avācya' (non-signifiable) does not negate the signifiability (vācyatā) of itself rather, it signifies the non-signifiability of 'samavāya'. Conclusively, it asserts that 'samavāya' is non-signifiable by other signifiers (vācakas),²⁹ but the word non-signifiable (avācya) itself signifies it.

Bhartṛhari's Concept of Relation as Natural Fitness (Yogyatā-sambandha)

Bhartṛhari has understood the relation of language/word and meaning in terms of a natural relation between power (śakti) and the powerful (śaktimāna). The relation between the two is a given, and we provide only the logical explanation of it as identity or difference.³⁰ Ancient Naiyāyikas hold that the relation between word and meaning is fixed by God's will. Buddhists take it as fiction and others, like Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Vaiyākaraṇas have their own logic and explanation for relation as eternal or given, in the sense of the continuity

of use of the words since time immemorial. From the time language/ words come into use, they are related with their meanings. That is why, they have been, and they are, expressers of their meanings. Bhartṛhari defines this relation as the natural fitness (*yogyatā*) of the words. The *yogyatā* of the words to express its meaning is relation.

Yogyatā, for Bhartṛhari is called relation by virtue of the beginningless of the *yogyatā* of the expresser to express meaning. *Yogyatā* in this context is neither a signifier nor a signified but the *yogyatā* of the signifier. It is the *yogyatā* of word '*yogyatā*' that '*yogyatā*' is called relation (*yogyatā-sambandha*) and there is no other character of it.³¹ *Yogyatā*, as we have observed, is eternally dependent; it is neither a *vācaka* nor a *vācya* which are relata. It is always the *yogyatā* of a relata that, in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, is word/ language, *Naiyāyikas* hold *yogyatā* as mutual compatibility and on this ground, they find no *yogyatā* in the use '*vahninā sincati*' (he irrigates with fire). *Vaiyākaraṇas*, for whom a complete sentence is a word (*śabda*), take the meaning of '*vahninā sincati*' as contradictory on the ground of fitness. It, for *vaiyākaraṇas*, is the fitness of the language '*vahninā sincati*' that it conveys contradictory meaning, otherwise, how could we know that it is contradictory? *Vaiyākaraṇas* believe that the language/word is never void of its *yogyatā*, which for them is a given and is not a shifted relation between it and its meaning.³² *Yogyatā* of language/word is not produced but only known by convention.³³ It is the *yogyatā* of a word that a word is called so.

Bhartṛhari's concept of *yogyatā* can be understood with the analogy of the natural fitness of the senses.³⁴ The *yogyatā* of eyes to perceive form and colour (*rūpa*) is fixed. That is why, only eyes, and not the other senses, are fit to perceive form (*rūpa*) on the one hand, and eyes have no fitness to perceive the objects of other senses, on the other. Similarly, the word '*gauḥ*' has no '*yogyatā*' to denote the meaning 'horse', or vice versa. The word '*gauḥ*' and '*aśvaḥ*' are eternally fit to express their respective distinct (*niyata*) meanings. The *yogyatā* of the words '*gauḥ*' and '*aśvaḥ*' cannot be indicated apart from them.³⁵ Therefore, the *yogyatā* of being eternally dependent is to be found only in the natural fitness (*yogyatā-sambandha*), which for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is an eternal relation (*nitya-sambandha*).

'Yogyatā' should not be confused with the *samavāya-sambandha* of the *Vaiśeṣikas*. The word 'samavāya' is used for relation only by virtue of its *yogyatā* of being dependent in the limited case of a whole-part relation with the substance (*avayava-avayavīśambandha*), and not in all cases, e.g. quality, action, etc.³⁶ *Vaiśeṣikas*, as we have seen, categorize 'samavāya' as a *relata* (*padārtha*). *Samavāya*, as *Bhartṛhari* observes, is not *yogyatā*. How can a *relata* be called relation? That is the reason, *Helārāja* holds that 'samavāya' is not a relation. Relation is the fitness of a word, even of 'samavāya', on account of which it conveys its meaning (inherence).³⁷

It is the *yogyatā* of words, on account of which they beginninglessly function as limitors (*paricchedakas*) of their own meaning (*vācya*) and this is the reason, *Bhartṛhari* has called it power.³⁸ For example, it is the *yogyatā* of the word *guṇa* (quality) that it conveys the limits of the degrees of a substantive. The words 'Brāhman', 'time', 'space', 'number', 'gender', etc., all express their own meanings on account of their eternal fitness, or 'yogyatā'. Keeping this sense in view, *Bhartṛhari* has characterized *yogyatā* as the power of powers. *Yogyatā* as the power of powers, does not mean it is *supreme*. It simply means that it is the *yogyatā* of the words 'power' and 'supreme-power' that they are naturally fit to express their meanings.³⁹

Difference Between Convention and Yogyatā sambandha

The concept of *yogyatā-sambandha* will be discussed later. Presently, we shall discuss the problem of the need to accept convention (*samaya*), apart from *yogyatā-sambandha*. *Helārāja's* solution to the problem is quite clear. According to his interpretation, though the power of perceiving objects is given in the eyes, yet only on the basis of having that power it cannot perceive objects – it needs light in order to perceive them. Similarly, a word is eternally fit to express its meanings, it is eternally related with all its meanings, but needs convention to restrain *yogyatā*, or to specify the very meaning for the communication of which the word is spoken. This is the reason he calls *yogyatā-sambandha* *samayopādhika*, which means the word is eternally fit for expressing all its meanings, but communication cannot be accomplished by all meanings of a word except by the one popularly fixed. *Yogyatā*, for the accomplishment of cognition in communication (*pratipatti*), is

limited by convention (*samaya*). But this does not mean that dependency of the *yogyatā-sambandha* on convention is its unfitness. According to the *Vṛṣabha* commentary, the dependency of *yogyatā* on convention for the cognition of specified meanings is only instrumental and is not natural. It is justified to accept convention as the specifier of the natural-fitness relation between the word and its meaning. Without the given *yogyatā-sambandha*, cognition by words cannot be accomplished.⁴⁰ Convention for them is the restrainer (*niyāmaka*) of the eternal *yogyatā-sambandha*. Just as sight, or the range of perception, are limited when one perceives through a tube (*nalikā*), convention, limits or specifies *yogyatā-sambandha*, on account of which a fixed meaning is known by a fixed word or sentence.

Cause-effect Relation

Keeping the user's intention in view, *Vaiyākaraṇas* interpret relation of language and meaning in terms of cause-effect. Bhartṛhari writes, the knowledge from hearing utterances involves the following: first, the revelation of the *sphoṭa*, second, convention of the word and third, knowledge of the intention involved in the use of the word.⁴¹ Knowledge by words implies relation given between the expresser (*vācaka*) and the expressed (*vācya*) as the natural fitness of the expresser. In order to know the significance of the cause-effect relation in cognition by words, we have to observe Bhartṛhari's solution of the question: how does an act of cognition take place? Bhartṛhari takes knowing as an act and elucidates that in accomplishing any act and, hence, cognition, two sorts of reason (*hetu*), expressive (*kāraka*) and suggestive (*dyotaka*), are necessarily involved, though separated after the accomplishment of the action. For example, the stick is a *kāraka-hetu* in the construction of a pot and separated when the pot is constructed. *Dyotakas* incline the mind towards performance of action. Smoke, in the inference of fire on the mountain, is a *dyotaka-hetu*, which is evidential only in the inference and is separated when the inference is accomplished,⁴² but this is not the case with words. Words play a different role. As meaning is conveyed of words and cognized as '*asyedam vācakaḥ*' (this is the expresser of that), they are always related as *vācaka-vācya*. The sixth case (*ṣaṣṭī*) in Sanskrit is used to show this relation, but the cases (*kāraṇas*) do not express relation themselves, but are marks (*upalakṣaṇa*) of it from different perspectives.

In order to clarify cause-effect relation between word and meaning, we have to observe how Bhartṛhari has understood it. The use of words, Bhartṛhari says, involves the intention of accomplishing visible (*dṛṣṭa*) and invisible (*adṛṣṭa*) purposes.⁴³ As these purposes are achieved by the use of words, words are taken as their cause. Helārāja gives the example of the use of 'śabaramantra' to remove the poison of snakebite. The use of 'aiṅga' (a numinous mantra), he says, in a contemplating manner, accomplishes the visible purpose of obtaining the grace of Goddess of Knowledge (*Sarasvatī*) and also the invisible purpose of causing merit (*dharma*).⁴⁴ These effects caused by the use of words are observed since time immemorial, and hence, they have come into use. On account of these reasons, *Vaiyākaraṇas* take the cause-effect relation between language and meaning also as eternal.

The use of the word eternal (*nitya*) should not be confused for a metaphysical real. Though, Bhartṛhari takes the world-principle as ontologically eternal, on the basis of which he includes a coherent explanation of the eternity of relation in *Vākayapadīya*, yet in the world of communication, he, as a philosopher, takes the word 'nitya' in the sense of the continuity of the use of words. In this sense, he says, both the systems of 'śabda-nityatāvādī' (who accepts the eternity of words) and śabdā-nityatāvādī (who considers words as transient) equally accept that the signifying capacity (*abhidheyatva*) of the word is naturally there with the word.⁴⁵ Bhartṛhari's emphasis is that since words come into use (may be later) they have been expresser (*vācakas*) of their expressed (*vacyas*) and, thus, he finds no difficulty in interpreting eternity of relation between a word and its meaning.

In the act of cognition, words are revealed first and their meanings are revealed afterwards. Therefore, it is taken that the meaning is caused by words. The speaker utters the words with expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) to communicate. For him, meaning is first and words are afterwards and thus, meaning, for him, is the cause of words. Helārāja's answer to the question, 'which is first – word or meaning – is that it is relative to the communication that the word is first for the hearer and meaning for the speaker. Trans-communicatively such questions do not arise.'⁴⁶

Relation is there only between thought-objects or ideas/ beings

Now, the question, if the word and its meaning both are inner (*buddhistha*), how can sentences like 'odanam bhuñkte' (he is eating rice), be interpreted in terms of cause-effect relation? There are three externals – enjoyer, rice and eating. Bhartṛhari⁴⁷ is of the view that we know external things only when they become an object of thought. It is the perception of his act of eating rice that manifests the words (*sphoṭa*). Manifested so, the word reveals itself and reveals the meaning non-differently in the mind of the hearer. The intelligible being revealed by language in the mind (*upacāra-sattā*), is the being of language and of the meaning with which language/word is eternally related.

Bhartṛhari has made some very minute and significant observations on the difference between external thing (*mukhya-sattā*) and thought-object (*upacāra-sattā*) and has furnished arguments to justify why an external thing (*mukhya-sattā*) is not the meaning of a word. *Mukhya-sattā*, he says, is a thing to be found in the external world and *upacāra-sattā* is the idea, the idea of the expresser and the expressed. *Upacāra-sattā* is the limit of the use of words. The meaning of the word 'fire' is not an external fire that burns but the idea or thought of the fire revealed by the word 'fire'. If we accept *mukhya-sattā* as the meaning of words, we may face several problems regarding the relation of the two discrete extremes that may not be solved properly and justified epistemologically by any theory of cognition. It will be equally difficult to know its relatedness with word, and, hence, to cognize and to communicate it. No epistemological justification of the existence or non-existence of an external thing, he says, can be given independently of how it is revealed in the mind by language. The epistemological justification of existence or non-existence requires their cognition, namely the cognition of the thought-object revealed in the mind by language.⁴⁸

Bhartṛhari has pointed out some technical difficulties that may creep in the use of language, if meaning as an external-object is taken into consideration. For example, if the word 'vṛkṣa' in the sentence 'vṛkṣo'asti' (tree exists) conveys *mukhya-sattā*, the use of the word 'asti' (exists) will be redundant, because the word 'asti' means 'sattā', which has already been conveyed by the word 'vṛkṣa' (tree exists).

Similarly, 'vṛkṣonāsti' (tree does not exist) will be a contradictory sentence, because, if the existence of tree is already conveyed by the word 'vṛkṣa', it will be a contradiction in terms to use the word 'nāsti'. Therefore, if meaning is taken as *mukhya-sattā*, a thing independent of cognition, it can neither be affirmed nor be denied, and no expression will be possible.⁴⁹ Not only that, most of the words, like 'non-existent' (*asat*), 'negation' (*abhāva*) 'hares-horn' (*alīkā*) and many others expressing past and future meanings (not to be found in the external-world), will be without meaning and will cease to be words.⁵⁰ But this is not the case with *upacāra-sattā*, the being revealed in the mind of by words, i.e. language and meaning. Only in the world of intelligible beings (*upacāra-sattā*), Bhartṛhari says, mind enjoys freedom. Mind separates those disassociated, analyses them and, finally, cognizes them. The external things are taken as combinations of many categories. The mind perceives them, separates them, cognizes them and uses words expressive of them. On the basis of that analysis, the speaker uses words fit for expressing those categories, i.e. substance, quality, etc. External-things, being of a fixed character, cannot undergo such changes as figuring in different capacities in different uses. Even if we accept that they do, it requires to be known and conveyed by words. Figuring of one and the same object in different capacities is possible only if they are cognized as words express them. Unless an object is clearly figured in the mind, we will not be enabled to use their fixed expressers.⁵¹ It is with intelligible beings (*upacāra-sattā*) that words are eternally related with their meanings as their very expressed (*vācya*).⁵² That is why Helārāja following Bhartṛhari, clearly affirms that *upacāra-sattā* is the only object of cognition and is the sole concern of a philosopher's enterprise.

Relation and the Problem of Synonym and Polyseme

The theory of eternity of relation raises many critical problems that need to be discussed in order to elucidate Bhartṛhari's novel analysis and exposition of his own standpoint. Analysis of synonymous and paronymous words is one such problem. Those considered as synonyms, Bhartṛhari observes, are actually separate words having meanings of their own. For example, the words *vahni*, *purohit*, *agni*, etc. are taken as synonyms of the word 'fire' but they, as Bhartṛhari

observes, express their separate meanings (*vācyas*) and hence separate words. The intention in the use of the word '*agni*' is to express that which makes a component of its own to all of them offered into it and in the word '*vahni*' to express that which carries offerings for deities. The use of the word '*purohita*' is to convey that which is placed always ahead in all religious performances. It is obvious, now, that those taken as synonymous are different words used to convey different qualities and functions of a substantive. The differences in their use are overlooked and the words are taken as synonymous.⁵³

In the case of polysemes, these words are generally taken to convey many meanings. For example, the word '*kanaka*' is used for gold as well as for a poisonous thorn-apple. Similarly, the word '*gauḥ*' is used for 'cow' and 'cowherd'. Bhartṛhari⁵⁵ mentions two reasons for such uses. First, on account of some similarities, the primary meaning of the word is imposed on other meanings as well, as in the case of the word '*gauḥ*' for 'cowherd'. Second, all words are expressive of all meanings, that is *mukhya*, *gauṇa* and *nāntarīyakārtha* (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*), out of which the meaning for which the word is popularly used is taken as the expressive meaning of the word. This expressive meaning is a cognitive unit and is imposed on other meanings by similarity, etc. The word is a force and can be applied with different intentions for different meanings – primary and secondary or expressive and suggestive – as we find in the case of the word '*kanaka*'.⁵⁴ The expressive meaning of the word '*gauḥ*' is 'cow' but on account of similarity in dullness and stupidity, it is imposed on 'cowherd', which is taken as a secondary meaning. In some uses, secondary meanings are given priority, but that does not mean that they are expressive of the fixed meaning of the word. Bhartṛhari seems to support both the above views, which shows that he attaches a great deal of importance to the freedom of the human mind in the specific uses of words. A word may be used with a certain intention, for other meanings, but the fitness of the word for expressing its meaning does not change or perish with the change of intention involved in uses. The cognition of different uses, based on primary, secondary and tertiary conventions, helps us to distinguish the primary, secondary and tertiary meanings of the words. It helps us to know that the various meanings of a single word are due to the different intentions

of the user and that the relation between the different meanings (*vācya*) and the word (*vācaka*) does not change with the change of intention in use as all meanings are the meanings of the word, which is eternally related with its meanings.

Dharmakīrti's and Jayanta's Arguments against Expresser-expressed Relation (*Vācaka-vācya sambandha*) between Language and Meaning and their Solution for the side of Bhartṛhari

Dharmakīrti refutes the *Vaiyākaraṇas'* concept of the eternity of the *vācaka-vācya' sambandha*, in his short treatise entitled '*Sambandha Parīkṣā*', on the ground of transitory nature of *relata*. His primary concern is to show the transitoriness of relation, by putting dialectics against the '*vācaka-vācya*'-*sambandha* of *Vaiyākaraṇas*. As it is not possible to go in a detailed description of Dharmakīrti's arguments, an estimate of his dialectics against eternal-relation (*vācaka-vācya-sambandha*) is given as follows: If the *vācaka* and *vācya* are different, they should be independent of each other and, then, may not be related. If relation is dependent on *relata* and *relata* is dependent on relation, relation will be a relation no more. If they are non-different, the question as to why only *relata* are perceived and not the relation, arises. We cannot avoid the question of a free function of relation then. As no contradictory character of an eternal is logically tenable, Dharmakīrti argues, it is inconsistent to accept identity and difference between an eternal expresser and its expressed.

As we observe, the arguments of Dharmakīrti against the eternity of relation are based on confusing the word eternal (*nitya*) for an ontic real. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāya Mañjarī* has also made a similar confusion while putting across the *Vaiyākaraṇas'* thesis of eternity of relation between an expresser and an expressed. *Vaiyākaraṇas*, do not take relation as an eternal being. Their view in elucidating eternity of relation involves the fact that relation as the fitness of word is given. It is with fitness that the word comes into use. If it would not be given, irregularities in the use of words would have made communication impossible. The '*yogyatā*' of the word is not a *relata*, but the given expressing power of the expressers by virtue of which they are beginninglessly used for their meanings.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To sum up, we can say that relation is not an expresser (*vācya*) of an expressed but the natural fitness (*yogyatā*) of the former. Bhartṛhari, as a language-philosopher,⁵⁵ affirms it as a given (*nitya*). How can a word be an expresser (*vācaka*) if it does not express an expressed? A word is eternally an expresser. Relation as the fitness of the language/word is also eternal and is restrained by convention, which is understood as the observation of the use of language by elders. On the basis of the cause-effect theory of cognition by language, also, Bhartṛhari has interpreted, the eternity of relation of the word and its meaning.

Accomplishment of communication by language is the cognitive ground of the eternal-relation between an expresser and an expressed. Over and above this, the memory of an expressed inevitable from its expresser and vice versa justifies the eternal relation between them.

However, it is remarkable to note here that though *Vaiyākaraṇas* accept natural fitness (*Yogyatā*) as relation, they do not overlook the importance of convention (*samaya*) in verbal cognition. It is true that they accept '*yogyatā-sambandha*' independently of convention (*samaya*), but it is equally true that ordinary persons, without convention, as they think, cannot accomplish cognition of a particular meaning by a word. Convention delimits the '*yogyatā*' of a word to a specific meaning for which the word is popularly used in communication, on the basis of which the fixed meaning is known by the fixed word. The '*yogyatā*' of a word is given with all its meanings (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*), and it is convention that specifies the *yogyatā* for a specific meaning. For example the word '*gauḥ*' (cow) is related with all of its meanings, i.e., a foolishman, cowherd, animal (cow), etc. but it is convention that specifies its popular meaning or fixed use for cow, the animal.

Convention (*samaya*), according to Helārāja,⁵⁶ has a two-fold significance in the accomplishment of communication. It, on the one hand, functions for delimiting the natural fitness-relation (*yogyatā-sambandha*), by excluding other meanings for which the word is not used conventionally; and on the other hand, for determining the meaning for which the word is usually used. There is natural fitness-relation between a word and all its meanings and convention functions

as a restraining factor (*niyāmaka*) for it. Convention demarcates *yogyatā* so as to make the fixed meaning of the word known by the fixed word. Convention may be there in primary, intended or non-intended significations of a word or language, according to which meanings of the word are distinctly known.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamāḍṛte. Anuviddhamiva, jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate.* VP, 1/123. *Vākyapadīyam*, edited by B.P. Tripathi, Sampurnanand Sanskrita Visvavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1976.
2. *Yathā jyotiḥ prakāśena nānyenābhiprakāśyate, Jñānākārastathānyena na jñānenopagṛhyate.* VP, Khaṇḍa III Chapter (*Jāti Samuddeśaḥ*) *Kārikā* 104. S.S.U., Varanasi, 1974.
3. *Śabdaḥ kāraṇamarthasya sa hi tenopajanyate. Tathā ca buddhiviśayādarthāḥ Śabdaḥ pratiyate,* Ibid., Chapter III, *Sambandha Samuddeśaḥ Kārikā* 32. & *Buddhyānirūpita vastuviśayāḥśabdāḥ,* Ibid. Commentary by Helārāja on *Kārikā* 39.
4. *Kim asmākam vastugatena vicāreṇa.* M.Bh. *Dīpika*, p. 28 (B.O.R.I., ed.).
5. *Grāhyatvam Grāhakatvam ca dve śaktiḥ tejaso yathā. Tathaiva sarvaśabdānāmete pṛthagavasthite.* VP, 1/55.
6. Ibid., 1/56.
7. Ibid., 1/23.
8. *Anāgamaśca soabhyāsaḥ samayaḥ kaiścidiśyate Anantarmidam kāryamasmādityupadarśanam.* VP, 2/118, and Helārāja's commentary on it and Ibid., 3/3/32.
9. *Nitye'nitye'pi vācye'rthe puruṣeṇa kathancana, sambandho'kṛtṁ-sambandhaiśabdaiḥ kartum na śakyate,* Ibid., 3/3/38 and Helārāja's commentary on it.
10. *Sambandha Samuddeśaḥ,* 3/3/31.
11. *Tātparya tīkā,* Vacapati Misra, 2.1.55.
12. Nāgeśa-Maṇjuṣa, p. 34. *Sabhāpati sanskaraṇa.*
13. Helārāja on V.P, 3/3/38 P. 274
14. VP, Vṛṣabha's commentary on 1/23.
15. Ibid., 3/3/32 and Helārāja's commentary on it.
16. *Nābhīdhānam svadharmeṇa sambandhasyāsti 'Vācakam. Atyantaparatantra tvād rūpam nāsyāpadiśyate.* Ibid., 3/3/4.

17. Ibid., Helārāja's commentary on 3/3/4.
18. Ibid., 3/3/4-5.
19. *Padārthikṛta evānyaiḥ sarvatrābhyupagamyate. Sambandhastena śabdārthaḥ pravibhaktum na śakyate.* Ibid., 3/3/12.
20. Ibid., Helārāja's commentary on 3/3/18.
21. VP, 3/3/19.
22. Ibid., 3/3/20 - 21.
23. VP, 3/3/21.
24. Helārāja, 3/3/22.
25. This important part of discussion regarding Bhartṛhari's Paradox of —'sarmavāya' as relation is not included in H.G. Herzberger and Radhika Harzberger's paper entitled 'Bhartṛhar's Paradox' published in Journal of Indian Philosophy, 9 (1981) edited by B.K. Matilal.
26. VP, 3/3/23
27. VP, 3/3/24.
28. VP, 3/3/25.
29. VP, 3/3/28.
30. VP, 3/3/29.
31. VP, 3/3/31.
32. HR, commentary on 3/3/4.
33. *Indriyāṇām svaviśayeśvanādiryogyatā yathā. Anāndirarthaiḥ śabdānām sambandho yogyatā tathā,* Ibid., 3/3/29.
34. *Yo hi gāmasva iti brūyānna jātucita sampratyayaḥsyāt,* Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali on Pāṇini sūtra, 1/2/64.
35. Helārāja's commentary on VP, 3/3/28.
36. 'Samavāya śabdopi 'Yogyatayaivānādi siddhayā svārtha pratipādakaḥ, Ibid., Helārāja's commentary on 3/3/31.
37. *Śaktināmapi sa śaktirguṇānāmapyasau guṇaḥ,* Ibid., 3/3/5.
38. V.P, 3/3/5.
39. Ibid., HR commentary on 3/3/5.
40. *Pratītim janayad vyadhikaraṇam bhavati danḍaiva dhūmādi liṅgam. Śabdastu na janakatāmātreṇārtha pratītau sambandhamanubhavati,* Ibid. HR commentary on 3/3/2.
41. *Prayogeṇabhijvalitaiḥ Śabdaistritayamavagamyate-ātmīyam rūpam,*

- arthaścaphala śādhanaḥ, prayokturabhiprāyaśca, Ibid., HR, commentary on 3/3/1.*
42. *Ibid., Helārāja's commentary on 3/3/2.*
43. *Śabdenārthasya samaskāro dṛṣṭādrṣṭaprayojanaḥ, Ibid., 3/3/35.*
44. *Ibid., HR and Ambākartrī commentary on 3/3/35.*
45. *Anityeṣvapi nityatvamabhidheyātmanā sthitam, VP, 3/3/34.*
46. *Sattāñca na niṣedho'sti so'satsu ca na vidyate, Jagatyanena nyāyena nañarthaḥ pralayam gataḥ, Ibid., HR Commentary on 3/3/42, HR commentary on VP, 3/1/43.*
47. *Bojanādyapi manyante budhyarthe yadasambhavi, Bhuddhyarthādeva buddhyarthe jāte tadapi dṛśyate, Ibid., 3/3/33.*
48. *Ibid., 3/3/39.*
49. *Evam ca pratiṣedhyeṣu pratiṣedhapraklīptaye. Āśrtesūpacāreṇa, pratiṣedhaḥ pravartate. Ibid., 3/3/42.*
50. *Atyantāsatyapi hyarthe jñānam śabdaḥ karoti hi-Ibid., Commentary of Ambākartrī on 3/3/39, p. 276.*
51. *Prāk ca sattābhi sambandhānmukhyā sattā katham bhavet. Asanśca nāsteḥ kartā syādupacārastu pūrvavat, Ibid., 3/3/48, compare it with śamprati sattātyām yathā syād bhūtabhaviṣyatasattāyammabhūd-Mahābhāṣya 5/2/94.*
52. *HR commentary on VP, 3/3/49-51.*
53. *Harivṛtti on VP, 1/74.*
54. *Ibid., 170-174.*
55. *Vākyapadīyam is generally taken as a metaphysical understanding of language but it may well be observed as a system of language based on a plea for confining philosophical thinking to what is revealed by words or cognized in the world of communication, and in order to distinguish this aspect of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language, I have used the word 'Bhartṛhari as a language-philosopher'.*
56. *Helārāja on VP, 3/3/29, Saṅketastu tāmeva dyotayati / Mūlaprakṛtiyviduṣām vācikā, Helārāja on VP, 3/3/30.*

CHAPTER-IX

CRITICAL ESTIMATE

Bhartr̥hari is regarded by those having allegiance to *Advaitavāda* (non-dualism), as a non-dualist metaphysician who propounds an ontological theory of *śabdādvaita* on the basis of the language-principle (*śabda-brahman*) as the absolute reality.¹ In the present discussion, we adopt a different outlook in observing Bhartr̥hari's *śabdādvaita*. Our contention here is that he provides a philosophy free from metaphysical allegiances without feeling any philosophical requirement for a rejection of metaphysics. The aim of his philosophy is to explain communication (*vyāvahāra*) as it is revealed in the mind by language. It considers 'communication' in terms of the knowledge revealed by language in the mind of the hearers. Accordingly, we view his *śabdādvaita* as sentence/cognitive-holism, a philosophy that emphasizes reflection on the problems of communication; a philosophy for which language is an inner, indivisibly and ubiquitously given being, and which explains meaning as a being non-differently revealed in the mind by language; a philosophy which is based on a holistic idea of non-difference between the being of language and that of meaning, and between language and cognition. It is a sort of holism for which philosophical reflections are not only concerned with, but also confined to the language and the meaning it reveals (*upacārasattā*). It considers metaphysical entities, whether transcendental or empirical, to be untouched by language and, hence, trans-cognitive and trans-communicative.² It is a kind of philosophy that considers language and meaning as philosophical beings or beings of awareness. The basic premise of Bhartr̥hari's holism is that all knowledge, for it, is knowledge shot through and through by language, and that the knowledge isolated from language ceases to be knowledge. It views even physiological, psychological and transcendental issues, ontic in nature, as the language reveals them in the mind. It takes sentence as *spṛṣṭa*, the real unit of language. Language-tokens/garbs, gestures, signs, symbols and experiences are instrumental in manifesting the real language. Manifested by them, language reveals itself first from which the meaning is revealed non-differently in the mind afterwards. It is sentence-holism or sententialism, as it considers words, roots/

stems, suffixes, etc., as outcomes of grammatical analysis of the indivisible sentence, useful for the understanding of ignorants and children who can only understand in a piecemeal manner. The indivisible language and the meaning it reveals are the only beings to which cognition and philosophical reflections are confined.

The terms 'sentence-holism' and 'cognitive-holism' are not used synonymously. When we use the term 'sentence-holism', we emphasize the fact that the indivisible sentence is the original unit of cognition given in the mind, by which the meaning is revealed non-differently. Different words, suffixes, etc. are outcomes of the grammatical analysis of the indivisible sentence useful for an understanding of the freshers and the indivisible sentence remains undivided by the analysis which is an artificial device only. When we use the term 'cognitive-holism' we emphasize another essential character of his philosophy, according to which the unit of language, i.e. sentence, and its meaning are revealed units that are awareness in nature and are non-different. The cognitive-holistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari does not deny the existence of metaphysical entities that are beyond the touch of language. Although all knowledge for this philosophy, is knowledge revealed by and is shot through and through by language, the things-in-themselves as they are not the beings revealed by language, are known by implication as the ontological substratum of cognition revealed by language in the mind. The distinction between the ontic Being and the cognitive being, revealed in the mind when presented by language, must be kept in the mind for observing the distinction of his philosophical reflections from metaphysics. Taking this distinction in view, I conclude my exposition of his philosophy of language, being and cognition. The conclusion contains a philosophical observation based on Bhartṛhari's reflections on the problems relating to concepts, only on the basis of cognition as it is revealed in the mind by language itself independently of any allegiance to metaphysical entities.

It hardly needs mention that philosophers, both of the east and of the west approach language chiefly from two distinct perspectives:

1. A major group of philosophers has taken it as a concrete series of ink/chalk marks or verbal-noises/utterances. They consider language as a sign system having a conventional value of indicating the entities, viz. physiological, mental or transcendental.

2. The other small section of philosophers, including Indian grammarians, takes language as inner, indivisible and given ubiquitously as a meaning-revealing being. The followers of the former view held that language is a tool through which our experiences of the things-in-themselves are communicated, i.e. it is a system of signs standing by proxy for the things. Signs are only perceived, and there is no need to accept language as given in the mind, for it is not proved.

There are two basic premises that can be derived from the former view of language:

1. Knowledge is experience acquired by perception, etc. and language is a means through which those experiences are communicated.
2. Language is a set of signs standing by proxy for the entities that are the object of empirical experience. An account of the problems, arising out of this view of language and inviting philosophical investigation, may be given as follows:
 - (i) What is the actual role of experience in knowledge?
 - (ii) What is the real object of experience and that of knowledge?
 - (iii) What is knowledge in-itself?

According to Bhartṛhari, experiences like verbal-utterances/noises, perception, etc., are only instrumental in the knowledge and the knowledge is always a knowledge revealed and infused by language.³ There is a difference between the sense data acquired by experience and knowledge. The data themselves require language in order to be known distinctly. The abstracted data are relational to the object perceived and to the mind that perceives, but knowledge is foundational. The sense data acquired by abstraction, as accepted by the theorists, obfuscate the uniqueness of the entities and, above all, abstraction itself belongs to the empirical realm and requires to be expressed distinctly, and, this expression is not possible in isolation from language. Abstraction ceases to be so if taken as foundational, because it is abstracted out of several instances and occurrences of individuals and knowledge if taken, as abstraction is knowledge no more, because knowledge is a revealed unit and not abstracted. As the sense data are taken as abstracted from entities non-linguistic in nature,

the problem of relation between a linguistic unit and a non-linguistic entity or data arises. How can a non-linguistic entity incommunicable and incognizable by itself be communicated and known by language? The two discrete will meet at no point and then cognition and communication by language will not be possible. It goes in favour of Bhartṛhari and against abstractionists, if the data are taken as infused by language.

How can the language, if taken, as a mark of pointer to the reality perceived, point to the uniqueness of that reality, as it does not touch the uniquely real. P.F. Strawson contends 'we pass on from a bare understanding of an expressor to a bodily identification of the real referred to by it.'⁴ His idea is based on his hypothesis of expressions as pure individuating descriptions, but language as an indicator is incapable of doing identification of uniquely reals as the theory itself indicates a difference between the indicator and the indicated. It is trivial to accept that linguistic unit is non-different from a non-linguistic uniquely real referent. The identification of the two discretes, having different characters, is a false logic and, hence, unacceptable. Nonetheless, the distinction of identification of two units having opposite character and the cognition of such identification still persists as a problem.

Perception provides only sense data and cannot, by itself or through data, be taken as cognition. To provide primary importance to mind, in the knowledge, amounts to the idea that knowledge is fiction. Mind requires to be revealed by the word 'mind' in order to be known and the mind as a knowing faculty is inferred on that basis. It does not hold proper to accept that the name and the named perceived, if they are external, are identical. Rajendra Prasad seems right in saying that 'a wrong conception of the nature of truth and inadequate attention to the role of language in human affairs have led people to believe that there is some essential and peculiar relationship between language and Reality, a relationship which cannot exist'.⁵ The name, for Bhartṛhari, reveals its meaning in the mind, and the meaning is not the named, which is an individual existing externally. Meaning as an idea revealed non-differently by the word 'name' is identical with the name, but the named as an external individual is known consequently by imposition as an ontological substratum of the meaning 'named' revealed by language in the mind.

The actual object of the cognition, for philosophers who believe in knowledge as experience of things, are the entities that, in the very process of experiencing, are deformed, and it is data that are taken by them as the real object of knowledge. Now, the problem for consideration is: What can be said about the possibility of the knowledge of the objects destroyed or yet to be born and others like hair's horn, etc., that have no external existence? Are the two: experience and cognition revealed by language: identical? If it is so, then, they must be known simultaneously, but it is not conducive, as no simultaneous cognition, for Bhartṛhari, is possible. Does the perceiver express the same experience (acquired earlier) through language? Obviously not, as they are different moments. No expression is possible, if the expectancy for it is denied and expectancy, for expressions, is not possible if external existents are taken as object of knowledge. We perceive, and then, express, but what can be said about the expression causing expectancy for perception? Nothing can be done without a prior expectancy propelling to the action. The inactive discrete data abstracted by experience, independently of language, cannot be taken as the object of knowledge, because the object of knowledge, for Bhartṛhari, is the being cognitive and communicable by nature. They are intelligible beings revealed or expressed by language. *Perception of uniquely* reals is only instrumental in the manifestation of language in the mind. Manifested by them, the language reveals itself and its meaning. Nothing, for a philosophical purpose, can be taken to exist independently and isolatively from cognition, and cognition is always cognition revealed by language. Negation, etc. *are also known, as they are revealed so in the mind by language.* No cognitive claim, positive or negative, can be made *independently of language* and, for this reason, the primacy of language as the expression of the expresseds (objects = *upacārasattā*) is acceptable.

The very fact of forming language-tokens implies some given idea of forming it. If it were otherwise, there would be no cause of expectancy of the idea. Convention implies the prior existence of language ubiquitously given in the mind. Language and thought have no origin except as intertwined, and this very fact cannot be explained on the basis of a theory of language as a set of signs and symbols formed on the basis of awareness and conventionally fixed for some entity.

Knowledge is not a construction at all; it is foundationally a unit of awareness. The objects of experience are not the objects revealed by language. Experiences like verbal-noises/utterances are means for manifesting inner-language (*sphoṭa*), which is awareness by nature. Manifested by them, the *sphoṭa* reveals itself, and its meaning is revealed non-differently by it. *Sphoṭa* reveals meaning (*pratibhā*), which being revealed in character is non-different from the former and different from metaphysical entities. However, the instrumentality of language token, as we have discussed earlier, is not denied. Conclusively, we can say that the object of experience for those theorists is not the things-in-themselves, but the data acquired on their basis, and the data are only instrumental in the manifestation of language, while the object of knowledge, for Bhartṛhari, is revealed non-differently in the mind by language, i.e. *upacāra-sattā* = *pratibhā* in the sense of meaning or expressed, and *sphoṭa* in the sense of its expresser. Though Bhartṛhari accepts *pratibhā* as the object of knowledge, he does not accept knowledge itself as the object of knowledge. Knowledge is not an object in knowledge, but the awareness and the self-awareness of itself. This difference of the awareness of the object and the awareness itself is based on the idea of non-difference of the objects of knowledge and knowledge of the objects, and thus forms the basis of the cognitive-holistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari.

It can be said that the language-tokens standing by proxy for things and the real-language (*sphoṭa*) expressive of meaning are separate not only essentially and existentially, but also functionally. Tokens are means for manifesting real language, which, when manifested by them, reveals itself and its meaning as well. Tokens/garbs are outer manifestations of the real language and are manifested by the expectancy caused by real language, for communicating. If the tokens are taken to stand for things indicated, they cannot be taken as *sphoṭa* (idea), which is an indivisible being cognitive in character. The idea of 'token as idea' goes against their basic theory. If the token, for a moment, is taken as idea, even then, the conscious idea will stand separate from the physical thing to be perceived and indicated, which will lead to a very difficult situation owing to which the analysis and expression of the conscious will not necessarily be the analysis and expression of the physical, and, then, the philosophy which takes analysis and understanding of physical through analysis and

understanding of awareness, will be inconsistent. The analysis of language cannot then be taken as the analysis of the physically or uniquely real, incommunicable and incognizable by language.

The second group of philosophers, among whom Indian *Vaiyākaraṇas*, in general, and Bhartṛhari, in particular, occupy a very respectable place, considers that no fixed syntactical and semantic rule applicable to garbs can possibly be framed, if we confine language to language-tokens or garbs. Unless we accept language as inner, indivisible, and ubiquitously given as a meaning-revealing being, no fixed rule of language can be given appropriately. *Vaiyākaraṇas* start their observation from a perceptual plane of the syntactical structure of language (*vaikhari*), move towards conceptual (language as idea given in the mind, i.e. *Madhyamā*) and, finally, approach the awareness nature of language. It is the awareness nature of language that serves as the basis of cognition of other levels of *paśyanti* and *vaikhari*. This is called *sphoṭa*, as it reveals itself as an expresser and its meaning as its expressed, without any interference of a non-sphoṭic entity. It is a self-effulgent being, as it expresses both itself and its expressed (*grāhya* and *grāhaka*).⁶ The concept of *sphoṭa* as a cognitive unit distinguishes Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language from that of the former group of philosophers, for he, unlike them, does not accept language as confined to the verbal utterances/noises and other signs and gestures only.

Bhartṛhari has approached language chiefly from two perspectives:

1. **Metaphysical understanding of language:** For this view, language is a pointer or an indicator to things (physical, mental, etc.). It has an ontological origin and functions for referring to things ontic in nature. It points to things known by inference or presumption.
2. **Cognitive understanding of language:** The referring function of language cannot be denied, but one can be deprived of estimating the actual function of language if one limits our investigation to the metaphysical understanding of language. Language, for Bhartṛhari, is an expressive force. It expresses itself first as an expresser (*vācaka*), and later the expressed (*vācya*) is known non-differently by it.⁷ The difference between the metaphysical and the cognitive understanding of language must be kept in mind for a proper evaluation of Bhartṛhari's philosophy.

Reflections on language can philosophically be legitimate and interesting only if the cognitive understanding of language is taken in view. Taking the aforementioned view into consideration, it can be said that *sphoṭa*, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, can be explained, as a metaphysical as well as a cognitive unit, but the difference in accepting the two views on *sphoṭa* must be clarified for a clear understanding of his philosophy. *Sphoṭa*, as a cognitive unit is a self-revealed being, and, it as a metaphysical being is a Being known by implication, made on the basis of cognition revealed by *Sphoṭa*, as its ontological substratum. Mind as flash or awareness and the language 'mind' as envisaged by the former view, are non-different, but there is a difference between the 'mind' as an ontic real and the 'mind' as a flash or cognitive being revealed in the mind by the language 'mind'. The flash is a revealed being while mind as ontological being is cognitively beyond the knowledge and it is only by implication or presumption made on the basis of cognition revealed by language that mind in itself is known as an ontological substratum of the cognition revealed by the language/word.

Taking the latter understanding of language in view, it needs to be clarified that language is not an abstraction from language-tokens, but a self-revealed being and tokens are only instrumental in its manifestation. No such instrumentality is required in the cognition by yogins (*lakṣyaika-cakṣuṣka*) possessing a higher state of realization of the language-principle. Emphasizing the very cognitive character of language, *Harivṛtti* quotes a verse according to which not only light (*prakāśa*) but darkness (*aprakāśa*), not only wisdom but ignorance are all revealed and known as they are presented so by language.⁸

The *sphoṭa* theory of language emphasizes that all sentences and words and the meaning revealed by them, be viewed as concepts. The word '*sphoṭa*' itself is a concept and that is why identical cognition by the word in its different instances and occurrences is revealed in the mind. The real language revealed by itself is a universal, and the meaning it reveals non-differently is also a universal, and the two are non-different, which is why identical cognition by language is accomplished in communication.⁹ It is neither formed by, nor abstracted from, tokens and gestures that are individuals. It is neither changed nor destroyed with the change and destruction of the tokens. The length of the duration, involved in uttering and writing, are the qualities of

individuals (tokens) which are wrongly understood by impositions as the character of language, which reveals them all when presented so, but, it in-itself is devoid of all changes, duration, division and destruction. The language is not confined to the act of hearing and uttering. It is the unit of communication that is taken by Bhartṛhari as accomplishment of cognition by language. The aforesaid view is quite in tune with his holistic trend based on the non-difference of the indivisible cognition and also that of the unit which it reveals.

As there is no part in meaning, there is no part in the unit that reveals it. In connection with part or artificial analysis of an indivisible, Bhartṛhari's view of them as grammatically real units, must be kept in mind. Though, he accepts the real language as indivisible, yet for all practical and grammatical purposes, the parts derived by grammatical analysis of it are also taken as real. In Bhartṛhari's holistic philosophy, the divisions of the indivisible, i.e. words, roots/stems, suffixes are taken as real for all practical purposes they perform,¹⁰ but no real whole-part division of units of awareness (*sphoṭa* and *pratibhā*) is possible, and the division by analysis is only a device to make the indivisible awareness understandable.

Taking the expressive nature of language in view, we presently summarize Bhartṛhari's discussion on the nature of meaning (which is a being non-different from the language) and the relation between the being of the language and that of the meaning as well.

Bhartṛhari, following *Mahābhāṣyakāra* Patañjali,¹¹ has accepted two categories of beings: (1) *Mukhya-sattā* (ontological existences that are generally taken by the word 'sattā' and (2) *Gauṇa-sattā* or *upacāra-sattā* (idea as figured in the mind by language). The former, for him, is a non-philosophical-Being, as it is beyond the touch of language, and the latter is a philosophical-being as it is revealed non-differently by language in the mind; it is the only intelligible being. In very brief, ontological existences, which are the objects of experience, are of no use so far as cognition by language is concerned. It is only the latter kind of beings (*sattā*) to which our cognition, communication and philosophical reflections are confined. They are the only being cognizable and communicable by nature.

What figures in the mind by language is a flash of understanding (*pratibhā*) that is a philosophical or intelligible being and is not

ontological in character. It is a revealed being, a being cognitive in nature. Doing or experiencing things and knowings are different for Bhartṛhari. We may do with several things – external or internal – but cognitively they, in themselves, are untouched by language. The knowledge, on the other hand, is always the knowledge revealed by and is shot through and through by language.

Non-being, like a being, also figures in the mind by language as an idea of non-being, and that is why expectancy for expressions and the communication by the expressions like being, non-being (*abhāva*), being destroyed and the being yet to be born, are accomplished. That is the reason Bhartṛhari defines those intelligible beings as *bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa* that is, beings fit for figuring by language in different capacities of existence, non-existence, past, future and present. If it is taken to exist only in present then the expectancy for communicating them and the cognition, by negative expressions and that by expressions expressing past and future being will not be possible. Thus, *Mahābhāṣyakāra*'s statement '*na sattām padārtho vyabhicarati*' (no existence is ever deprived of its intelligible or inner-being) seems significant. Independently of the *upacāra-sattā*, there is no possibility of expressions.¹² It, without a change in its nature, figures equally as being and non-being as well and that is why they are known so, and communication without a need of Being (*Mukhya-sattā*) is accomplished by them. The law of contradiction is not applicable to it. Even the expression regarding 'contradiction' also reveals its being non-differently in the mind, and that is why it is known so.

It is non-philosophical to say that the being by language figures as a positive being (*bhāvarūpa*) and that by non-being does not figure so. Negation, for Bhartṛhari, is not a counterpart of positive being, as it also figures positively as a being (idea of negation) by language 'non-being' in the mind.¹³ Idea, even of negation, is a positive idea. If it is not so, no knowledge by negative expressions is possible. The question of their ontological difference does not arise significantly, as both of them are inner-beings (*upacāra-sattā*), awareness in character. They are known distinctly, thus, as they are so revealed by the expressers.¹⁴

As we have mentioned earlier, the possibility of a relation between language and meaning cannot be explained if language as language-

token and meaning as things in-themselves are taken into account. The question of relation between a non-linguistic Being and a linguistic-being does not arise. The relation between the two significantly arises, only if the inner being of language (*vācaka*) and that of the meaning (*vācya*), revealed non-differently by the former, is taken into account. Between the token and the thing-in-itself, the former would not, and the latter could not, cause the relation. As the indicator-indicated relation is itself inferred on the basis of the use of language, it cannot be taken as the cause of relation or as a relation given between the two. Language, for Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is naturally fit to reveal or to express the meaning. It is the natural-fitness of the expresser on account of which it expresses its meaning non-differently in the mind. It is not the mind that constructs a relation between the two. It can also not be taken as caused by convention, since convention itself implies a prior relation given between the two. Convention, for Bhartṛhari, functions for restraining *the natural-fitness* of the language. It reveals meaning, by excluding other meanings the language expresses and for which language is not popularly used, on account of which a fixed meaning is known by a fixed word/sentence. Conclusively, the relation between the expresser and the expressed is *yogyatā-sambandha* (natural-fitness), by which expresser is naturally related with all its meanings. No sound explanation of relation between language and meaning can be given if the two are taken as discrete facts independently of each other as we find in earlier Wittgenstein. The use theory in general implies a relation given between the two, on the basis of which we use it for meaning. If, otherwise, the expectancy for the use may not arise because expectancy for communicating by language is based on a prior relation given between the two as a prerequisite of it. Bhartṛhari doesn't view meaning as a discrete fact, but as a revealed unit, a being non-differently revealed by language. A meaning independent of language is not possible. Therefore, the concept of *yogyatā-sambandha* is quite consistent with his holism, which holds the non-difference of the expresser and the expressed.¹⁵

Emphasizing the cognitive nature of being, Bhartṛhari asserts that the meaning independently and isolatively from language is not possible and cognition, isolated from language, ceases to be cognition. Cognition is always shot through and through by language (*śabdānuviddha*). It is the *śabdānubiddhatā* of cognition on the basis of which all cognition, by different words/sentences, are distinctly known as units of cognition.

Analysis of language vis-à-vis analysis of thought is possible only if the two are taken as intertwined. If, it is otherwise, no philosophical activity is possible. It is the concept of *śabdānuviddhātā* that forms the basis of his sentence-holism. It is on this basis that cognition is foundationally differentiated from abstraction, imagination, etc. Language is foundational in the sense that it itself is known first, and its meaning is known afterwards as a being revealed non-differently by it. We have already mentioned that Bhartṛhari's active theory of knowledge makes a difference between the experience and the knowledge revealed by the language. He writes, in experiencing, senses need not be cognized themselves before they experience. They are cognized by their mere presence, when they come into contact, but this is not the case with cognition by language.¹⁶ Language requires to be revealed first as the expresser (*vācaka*) and then its meaning (*vācya*) is known as revealed non-differently by it. In perception and inference based on it, the sense organ and the indications (*liṅga*) like smoke, etc., stand respectively at a distance and are separated after causing perception. Different from it, the language infuses cognition. If it were otherwise, knowledge would not be accomplished in the absence of language. No knowledge, in the absence of proper figuring of the language (*vācaka*), is possible, because all knowledge, for Bhartṛhari, is revealed by and is shot through and through with language. All sorts of knowledge—determinate, indeterminate, the knowledge of dream-sleep and that of deep-sleep – are intertwined with language, which is why they are distinctly and determinately known as such.¹⁷

As language is given ubiquitously, and as cognition is directly revealed by language independently of metaphysical things and of our allegiance to them, the cognition, it reveals, is an impartial knowledge.¹⁸ The theory does not deny the interestendness of knowledge, rather it accepts it. The knowledge as it is revealed by language independently of metaphysical entities and our allegiance to them, is always disinterested in character, and when this revealed knowledge is imposed on our allegiance to things and theories, or when it is sliced with them, it serves as interested knowledge. Bhartṛhari has mentioned imposition of the cognition on different allegiances and the imposition of different allegiances on cognition as well, though, he emphasizes the former as a correct form of it, with a view that the imposition requires some foundation, and, in the absence of the cognition revealed directly by language, the imposition of the cognition

will be unfounded. Perhaps, this basic logic of imposition is turned downside up by metaphysicians, who emphasize imposition of the unknown or unrevealed on the known or revealed. Opposite to them, Bhartṛhari, as a philosopher, emphasizes imposition of the known or the revealed on those that are not directly known by language. He gives primary importance to what is revealed or known and accepts those on which it is imposed as known consequentially by imposition or by presumption made on the basis of cognition revealed in the mind by language as the substratum of it.

Experience, as such, for Bhartṛhari, is not knowledge, as it, isolated from language, is not more than bare indeterminate and private feeling with the things. The knowledge claim of experience per se is not possible, if it is taken as isolated from language. It is by ignorance and habit that we equate perception, etc., with knowledge that cannot be revealed without language. We are so accustomed with sense perception and other means of experiences that we limit knowledge to them only, and do not mind that they are only instrumental in manifesting the language that reveals cognition. His philosophy seems right, if we view the problem of cognition in the constitution of his sentence/cognitive-holism for which language is the foundational being, and for which, our knowledge and philosophical reflections are confined to language and the meaning revealed non-differently in the mind by it only. This is, perhaps, the only way that Bhartṛhari's concept of language as a being, *grāhya* and *grāhaka* by nature, and his concept of non-difference of language and cognition can be estimated properly as a significant contribution to the history of philosophy.

It is on the basis of the self-revealed and revealing nature of language that Bhartṛhari accepts cognition expressed by language as a veridical cognition. Language is expressive of cognition, which is always a veridical cognition, and that is why communication by language without any want of evidences and justification based on experience and verification, is accomplished.¹⁹ Not only that, it is the verity of cognition, revealed directly by language in the mind, that serves as the foundation or cognitive base for the empirical evidences and epistemological justifications. Otherwise, they would be unfounded. The knowledge revealed by the expression 'non-veridical' is also veridical, and that is why it is known thus.

Another distinctive feature of cognition, as elucidated by Bhartṛhari, is that it is always cognition of the object revealed by language in the mind, but it is not an object in cognition in itself. It has no 'other-ness' in its character. Cognition does not function as an object of cognition in a cognition. Cognition is illumination. It illuminates itself and the objects as well. As it is not an object, it is neither universal nor individual, but foundational in nature. By the term 'foundational' we do not mean only the awareness, but the self-awareness character of it as well.²⁰

Conclusively, we can say that Bhartṛhari makes a difference between language-token and the real-language. The former is only a tool that helps in the manifestation of the latter, and the latter is a foundational unit, ubiquitously given as an indivisible and meaning-revealing being. It reveals itself when manifested by tokens. In other words, before it reveals meaning, it reveals itself when manifested by tokens.²¹ He makes a distinction between objects revealed by language and things-in-themselves untouched by language. The objects revealed (*upacāra-sattā*) by language are only intelligible beings that figure as flashes of understanding, equally by negative and positive expressions. As language reveals itself first before it reveals meaning, it is also a being and the two are non-different. Taking the non-difference of being of language and that of meaning that he propounds cognitive-holism, for which, philosophical reflections and investigations are not only concerned with but are confined to the being revealed by language in the mind (*upacāra-sattā*).²² His sentence-holism considers language as expressive by nature and relation between language and meaning as the natural-fitness (*yogyatā-sambandha*) of the former because of which the latter is expressed. A word or a sentence is related with all its meanings (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*), but the relation of language with all meanings is restricted by convention to a popular meaning on the basis of which a fixed meaning is known by a fixed sentence/word. The non-difference of language and meaning, language and cognition, and cognition and self-awareness form the basis of Bhartṛhari's sentence/cognitive-holism for which the real language is a being of awareness (*sphoṭa*) that reveals the meaning, and the two are eternally related by the natural fitness of the former. On the basis of universal character of intelligible beings identical cognition by language in all its occurrences and instances is accomplished.

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 - ii. Being a grammarian, Bhartṛhari analyses concepts, as speculated by metaphysicians, on the basis of cognition revealed by language in usual communication and shows that their view of them also affirms the view of concept as used in communication and, hence, are not opposite to the one based on cognition.
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*NB: Names of Bhartṛhari, Puṇyarāja, Helārāja, Patañjali, Pāṇini, and their works have occurred frequently and therefore they are not shown separately in the index.

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